The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Israel Invades Lebanon

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Israeli forces today pushed their weekend invasion of Lebanon to within 16 miles of the capital, Beirut. In lightning strikes by land and sea, the Israelis attacked the major city of Sidon, and seized key strongholds of the Palestine Liberation Organization. They captured Beaufort Castle dating from the days of the Crusades and used as a Palestinian observation post. They also took the PLO strongholds of Tyre, Nabatiye and Hasbeya. That brought the Israelis within a few miles of Syrian troops occupying the Bekaa Valley, but the Israeli commanders said they would not fight the Syrians unless first attacked by them.There was a clash with Syria in the air. Israeli jets bombed Palestinian targets in Beirut. Syrian fighters rose to intercept, and one Syrian jet was shot down. In attacking the Mediterranean coastal town of Tyre and Sidon and launching a pincers movement from Nabatiye towards Sidon, military analysts said the Israelis appeared to be trying to tie PLO forces in southern Lebanon into a pocket. The Israeli chief of staff, General Rafael Eytan, said his troops, estimated at 20,000 strong, had achieved in 24 hours what they thought would take twice as long. Tonight, the purpose of Israel's lightning attack, and reaction to it. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, the United States today put the burden on both Israel and the PLO for what's happening in Lebanon. State Department spokesman Alan Romberg called on both to cease and desist, Israel to withdraw its troops, the PLO to quit using Lebanon as a launching pad for attacks on Israel. Special U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib flew to Israel last night to try to negotiate a ceasefire. At last report he had yet to meet with Prime Minister Begin who was at an advanced post in the combat area. Most other world reaction was not favorable to Israel. British Deputy Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd accepted Israel's claim that it invaded in order to stop PLO attacks, but he said it wouldn't work. "I don't think you can win Israel's security indefinitely by occupying other people's lands," he said. From Egypt, the only Arab country with which Israel has diplomatic relations, came words of condemnation from President Mubarak. He called Israel's invasion "outrageous," and "a violation of the peace." Other Arab and Islamic countries used much stronger language. The speaker of the Iranian Parliament, for one, calling on all Islamic countries to combine their military and economic strength to fight Israel. Other condemning words came from countries as diverse as Spain, Turkey, India, Malaysia, Yugoslavia and Romania. The Soviet Union demanded Israel end its military operation which it said may cost Israel and its people dearly. It was in Israel itself that the only unqualified acts of encouragement came. The Associated Press reported that the Lebanon action had brought back the old spirit of togetherness, that the entire Israeli population was already caught up in supporting the war. Robin?

MacNEIL: First, a general observer of the Middle East scene. David Mizrahi is a Jew who was born in Lebanon. He is editor of the Middle East Report, which covers political and financial news in Israel and the Arab countries. Mr. Mizrahi, what do you think Israel's purpose is in this invasion?

DAVID MIZRAHI: I think the immediate purpose for Israel is to clean out the pockets and the Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon and Palestinian hideouts. This was confirmed by the fact that the Israelis have occupied Tyre; they are about to occupy Sidon. They have hit, I understand, the PLO headquarters in Beirut. That is the main purpose of the Israeli push into Lebanon.

MacNEIL: Do you think that they will withdraw when they have cleared the Palestinians from the 25-mile-deep zone they talk about?

Mr. MIZRAHI: I wouldn't think so, no. I think the Israelis will stay in Lebanon until an international force is being set up in order to control all this area, and turn it into a buffer zone -- what I call a buffer zone -- to the north of Israel. What has been a buffer zone to the south of Israel in the Sinai right now.

MacNEIL: Do you think there is a deeper or a secondary Israeli purpose in all this?

Mr. MIZRAHI: There might be a second Israeli purpose -- is to test, I think, Syrian reaction. I think the Syrian reaction will be crucial in the second phase of the offensive. Meaning that if the Syrians have a mild reaction to the Israeli thrust, I think Begin has an obsession with the Israeli -- with the Syrian missiles in the Bekaa Valley that goes back to April, 1981.

MacNEIL: The ones he made such a point about over a year ago, insisting that unless they were removed, he would go in and remove them, he said at the time, and the United States persuaded him not to.

Mr. MIZRAHI: Yes.

MacNEIL: And you think that he is still after those missiles?

Mr. MIZRAHI: Well, having studied the man, I mean Mr. Begin himself, I think he has an obsession with the missiles in the Bekaa Valley, and that has -- I wouldn't discount that.You see, in other words, Mr. Begin could go as far as to destroy the missiles in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon.

