The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour

Intro

JIM LEHRER: Good evening. Leading the news today, General Secord told the Iran-contra hearings about the Iranian arms deals. A second contra fundraiser was charged with fraud, and former CIA Director William Casey died. We'll have the details in our news summary in a moment. Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in New York tonight. Charlayne?

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: After the news summary, the News Hour continues its special Iran-contra probe coverage as Judy Woodruff looks at Day Two of the Secord testimony, followed by two views of it. Then a look at what William Casey's death may mean for the Iran-contra probe. News Summary

LEHRER: Dealing with Iran on arms and hostages was detailed today in the Iran-contra hearing. Retired Air Force Major General Richard Secord told the story. Secord said he was told by White House aide Oliver North that President Reagan knew about and approved of his Iran-contra activities. He said when the whole affair became public last November he tried twice to talk to President Reagan himself. He wasn't successful, but he said today what he would have said if he had been.

Maj. Gen. RICHARD SECORD, U.S. Air Force, Retired: I wanted to tell the President that I'd like to see him and bring some rationality back into this matter. We'd done nothing wrong, moreover, in trying to privately support the contras. The Iranian initiative was completely legal. Lawyers worked on that hard as they could. We made some progress in both areas. Some credit could be taken, it seemed to me. And so my advice would have been, let's stake out our position, don't cut and run. I didn't get a chance to make that kind of speech. I'll make it now.

LEHRER: General Secord will continue his testimony tomorrow. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: Former CIA Director William Casey died today, never having recovered from a brain seizure last December. The official cause of death was listed as pneumonia stemming from lymphoma, a form of cancer. The 74-year-old Casey established a distinguished career as a spymaster dating back to World War II. He was also one of the central figures in the Iran-contra affair. President Reagan today called Casey 'a good friend and a patriot."

LEHRER: A Washington public relations man was charged today with fraud in raising money for the Nicaraguan contras. Richard Miller later appeared in Federal District Court, where he pleaded guilty and agreed to assist the Independent Counsel's Iran-contra investigation. Miller was associated with Carl Channell, who is charged with and admitted to a similar charge last week. Miller is 34-years-old and is a former employee of the State Department. After today arraignment, Miller's attorney and a deputy independent counsel spoke to reporters.

DAVID ZORNOW, Deputy Independent Counsel: Mr. Miller acknowledged in court today that in the fall of 1985 he met with Lt. Col. Oliver North and discussed a solicitation for a piece of military hardware, and obtained a price for that piece of military hardware. Mr. Miller also acknowledged in court today that in November of 1985, he met with a potential contributor to the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and made a solicitation for contributions for that piece of military hardware.

EARL DUDLEY, Mr. Miller's Attorney: Mr. Miller deeply and sincerely regrets the mistakes which have tarnished his efforts and the efforts of others to provide support to the President's policy in Central America. He was and remains entirely committed to the view, that that policy is wise, direct, courageous and necessary.

HUNTER-GAULT: While Gary Hart campaigned in New Hampshire, another Hart stepped forward to defend him against accusations of weekend indiscretions with 29-year-old Miami model, Donna Rice. The candidate's wife, Lee Hart, speaking publicly for the first time since charges were published, held a news conference in Denver this morning before flying off to join her husband.

LEE HART, wife of Presidential candidate: I know Gary better than anyone else. And when Gary says nothing happened, nothing happened. The one thing I do know especially about my husband is that he does not lie. If I could have been planning his weekend schedule, I think I would have scheduled it differently. But I don't think one should misconstrue -- if I may say so -- something that might be a bad political judgment with the kind of character assassination that has been going on. And in all honesty, if it doesn't bother me, I don't think it ought to bother anyone else.

HUNTER-GAULT: Late this afternoon, Gary Hart delivered a campaign speech at Dartmouth College. Afterward, he met the press and once again was questioned about the weekend activities. Hart acknowledged he'd made a serious mistake, but that he had nothing to hide.

GARY HART, Democratic Presidential Candidate: You can ask me about adultery, you can ask me any question you want, and believe me, my wife and I have answered more personal questions than I think anybody in public life -- and will probably have to continue to, to my regret. But I am going to demand this system be fair. And I have a right to demand it. And if somebody's going to follow me around, they'd better follow me around, and they'd better print all the facts.

HUNTER-GAULT: The repercussions from Hart's widely-publicized connection to model Donna Rice narrowed, but apparently didn't change, his out front position in the field of Democratic Presidential contenders. An ABC News poll showed support fell from 46% in March to 36% Monday night, against Democrats. And against the leading Republican candidate George Bush, the polls showed a drop from 57% in January to 45%.

LEHRER: Attorney General Meese announced a major drug bust today. He said more than 40 U.S. and Columbian drug dealers were arrested after a three-year undercover operation. Drug Enforcement agents posed as money launderers to make the arrests, which were made in Los Angeles, Miami and New York.

And finally in the news, former TV evangelist Jim Bakker and Richard Dortch were dismissed today as ministers in the Assemblies of God Church. Leaders of the denomination said Bakker was dismissed because of his admitted extramarital encounter with a church secretary and other allegations. Dortch is accused of concealing Bakker's misconduct.

HUNTER-GAULT: That's our news summary. Still ahead on the News Hour, Day Two of the Iran-contra probe, and what Casey's death means for the investigation. Iran-contra Hearings

LEHRER: We continue our special coverage of the Iran-contra hearing with Day Two of Retired General Richard Secord's testimony. Today, the focus was on the dealings with Iran. Judy Woodruff gives us our report.

