The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; 6261; Iran: Beheshti Dead

{Tease}

ROBERT MacNEIL [voice-over]: In Teheran workers clear the rubble from a huge bomb explosion which killed Iran`s second most powerful political figure and 7 I other religious leaders and politicians.

(Titles)

MacNEIL: Good evening- The religious forces ruling Iran appear decimated today by a mass assassination of leading personalities. A large bomb planted at a meeting attended by 90 members of the ruling Islamic Republican Party exploded last night killing man outright and crushing others when the roof collapsed on them. The best-known victim was Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti. the most powerful man in Iran after the aging Avatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Beheshti was Iran`s chief justice and head of the ruling party. Besides him. 71 other men died, including four cabinet members, six deputy ministers, and 20 members of Parliament. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, and there was nothing to link it with former President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr. who has been in hiding since his impeachment and removal from office last week. Senior clergymen blamed The Great Satan, the term usually meaning the United Slates. In Washington. Secretary of State Alexander Haig went out of his way to deny any U.S. role in the incident. Tonight, new turmoil shakes Iran`s troubled revolution. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, historians point out that most successful revolutions come in two parts: the revolution itself to seize power, then the light among the revolutionaries to exercise that power. In Iran, part two has been underway since virtually the day (he Shah left and the Ayatollah Khomeini came back. It has been a struggle over how pure the new Islamic Republic of Iran should be. On the one side, the purists pushing a return to centuries-old principles and practices. The were led by the clergy -- the mullahs -- and their most visible and articulate leader was the man who died yesterday. Ayatollah Beheshti. On the other side, those who wanted a more modem approach -- an Islamic republic guided by the clergy but run by civilian professionals and politicians. Bani-Sadr became the leader of that faction. For a while it seemed as though he might prevail. He was elected president of the country with 75 percent of the vote. But the mullahs came back to win control of the new Parliament. Slowly, on issue after issue, the mullahs overrode or ignored Bani-Sadr`s authority in cabinet appointments, in negotiating for the release of the American hostages, and so on. In recent weeks the struggle broke more into the open. Bani-Sadr was stripped of his job as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, then as president, after the Parliament decreed him incompetent. Bani-Sadr then dropped out of sight. Some 30 people were killed in street fighting between supporters of each faction. The mullah-led government began rounding up people known to support Bani-Sadr. In one week 40 people were put to death by firing squad. Amnesty International estimates that some 1.600 people have been executed since Khomeini came to power. Yesterday`s bombing clearly was seen as another form of revolutionary execution, al-though the names and persuasions of the executioners are not yet known. Robin?

MacNEIL: First we hear from an Iranian journalist who edited an English- language newspaper in Teheran, and reported there for Time magazine. He is Raji Samghabadi. who left Iran last November but has continued to follow events there closely. Mr. Samghabadi. in addition to blaming The Great Satan, some government officials are being quoted as blaming leftists for this attack. Do you have any feeling yourself who might be behind it`.

RAJI SAMGHABADI: I can understand why they blame the leftists, and it would be quite plausible at the moment, particularly because the left -- including the People`s Mojahe-deen. the biggest underground guerrilla organization in Iran, and the biggest component of the opposition, subversive opposition, to the clergy -- have kept quiet. This quietude in itself is significant. Otherwise, they would have said they haven`t done it. The Mojahedeen themselves a couple of weeks ago announced that from now on they would answer fire with fire. And in the first demonstration of their power, they engaged the storm troopers of the clergy during pro-Bani- Sadr demonstrations, killed 25. disarmed and wounded hundreds. And in retaliation the next day. the clerical establishment executed scores of people, and among them were 12 girls decidedly belonging to the organization of the People`s Mojahedeen.

MacNEIL: Twelve girls.

Mr. SAMGHABADI: Twelve girls aged between. I would say. 18 and perhaps 14. They died game; they were steadfast in their belief to the last second that the revolution had been betrayed. They would not repent of what they believed in. and what they had done, and they went to the firing squad in a very brave manner.

MacNEIL: Which suggests to you what?

Mr. SAMGHABADI: Which suggests that the People`s Mojahedeen is an organization capable of producing at this age -- very early age -- people willing to die and fight in this fashion for their beliefs.

MacNEIL: What is going to be the larger impact on Iranian politics of this bombing incident?

