The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Nkomo/Rhodesia

ROBERT MacNEIL: On Rhodesia this week, the U.S. Senate rebuffed President Carter and voted for the lifting of sanctions. Tonight, with guerrilla leader Joshua Nkomo, president of the Zimbabwe African People`s Union, the ramifications of the move to lift sanctions.

Good evening. It`s a delicate political equation President Carter now faces over Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, as it`s soon to be called. If he persists with his policy, the whole Congress may ride roughshod over it, as the Senate did this week. If he follows the Senate`s wishes and lifts the punitive sanctions, he offends liberal opinion, black African nations, and maybe his own U.N. Ambassador, Andrew Young. If he listens to them, he may find himself deserted by Margaret Thatcher, Britain`s new conservative Prime Minister. She`s talked of a new reality in Rhodesia now that a black- led government is about to be installed and has had a senior diplomat out there this week making contact. Secretary of State Vance goes to London this weekend to discuss new policy with the British. Tonight: how does the United States get out of the Rhodesian bind? Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, there`s another weekend meeting scheduled on Rhodesia. It`s in Houston tomorrow, and the participants will be U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young and Joshua Nkomo. Mr. Nkomo is the guerrilla leader who has been at war with the Ian Smith-led white government of Rhodesia for more than six years. He refused to participate in the April elections which established the Muzorewa government, and he has vowed to overthrow it. Reports say he has some 25,000 armed troops under his command, all operating out of Zambia, just over the Rhodesian border. The United States and the old Labor government of Great Britain maintained that without Nkomo` s participation and that of another guerrilla group led by Robert Mugabe no solution in Rhodesia will ever b e a peaceful one. Mr. Nkomo flew to Houston late this afternoon to participate in a weekend conference sponsored by the African American Institute. The State Department announced his private meeting with Mr. Young this afternoon. Right now he`s in the studios of Public Station KURT in Houston. Robin?

MacNEIL: Mr. Nkomo, thank you for joining us this evening. What happens if the United States and Britain lift sanctions against Rhodesia?

JOSHUA NKOMO: Well, I don`t think that Britain and the United States can take such a move, because it certainly would be against their interests, and one does not see them doing a thing; also, lifting sanctions would mean almost recognizing the illegal regime of Ian Smith; let us be clear about this. This government -- or so-called government -- is not going to be a Muzorewa government, it is a Smith government. The whole setup was designed by Smith.

MacNEIL: Why would it be not in the interests of the United States to lift sanctions?

NKOMO: Not in the interests of the United States because firstly the sanctions were not imposed by the United States, they were imposed by the United Nations. And all member states of the United Nations were responsible for imposing sanctions, and they can only be lifted by the United Nations. If the United States does it without the United Nations, then the United States would be declaring war against us in Zimbabwe. I don`t think that after their experiences in Southeast Asia they would take that in.

MacNEIL: I see. Some people in this country believe that if Mr. Carter changes his policy and lifts sanctions and in effect, as you say, recognizes the Muzorewa government, that will push you and Robert Mugabe and your forces to seek aid from the Soviet-backed Cubans. Is there any truth in that fear?

NKOMO: That depends what you mean by this, because...

MacNEIL: What do you mean by it?

NKOMO: What do you mean? (Laughing.) The point is this, that we have been waging war and must have our weapons; it`s known most of our weapons and other war materials come from the East European countries, and not because we requested just those people but because the Western countries would not give us arms.

MacNEIL: Well, if the United States took the course I`ve just described, would that lead you to seek more aid from East Europe?

NKOMO: I don`t think it`s a question of more aid; it`s a question of us intensifying the war. As a matter of fact, it means our own effort, not necessarily efforts from other people, and so it`s not a question of the Soviet Union or Cuba, it`s a question of the people of Zimbabwe themselves.

MacNEIL: Yes-- are you saying that if the United States and Britain lifted sanctions that the fighting would intensify?

NKOMO: Of course it would intensify. Now, what is this war all about? The war is about transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe, and unless the people who are engaged in this war, who know why the war started in the first place, who will determine whether in fact that which we started the war for has been achieved, can that war end.