JUDY WOODRUFF: General Secord is the retired Air Force General turned businessman, who became the pivotal private facilitator for much of what the White House wanted done in Nicaragua and Iran. He played a role in finding arms and critical supplies for the contras fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. And he made arrangements to ship Israeli and U.S. arms to Iran. It was Iran that was today's focus, and Chief House Counsel John Nields, among other things in this morning's session, established that it was former NSC aide Oliver North's idea to use some of the profits from the sale of U.S. arms to Iran for the Nicaraguan contras. Nields at one point asked Secord about a million dollars he had been paid by the Israelis for weapons destined for Iran.

JOHN NIELDS, Chief House Counsel: You testified that you got in November million dollars, the purpose of which was transportation costs. That I take it would have covered the five shipments which were contemplated at that time -- and only one occurred. Does that mean that you spent substantially less than a full million dollars on transportation.

Gen. SECORD: Yes. We spent, I think, about $ 130,000 to the 707 operator, and another sum of money for a leased Lear jet. And so altogether less than $ 200,000 was expended in support of that project.

Mr. NIELDS: So more than $ 800,000 which had been put in by the Israelis remained in Lake Resources?

Mr. NIELDS: What happened to that money?

Gen. SECORD: Well, I assumed that they would ask for their money back, but they didn't. And I discussed this with North also, and later I believe in Late December, he told me that they were not going to ask for it back and we could use it for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually spent it on the contra project.

Mr. NIELDS: Did you and North discuss the fact that you would spend it on the contra project?

Gen. SECORD: Yes.

Mr. NIELDS: Did he indicate where the idea came from to use it for the contra project?

Gen. SECORD: I think it was his idea.

WOODRUFF: During the morning session, Secord provided inside into the cold businesslike approach of Minucher Ghorbanifar, the Iranian who provided the necessary link for deals between the U.S. and the Iranian government. Secord told how in a series of meetings in December of 1985, Ghorbanifar bluntly proposed trading arms for hostages.

Mr. NIELDS: What were Mr. Ghorbanifar's proposals?

Gen. SECORD: His proposals all were various sets of arms-for-hostage proposals. He came up with different formulas, so many phoenixes for so many boxes, as he called it, which was his code word for hostages. He had a boilerplate kind of salesmanship patter which he put out very, very glibly, which talked about the strategic setting, things that he knew Americans would like to hear. The Russian threat, the Iranians were being held hostage by the hostages, and by themselves, and so when they needed to move on -- But it was my impression that Ghorbanifar was more interested in business than he was in foreign policy.

WOODRUFF: According to Secord, arms-for-hostages was brought up again at a meeting a few days later. This time, Col. North and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane were there.

Gen. SECORD: McFarlane said that he was prepared to listen to what had happened, and to listen to any proposals that they might have. Ghorbanifar ran through again the whole litany of things that I have mentioned to you here today. He started out with his overview, his strategic setting. He, as I said, was very good. I've heard him make that address several times. He almost has it like a tape. And he -- very quickly, that meeting degenerated. It degenerated into propositions of U.S. arms for U.S. hostages in Lebanon. Ghorbanifar pursued that line with Mr. McFarlane for a long time -- far too long. I was glad when the meeting was over and McFarlane was very unhappy -- very, very unhappy with this session.

Mr. NIELDS: What did he say at the meeting?

Gen. SECORD: He said that he would report this information back to the President. He committed to nothing. He didn't say he would do anything or wouldn't do anything. He just left. The three of us came back that night together, and so I had opportunity to toss this around with Mr. McFarlane and with Col. North on the way home. And we conferred quite a bit.

Mr. NIELDS: What did you say, what did they say?

Gen. SECORD: Well, McFarlane said this was one of the most despicable characters he'd ever met. I found that kind of an interesting comment, because he was far from the most despicable character I've ever met. (laughter) He'd been --

Mr. NIELDS: Let's make sure we know who we're talking about, Mr. Secord?

Gen. SECORD: Mr. Ghorbanifar was the subject.

Mr. NIELDS: Was Mr. Ghorbanifar -- if not the most despicable character you've ever met, nonetheless despicable?

Gen. SECORD: The argumentation he was advancing was repulsive to all of us. There's no question about that. But Ghorbanifar's smooth, and he's a salesman, and he was on the wrong line, but he was making a hard pitch. And he had a lot of tenacity, and he just wouldn't stop. Ghorbanifar wanted -- as I've said twice before -- the game to continue. That was his objective. Now, he may have posed as an agent of Iran, but he was really his own agent. He was a businessman. He was interested in making money, and that was it. So I didn't argue with Mr. McFarlane on that point. I did, however, sense in my discussions with him that the Iranian initiative was dead.

WOODRUFF: Just after the first of the year, 1986, Gen. Secord learned the Iranian arms initiative was not dead after all. In a meeting with Admiral John Poindexter, who replaced McFarlane as National Security Advisor, Secord learned of a new initiative with Iran. He was asked to attend a February briefing with some CIA officials in the White House Situation Room.

Gen. SECORD: I thought the meeting was peculiar because I didn't really know why I was there, because they were discussing the finding. I had been told earlier by Admiral Poindexter there was going to be a finding. Of course, there would have to be if it was going to be a covert operation. And the finding -- the Presidential finding, the order initiating this covert action -- was the main subject at this meeting.

