The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Mid-East Peace Treaty

(SIGNATURE MUSIC)

ROBERT MACNEIL: Good evening.

President Carter is flying back to the United States tonight, having apparently brought Israel and Egypt to the brink of signing a peace treaty. After days of intense and often frustrating personal diplomacy with both countries, Mr. Carter was able to make an optimistic announcement at Cairo Airport. He said he had just given President Sadat a full report of his discussions in Israel. During the visit the U.S. made proposals for resolving a number of outstanding issues, proposals which were accepted by Prime Minister Begin- and his cabinet.

PRESIDENT CARTER: President Sadat has- now accepted these proposals. Based on discussion in Egypt and Israel, I have also presented United States proposals to President Sadat and to Prime Minister Begin for resolving the few remaining issues.

Earlier today Prime Minister Begin to present these proposals to his cabinet for consideration. This will be done at the earliest opportunity. President Sadat has carefully reviewed all these remaining issues and has accepted these same proposals. I have just informed Prime Minister Begin by telephone of President Sadat`s acceptance.

I am convinced that now we have defined all of the main ingredients of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which will be the cornerstone of a comprehensive peace settlement for the Middle East.

MACNEIL: After making that statement Mr. Carter took off in Air Force One for Washington, where he`ll arrive around midnight. Details of the compromise are still secret. Mr. Begin said he would seek his cabinet`s approval tomorrow. Then he`ll go to the Knesset, confident enough to stake his government`s survival on a yes vote. He said peace treaties could be signed in Jerusalem, Cairo and Washington as early as next week.

Tonight after 16 months of alternating euphoria and gloom, is this the moment of truth?

Jim.

JIM LEHRER: Robin, this time last night the reporters with the president were all filing this same story. It was about failure of about gloomy moods and unhappy people. The president`s dramatic trip for peace was coming up empty, it was to be a long dreary trip home.

Then came that meeting with Begin over breakfast, the 2 1/2 hour talk with Sadat in Cairo, a phone and suddenly, peace was once again at hand, a peace treaty at least. It had been a tough six days for the president. He left here amidst a chorus of verbal sticks and stones, critics and even some friends suggesting he was taking an unnecessary gamble, putting his, and the nation`s prestige on the line, in an unconventional and unpresidential act of diplomatic desperation.

His first stop in Cairo produced a rejection by Sadat of U.S. compromise proposals previously okayed by Begin. His next stop got a turndown from Begin of Sadat`s counterproposals. There was tough talk over dinner and before the Knesset in Jerusalem. Nobody was budging, everybody was judging, the president`s gamble was turning up a loser.

Then came that last turn of the wheel and it all changed.

Joseph Sisco has been watching all of this unfold with the rest of us. His is a special view. As undersecretary of state under Henry Kissinger, Mr. Sisco was directly involved in earlier trips toward a Middle East peace. He is now the president of American University, and has been with us numerous times in the past to help sort out the latest Middle East developments.

Mr. Sisco, the president did break some of the rules of accepted diplomacy. He did gamble. Was it worth it?

JOSEPH SISCO: Clearly Jim, this is an area of vital interest, and the gamble worked. I think that the Iranian developments underscored both to Sadat and Begin the increasing importance of achieving this agreement. The agreement I think reinforces both the Egyptian/American relationships, as well as the Israeli/American relationships. Lit reduces the likelihood of war in the area because with Sadat out of the fray in the sense of having agreed to a treaty, the notion of a one front war from Syria along with Iraq against Israelis not a viable military option. I think this represents a real breakthrough, I`m confident that the Knesset and the cabinet will approve this proposition.

LEHRER. : Do you think that the fact that the president took such a risk added a special psychological pressure on Begin and Sadat to get their act together?

SISCO: I think the objective conditions of the area were really the overriding considerations, and that is that both realized that if there were not an agreement, you would have probably a prolonged stalemate, an area of instability in the Middle East alongside the area of instability that had already developed in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. I think that is a critical consideration.

And secondly, And secondly, I think that both sides realize that the peoples in their respective countries in many respects have been and are in advance of the leaders. I think there has been a general change in the Middle East in favor of the peace process itself, and I think both Begin and Sadat reflected that.