MacNEIL: Even though his commander is saying now they won't engage Syrian troops which control those Soviet missiles?

Mr. MIZRAHI: Well, I'm pretty sure right now the Israelis are not going to engage the Syrians right now.

MacNEIL: Why do you think Mr. Begin chose this moment?

Mr. MIZRAHI: Oh, there are many factors for that. First of all, the Arab League -- the members -- the 21 members or 22 members, including the PLO -- of the Arab League are really in disarray. You have a war between Iraq and Iran; you have a semi-war between Morocco and Algeria in Western Sahara. Jordan and Syria are not on good terms. There are domestic problems within Syria for President Assad of Syria. And there is a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, so I think for the Israelis, the moment is quite opportune now to attack southern Lebanon.

MacNEIL: Do you see a domestic political reason for Begin doing this now?

Mr. MIZRAHI: There is also a domestic political reason. I think Mr. Begin is shooting for re-election sometime in November where he will have a more comfortable majority in the Knesset, the parliament.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: An Arab perspective on the Lebanon fighting now from Hisham Milshim, a U.S. -based reporter for Okaz, an Arabic daily published in Saudi Arabia. He was born in Lebanon. Do you expect the Arab world to rally to the PLO side other than just with words?

HISHAM MILSHIM: Well, unfortunately so far, we don't see any credible Arab reaction to the Israeli aggression on Lebanon. Obviously, the fighting continues, and all indications are that the stiff resistance that the Israelis are facing in Lebanon will prolong the fighting, and I think even beyond Israeli expectations.Granted, the Israelis have superior firepower, but observers are saying that they are facing stiff resistance in Tyre and even in Sidon. I would imagine if the Arab world -- Syria, basically, also -- would find it extremely difficult to watch the situation as if they are, you know, spectators.

LEHRER: So do you expect Syria and Israel to eventually come to blows over this in a very direct confrontational way?

Mr. MILSHIM: I think the next two days will be very critical as far as Syria's response will be. If the PLO forces in the south and the Lebanese forces in the south need -- are under intense pressures from the Israelis militarily, then the Syrians would have to show that they -- then the Syrians would have to deliver on their previous promises to the Lebanese government and to the PLO that they would stand up -- stand by them in this time of need.

LEHRER: So, in other words, if the Israelis continues to be successful, which they appear to be up 'til now, what you're saying is Syria will have no choice. They will have -- what do they have, about 30,000 troops there?

Mr. MILSHIM: Less than that.

LEHRER: In this Arab League peace-keeping force?

Mr. MILSHIM: Yes.

LEHRER: You think Syria will have to go in just to -- they'll just have to. Is that right?

Mr. MILSHIM: Exactly. They have to because, notwithstanding previous Syrian commitments to the PLO, here we're discussing also the Syrian national interest, too. I mean, the Israelis would be very close to the Awwali. This is Syria's soft belly. No military commander in Syria can afford a strong Israeli presence in that part of Lebanon. Syria would lose politically if the PLO suffers militarily. I'd like to add one thing, basically, that since 1968 -- since the Karama military encounter between the Israelis and the Palestinians in Jordan -- we've seen the PLO suffering once in a while military setbacks, but never suffering a major political defeat. The Israelis should know by now that a military thrust against Lebanon is not going to weaken the PLO because the PLO is not only a military machine; the PLO is all these combined cultural, social and economic and political institutions that the Palestinian people created over the last 10 to 15 years. A weak --

LEHRER: So even if the Israelis are successful in achieving this 25-mile buffer zone which they want, or in running the PLO completely out of Lebanon --

Mr. MILSHIM: Where would they go?Where would you run them out of Lebanon?

LEHRER: Let me ask you. Where would they go?

Mr. MILSHIM: Well, I don't think the PLO can be defeated politically in Lebanon. They may suffer a military setback. This is not going to give Israel its sort of cordon sanitaire because, after all, where would they go? The only way -- I mean, there are many Palestinians throughout the Arab world. They may not be armed in the Gulf area or in other parts of the Arab world, but they have political cohesions; they have political organization. And if we see the PLO out of Lebanon, which is inconceivable to me at this stage, there will be upheavals throughout the Arab world. And this is a major -- I mean, the next period is pregnant with all sorts of possibilities, good and bad.