Mr. NIELDS: Why were you, a private citizen, invited to a meeting with apparently a number of lawyers who were putting together a Presidential finding?

Gen. SECORD: They had already put the finding together, and they were discussing it. I thought that they were discussing certain language and the later reports indicated that that finding may have already been typed and final at that point. I don't recall, because it was kind of an academic discussion as far as I was concerned.

Mr. NIELDS: Was it a signed finding you were talking about there? Or a draft of a finding?

Gen. SECORD: I don't think the finding was signed when I saw it. I only got a chance to read one paragraph of it, and I don't recall seeing the President's signature on it.

Mr. NIELDS: Were there legal issues that were discussed at that meeting?

Gen. SECORD: Yes. Whether or not to notify the Congress, and how it would be done, when it would be done. It was discussed that there was legal precedent for delaying notification. I was at the time not very familiar with the laws pertaining to this Central Intelligence Agency since I'd never dealt with those when I was in the Pentagon. So I was simply a listener at that point. Additionally, it was decided that the United States -- and this was a very important point -- the United States would have to directly ship the weapons rather than taking them from Israeli stock. And they decided they would have to do this because of the various statutes that applied to the sale of arms and it was decided by the lawyers that the Economy Act would have to be utilized, whereby one agency of the U.S. Government can purchase from another agency. And so the plan was for the CIA to buy the materials from the Defense Department stock, and then to sell them to my organization, which in turn would sell them to Ghorbanifar, who would in turn sell them to Iran. That was the plan, and that's the way the plan was executed for the first several transactions.

WOODRUFF: The new plan to sell arms to Iran worked on paper, but soon ran into trouble. According to Secord, Ghorbanifar was becoming difficult to deal with.

Gen. SECORD: I was in touch with Ghorbanifar on a couple of occasions in February by telephone. And we one one of these occasions -- I kind of burned my bridges with Mr. Ghorbanifar, because I was very angry with him. He had made a deposit to the credit of Swiss Bank, which bounced. And of course we couldn't move. We didn't have one cent of the U.S. government money in this operation, never. And we couldn't move without cash in advance, because the whole process was stalled without money. The CIA had to have money in advance. They would not float this with their money. The Defense Department had to have money in advance, and so on.

Mr. NIELDS: Just before you get off that, I talk it what you're saying is that until you had the money from the Iranians put in Lake Resources, and out of that money paid to the U.S. government the price that it was charging for the military hardware, the military hardware stayed in U.S. government stocks.

Gen. SECORD: Yes, and no moves were made, even preliminary moves could be made until the money was in the system.

Mr. NIELDS: Getting back to Ghorbanifar, I think you were about to tell us --

Gen. SECORD: So I was having a rather acid conversation with Mr. Ghorbanifar on the telephone, and I told him that I thought that he had behaved very poorly, that he was promising the moon always, but never producing, and that I was going to recommend that he be terminated. Now, he misinterpreted that, and he -- (much laughter) I don't mean that to be funny, but he took it the wrong way, and he told Mr. Nair that I was trying to have him killed. I think I ever said later, "It's not a bad idea, but it's not what I had in mind' From this time onward, I was complaining -- and so were my colleagues -- about the Ghorbanifar connection. It seemed to me to be too flawed with problems.

WOODRUFF: Secord and McFarlane proceeded to Teheran for another meeting on arms and what McFarlane thought would be a resolution of the hostage situation.

Gen. SECORD: As far as I know, and this will surprise some people, I guess -- as far as I know, there was no Iranian agreement to produce all the hostages at the time of the meeting in Teheran. And I know that this expectation arose somehow -- I don't know how exactly that expectation got into McFarlane's head -- you'll have to ask him, I don't know. But I know of no such agreement. I was surprised to learn that that was one of the negotiating points, one of the sticking points.

Mr. NIELDS: I take it you had been in frequent contact with Mr. North and Mr. Nair in the weeks and days preceding the trip.

Gen. SECORD: Yes. Now we had an expectation that we might be able to convince the Iranians to exercise their influence at the time of the meeting or shortly thereafter to gain the release of the hostages. But I knew of no plan for simultaneous release of the hostages.

Mr. NIELDS: What was the final outcome of this meeting?

Gen. SECORD: The Teheran meeting failed. It stuck on the issue of the failure of the Iranians to arrange for the release of the American hostages, and the McFarlane mission broke off after some discussions with high ranking members of the government. They did go through some discussions there. They did present points, they went down that road, but after a few days and the hostages were not released, they aborted the mission and returned.

Mr. NIELDS: Did they return to Tel Aviv?

Gen. SECORD: They returned to Tel Aviv, and immediately the bulk of the party traveled on to Washington.

Mr. NIELDS: Did you have any brief conversations with Mr. McFarlane and his party before they traveled on?

Gen. SECORD: Yes, I had a brief conversation with McFarlane himself. He was very disappointed, of course -- so were we all.

WOODRUFF: At another point, Nields zeroed in on who controlled the surplus money in the Swiss bank account -- money that was over and above the cost of transporting arms to the Iranians.

Mr. NIELDS: Mr. Secord, I think you've testified that the three transactions with Iran threw off a surplus of $ 14 million. My question to you, sir, is whose money was that?

Gen. SECORD: It was the enterprise's money, and it was there for continuing operations.

Mr. NIELDS: Who decided -- who was entitled to decide how it would be spent?