MacNEIL: Yes. Are you in sufficient strength -- you and Mr. Mugabe and your forces -- to prevent the Mugabe government from governing effectively?

NKOMO: You mean the Muzorewa government.

MacNEIL: I beg your pardon, the Muzorewa government; thank you.

NKOMO:, As a matter of fact, the Muzorewa government really is not meant to govern. Now, let us look at the constitution. The constitution leaves power in the hands of the minorities. The twenty-eight people out of a house of a hundred have got greater powers. Now, as a matter of fact, what people talk of as majority rule is not a majority rule. It may be an apparent majority rule. Out of the hundred, twenty-eight percent of the seats are given to three percent of the people of that country.

MacNEIL: Yes...

NKOMO: Now, let us be clear about this. So that, don`t talk about majority rule. It`s twenty-eight percent seats to represent three percent of the people, and ninety-seven percent represented by only seventy-two; so it is in fact not majority rule, it is an apparent majority rule.

MacNEIL: Right. Well, my question is, could you and your forces prevent that constitution from working? Have you enough strength?

NKOMO: We are not fighting against Muzorewa; we`re fighting to remove Smith. And in fact, we have removed Smith. What has happened is that Muzorewa is being used by Smith as an offshoot. Smith said less than two years ago there was not going to b e majority rule in his lifetime; now he has conceded to some principle of majority rule, and he has used his tactics to evade it by installing a puppet without power.

MacNEIL: But you were fighting against Smith, but that involves killing Rhodesians, or Zimbabweans, does it not, Mr. Nkomo?

NKOMO: No, it appears you`re saying we are killing. Who does the killing? Is it us or Smith? Who has been doing the killing since 1890? The minority white people. We have been ruled by force, we have had a minority government imposed on us by force for almost a hundred years now. The killings in Zimbabwe today, almost a thousand a month, that is abetted by both Mr. Callaghan when he was still Prime Minister and Mr. Vance in their statement last month, that over a thousand people are killed each month; and these people are killed by Ian Douglas Smith and not by the Patriotic Front.

MacNEIL: Is there no way, except to carry on fighting, that you can reach some solution, from your point of view, to this situation?

NKOMO: As a matter of fact, the Patriotic Front had agreed in April 1978 to try and get a solution through the Anglo-American proposals. Then the Anglo-Americans came on with what they called an All Party Conference; we were prepared to go to this All Party Conference. They talked about elections supervised by the United Nations. When we met them in Dar es Salaam in April 1978 we agreed on the principle of elections supervised by the United Nations. So it is not us who rejected elections supervised by the United Nations, it is Ian Smith who, because he was planning this treacherous scheme of his, managed to lure the gullible -- Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau -- to agree to his own set type of majority rule.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you; we`ll come back. Jim?

LEHRER: That 75-to-19 U.S. Senate vote on Tuesday was as surprising as it was overwhelming. By all reports, the administration had not expected it and was caught completely off-guard. There was an amendment to the State Department appropriations bill, and while not binding on the President because it`s a so-called sense-of-the-Congress resolution, it certainly creates some pressure. Specifically, the amendment calls for the lifting of sanctions within fourteen days after the Muzorewa government takes over. One of the amendment`s principal sponsors was Senator Richard Schweiker, Republican of Pennsylvania. Senator, did anything Mr. Nkomo just said provoke any second thoughts on your amendment?

Sen. RICHARD SCHWEIKER: Well, it didn`t for this reason: I was one of the Senators who voted to impose sanctions in the first place, and I voted to impose sanctions -- in fact, my vote was crucial when they first got An, because, number one, there was a minority government of whites that held power, and number two, they were denying blacks the right to vote. That`s why I voted and the Senate voted to impose sanctions. Now, I frankly feel that as a result of what`s happened with the settlement and the elections and the Freedom House report, that the conditions that were imposed in terms of putting sanctions in had been met, that they had made a good-faith effort to give up power, that the whites voluntarily handed over that power, that they conducted an election and that a majority voted for a new black prime minister, who will be installed in June. And I frankly felt that because the sanctions were imposed for these reasons, that if they corrected those conditions the very least we could do to be even-handed and fair is to lift the sanctions. And I think that`s exactly why three quarters of the United States Senate agreed with my position.