LEHRER: I see. Do you agree that the Arab world is in disarray now, and that would make it likely that, if Syria did go in and did take on the Israelis, it would go in alone?

Mr. MILSHIM: Basically, I think the Syrians initially would have to go alone, and I've never seen the -- as an observer of Arab affairs, I've never seen the Arab political establishment in such disarray at any time before. The Arabs' political order is more exposed than ever. They can't deal -- couldn't deal with the Iraq-Iran war, and they can't face the Israeli challenge, and they can't even deal with their own internal problems. That's why I'm saying the next period is going to be pregnant with all sorts of possibilities. We may see many Arab regimes facing tremendous difficulties. What the Israelis are attempting to do now basically is redrawing the political map, and this is a double-edged sword. They may end up facing five radical, revolutionary regimes or forces in the Arab world.

LEHRER: I see. Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: We hear now from an American diplomat with direct experience in Lebanon. He is Talcott Seelye, who was presidential emissary to Lebanon in 1976. Mr. Seelye was a deputy assistant secretary of state. He has served in many Middle East posts, most recently as ambassador to Syria from 1978 to 1981. Mr. Seelye retired last year, and is now a consultant on Middle East affairs. Mr. Ambassador, what do you think the United States should be doing now?

Amb. TALCOTT SEELYE: Well, I think first that the statement by the State Department spokesman, in which he criticized both sides, was a typical statement. We always take a balanced position, regardless of whether more blame is to fall on one party rather than the other. But I think it's quite clear that any U.S. government policymaker must recognize, acknowledge that the Israeli reaction to this admittedly very tragic attempt on the life of the Israeli ambassador in London was far disproportionate to that particular attempt, and it resulted in a tremendous amount of innocent losses of life. And I think that therefore our policy has got to be, first, to insure that there is a ceasefire as quickly as possible to carry out the U.N. decision -- use our relationship with Israel to get it established and started. My understanding is that the PLO has agreed, but the Israeli government has not yet done so. And, secondly, to use our influence to get Israel to withdraw. And I know this will be a difficult proposition.

MacNEIL: Why is it so important to get Israel to withdraw?

Amb. SEELYE: It's very important for several reasons. Number one, because by staying in Lebanon they are further eroding the Lebanese government and its prospects of ever rehabilitating itself and establishing national reconciliation. And Lebanon has long been a very close friend of the United States, an example of a pluralistic, democractic, pro-Western society, and we would lose a great asset if the Lebanese government went down the drain. Number two, I think that the trouble with what has happened is that the PLO extremists, if the Israeli forces remain in Lebanon, will be strengthened at the expense of the moderates. That certainly is not in our interest as we move, hopefully, toward a peace settlement. And as for a peace settlement, of course, this makes it even more difficult because the moderate Arab regimes, who, I would submit, are prepared for a peace settlement based on an internationally accepted U.N. formula would find it increasingly difficult to move in the direction of having peace with an Israeli government occupying Lebanon in perpetuity.

MacNEIL: So you feel that today's State Department statement was too soft and too even-handed in the circumstances.

Amb. SEELYE: Of course. I've always felt that, even when I was in the Department.

MacNEIL: Well, do you feel it's sort of a holding statement because President Reagan and the Secretary of State are in Europe on the post-summit tour, and that something else will be forthcoming when they come back?

Amb. SEELYE: To a certain extent, but we tend to always take balanced statements without necessarily placing greater blame on one side or the other. I think you're right; to an extent that's true.

MacNEIL: Have we got the clout to get Israel to withdraw immediately -- to issue an ultimatum?

Amb. SEELYE: I think we have the clout if we want to use it, but if I may say so very frankly, Mr. Begin has been thumbing his nose at us now for so long that he's been able to get away with one action after the other, despite our efforts.

MacNEIL: I see. And what do you think of the prospects of the special envoy, Mr. Habib, being successful right now?

Amb. SEELYE: I think Mr. Habib is the best thing we have going for us in the area. His missions up 'til now have been successful; he has been able to establish excellent rapport with all key parties. He has an almost impossible job, but I think insofar as we could pick anyone for the job, he is the most adequate personality. And I think he will be able to be of some help in this regard.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Jim?

LEHRER: A different view on what the U.S. should do. It comes from Joseph Churba, president of the Center for International Security, a research group here in Washington on defense and foreign policy issues. He is a former Air Force intelligence expert on the Middle East, was a Reagan campaign adviser, and until last month was a senior policy adviser at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mr. Churba, does the United States have the clout to get Israel out of Lebanon?