Gen. SECORD: These decisions were being made by me, and they were being relayed to Mr. Hakim, who implemented the decisions.

Mr. NIELDS: Are you asserting, Mr. Secord, that you were entitled to decide to use that money for any purpose that you wanted?

Gen. SECORD: Yes.

Mr. NIELDS: Now, some of the money was used to buy a boat. Is that correct.

Gen. SECORD: Correct.

Mr. NIELDS: That was done at Mr. North's request.

Gen. SECORD: Yes. For a U.S. requirement.

Mr. NIELDS: And that was for a governmental purpose?

Gen. SECORD: Yes.

Mr. NIELDS: Some money was spent to buy Motorola radios?

Gen. SECORD: Yes.

Mr. NIELDS: That was at Mr. North's direction?

Gen. SECORD: At his request.

Mr. NIELDS: And that was for a governmental purpose?

Gen. SECORD: I think it was for a -- it was in the form of a donation.

Mr. NIELDS: To a foreign government?

Gen. SECORD: Yes.

Mr. NIELDS: Was this something that Mr. North wanted to do to satisfy himself personally, or was there some official purpose to giving a donation to a foreign government?

Gen. SECORD: I think he'd had some request for assistance from the U.S. representative in this country.

Mr. NIELDS: Well, did you understand that he was acting in an official capacity, or some personal capacity, when he asked you to give money to this Caribbean country?

Gen. SECORD: I always understood him to be in an official capacity.

Mr. NIELDS: So you understood this to be a governmental request?

Gen. SECORD: That's a hard question. I didn't think if it in that way, but I suppose the answer is basically yes.

Mr. NIELDS: And Mr. North asked you to give him some cash that he could give to some DEA agents.

Gen. SECORD: Yes, we gave cash to him for that purpose, and also we gave it directly to the DEA agents.

Mr. NIELDS: And that was a governmental purpose?

Gen. SECORD: Yes.

Mr. NIELDS: And a lot of the money was spent on Iran expenses?

Gen. SECORD: Correct.

Mr. NIELDS: And that was a governmental purpose?

Gen. SECORD: Yes, sir.

Mr. NIELDS: And money was spent on the contras?

Gen. SECORD: Yes.

Mr. NIELDS: That was also at Mr. North's request?

Gen. SECORD: His suggestion.

Mr. NIELDS: Well, I think you indicated he did more than suggest -- he urged you continually, as I understand it.

Gen. SECORD: Yes, he did. He urged me to do it, but it was my decision, and as I testified earlier, we didn't always send as much money as he thought we should.

Mr. NIELDS: Now, you asserted a moment ago that in spite of the fact that you were using the money for governmental purposes, at Mr. North's request, that you were entitled to take all the money -- $ 14 million -- and spend it for any personal purpose that you wished.

Gen. SECORD: I didn't say personal purpose -- you asked if I could spend it for any purpose I wished. And my answer technically was yes.

Mr. NIELDS: Including personal purpose?

Gen. SECORD: We never contemplated such a thing. Never.

Mr. NIELDS: Were you entitled to use it for a personal purpose?

Gen. SECORD: In my opinion, yes.

Mr. NIELDS: So you could have gone off and bought an island in the Mediterranean with the $ 14 million.

Gen. SECORD: Yes, Mr. Nields, but I did not go to Bimimi (laughter).

WOODRUFF: Once the Iran arms sale initiative had been made public, Secord helped the administration graph a chronology of the events. He was then called back to proofread the final version.

Gen. SECORD: I read a few pages into it, and came to a part that had been changed significantly, and I questioned it.

Mr. NIELDS: What was the change, and what did it say?

Gen. SECORD: Well, the change had to do with whether or not the President approved or acquiesced in the sale of -- the transfer of -- the Israeli arms in 1985. And the version on Tuesday, which I had helped out on, laid out to the facts as I understood them --

Mr. NIELDS: Which were?

Gen. SECORD: Which were that the President had acquiesced in this -- in these transfers. But on the version which I read on Wednesday, this had been changed to indicate that the President had not approved. Which was not consistent with my understanding of the facts. However, I was informed by Col. North --

Mr. NIELDS: What did you say to him -- tell us exactly what you said to him, and exactly what was said to you?

Gen. SECORD: Well, I stopped when I came to the relevant portion of the text, and I said to Col. North, "There's something wrong here. This is (expletive deleted), and he -- I think he was expecting me to stop at that point, because he was ready for my question. And he said that Mr. McFarlane had drafted that section himself. He had done it the night before, after I had seen the earlier draft. And I said, "Well, it's not to my understanding of the facts." He said, well McFarlane had drafted it himself, meaning that McFarlane was the principal, he should know. And I said, fine, thank you very much. I'll get out of you guys' hair, see you later, and I left.

WOODRUFF: Wanting to escape the pressure of the news media, Secord had to go to a hotel. There he overheard Col. North receive two phone calls.

Gen. SECORD: One call was from the President. I didn't realize it was the President for a few seconds, until I saw him stand up at attention. He's a good Marine, you know. And he said, "Yes, Mr. President. Yes, Mr. President. Thank you very much, Mr. President." And then he said, "I'm just sorry it had to end this way. I was trying to serve you the best way I knew how, Mr. President." I said, "Let me have the phone." But it was too late. He hung up -- I wasn't fast enough.

Mr. NIELDS: What was it you wanted to tell the President?