LEHRER: You know, some commentators were suggesting today, even that while it was a great thing that the president pulled this off, it was too bad that the President of the United States had to go on his hands and knees so to speak, to smaller, less powerful countries and beg them to make an agreement and make some final concession that was in their own actual self interest. Do you share that view?

SISCO: I certainly don`t. I think that this is a concrete case of where America`s power, politically, economically, strategically, and militarily, everything that we represent as a superpower, involved itself in a very critical and very decisive way.

The United States is the only power acceptable to both sides. It`s the only power that could have reconciled the differences that have been reconciled. And we have a vital interest on an overall basis in the area, and our diplomacy has been and continues to be central to the process.

LEHRER: Does this act today, or this trip, this mission, this result that the president has gotten, does it add up to that show of strength abroad that many people were saying the president should make before he went on this trip?

SISCO: I believe that one of our primary problems in foreign policy today is psychological. I think in some respects we are still suffering from what I call the Vietnam syndrome. I think it is important for the United States to create options of power, and I don`t mean gunboat diplomacy. I believe that the United States has a range of options, politically, economically and militarily. I think it`s important that these range of options be utilized, particularly today in the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula.-I welcome what the Carter Administration has been doing in recent weeks with respect to the whole situation in Yemen, for one overriding reason Jim, this will bulwark and support out moderate friends in the area. There is a measure of uncertainty that has developed with respect to our will, I think the steps that have been taken by the Carter Administration in recent days will go a long way to begin to assure, particularly the Saudis, and this success in the Middle East alongside these developments, shows that America recognizes what its vital interest area, and its willing to use and involve its power, and this is important.

LEHRER: It was said beforehand, before he went, that the the president was putting the prestige of the United States on the line by making this trip. What has this mission done for the prestige of the United States?

SISCO: It has shown that the president can succeed in breaking at least some of this chasm of suspicion that has resulted in this agreement. And therefore, it can show results. For Sadat, for example, he can say that from this agreement, he is the only Arab that will have returned to him the territory that was captured by the Israelis. This is a monumental achievement from the point of view of the Arab world.

Moreover, there isn`t any doubt that the United States is going to have to and intends to provide ongoing assistance, both to Egypt and to Israel, and therefore this tie becomes even closer. This strengthens our overall political position in the area, even though the Arab world will continue to be divided.

LEHRER: All right. Thank you.

Robin.

MACNEIL: Obviously a lot now hinges on Mr. Begin`s success in carrying the cabinet and the factious Knesset with him. Let`s get an Israeli perspective from Ronan Lurie, an American citizen, born in Israel. Mr. Lurie is a political analyst and cartoonist whose work is syndicated in 350 newspapers, including many in the Middle East and the United States. lie has recently returned from Israel where he talked with Mr. Begin and other leaders.

Mr. Lurie, Joseph Sisco says he`s sure the cabinet and the Knesset will pass the treaty. Do you agree with that?

RONAN LURIE: I do. I think that the whole thing depends really on the labor party, and Mr. Peretz has already declared that he was going to support Begin.

MACNEIL: What about all those right winters, the Likud Party, who heckled Mr. Begin and Mr. Carter`s presence so strenuously yesterday?

LURIE: Well the dogs that bark do not bite. They have to heckle because they`re so small. I think the entire groups are perhaps, maybe 4 percent of the Knesset. So we can rest assured that the vote will pass. I must admit that when Begin says he will resign if this doesn`t pass, I thought there might be a possibility for the Labor Party to seize the opportunity, and say, well that`s a good opportunity to take over. But they were decent enough politically, and manly to say right out, they were going to support him.

MACNEIL: Why-does Mr. Begin need, in fact treaty, paragraph by paragraph to the Knesset of a shock to Mr. Carter when he heard about it. signing it?

LURIE: Well, this will be closest thing to a plebiscite, is that every Israeli leader knew he would have to make, if he would ever want to return the West Bank and the Gaza Strip -- now mind you, he is not returning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip yet, but there are already elements, where he wants to have the Knesset on his side, in a way to create an alibi.

MACNEIL: To create an alibi?

LURIE: For himself.

MACNEIL: To spread the responsibility.

LURIE: Exactly:

MACNEIL: I see.

