The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Mexican Initiative

JIM LEHRER: Good evening. It's been four days now since the Central America story took its hopeful Mexican turn -- the weekend agreement by the United States to go along with Mexico's offer to help negotiate peace, peace between the warring factions in El Salvador, as well as between the United States and Nicaragua and Cuba. Clarifications and reactions since have diminished the hope somewhat -- Secretary of State Alexander Haig saying Monday Mexico's role will be only to facilitate contacts, not to negotiate on behalf of the U.S.; President Jose Napoleon Duarte, head of the U.S.-backed government in El Salvador, yesterday doubting Mexico's ability to influence anything. But a Reuter report from Mexico City today said Mexican officials remained optimistic. Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda is still planning to meet officials of Cuba and Nicaragua in the next few days. It was his meetings with Secretary Haig the last two weekends in New York that produced the U.S. okay to proceed. Events are not standing still in El Salvador, Nicaragua and elsewhere while the Mexicans work away at their diplomacy, and there's a chance those events could remove all hope of its success. But with its problems, many are saying the Mexican way may be the only way -- the only way to avoid escalation of the war of bullets and words in and over Central America. It's the prospects for the Mexican way we explore tonight. Robert MacNeil is off; Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in New York.Charlayne?

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Jim, in the four days since the Mexican initiative took on its new life, more turmoil and violence have plagued the Central American scene. On Monday Nicaragua's revolutionary government declared a 30-day state of national emergency, and went on to suspend constitutional rights and guarantees throughout the country. Nicaraguan officials said the move was made after two important bridges were blown up Sunday night, an act which they charge was ordered by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Today, the regime suspended for one day a pro-government newspaper for printing what it called a false account of its new emergency powers. Meanwhile, fighting continued in El Salvador, including one incident where 1,000 students were trapped in crossfire between leftist guerrillas and army troops in two San Salvador suburbs. Jim?

LEHRER: On many occasions in the past we have turned to Don Oberdorfer, diplomatic correspondent of The Washington Post, to help us sort through the official U.S. view on foreign affairs stories. We do so again tonight on this one. Don, are U.S. officials optimistic about Mexico's ability to pull something off on this?

DON OBERDORFER: I don't believe so. I don't think they're really optimistic. I think, now, talking about the Secretary of State, and the dominant trend of U.S. policy -- you know, in an administration like this you have different people with different views. But I think the Secretary doesn't want to offend the Mexicans. I think, as he said on Sunday or Monday in New York, he thinks that the Mexicans could be a facilitator. But in the end, Secretary Haig believes that it's the United States that's going to have to do the negotiating if there's any hard negotiating with Cuba, Nicaragua -- especially -- that is going to produce anything.

LEHRER: But does he believe that Mexico could play a constructive role in facilitating something that would lead to those hard negotiations, or is it just kind of window dressing -- "Yes, we'll give you a chance," or "Go ahead and try, but we don't think it'll work"?

Mr. OBERDORFER: Well, I don't think he would say that to the Mexican foreign minister. He has said, in effect, "Go ahead and try. Go ahead. We have some ideas, and you are authorized to convey those ideas to Nicaragua," especially. He's outlined what those ideas are. They're not greatly different, though they're much more explicit than ideas that were offered to the Nicaraguans late last summer and early fall by Assistant Secretary Thomas Enders. I think the U.S. feels, first, that Mexico is a very important country. You remember the Reagan administration came in with a special effort to be friendly to Mexico and Canada -- our two neighbors. And it would like to have Mexico feeling good about the United States. There has been talk between Reagan and Lopez Portillo, constantly, on telephone and so on. Secondly, perhaps there is some way that Mexico could smoothe the way. But I don't think that the State Department or Secretary Haig has any great expectation that Mexico is going to produce an agreement or something.

LEHRER: Is there a structural procedure set up on this that Castaneda will now go talk to the Nicaraguans and the Cubans, and then he will come back and deliver a message to Haig and then he will meet with them? I mean, is there anything like that in the works?

Mr. OBERDORFER: Well, he is planning to, as I understand it, to see the Cubans and Nicaraguans, and I have an idea he may actually have already started doing so in New York. And then he's going to come back to the Secretary with some of their reactions. But when it gets to the stage of real talking between -- with the Cubans and Nicaraguans, Haig made very, very clear in New York this is to be a bilateral conversation between the United States of America on one end, and Cuba or Nicaragua -- as the case may be -- on the other end.

LEHRER: Have you picked up the fear within the State Department that the United States is afraid that it might get trapped in this deal? That Mexico might come out with some deal and get it out publicly, and it's a deal that the United States doesn't want to go along with but might be embarrassed if it turned it down?