Gen. SECORD: I wanted to tell the President I'd like to see him and try to bring some rationality back into this matter. There's no reason to back away from these operations. I mean, maybe there were mistakes in judgment taken in the policy -- maybe not. I happen to think it was a good policy and worth the try. But in any case, once you've made a decision like this, to back away from it is a terrible mistake in my judgment. They're defensible. The American people would understand the rationale that underlies such a policy. We've done nothing wrong, moreover, in trying to privately support the contras. We've not broken any law -- especially, we were assiduous in making sure we didn't violate any law pertaining to the contras.

Mr. NIELDS: Mr. Meese had emphasized in his press conference of that day the so-called diversion for use of Iranian arms sales proceeds for the contras. What was your understanding of the President's knowledge of that issue, and what was your basis for it?

Gen. SECORD: Well, I have no direct firsthand knowledge about what the President did or didn't know. As I think everyone knows, I never spoke with the President on this. I was told on a number of occasions, and I even recorded it once, and in December 1984 in a memo to myself, that the President was informed of my participation in the contra -- and later in the Iranian operations. I talked with the Director of the CIA who was a close confidante of the President, and I assumed that he was passing information. I talked with two different National Security Advisors during the two years in question here. I [unintelligible] all the projects I was working on with Oliver North, and I was told by Admiral Poindexter in January of '86 that not only was he pleased with the work that I'd been doing, but the President was as well. And on a few occasions, I heard Oliver North in an offhand -- and I think humorous -- vein remark that in some conversations with the President, he had mentioned that it was very ironic that some of the Ayatollah's money was being used to support the contras. Whether he was -- whether he actually said this to the President, or whether he was joking with me, I'm not sure. It was not said to me in a way that I took it as a joke.

WOODRUFF: After Nields finished, the Chief Republican Counsel for the Committee took over. It was noticeably friendlier questioning that at one point gave Secord an opportunity to justify the need for private aid for the contras. George Van Cleave is the Republican Counsel.

GEORGE VAN CLEVE, Chief Minority Counsel, House Select Committee: In your opening statement, you referred to the vital interest of the United States and containment of the Sandinista regime. Would you please describe for the committee the strategic significance of Central America, and in particular Nicaragua, as you understand it, as specifically as you can?

Gen. SECORD: Well, briefly, I can say a few things I think. I'm not an expert on Central American, but I know enough about warfare to know that the situation in Nicaragua represents a terrible threat to the United States. The whole -- the nations of the Caribbean basin are very fragile nations, and many of them are struggling for democracy right now, and they all need U.S. military and economic support. But the Russians -- as some members have pointed out -- have already got a beach head, if you well, in Nicaragua today. There is no question in my mind that if the Sandinista government is allowed to continue in power that they will be trying to export the revolution to their neighbors, and I'm not a great adherent of the domino theory, but if there were ever any dominoes stacked up in this world, they've got to be stacked up down south of us. The bottom line with me is it's very important to contain Nicaragua. If we can't contain them down there, I think we're in for more trouble than any of us here can predict. I don't believe -- I'll hasten to add -- that the contras can win a decisive military victory. I think that the best outcome they can look for is to force some sort of serious negotiations with the regime.

WOODRUFF: Secord wrapped up his testimony with a surprise disclosure -- about the other call he heard Col. North receive just after he been fired from the White House.

Mr. VAN CLEVE: You testified that he got another phone call. Who was the other call from?

Gen. SECORD: The first phone call -- I was afraid you were going to ask. I can't keep any secrets. The first phone call he received was not from the President, but was from the Vice President. And my understanding of that call was it was essentially the same kind of laudatory call -- but sad. A very short call.

WOODRUFF: The hearings broke off an hour earlier than expected this afternoon, so that the Chief Democratic Counsel for the Senate Committee, Arthur Liman, could conduct his questioning in one complete session tomorrow. Liman will play the role of cross examiner, questioning Secord aggressively about any contradictions or weak points in his testimony so far. Jim?

LEHRER: We look at the Secord testimony so far with two former foreign policy insiders. Charles William Maynes was Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter administration, and is now editor of Foreign Policy Magazine. Roger Fontaine was a staff member on President Reagan's National Security Council from 1981 to '83, specializing in Latin American policy. He is now a writer. Mr. Maynes, is Richard Secord a credible witness?

CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES, Foreign Policy Magazine: I think he has been. I think he has been clear. His account basically conforms with what has already appeared in the Tower Commission. He's provided new details, some important details, but I think that basically, the account conforms with the record that we have thus far, and he expressed himself well also.

LEHRER: Mr. Fontaine, do you agree?

ROGER FONTAINE, former National Security Council Staff: Yes, I do agree with that assessment. I think that he has been a credible witness, and it has pretty well tailored or dovetailed with the things that have been disclosed so far, and that we've known in newsrooms and just reading the newspapers.

LEHRER: Mr. Fontaine, on the question of the President's knowledge -- we just saw the tape of what Mr. Secord said. He assumed the President knew everything that he was doing, based on what Poindexter had told him, what North had told him and his conversations with Casey. How does that sell with you?

Mr. FONTAINE' Well, maybe, but it's a question of precisely what was said and what was said when, and how it was presented. That's at least not clear to me yet. I think that's going to have to wait until not only Richard Secord -- who never had direct access to the President -- we'll wait until we see the other people and listen to the other people -- Poindexter and Col. North in particular.