Mr. SAMGHABADI: The loss of Ayatollah Beheshti is going to be a very significant blow to the Islamic establishment because he was the most capable grand strategist, manipula-tor, power politician. and power broker of the clerical establishment, and I cannot think of any individual or combination of individuals that can replace him. There is simply nobody to do for the establishment what he used to do. and the more difficult point is that he might have created a machinery that only he can control. And from now on. for instance. I would assume it would be very difficult for anybody within the clerical establishment to be capable of controlling maverick mullahs like the hanging judge. Kafolli: like Kafouri. the gentleman you see helping clear the debri; who would on their own now try to seize the position of leadership once enjoyed by Beheshti. So it poses two distinct threats: reduced capacity to deal with subversive opposition, and reduced capacity to control their own ranks.

MacNEIL; So. to put it very simply, it weakens the Islamic Republican Party signifi-cantly.

Mr. SAMGHABADI: It certainly does

MacNEIL: You appeared on this program back in February, and you said then you saw a distinct possibility of open civil war between the moderate forces represented by Bani-Sadr. and the fundamentalists in the Islamic Republican Party. What now?

Mr. SAMGHABADI: Well, you report the first part of my statement. I think, accurately: the second part is a bit inaccurate. I did say that there is the distinct disturbing possibility of civil war. And in making the alignment seem more visible. I said that Bani-Sadr and the left are on one side, and the pro-Moscow communists and the clergymen are on the other. Bani-Sadr lost the power struggle. That was the first phase: lost the power struggle to the mullahs. Now he cannot escape playing second fiddle to the- People`s Mojahedeen. who are hiding him. and who have the political backbone and the training and the guerrilla organization to stage the second phase of the confrontation with the mullahs. As we have witnessed during this week, there was no longer am possibility of peaceful political opposition. We see executions on one side, explosions on the other, and I would certainly consider it now even more distinctly possible than a few months ago for us to see a real bloodbath in Iran.

MacNEIL: Just so that I`m clear, you say the Moscow-backed forces of the left. They are -- the People`s Mojahedeen you are saying are Moscow- backed.

Mr. SAMGHABADI: No. no. no. no. The People`s Mojahedeen are independent of Moscow. The independent left is with Bani-Sadr. The pro-Moscow communists are with the clergy

MacNEIL: I see Jim?

LEHRER: The view now of another Iranian who has been monitoring the politics of Iran. He is Ervand Abrahamian. a professor of history at the City University of New York, who is writing a book on Iranian politics. What is your best thought on who is responsible for this bombing, sir.

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN: My own feeling -- it`s a guess until someone takes responsi-bility. My own guess is that it`s not the Mojahedeen. and if s not the letiist Fedayeen. It is more likely to be one of two groups -- one. the first possibility, is remnants of the old regime who still have a network, who are well-financed --

LEHRER: You mean the Shah? By the old -- you mean the Shah`s regime?

Mr. ABRAHAMIAN: Yes. The army -- who have -- who have received support from Iraq and would have the technical ability to carry out such an act. A second possibility is an underground terrorist group called Forghan who took responsibility for a number of as-sassinations in 1979-80. Almost all their victims were clerical leaders. And this could be part of their own activities. The leadership of Forghan was executed, but some of their members may have survived to cam out this action.

LEHRER: What is their political orientation? They `re a leftist group affiliated with whom.

Mr. ABRAHAMIAN: No. they`re not leftist: they`re in fact very anti-left hut also anti-clerical. They consider themselves highly religious but anti- clerical. They feel that the clerical leadership that has taken control of the Republican Party is a group of opportunists who have betrayed the revolution.

LEHRER: You mention the army. What would the army have to train by committing this act?

Mr. ABRAHAMIAN: Well, one shouldn`t underestimate the feeling of revenge, just of personal bad feelings since so many army officers have been executed. Also, the strategy of trying to destabilize the regime as much as possible, and this definitely would seem to be doing that.

LEHRER: Destabilize, and then maybe a vacuum would be created and they could come back to power`.` Is that what you mean?

Mr. ABRAHAMIAN: Eventually, yes

LEHRER: I sec. What about Bani-Sadr`* Nobody seems to -- everybody is saying. "Well, maybe Bani-Sadr didn`t have anything to do with this." And yes he was the one who was having the problems with the mullahs. Why is he suddenly not the number-one suspect -- or his people`.`

Mr. ABRAHAMIAN: For two reasons: one. there has been really no actual blood spilled between Bani-Sadr and the Islamic Republican Party. Of course, there has been much political fighting and bad feeling, but of the people who were executed, none of the names I recognized as Bani-Sadr`s people. Secondly. Bani-Sadr`s people are not the type of people who would indulge in terrorism. They`re just not the type of people who would be interested in this type of political action.