Mr. OBERDORFER: Well, as a State Department official said to me today, Secretary Haig doesn't like to have his hand forced. That's not talking specifically to this eventuality you mentioned, but I think it's very interesting that on Sunday, after Haig on his part and then the Mexican foreign minister on his part had press conferences, the Mexican foreign minister sounded very optimistic about the Mexican plan. Then the State Department sent out a cable to its embassies in Central America saying, "There's no breakthrough here. There's nothing that is in the way of real movement," and especially making the point that no negotiations in El Salvador are contemplated, certainly between now and the November 28th election, which is --

LEHRER: March 28th.

Mr. OBERDORFER: Oh, I'm sorry -- March 28th. The November elections we had -- and the March 28th elections.

LEHRER: Don, finally, let me ask you this.This offer from Mexico to be a facilitator, a mediator, has been on the table now since November, and the United States said no thanks up 'til now. What caused them to change their mind?

Mr. OBERDORFER: Well, you may say it's been there since November, but Lopez Portillo reiterated it rather recently in Managua and then the Mexicans asked for a meeting, and they asked to see Haig to present more details of their proposal. And he agreed. He went to New York weekend before last and met the Mexican foreign minister. And so it's at the Mexican initiative that this -- that they're translating what is some language by Lopez Portillo in the speech or speeches into some kind of a diplomatic process.

LEHRER: So it wasn't Haig picking up the phone and calling Castaneda and saying, "Okay. Hey, we'll take you up on it." It was the other way around.

Mr. OBERDORFER: Well, Castaneda -- the Mexicans were the people who really wanted it; Haig went along with it.

LEHRER: I see. Thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: Now to someone who can give us some perspective on the Mexican side. She is Susan Purcell, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations specializing in Latin America and the Caribbean. Dr. Purcell was a member of the policy planning staff of the State Department from January, 1980, through June, 1981. Dr. Purcell, why do you think the Mexicans have gotten so far out front, or gotten out front in this way?

SUSAN PURCELL: Well, I think there are two basic explanations. One has to do with a consideration of the possible impact of events in Central America on Mexico. There is a somewhat popular theory known as the domino theory, which says that Mexico is the last and the most prized domino, particularly the Mexican oil fields. The Mexicans don't subscribe to that theory, and neither do I, but I would say -- and the Mexicans, I think, believe -- that there is undoubtedly some effect on Mexico's internal political situation from the events in Central America. At the very least there will be a refugee problem, which has already begun. But in a more general sense, events in Central America will tend to polarize or divide the Mexican political system much more along more pronounced left-right lines, and make governing Mexico a little more difficult. This is what happened during the Cuban revolution.

HUNTER-GAULT: So that's what Secretary Haig meant when he said in an interview the other day that the Central American crsis could become a fundamental threat to Mexico in the very predictable future.

Dr. PURCELL: Well, I don't think fundamental. I'm afraid that what Secretary Haig has in mind is basically the collapse of the Mexican political system, which I don't think is imminent by a long shot. But, yes, there will be some domestic political fallout from the events in Central America.

HUNTER-GAULT: For what other reasons would Mexico offer itself as a mediator?

Dr. PURCELL: Well, I think one reason has to be that they're somewhat concerned with the role that the United States has played. I mean, this news about supporting paramilitary forces or giving economic support to the moderates in Nicaragua, etc., while they may not be true, if they are true -- and even if they're not true, they're going to have some effect on events; the Mexicans are afraid that this is not the way to proceed, and that the United States is only sort of fueling the fire. And the Mexicans feel that as a Latin American country, and as a Central American country in a sense -- I mean a regional power -- they have more understanding and more sensitivity toward what's happening there, and that their own political history is much more relevant to Central America's past, and probably its future, than that of the United States.

HUNTER-GAULT: El Salvadoran President Duarte said in an interview published in The Washington Post today that Mexico has no influence, that they're really playing at this. How credible do you feel Mexico is in the Central American context?

Dr. PURCELL: Well, I think Mexico could conceivably have some influence on the situation. Mexico is really one of the only powers in the region that has good relations with both Cuba and Nicaragua, and that even though Mexico itself clearly is not a Marxist regime, that is precisely the attraction of Mexico to Cuba and Nicaragua -- the fact that good relations with a country like Mexico, acceptance by a country like Mexico, makes the Cuban and the Nicaraguan revolutions seem more authentic, more Latin American and more autonomous -- that they are not just actual or potential Soviet clients, as the United States officials sometimes make it seem.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right. We'll come back. Jim?

LEHRER: Finally, what is Nicaragua's and Cuba's stake in the Mexican initiative? For that perspective, Professor William Leogrande of American University, a long-time observer of those two countries with good government-level contacts in both. What is the extent of the influence Mexico has over Nicaragua?