LEHRER: Did he convince you that he, Richard Secord, felt that the President knew what he was doing and approved?

Mr. FONTAINE: I don't know. I'd have to -- tomorrow's testimony is going to be very important. The cross examination is going to be very important, because a lot of things were left unsaid.

LEHRER: How do you feel about that, Mr. Maynes?

Mr. MAYNES: I think -- he did convince me that he thought that he had the President's approval. I think that someone like Secord who spent years i n the U.S. Government would not undertake something like this unless he felt that he had approval at the highest level.

LEHRER: You said a moment ago that there were some important new details that Richard Secord brought out in his testimony thus far. What are they?

Mr. MAYNES: Well, I think one key detail is the fact that there seems to be a disagreement between Secord and McFarlane about what the Iranians had agreed to prior to McFarlane's trip to Teheran. According to Secord, the Iranians never agreed to release all of the U.S. hostages once McFarlane arrived on the ground in Teheran. McFarlane obviously thought the Iranians had agreed to that. That was one of the reasons that the meeting broke down and that the whole trip was a fiasco. So that's one important detail. I think that some of the details that we received about the alteration of the chronology are also new details. The fact that the Vice President telephoned him is another detail. And I think what he has done is provide us with more information on the role that the Iranians and the Israelis played in this whole affair. I think what's clear is the Israelis and the Iranians knew what they wanted. And they went out after it very deliberately. It isn't clear that we knew what we wanted. Sometimes we wanted the hostages, sometimes we wanted simply a relationship with the Iranians. And we were twisted around because of that, and ended up on the short end of the bargain every single time.

LEHRER: Mr. Fontaine, do you have a list of important new details that Richard Secord added -- adds -- to the mix?

Mr. FONTAINE: Well, two things. One, I agree with Bill. The misperception, or the -- just dropping of the ball in regard to what Bud McFarlane thought was going to happen in Teheran and what apparently Richard Secord knew to be the case -- it's very difficult to understand why that wasn't coordinated between two and three people. That's number one. That's bad staff work. And the second thing is this really interesting and somewhat strange meeting in the Situation Room where a private citizen is in the Sit Room, looking at apparently an unsigned Presidential Finding. I've never heard of that before. And I never saw it before. When you're in government, you're in government. My experience is when you're out, you're really out. And what that purpose served, I don't know. But it's a little disturbing and it's a little strange.

LEHRER: Would you also add, though, to Richard Secord's feeling that he was on the government's team?

Mr. FONTAINE: Oh, I would think so. But then he's also an experienced operator himself. He's been in government a long time. Yes, I think it would add to that perception, that's right.

LEHRER: Mr. Fontaine, what about the speech that Mr. Secord didn't get to make to the President, but he did make today to the hearing, that "Hang tough, Mr. President, these are defensible policies." If he'd gotten through to the President and the President had said, "Okay, I'll follow that line," how successful do you think he might have been?

Mr. FONTAINE: Well, there's a second part to that speech he wanted to give the President. And that is, it's a defensible policy, but it's not being carried out very well. And I think that probably would have been a very good speech to make to a President. The President is surprisingly -- because he is overwhelmed with the amount of information he gets -- and in decisionmaking, has to get -- he often doesn't know how badly things are going. And that can get a President and his administration in very serious trouble. And I think this was one of those cases.

LEHRER: Yes, Bill Maynes, what do you think would have happened if Mr. Reagan had followed the advice of Secord that he didn't get?

Mr. MAYNES: Well, there's one key issue here. Secord believes that he was respecting the Boland Amendment, and that North was. Indeed, he said at one point in his --

LEHRER: The Boland Amendment --

Mr. MAYNES: Which prohibits -- well here it is, I've got it right here -- prohibits the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any agency or entity of the U.S. Government involved in intelligence activities from receiving money for the purpose of supporting directly or indirectly -- I think those are key words -- the military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. Now, according to Secord, he believed that North was trying to implement the Boland Amendment. I think very few people would believe that. Unless you believe that, I think the administration does feel that it's on very thin ice with some of the activities -- perhaps Secord himself wasn't violating the Boland Amendment. After all, he's a private citizen. The issue is whether agents of the U.S. government were violating it. And I think that it is a real issue here.

LEHRER: Mr. Fontaine, Mr. Secord also clearly believes that he was left high and dry and abandoned. And I think it's fair to say that his testimony, at least after a day and a half, is that he feels like he is a victim in all of this. Is he justified in felling that way?

Mr. FONTAINE: Well, in a certain sense he is. And I think there's some other people involved in this who may feel the same way with the same sort of justification. But on the other hand, the administration found itself in trouble very early -- back in November. What the Attorney General did then was really extraordinary -- attempt to get something out very quickly. And that unleashed the whole process that we now have. Suddenly you're in the White House and serving the President, and the next day you're out. I think he's not the only one who feels that way.

LEHRER: Yes, but what about him? Do you think he's justified in feeling the way he does?

Mr. FONTAINE: I think he is. I think he's justified in felling that way.

LEHRER: What do you think, Mr. Maynes?

Mr. MAYNES: I think -- I can understand why he feels that way. Whether he's justified is another question. I think the whole operation was misconceived. I think that if Mr. Secord had a few months to stand back and look at it, I think he might realize that too and not be so surprised. But given his direct involvement in it, given his belief that the President himself was authorizing everything -- and then suddenly to have the rug yanked out, I'm sure he does feel betrayed.