LEHRER: Well just from a political standpoint, assuming that he and his people had nothing to do with the bombing, how does the bombing itself affect him and his fate in terms of politics in Iran? Is he helped or is he hurt?

Mr. ABRAHAMIAN: Oh. my own feeling is that it will weaken him because. I think, the whole bombing will strengthen the IRP. it will give the IRP what they have never had before, which is martyrs. It will increase their popular appeal because now they can appear as the real bulwark of the revolution, and carry on the banner of the struggle against the former regime. This is why they`re stressing so much it was the counterrevolutionaries. And also, carry on their old struggle of anti- imperialism. So they can use these slogans in order to rally people around them, and now that they do have the martyrs, they seem to be the victims of counter revolutionists. This is something they will use to the full. So on one hand they have lost the sort of manpower in leadership, but they have gained considerably in terms of political leverage.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin0

MacNEIL: We hear now from a man who`s been keeping a close watch on the political role of the clergy in Iran. He is Farhad Kazemi. professor of politics at New York University, and the author of the recent book. Poverty and Revolution in Iran. Mr. Kazemy. who do you think is responsible?

FARHAD KAZEMI: Well. I heard recently -- just about a few hours ago -- that a small organization in Turkey with the name of the National Equality Party has called up certain people, and has taken responsibility for this. And they are supposedly speaking on behalf of Turkish-speaking Iranians, and they`re calling for a federated Iranian state. To what extent this call is accurate -- that is. that this organization exists -- is a different matter, but there is some activity going on in Turkey among the Iranian exile community and there may be some kind of link to this behavior.

MacNEIL: That would be a very confusing development.

Mr. KAZEMI: Extremely confusing, yes.

MacNEIL: Apart from who did it. assuming that isn`t going to be known immediately, will this incident weaken the power of the clergy to rule Iran?

Mr. KAZEMI: I think in the short run I would agree with Professor Abrahamian that probably the resolve of the clergy will be increased to dominate the society even further, but there is no question in my mind that a very phenomenal blow has been leveled against the clergy. You have lost the most important ideologue of the party -- Beheshti. the man who was the force behind the cultural revolution, a man who was very astute, and who had the know-how about power, and also knew a great deal about how to organize. Aside from that. I don`t recall many times in history that a large group of the leadership of a ruling party has been wiped out in one blow. Now . it`s true that they have three, four people left, such as Khomeini. Rafsanjani. and others, but an essential cadre of the effective leadership is out.

MacNEIL: People like Prime Minister Rajai are not significant in this?

Mr. KAZEMI: Not at all. He is not. of course, a formal member of the party, but he is just a figurehead, and I think everybody is in agreement on that issue. On top of that you keep in mind that Mr. Chamran. Mostafa Chamran. former defense minister, and a man in charge of group activities, he also was killed in a recent battle with the Iraqis. So some of the most important key figures, whet have been imposing this system on Iran, are now out. So in a long-range view . I think the clergy`s hands have been substantially weakened by this episode. One other item is the issue of terror. Now they are getting some of their own terror back, directed at themselves, which is a factor I think.

MacNEIL: Where does this leave Bani-Sadr and the moderates, in your view?

Mr. KAZEMI: Well. I may be a minority of one. but I never thought very much of Bani-Sadr`s ability to do anything along these lines. He has not been able to use some of his popularity to make a mass organization: he is obviously a catalyst to these events --

MacNEIL: Getting himself elected was not evidence of his ability to create a mass organization?

Mr. KAZEMI: Well. I don`t think he was so much his own organization as it was the consent of Avatollah Khomeini, and the fact that the Islamic Republican Party candidate at the last moment was disqualified, and there wasn`t sufficient time to do really anything to replace him. But Bani-Sadr is important now as a catalyst. He is now a person of some reputation among certain segments, speaks for a certain "moderate" causes and forces, and he -- if he comes now openly -- whether Iran or abroad -- and denounces Khomeini and doesn`t do any dilly-dallying, just denounces Khomeini, then he may be a symbolic force in gathering some of the disparate elements together. But anything short of that I don`t see as being an important element.

MacNEIL: How do you see the next few months going? Do you see a prospect of open civil war?