WILLIAM LEOGRANDE: The Mexicans have a considerable degree of influence over the Nicarguans. They supported the Sandinistas during the insurrection against Somoza, and have since the triumph of the Sandinista revolution provided more economic assistance to Nicaragua than any other country in the world. Right now they are, along with Venezuela, providing an oil facility to the Nicaraguans, which makes it possible for Nicaragua to obtain energy at reduced costs. They're the best friend the Nicaraguans have in Latin America at this point.

LEHRER: But how could that friendship be translated, just in terms of clout? In other words, is Mexico in a position to say, "Look, Sandinistas, this is it, friends. You got to stop this; you got to do this"? Can they exercise that clout, and will Nicaragua go along with it?

Prof. LEOGRANDE: I think they can. I think they have the economic leverage to do that although the Sandinistas have not been resistant to the Mexican proposal.

LEHRER: What's in this for Nicaragua? Why would Nicaragua want to go through with the kind of peace initiative that Mexico is working on?

Prof. LEOGRANDE: I think there are really two principal things at stake for the Sandinistas. One is that they're tremendously afraid of their position in Central America right now -- afraid that the conflict in Salvador is going to become regionalized, draw them into it, and that they will be attacked by the United States, or by other forces that operate with the support of the United States -- be it exiles in Honduras or the Argentines, or whatever. The recent reports of U.S. covert-action projects aimed at Nicaragua have exacerbated that fear. So for them a peaceful solution in Salvador, and using the Mexicans as an intermediary with the United States, gives them the opportunity to reduce their own perceived national-security threat. Additionally, their domestic situation economically is very bad right now -- largely because of the world market situation -- but in any event, having to divert substantial resources into national defense rather -- and away from economic reconstruction is causing them some domestic political problems. So they, I think, stand to gain both internally and externally by going along with the Mexican proposal.

LEHRER: Let's turn to Cuba. What kind of clout does Mexico have with Castro?

Prof. LEOGRANDE: Once again, Mexico has been the one country in Latin America which has always been reasonably friendly with Cuba.In 1964, when the Organization of American States expelled the Cubans and instituted an economic and diplomatic boycott of the island, the Mexicans were the one country in the hemisphere that wouldn't go along with it. Just recently, President Lopez Portillo of Mexico called Fidel Castro's Cuba the country in Latin America most dear to Mexico. So I think, as Dr. Purcell said, the friendship between Mexico and Cuba is a very important one for the Cubans right now.

LEHRER: Do you agree with her analysis that one of the reasons that Mexico is so attractive to Cuba and Nicaragua is that it is not a Marxist state, that it is a semicapitalistic country?

Prof. LEOGRANDE: I think that's absolutely right. I think both the Cubans and the Nicaraguans are hopeful that their revolutionary governments, whatever internal policies they may follow, can eventually establish and maintain good normal international relations with the rest of the countries in the hemisphere. Mexico provides a bridge to being able to do that.

LEHRER: Thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: Don Oberdorfer, you heard both Susan Purcell and William Leogrande say that the Mexicans were, because of their history and because of the perception that they are not Marxist, that they will have more sensitivity in these kinds of negotiations. Is that likely to have an impact, do you think, on the United States and its feeling about what Mexico can do?

Mr. OBERDORFER: Well, I think it's likely to have an impact on the situation myself. I mean, I think one of the suggestions of people who have been down in the area, for example, Steven Rosenfeld of my paper, was that the United States ought to enlist somebody, to help its cause with those folks, who can speak the language of the local people, especially of Nicaragua. A lot of this misunderstanding is really cultural, besides political and everything else. As to whether the administration feels that way, I'd have to say I remain unconvinced. I'm not sure that the administration really expects Mexico to do very much more than open a door for them, which possibly they can go in.

HUNTER-GAULT: Dr. Purcell, do you feel that the Mexicans are likely to accept a less than out-front role? I mean, do you think that they would be prepared to -- once they have opened the door for the United States, if they are able to do that with these talks that are going on now -- that they would be content to sort of step back and then let the United States come in and do the hard negotiating?

Dr. PURCELL: Well, from what I know about how the domestic political system works, the Mexican government usually does not like to have an out-front role. I mean, the secret of the success and political stability that Mexico has enjoyed for many decades is precisely that they know how to engage in behind-the-scenes and quiet, closed diplomacy.And so I think that that probably could be transferred to their attitude toward international relations.

HUNTER-GAULT: Well, in other words, you think that this stepping out front now is just a first step to engage the United States in a different kind of relationship with these governments, and that they would be quite willing to step back once the U.S. moved forward?

Dr. PURCELL: Well, again, I can't speak for the Mexican government, but I don't see any obvious reason why they would not be willing to step back providing that the negotiating process went along a path that was acceptable to the Mexicans, and that if the Mexicans stepped back that the United States would not claim that Mexico had a particular position supportive of what the United States was trying to do if indeed it did not.