LEHRER: You heard what Mr. Nkomo said, though, he says it`s still a Smith government; it`s not really a black-controlled government, it`s an apparent majority-controlled government.

SCHWEIKER: Well, all I can say is that if you have something like seventy- two seats out of a hundred, seventy-two percent -- I`m in Washington and we only have forty percent as Republicans -- I`d give my right hand to get seventy-two percent of something; that`s got to be the biggest majority I would know of, and I honestly wouldn`t agree. I think that that was a provision of the constitution, it was put in there for transitional purposes, it evaporates within ten years, and I think it`s not a desirable feature but I think it was a necessary feature to get it off dead center.

LEHRER: You also heard Mr. Nkomo just say that if the United States should lift sanctions -- in other words, if the President should do what you and the majority of the Senate have asked him to do -- that this would cause more bloodshed, it would escalate the war.

SCHWEIKER: Well, all we can do is to make an honest judgment, as I think we have. And I believe that if fair elections were held, as the Freedom House report says it was, and I might say Clifford Case, a former liberal Republican Senator, is chairman of that board, Jack Javits is on the board; if that is their prognostication in terms of a fair election, then I think we have an honor-bound duty to remove the sanctions. And I believe, frankly, that this will help bring the parties together. Some of the parties have not been willing to sit down and talk; I think it`ll give the new leader, the new prime minister, black prime minister, power to perhaps work out some of these problems that still remain. But it will be a black government by majority rule.

LEHRER: In other words, you just don`t believe Mr. Nkomo when he says that this is going to lead to more fighting rather than less.

SCHWEIKER: Well, I don`t think anybody approached my vote on the basis of who can predict a war; I think we`ve learned the hard way in Vietnam, nobody can predict a war. But we`d like to see the war settled. I really think the reason so many people voted in the election, from what I can tell, and so many people participated was that they`d like to see the war over, too. And I think this is a decisive mandate to the new prime minister to get the war settled; and I think if he has some leadership ability he has a good shot at that, if we`ll help him and not chop his legs off.

LEHRER: Finally, Senator, would you support the President if he did anything less than lifting sanctions outright, which is what your resolution calls for? Is there a middle ground somewhere?

SCHWEIKER: I think there`s some middle ground, yes. I think that there are obviously Sorne hurdles to be overcome here, and obviously the broadest- based government is the best government. So if there`s some kind of a plan to work out and include a broader-based government among blacks.

LEHRER: Including Mr. Nkomo?

SCHWEIKER: Well, I`m going to say including everybody in the government, then that`s certainly desirable. But I think it has to be a plan that`s realizable, practical; I think it has to be one that`s achievable and one that doesn`t polarize the situation worse than it`s polarized.

So I don`t rule that out, and I think if the new prime minister exercises some leadership and gets some cooperation, that might be feasible; and I think that`s one advantage of giving the new prime minister some leverage to try to work that out, as we did by lifting sanctions.

LEHRER: Thank you, Senator. Robin?

MacNEIL: Whether the House will follow the Senate in rejecting the Carter policy is uncertain. The fight to retain sanctions is being led by Democrat Stephen Solarz of New York. Congressman Solarz is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Africa and has visited Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, three times, mostly in April. Congressman, what`s the value of retaining sanctions?

Rep. STEPHEN SOLARZ: I think, Robin, that our primary interest in Rhodesia is in bringing the war to an end. The only way the war can be brought to an end in the relatively near future is in fact through a negotiated agreement between the parties to the conflict themselves. And the reason I think that maintaining sanctions at this time serves a real purpose is that the minute we lift sanctions and recognize the internal settlement, whatever opportunities may remain for a negotiated agreement between the parties to the conflict will go down the diplomatic drain, first because we will have forfeited our credentials as an honest broker attempting to bring the parties together, and secondly because once we lift sanctions we`ll no longer have any leverage with respect to the Salisbury government in an effort to persuade them to make the kind of compromises which are clearly going to be necessary if an agreement can be achieved between the parties to the conflict themselves.