Mr. KAZEMI: I am still somewhat dubious about the civil war on the full scale, but I think the handwriting is on the wall. Now there is going to be more and more bloodshed, as Mr. Samghabadi pointed out very accurately; the norm of the day is bloodbath, and they`re going to try to interact along those lines. So I see more of this getting out of hand, and perhaps then, some other Iranian communities -- the Kurds, the BaJuchis. the Turkish- speaking Iranians, others -- getting into the act. and getting out of hand. But I give it a few more months.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Finally, the special perspective of John Limbert. one of the 52 Americans held hostage at the U.S. embassy in Teheran. Mr. Limbert was a political officer at the time the embassy was seized. He is now a Middle East analyst at the State Department headquarters here in Washington. Mr. Limbert. was this act or something like it almost inevitable?

JOHN LIMBERT: I think it was. You saw -- at least the events of the last few months, or few weeks especially, were building up to it. I can`t speak that much of the events going back beyond January: I didn`t have much first-hand knowledge of those. But certainly what I`ve seen since I`ve been back would lead that way. The actions against Bani-Sadr to get him out personally, having already politically cut him off. politically destroyed him. they seemed to be -- his opponents in the Islamic Republican Party -- seemed to be determined to go all the way. to get rid of him and his supporters personally. And in doing so perhaps they overreached themselves, brought the opposition into the street, then -- as was pointed out -- the reaction came with these executions, and you saw an escalation -- the escalation of the violence which led to yesterday`s bombing.

LEHRER: Do you see any prospect that Bani-Sadr could now re-emerge and go after Khomeini directly and become the focal point for a counterrevolution: counter-counter-revolution?

Mr. LIMBERT: I have to agree very much with what Mr. Kazemi said. You know. when Bani-Sadr was president, w hen he was commander-in-chief of the armed forces -- with all of that -- with all that that implies -- he was not able to build a political organization. Now that he is neither president now commander-in-chief of the armed forces. I really don`t see him being able to do very much politically.

LEHRER: What do you see as happening next in this? Do you agree that there s more blood to be shed`. And then what happens after that, if you agree with that`.

Mr. LIMBERT: I do. In the short term -- I don`t know how short the short- term is. but in the short-term probably the IRP and its -- and its people -- the Islamic Republican Party and its people -- will be able to hold on. They have -- after all, they -- some of the leadership remains. They have the -- they still hold onto the revolutionary guards` organi-zation: they still hold onto the -- to the media -- the radio and television stations. these very important organs. But with the gap in leadership, the important thing. I think, to watch is what happens -- what happens in the streets: specifically, what happens in the streets of Teheran. The strong point of the Islamic Republican Party during the conflicts of the last few weeks has been their ability to control the streets of Teheran -- to get their mobs, their crowds -- the so-called Hezbollahi. the Party of God. these right-wing thugs -- to get them organized, out on the street carrying the banners, shouting the right slogans when and where they were supposed to be. With this event it may become much more difficult to organize these people in the same way. and they may find themselves in much more difficulty facing down rival groups such as the Mujahedeen. which Mr. Samghabadi pointed out at the beginning, is in fact the mass-based, organized group opposing them.

LEHRER: Do you see the other disparate groups in Iran -- the ethnic groups, the Kurds, and people like that -- doing something and reacting to all this and maybe coming together`.` I mean, the -- what I`m really saying is the anti-Khomeini types getting together in any kind of unified way?`

Mr. LIMBERT: Well, it`s a little -- I think it`s a little early to speak of -- to speak of anti -- this or that group being anti-Khomeini. Bani- Sadr. for example, has never called himself anti-Khomeini. He is -- the Ayatollah is certainly still the unifying factor in the country. But I will -- I`ll repeat what I just pointed out. I think the fate of the country now is not going to be decided among the tribes or in the outliving areas. It will probably be decided on the streets of Teheran.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Anyone want to comment on that? Would you agree with that. Mr. Samghabadi?

Mr. SAMGHABADI: I agree with the essential outline, yes. There are some external factors to consider, namely and mainly the Soviet Union, for instance, know the Muja-hedeen have a socialist Islamic ideology which is at certain points barely distinguishable from Marxism, but the fact that they are independent of Moscow does not sit well with the Kremlin, and the Kremlin can tolerate any regime in Iran -- be it Hitler, the Shah, anyone -- but not an independent leftist group. So you can be sure that, at the instructions of Moscow, the Iranian Tudeh party and the pro-Moscow communists will do everything they can to help shore up the clerical regime. This is a sinister, complicating factor that must be considered. Now. we have against this background the fact that there is not much the U.S. can do to affect the situation, with the exception of telling the Soviets to watch the line.