Can you explain -- apparently the last sticking points for Israel were three, and may still remain, to sort it out a little bit-

LURIE: Yes.

MACNEIL: One was the question of when Arab -- an Egyptian Ambassador would come to Israel, another one is getting oil from the Sinai, and another one was whether Egypt could have a presence in the Gaza, soon. Why are those three things so important to Israel?

LURIE: Okay. Mr. Sisco said something very correct before. Sadat will come back to his people and he can show something very physical, the entire Sinai Peninsula. If you will note, Begin cannot come back to his people and show anything physical. The only physical thing that he has in hand, or he can have in hand is an Egyptian Ambassador, flesh and blood. It`s very important for him.

MACNEIL: What about the oil from the Sinai? Why can`t he simply accept Egyptian promises that they will sell him oil?

LURIE: Well, Israel had -- has a bad history of broken promises, and for Israel the oil can be so vital, at least as it is vital here in the United States, so they want to get any kind of guarantee they can in order to have it, plus there is a psychological factor, if Israel found the oil in the Sinai, Israel digged it, and the Israelis feel some kind of an attachment to the thing that they have created, and feel that, you know, they have some kind of finders right. I`m convinced that on this point, Sadat will not give in, and my hunch is that the United States is going to back the promises of Sadat, but I may be wrong.

MACNEIL: The Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip, Egypt wants to put liaison officers in it, to observe and oversee the progress towards some sort of self-government with the Palestinians there..

LURIE: Yes.

MACNEIL: Why is Mr. Begin so adamant on that?

LURIE: Well, again, psychology plays a big role in the Middle East. For Egyptians to be in the Gaza Strip means to the Israelis and even more to the Arabs on the Gaza Strip, that the Gaza Strip is definitely going back - - coming back to Egypt. Or part of the Palestinian State. Now this is a thing that Begin cannot afford admitting now, ahead of time. Even if it will be true, and Begin, I am convinced does not think it will be true.

The second point is if you have an Egyptian in the Gaza Strip it will be some kind of an Egyptian High Commissioner. It will imply to the Arabs, and to the -- even to the PLO people who are in the Gaza Strip that they cannot only have a much longer rope to run(?) on, but psychologically they will want to prove to the Egyptians that they are good Arabs, loyal Arabs, they have bad experience of changing(?) regimes during the civil war that the Gaza Strip was conquered again and again and again.

MACNEIL: Finally, can all this become unraveled again?

LURIE: Yes, it can. I don`t think it will. I think that it`s really reached the stage now where every little stone was turned over, and examined. But the two people, Begin and Sadat are emotional, it can happen, but the odds are very small.

MACNEIL: Well, thank you.

Jim.

LEHRER: All right, assuming Israel does approve the treaty, the fews is are dotted, the is are crossed and its all signed by all concerned, then what? Well, there are those already concerned about that what. What kind of peace it really assures.

One so concerned is Leslie Jonkoff, former desputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, with special responsibility for the Middle East. He also worked on the National Security staff under Kissinger. Since leaving the government last year, he`s been an international consultant here in Washington.

Mr. Jonkoff, assuming there is a treaty, does that mean there`s going to be a real peace in the Middle East?

LESLIE JONKOFF: Well, I think it`s a major step forward. I don`t think one can predict almost anything in the Middle East. Those of us who have been involved with it over the past years, I think are very cautious of euphoria, and we saw the euphoris after the first Camp David exercise, and I think many of us are cautious, there`s no question that if a peace treaty is signed it`s a major watershed, it`s a very important psychological step forward. It`s a step forward, a major one, but I view it to be on very thin ice.

LEHRER: Thin ice for what? What reasons?

JONKOFF: Any stalemate or falling backward, I think will permit the more radical Arabs to say, see, we told you so. This is a sham, the bilateral treaty is simply trying to extract Egypt from Arab unity which is so important psychologically, to the Arab world.

LEHRER: Do you think that President Carter made a mistake in going against the Israeli/Egyptian treaty and not trying to weave it into a total comprehensive peace?