MacNEIL: Some people in this country would argue that we have no leverage with the gentleman I`ve just talked to in Houston, Mr. Nkomo; that in fact our policy as it`s been and would continue to be, if we keep sanctions in force, would be hostage to him and Mr. Mugabe.

SOLARZ: I don`t think that our policy ought to be hostage to anybody, but I would point out, as Mr. Nkomo indicated a short while ago, that last April the Patriotic Front more or less accepted the essential principles of the Anglo-American proposal, and the Salisbury government did not. Furthermore, having just returned from a trip through southern Africa, where I met with each of the Front Line presidents -- President Machel of Mozambique, President Nyerere of Tanzania, President Kaunda of Zambia and President Khama of Botswana -- each and every one of them made it clear to me that they were prepared to use their influence with the Patriotic Front, which is dependent upon them for both sanctuaries and support, in order to persuade Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe to accept a new Anglo-American effort to bring the war to an end based on the principle of some kind of international and impartially supervised elections; and I think that given all of the influence which the Front Line presidents have with the Patriotic Front, we can be reasonably confident that if we`re successful in persuading Bishop Muzorewa to accept the essentials of such a proposal there`s a very good chance that the Patriotic Front would accept it once again as well.

MacNEIL: Is our policy motivated by what we think is good for the inhabitants of Rhodesia, or for concern about U.S. image with black African countries, principally those Front Line countries you talk about?

SOLARZ: I think it is and ought to be concerned about both of those aspects of the present situation. So long as the war continues, the bloodshed goes on. So far about 20,000 Rhodesians, almost all of whom are black, have lost their lives, and in the absence of a negotiated agreement to bring the war to an end the killing will continue. I might point out, by the way, to our American audience that in per capita terms that`s the equivalent of more than half a million Americans, which is more than the total number of Americans who have lost their lives in each and every war we`ve fought in the twentieth century. But secondly, I think that our policy does have to be concerned about the wider implications and ramifications of our position in Rhodesia. The fact of the matter is that if we lift sanctions and recognize the internal settlement at this time, we will have alienated the rest of Africa; we will have put ourselves in a position where we have entered into a de facto alliance with South Africa, which is the only other country on the continent which is currently supporting the Salisbury government. And under such circumstances, it seems to me, we would have provided the Soviet Union with a golden opportunity to maximize its influence throughout Africa, because they will be perceived as being on the side of those forces that are fighting for majority rule while we will be perceived throughout the rest of Africa as being on the side of those forces that are fighting to maintain white minority domination. And finally I might say that we have been urged by some of our closest friends in Africa -- and I`m not talking now about some of the Front Line states, which many people in our country think of as either Marxist or socialist countries, but nations like Zaire and Liberia and Senegal and the Ivory Coast, countries that are clearly moderate and pro-Western -- not to recognize the internal settlement, on the grounds that if we did so it would be diplomatically disastrous for us and politically embarrassing to them as our friends in Africa.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Mr. Nkomo in Houston, back to you first, sir. Putting past history aside in terms of elections that at one time were proposed, would you, as the leader of your group in the Patriotic Front, be willing to lay down your arms and come to a meeting now with Muzorewa, the United States, Great Britain and everybody else, to try to work out a peaceful solution?

NKOMO: No, the point is, you don`t talk about laying down arms before you are able to. ..

LEHRER: Stop fighting -- let`s talk...

NKOMO: You don`t stop fighting, because the fighting is the thing that has brought Smith even to accepting this pseudo-majority rule. So we are going to fight until such time that we are certain that real majority rule will be given to the people of Zimbabwe.

LEHRER: In other words, you wouldn`t even stop fighting to go to a meeting and see if ...

NKOMO: You don`t go to a meeting first; no war has ended that way. What does happen, you negotiate, and then it is out of the negotiations that you get - you stop the war. That is what is done in any war. You don`t stop the war before you are certain that you are getting what you are fighting for.

LEHRER: Senator Schweiker, let me get your reading on Congressman Solarz proposal that maybe by using what leverage the United States might have left by not lifting sanctions it might be able to get the Muzorewa government to sit down. Mr. Nkomo is, I think, less than enthusiastic about that idea; what do you think about it?