MacNEIL: Let`s leave the U.S. out of it just for the moment, and come hack in a few minutes. I`d just like to get the others to comment on how you see this shaping up. I mean, is there -- do you Professor Abrahamian. do you see the Soviet motives as Mr. Samgha-badi does"?

Mr. ABRAHAMIAN: No. I think he is giving the Soviets too much Machiavellian long-sightedness. The Soviet policy has probably been very much like American policy. They have gone from day to day and really not known too much what`s going on in Iran, and probably they didn`t know until the Mujahedeen -- until after the revolution -- what they were. I don`t think their motives have been directed in tear of the Mujahedeen at all. The Touch policy has been consistent since 19 --

MacNEIL: That`s the communist party?

Mr. ABRAHAMIAN: That`s the pro-Soviet communist party. It`s been consistent since 1963 in that they have supported Khomeini because Khomeini has been anti-imperialist, and they w ill continue to support him on those grounds. And so I don`t think their tactics is based on what the Mujahedeen do or do not do.

MacNEIL: Does the present situation create -- to oversimplify this. sort of. in American eyes -- does this create more of an opening for the Soviet Union to do mischief in Iran? One of the nightmares for Washington being the destabilization of any regime in Iran, and opportunities --

Mr. KAZEMI: I think so. Obviously, the situation is ripe for great-power involvement, whether American. Soviet, or whatever. And the fact that the Soviets have been very much supporting the Tudeh party in Iran, and Tudeh has been expanding its base, points to a possibility that if the time comes, there is a group that will be. that Moscow can speak to. and will very much understand Moscow `s language. So the chances for mischief -- to use your words -- are very much there.

MacNEIL: Is that how it`s seen in Washington. Mr. Limbert. that as the situation disin-tegrates -- ? let me ask it another way. Is it seen in Washington that the situation in Iran is beginning to disintegrate to the point that it becomes dangerous because of the opportuni-ties for Moscow to do mischief there?

Mr. LIMBERT: Well. I mean, any instability -- now. any instability in Iran is going -- this particular event is going to complicate -- is going to complicate an already very difficult internal situation. It`s really -- from my point of view in there, it`s very difficult to speak so soon of what`s going to happen. We haven`t seen the long-term events. But in the case of the Tudeh party. I would -- I would point out it`s always -- it`s been very interesting to me. You know they -- the Tudeh party -- the Iranian communists -- were in the forefront of the opposition to Bani- Sadr. And it is always an enigma to me why the Islamic -- why the Islamic Republican Party never went against a party which is openly acknowledged and commonly known to have foreign connections, when they went against other groups, and accused them of having foreign connections, and made stronger moves against them, having never made a move against the Tudeh.

MacNEIL: We have only a minute or so left. I`d like to hear from each of you what you think the United States should be doing in this present situation. What do you think? Very briefly.

Mr. SAMGHABADI: As I said, the U.S. cannot do anything directly to affect the situation in Iran. And in explanation of it I should point out that -- that the Soviet Union does not want another Afghanistan right now. When the situation is ripe. yes.

MacNEIL: Okay. What do you think the United States should be doing in Iran*

Mr. KAZEMI: I think U.S. should keep the options open. Thai is. to have extensive contacts with the various groups that are in Iran, whether in the opposition or those who are ruling the country. We cannot just sit back and allow the country to go to pot.

MacNEIL: Do you have a view on what the United States should be doing?

Mr. ABRAHAMIAN: No. I don`t have much to say on that. I just hope the United States doesn`t get involved in it.

MacNEIL: Yes. Mr. Limbert. do you have a view?

Mr. LIMBERT: I agree very much with what Mr. Abrahamian said. I have some personal experience with that. I think we have to recognize the limits of our own power, and the limits of just exactly what we can and should do in Iran.

MacNEIL: And we have to recognize the limits of our time. Mr. Limbert in Washington, thank you very much for joining us. Mr. Samghabadi. Mr. Kazemi. Mr. Abrahamian. thank you. Good night. Jim.

LEHRER: Good night. Robin.

MacNEIL: That`s all for tonight. We will he back tomorrow night. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.