JOSEPH CHURBA: Well, I think we should approach the problem differently. I think a new geopolitical situation is emerging, and with it a new opportunity for creative diplomacy on the part of the United States.

LEHRER: Meaning what, sir?

Mr. CHURBA: Well, if successfully and skillfully exploited, I think the West Bank Arabs now can come forward and negotiate autonomy along the lines of the Camp David peace agreement, and without fear of PLO retribution, peace can return to the West Bank along those lines. Secondly, the Israeli presence in Lebanon might be used as military and political leverage for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from this state, thereby permitting the reconstitution of Lebanon's integrity. Let me elaborate.

LEHRER: Well, first of all, let me make sure I understand from a general overview. In other words, you are very much opposed to doing what Ambassador Seelye says, then, when he says put the heat on Israel to get out? You're saying let Israel stay, and support them while they're there.

Mr. CHURBA: Exactly. We have the opportunity now to reconstitute Lebanon's integrity by negotiating Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Short of that -- short of that the southern half of the country can certainly be handed over to the Shiite and Christian elements, rid of the PLO intrusion. My argument is very simple. There is no room for a foreign presence in Lebanon, and we should restore the territorial integrity and political independence of this once pro-Western and Christian state. And I think this is what the Lebanese themselves want, and here is the opportunity for diplomacy. Conversely, if we do not rise to this challenge, and we follow what is known as the Weinberger school -- to squeeze the Israelis and to punish them for this advance -- we will certainly be sending the wrong signal to Syria, and Syria would use our intervention on their behalf to escalate the crisis and bring in the Russians in the hope of triggering a superpower involvement. So this is the challenge to American diplomacy. Whether this administration is up to it is a question.

LEHRER: Well, based on what has been said thus far, do you think the administration is up to it?

Mr. CHURBA: No. I think that the Near East Bureau at State remains intact precisely composed of the same elements that were [there] during the Carter period. I think there is a fundamental misreading of the play of forces on the ground in the Middle East, not only in the Lebanon-Israel zone, but in the Persian Gulf region as well, and I don't believe that this administration has yet to correctly assess the asset -- the strategic asset that Israel represents to the United States. After all, the Israelis are doing more than just putting the PLO beyond the range of Israeli fields. It is a terrible and a very decisive blow they are inflicting on the PLO and global terrorism. I'm referring to the extensive PLO- Soviet collaboration on terrorism, world terrorism, which reaches every continent, including El Salvador and Nicaragua. This is a plus for the United States -- the diminution, the reduction of PLO-Soviet cooperation.

LEHRER: So if you were writing the statement at the State Department this afternoon, you'd be saying, "Right on, Prime Minister Begin.Go get 'em."

Mr. CHURBA: Exactly. I would give them tacit approval to finish the job and restore the situation to where it should be prior to the PLO and the Syrian invasion of Lebanon back in 1975.

LEHRER: And then once they're there, sit down at the table and say, "Okay, Israel will withdraw if Syria withdraws and Lebanon goes back to whole"?

Mr. CHURBA: Precisely.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: First, let's pursue, Mr. Mizrahi, what this is going to do to the PLO. You heard Mr. Milshim say this wasn't going to really weaken the PLO. Every time you inflict some setbacks, they're just strengthened. They diversify, but they re-strengthen. You have also just heard Mr. Churba say that this is going to decimate the PLO. Now, what's going to happen? What effect is this going to have on the PLO?

Mr. MIZRAHI: I think the Israeli invasion of Lebanon had two purposes: to destroy the military infrastructure of the PLO, and then possibly to destroy the political infrastructure of the PLO.If you put it in this perspective now we understand the problem better.

MacNEIL: Sure. What effect do you think it will have?

Mr. MIZRAHI: I think the Israelis are going to destroy considerably the military infrastructure of the PLO.The spirit, I'm not so sure. But militarily, yes. Now, the suggestion by Mr. Churba that now -- we have, strangely enough, three outside forces within Lebanon, you know -- we have Syria, we have the Palestinians, and we have the Israelis, and that's why, in reply to your question, I said the Israelis are not going to withdraw from Lebanon. They did it, I think, after 90 days of occupation in 1978, but I don't think the Israelis are going to do it again. The Israelis, this time, my opinion is that they are going to remain in Lebanon; they are going stronger -- I think there are strong possibilities for Israel even to confront the Syrian army, as my colleague said, and then after that there'll be a peace negotiation -- whatever you want to call it -- a conference in which the Israelis will withdraw, as Mr. Churba has indicated, only after the Syrian troops withdraw from Lebanon, and a solution will have been found for the Palestinians.