SCHWEIKER: Well, of course he is less than enthusiastic, and I think that`s a key point. I had a quote, but I think he said it more articulately than I in which he said simply, in The Christian Science Monitor, "Independence cannot be achieved through negotiation. The only solution is armed struggle." I think that`s the naivete of my good friend the Congressman`s position. I think that has been the problem all along; that`s why they didn`t participate in the election, because they want to fight it through. And I don`t see how, for those of us who believe in democracy and believe in elections, how that can be our policy. Maybe some countries should fight it through, but it seems to me democracy is what we ought to be working here for in our policies and principles.

LEHRER: Congressman, be my guest. Tell Mr. Nkomo why he should go to the meeting you propose.

SOLARZ: Well, I think that it`s obviously in everyone`s interest to bring this war to an end as rapidly as possible in such a way as to provide for a transition to genuine majority rule in that country. And I strongly suspect that if we were able to bring Bishop Muzorewa to a conference on the basis of an Anglo-American proposal that had the support of the Front Line states, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe would go as well. But let me make it clear that...

LEHRER: Well, wait a minute. Let`s just ask him. Mr. Nkomo, is that so?

NKOMO: I don`t understand what the argument is all about, because... let us be very clear what this war is all about. The war is about the transfer of power from minority to majority. This is after thirty years we have tried to negotiate with all successive British governments, with successive Rhodesian governments, and we only went to war when it was quite clear that it was not possible to get anything out of the settlers in southern Rhodesia. So that we have this one thing that has compelled those racists to ever even talk about majority rule, so we are not going to be compelled to withdraw the only weapon we have to bring about genuine majority rule until we are satisfied that a framework for the transfer of power from minority to majority has been worked out. This is what the Anglo-American proposals were all about; this is what the All Parties Conference was all about; and we believe that if we went to either of these conferences that would have happened. But the regime and the puppets in Salisbury did not want to come to the conference.

LEHRER: Is it too late, then, you`re saying, to try it again?

NKOMO: How do you try? With whom? Now, let us be clear: you are talking -- you`re talking about a government in Salisbury, you`re talking about elections in Salisbury. Do you think that there, have been elections? Let us be very honest about it. How do you hold elections when you do not have a voters` roll? Who votes? Now, you`re talking about a democracy. Could you in the United States go to the polls without knowing who is going to vote and who is qualified and who is not qualified?

LEHRER: Let`s ask Senator Schweiker that. Senator...

NKOMO: I mean, but this is nonsense. Let us really talk sense.

LEHRER: Let`s give the Senator a chance to respond to that.

SCHWEIKER: I think they did the best they could...

NKOMO: No, no, no; now, look...

SCHWEIKER: ...and that`s what Freedom House said. I`d like to ask him: your partner, Mr. Mugabe, said very succinctly that he has a commitment to Marxism, a one-party state in which democratic elections are a luxury. Now, isn`t that really your policy? Isn`t that what you`re saying, and isn`t that what the issue is, a one-party state? He doesn`t believe in elections, either. Let`s put it all on the table, right where it should be.

LEHRER: Mr. Nkomo?

NKOMO: Now, let me understand what -- is that the Senator?

LEHRER: Yes. Senator Schweiker.

NKOMO: -- what he is talking about. Now, look, you`re talking about our country, and you`re talking as if you are the arbiter, you are the judge of what must happen in Zimbabwe. We do not, we have never suggested a form, of government for the United States. And what right has the Senator to tell us what sort of government we should have in our country? This must be perfectly clear. This is where the United States went wrong in Southeast Asia, this is where the United States is going wrong and is getting the heat in the Middle East. And if the United States attempts this type of thing in southern Africa, then you will fall into a quagmire. All your interests will remain down there. And you have to be very careful what you are doing.

LEHRER: We have to leave it on that note. Robin?

MacNEIL: Yes; thank you, Mr. Nkomo in Houston, for joining us this evening. Thank you, Senator Schweiker and Congressman Solarz in Washington. Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night, Robin.

MacNEIL: That`s all for tonight. We will be back on Monday night. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.