HUNTER-GAULT: Mr. Leogrande, are there things that you feel the Nicaraguans and the Cubans are going to insist upon before they can come into this process, that they are going to demand from the United States?

Prof. LEOGRANDE: Well, it's difficult to know whether they will demand anything specifically before going into the negotiations. In both cases, both Nicaragua and Cuba, what they are most interested in is an end to the military threats that the Reagan administration has been making; in the case of Nicaragua, an end to the covert-action programs that have been reportedly put into effect. And they're also going to demand, I think, a reduction of the U.S. military involvement in Salvador itself.

HUNTER-GAULT: Don Oberdorfer, where is that going to get them?

Mr. OBERDORFER: Well, one of the things about what the administration has done so far is that they have stepped up considerably the military pressure around both Cuba and, if the covert-action stories are correct, around Nicaragua. Whatever you think of that, one of the things that comes with it is they have something that is bargainable. And the threat to those two countries is considerably greater than it was a few months ago. So that if the administration feels that the price is right, that the Cubans and the Nicaraguans are offering in return enough, it seems to me that there's a lot of area for possible compromise.

LEHRER: And hasn't Secretary Haig essentially said that in his five points -- that the United States would, without saying there are covert actions, would not do those kinds of things? And you were talking a minute ago about economic aid to Nicaragua -- reinstate that. They're willing to go -- already, on the record, they're willing to go part of the way, right?

Mr. OBERDORFER: Haig's five points are pretty remarkable. The one thing that I think you shouldn't lose sight of is that the basic thing for Haig, the most important thing for Haig is for Nicaragua to cease being involved in El Salvador. And he says this is the sine qua non of any progress with Nicaragua.

LEHRER: Will Nicaragua agree to that?

Prof. LEOGRANDE: Well, I think the Nicaraguans will agree to end any official government involvement in Salvador, and will agree to procedures which will allow the United States to be reasonably sure that that's being complied with. It will be virtually impossible, however, for the Nicaraguan government to guarantee that freelance gun-smugging is not going on from their territory. As we saw recently with the discovery of a huge arms cache in Costa Rica, the ability of professional arms smugglers to carry on this kind of business is quite extensive.

LEHRER: Dr. Purcell, my reading of Castaneda's statement last weekend in New York was that Mexico was now on the record as saying yes, El Salvador is being -- the El Salvador guerrillas are getting arms from Nicaragua.Is that a correct reading? Is that a major breakthrough from the Mexican point of view?

Dr. PURCELL: I'm not sure that Castaneda publicly accepted that. I frankly think that common sense tells everybody that there must be arms going from Nicaragua to El Salvador. The question is, is it an official Sandinista government policy? And I don't think that the Mexicans have been willing to publicly acknowledge that it is.

Mr. OBERDORFER: One point, if you will, on the Mexican plan. Haig's initial reaction to it which was, if not cool, it was certainly very noncommittal a few weeks ago, was because it did not in its formal statement, and opening statement, deal with this problem of Nicaraguan support for the El Salvador guerrilla movement. And he kept saying this is the sine qua non, and in a background briefing on Saturday, a famous senior official, who now has been revealed to be --

LEHRER: None other than!

Mr. OBERDORFER: -- Secretary Haig, in a phrase that I think would have given him away anyway, said that his problem with the initial Mexican plan was "a lack of definity in the sine qua non area." [laughter]

LEHRER: Meaning?

Mr. OBERDORFER: Meaning that they didn't say that they wanted the Nicaraguans to stop supporting the El Salvadoran guerrillas as a price of going any further with the United States.

LEHRER: Dr. Purcell, an informed guess: do you think the Mexican way is likely to work? Do you personally believe that?

Dr. PURCELL: I think that it is likely to work only if the United States comes around to supporting it more strongly. I think at this point there is a lot of hesitation inside the U.S. government.The United States government high officials are not used to dealing with Mexico as more or less an equal; they don't quite trust Mexico, given the history of the U.S.-Mexican relations and the suspicion that the Mexicans have, and sometimes the defensiveness. The United States is used to treating Mexico in a rather patronizing way. Recent events, including the discovery of vast petroleum reserves, have changed the balance somewhat more toward equality, and opened up the possibility for the first time of a true working relationship among countries that respect each other. If the situation domestically in the United States becomes such that the U.S. is convinced that the policy it has so far been following is really unworkable, mainly for domestic political reasons, then the United States will move more toward supporting the Mexican initiative.

LEHRER: Well, thank you very much, and thanks to you, Don Oberdorfer and William Leogrande, and good night, Charlayne.

HUNTER-GAULT: Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: And we'll see you tomorrow night. I'm Jim Lehrer. Thank you and good night.