LEHRER: Okay. Gentlemen, thank you. Charlayne? Forever Secret

HUNTER-GAULT: Today's hearing began with an announcement by Chairman Inouye about the death of former CIA Director William Casey. As Inouye and other member of the committee later observed, Casey's name has been, and will continue to be, a constant presence in the hearings.

Sen. DANIEL INOUYE, (D) Hawaii: In the coming weeks, as our inquiry unfolds, Mr. Casey's name will be heard frequently in regard to the Iran-contra affair. Whatever may be the final judgment of his role in this event, it should not obscure Mr. Casey's distinguished record to commitment to his country. From the office of Strategic Services to the Securities Exchange Commission, to the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Casey served his nation with dedication, purpose and energy.

Sen. ORIN HATCH, (R) Utah: I'm concerned his memory could be tarnished. On the other hand, I don't see how you can tarnish the memory of somebody who has served this country well. [unintelligible] A lot of people didn't like his strategic vision. But I think the vast majority -- if you look at it through history, history is going to be very, very kind to Bill Casey in my opinion. But it would be better if Bill were here to testifying. I think you'd get the straight scoop from him, and I think this country would be better off if he were still alive.

Sen. PATRICK LEAHY, (D) Vermont: I think that there is no question that someone in the CIA was helping Oliver North, bothin the Iran arms sales and in Central America. Bill Casey knew exactly what they were doing, he knew every single step they took and how much he was involved in actually setting policy with Oliver North, we may never actually know. There are some things he will take with him to the grave. And knowing Bill Casey, I suspect he'd prefer it that way.

HUNTER-GAULT: We go back to our analysts Roger Fontaine and William Maynes for a look at Casey as a key figure in the Iran-contra probe, and how his death will affect the investigation. First to you, Mr. Fontaine. To Sen. Leahy's point -- clearly speculative -- but what kind of secrets do you think William Casey takes to his grave?

Mr. FONTAINE: Well, I think there'll be some, but not many. There are too many people who know too much. They will be appearing in testimony. They've already been grilled by staff members. I think very little is going to be left unknown.

HUNTER-GAULT: What do you think about that, Bill Maynes?

Mr. MAYNES: I think the effect is going to be that while the investigation may demonstrate some facts, you won't be able to prove some of them, because Mr. Casey is not there to testify.

HUNTER-GAULT: And so what will that mean in terms of the investigation?

Mr. MAYNES: I think we get to the key question of what the President knew, and what the Vice President knew. And I think Mr. Casey would be obviously a key person in determining that.

HUNTER-GAULT: Can you determine it without him?

Mr. MAYNES: Well, one of the interesting aspects of this whole crisis is that there is such a small paper trail. Many of the briefings were done orally. It's almost by oral tradition that one learns that the President or the Vice President was involved in some of the key decisions. Of course, that's one of the reasons that it failed so badly, because nobody ever knew exactly what was decided, or what they were supposed to do, or what had been approved in previous meetings. But the fact is that it makes it very difficult for investigators except through sworn testimony before the Senate and the House committees.

HUNTER-GAULT: What's your view then?

Mr. FONTAINE: Well, I think that's in large part right. And there is not a big paper trail. But that's true in a lot of government in the past. That does cause problems -- especially foul-ups. Without a paper trail, people forget what they've decided upon. It's happened a lot in the Johnson administration, happened in this administration.

HUNTER-GAULT: What about the point about President Reagan? Do you need Casey's testimony to determine whether he did or didn't know -- or what he did or didn't know.

Mr. FONTAINE: It would help, but there are other key players very much alive, and they are going to be talking and have been talking to the committees.

HUNTER-GAULT: This absence of a paper trail -- one of the things they said about Casey was he had this incredible capacity for detail, and this incredible memory. How much of this absence of a paper trail might be attributed to Casey and his ability to --

Mr. FONTAINE: I don't know if that's peculiarly true with -- and especially true with a man like Bill Casey. I think it tends to be true in government in general -- particularly in sensitive sorts of operations. You don't want to leave a lot of paper around if you don't have to. Don't put it down unless you have to. And it's just a general rule that other people follow besides Bill Casey.

HUNTER-GAULT: Leahy was saying, Bill Maynes, that Casey would have loved this whole idea of taking secrets to his grave. Is that your reading of it?

Mr. MAYNES: I think obviously the high point of his life was his involvement with the CIA, with the OSS in World War II. I personally am of the view that he made his major contribution in World War II, and that the contribution he made now is not going to be seen as positive. I think the short run --

HUNTER-GAULT: You mean -- excuse me, the contribution vis a vis the probe?

Mr. MAYNES: The CIA -- his period as head of the CIA, I don't think is going to be seen as positive. There were some short run gains, he increased the budget, he raised morale. But I think that his tenure there is going to deal the agency a body blow -- that it really is not prepared to accept.

HUNTER-GAULT: Why? Because of the whole Iran-contra thing? Or other things?

Mr. MAYNES: Because of the Iran-contra scandal, and the fact that it seems clear that an effort was made by Mr. Casey not to keep the Congress fully informed after all the problems that we had in the 1970s, and the involvement of key CIA people in the contra affair, when the Boland Amendment makes it quite clear that they should not have been involved.

HUNTER-GAULT: But of course, Henry Hyatt has said that one of the reasons Casey was so secretive was that he didn't trust Congress to keep secrets that were necessary to be kept.