MacNEIL: Thank you. We can pursue that in a moment. I'd just like, Mr. Milshim, to pursue this idea of what it's going to do to the PLO. You heard Ambassador Seelye say that what it would have the effect of doing was strengthening the extreme Palestinian elements and weakening those who, presumably including Yasir Arafat, might have been inclined to have a political settlement. Do you agree with that?

Mr. MILSHIM: Well, I don't know. I'm not inclined to talk about moderates and extremist Palestinians. We're talking now about the survival of a whole community, and that community is represented by the PLO. There are limits to what the so-called moderates can do or will be allowed to do. There are two things here.Nobody can accept an Israeli diktat. What Mr. Churba is saying is that the Israelis should go in, violate the territorial integrity, the sovereignty of a nation, massacring untold numbers of civilian Lebanese and Palestinians, and then impose a diktat, a status quo. This is not going to be accepted by any reasonable Palestinian or Arab or Lebanese or anybody.

MacNEIL: Mr. Churba?

Mr. CHURBA: This is not a question of diktat, but a question of survival of the state of Israel and Western interests in the region as a whole. It seems to me that the Israelis have been sufficiently provoked for the last 35 years, and are struggling for acceptance and a peace solution. They are prepared to make these risks, and indeed they have taken these risks in an enormous way in the Sinai -- giving up the oil fields, giving up strategic depth and all the rest. So my point is that the Israelis consider this a major action designed to create the conditions for a political solution.

LEHRER: Let me ask the Ambassador. You heard what Mr. Churba says. He sees it entirely differently in terms of the way the United States should play this. How do you respond to his argument?

Amb. SEELYE: Well, I think that the most important element in the picture is getting a solution to the Palestinian problem. If the Israeli government could bring itself to understand that this is a central issue in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and not only that, it is the essence of Arab nationalism, and is that important to the whole Arab world, if we could get the Israeli government to address the aspirations -- legitimate aspirations -- of the Palestinians for some kind of a homeland, some kind of a state, them I think by getting to the heart of the problem, you aren't going to have these terrorist attacks against Israelis, and you aren't going to have the problem that has evolved in Lebanon in the last few days.

LEHRER: But what about his argumentthat what the United States should do is be supporting Israel completely now?

Amb. SEELYE: No, of course not. I don't agree. I think that -- I don't think that one can expect that the Syrians are going to withdraw as a quid pro quo for the Israelis to withdraw. And I think that the first step has got to be to get the Israelis out, and then try to reinvigorate our peace efforts because the Lebanese situation is integrally, intrinsically connected with that effort.

LEHRER: Mr. Churba?

Mr. CHURBA: We do have a framework for peace in the Middle East, and it is the Camp David peace process. There is a provision there for the settlement of the Palestinian-Arab problem -- accordance with the autonomy provisions of that framework.I think we should be exploiting this to the maximum without the PLO because the PLO is the principal surrogate of the Soviet Union; it is the major disruptive element in that region and other regions as well, and that the United States must in no way treat this surrogate invader and the Syrian invader in Lebanon as being a part of the normal process.

LEHRER: Mr. Mizrahi, what is your view on what the United States should do now? You heard the Churba and the Seelye argument.Is there a Mizrahi argument?

Mr. MIZRAHI: There is a Mizrahi argument, if you like. I think the United States -- the problem is not what the United States should do; it is what the situation is. Let's be more practical and pragmatic about it.I think that Ambassador Habib's mission to Israel today has no value at all. I don't think Prime Minister Begin -- he's going to listen to Ambassador Habib, but he's not going to ask forces to pull out of Lebanon. Second, Mr. Habib, I see his role only after the Israelis have achieved their objectives in Lebanon. Only then will Mr. Habib play his role, that is, to start a ceasefire and to start negotiations. I really don't see any role in the United States right now, even -- I would go one step further -- even if the United States had decided -- decides today to place an embargo on arms shipment to Israel, the Israelis would pursue their objectives.

LEHRER: All right, thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Yes, thank you all, gentlemen, very much, Ambassador Seelye, Mr. Milshim, Mr. Mizrahi and Mr. Churba. That's all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.