Mr. MAYNES: But Charlayne, we have the Boland Amendment which says directly or indirectly, and we have Mr. Secord's testimony about key CIA officials in Central America who are helping, we have his testimony that he met three times with the Director on these subjects. It's not a record that I think is going to help in building Congressional support for the kind of relationship between the agency and the Congress that we need to have.

HUNTER-GAULT: Is that how you see Bill Casey's legacy in the agency?

Mr. FONTAINE: I think Bill's going to come off better than that. I think Bill Casey's going to come off as one of the stronger DCIs that we've had, and one of the better ones. I think --

HUNTER-GAULT: Director of the Central Intelligence --

Mr. FONTAINE: I think increasing the budget, increasing the morale, which was at a very low level in 1970, is no small accomplishment. I think his energetic support of politics, particularly in Central America -- never mind Iran -- Nicaragua -- for a moment, but all that for -- increasing intelligence-collecting capabilities, which were -- and I can tell you from first hand experience -- were very limited and limited in 1981, early 1981 --

HUNTER-GAULT: That had to do with relying more on electronics than human activity?

Mr. FONTAINE: That's right, and there was a rebuilding of the human intelligence in the area that I was responsible for, and I could see the difference by 1982 and 1983. That is not a small accomplishment. On the other hand, what Bill is saying about his relationship with the Congress, unfortunately, is also true. I think this is probably the biggest drawback, or the biggest negative on Bill Casey's career.

HUNTER-GAULT: What do you think the Iran-contra thing is going to do to his legacy and his memory?

Mr. FONTAINE: Well, I think it won't help. But I don't think it will damage it to a huge extent. I think it's going to hurt, but it's not going to be fatal in terms of his reputation. And particularly in the case of his relationship with the Congress. That was something less than maximum performance.

HUNTER-GAULT: You know, he had only one brief appearance before he fell ill, and that was last December. And the image that emerged was either of a man who knew more than he acknowledged that he knew, or one who didn't know and delegated a lot. Is that kind of vintage Casey, to have the picture confused like that?

Mr. FONTAINE: I think it was vintage Casey in the sense that he really didn't trust members of the Congress in terms of intelligence and sharing of information.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right. Well, thank you very much, both of you. Mr. Frontaine, and Bill Maynes. Atlanta Hawks

LEHRER: The Iran-contra hearings aren't the only thing on people's mind this week. The National Basketball Association's play-offs are in full swing. And one of the teams vying for the championship is the Atlanta Hawks. Vern Smith, Newsweek's Atlanta Bureau Chief, has these thoughts about that team.

VERN SMITH: Call them Exhibit A in sport and pure entertainment. Whirling dervish basketball with a touch of P. T. Barnum. [voice over] The National Basketball Association's Atlanta Hawks are a welcome throwback to an age when pro sport is in danger of losing its special allure, as some of its most talented players fell victim to drugs and alcohol abuse. David Thompson, Sugar Ray Richardson, Walter Davis, and ex-Hawk star John Drew, the epitome of a player who enjoyed the game for its sheer pleasure, and a country boy rookie. Drew has been banned for life from the NBA for repeated violation of its drug policy. For a time, it seemed as if the fun had gone out of the league the way it had drained from Drew's [unintelligible].

The Hawks are proving that it doesn't have to be that way. Coach Mike Fratiello has blended players with speed and power into a harmonious unit, filled with a zest for the game. The Hawks have a budding star in 7 footer Kevin Willis. And a genuine superstar in All-NBA forward Dominique Wilkins. His nickname is the human highlight [unintelligible]. No wonder.

Watching Wilkins battle Michael Jordan of the Chicago Bulls recently and an explosive display of individual skills, was to witness a kind of American art form. Basketball is a quintessentially American sport. The NBA has fueled the dreams of a new generation of young players. Today it is to soar like Larry Byrd, and run the floor like Magic Johnson. Or to jam like Anthony Spudweb, the NBA's smallest player, and the Hawks' real live giant killer. He is both an embodiment of the team's superior fast breaks and a key reason for its widespread appeal. Plus Spudweb represents every man. Every guy who was ever told he couldn't measure up, the little engine who could slam dunk. With more than 50 wins and the Central Division assured, the Hawks are the team to watch in the play-offs. They have managed to catch on in a city that's always had a softer spot for baseball. Now a ticket to a Hawks game is often the hottest seat in town. With 14 sellouts, attendance is up 40% at the Omni, the team's home arena. The Hawks resurgence and the arrival of the amazing Michael Jordan couldn't have come at a better time for the NBA. They are refreshing reminders that while the harsher elements of life may sometimes intrude, pro basketball is, after all, a child's game played by men, and best enjoyed by the spectator when the level of enthusiasm on the floor conjures up the childlike quality to the awed and amused. That is the magic of the Hawks this season.

LEHRER: Again, the major stories of this Wednesday. Retired Air Force General Richard Secord detailed the swapping of arms for hostages with Iran, and as we heard, he also told the Iran-contra hearings that he was told by John Poindexter and Oliver North that President Reagan knew and approved his activities. A Washington public relations man, Richard Miller, became the second person to be charged with a crime in the Iran-contra affair. He pleaded guilty to one count of fraud in raising money for the contras in Nicaragua. And William Casey, the former head of the CIA died. Good night, Charlayne.

HUNTER-GAULT: Good night, Jim. That's our News Hour for tonight. We'll be back tomorrow night. I'm Charlayne Hunter-Gault. Good night.