JONKOFF: It`s hard to say it`s a mistake. But I think a lot of us see the course of diplomacy, particularly from the American side, often we see the realm of the desirable shrink .very quickly to the realm of the attainable. I`m afraid this is what we`ve done here. We remember the Carter Administration, I think so correctly started out seeking a comprehensive peace, and warning against the step by step method. Yet we see them coming to that now.

Clearly, I think psychological momentum(?) had to be continued, and I think Carter`s clearly earned great respect by doing that.

LEHRER: Where do you see the potential potholes that lie ahead, where it could come unraveled?

JONKOFF: Come unraveled in any number of places. Certainly one thing is absolutely essential, looking-at it from the American point of view of bringing the rest of the Arabs into making this the on-going process towards a comprehensive peace that Carter has promised. It`s(?) Israeli sincerity in moving towards some autonomy for the Palestinians. We simply cannot afford another debacle over settlements on the West Bank that followed Camp David which really started it on a downward slope.

LEHRER: Do you think that`s potentially the number one hazard?

JONKOFF: It`s hard to say what`s number one. There is - again, it`s withdrawal from the Sinai, there are many possible snags there in terms of the timing of removing bases and setting up various watch stations and so forth. Mr. Sisco and I watched the very painful process after Sinai II in `75, where many things were done from the Israeli side that simply undermined the credibility of Sadat and put him in a much worse position for moving the peace process forward.

LEHRER: Well much has been said that the Saudis must come on board quickly if this thing is going to work. Do you agree with that? Do you think they will come aboard as far as this treaty is concerned, and how important do you think it is that they do so?

JONKOFF: I think we need Saudi support. I don`t know that we need their enthusiasm or direct participation in this. And I think the Saudis are going to be very cautious, given their great concern for Arab unit, and I think they`re going to be very concerned in watching what happens in the rest of the Arab world. I think the Saudis are very concerned about the survival of Sadat and a moderate western oriented Egypt on their western flank.

The degree to which this treaty has been pushed to the point where more and more so it`s been only Sadat`s personality which has led to its approval rather than a broader Egyptian populace and especially the elite in Egypt, raise the question of if Sadat should be removed for any reason, what`s left in terms of an Egyptian commitment to a treaty.

LEHRER: Do the hard-line Arab states, or even the moderate ones like Saudi Arabia, anybody who`s interested in sabotaging this treaty, where is it vulnerable to that kind of sabotage? Assuming that the faith question that you raised in terms of the Israelis, goes through, where could they get this treaty?

JONKOFF: Well;-very much depends upon what happens to Sadat, and to the degree to which Sadat would become more isolated in the Arab world, and the Arab world turn against him, and clearly the position of Jordan is going to be very critical in terms of Jordan`s relationships with its neighbors and the Palestinians.

The Palestinians are a key factor here. The Palestinians simply cannot be left out, and I think another major factor in moving this process forward and let`s face it, the hard work is yet ahead. The key question is going to be, how much the American administration continues to do this hard work. And I think part of that hard work is going to ultimately and inevitably involve a renewed U.S. dialogue with the Plestinians.

LEHRER: All right, thank you.

Robin.

MACNEIL: Yes. That picks up on something you said Joe Sisco, a while ago. Can the U.S. now pull back from this very exposed diplomacy that Mr. Carter`s established, or does that establish a precedent that means we`re going to have to stay in the very center of it, in order to keep the momentum going?

SISCO: I believe Robin, we`re going to have to remain in the center, although I think all of us recognize that any negotiation in relationship to the West Bank and the Gaza is much more difficult, much more complex, and will be even more drawn out, in my judgment, than the negotiation in relationship to the Sinai.

Now, let me say parenthetically, that yes, there is concern in other parts of the Arab world, but in a place such as Saudi Arabia, in my judgment, there would have been much greater concern had President Carter failed to achieve this breakthrough.

Because I would agree with Mr. Jonkoff has aid, this is not synonymous with peace in the area. But it does strengthen the moderate forces. Sadat will be able to demonstrate what he has gotten from this particular deal and therefore, this reinforces the entire American role in the area, and the next focus will have to be on the West Bank and the Gaza.

MACNEIL: Do you believe, Mr. Lurie, from your own contacts in the Arab world, that it is likely that Jordan and Saudi Arabia will be, from the Egyptian point of view, able to see the light rapidly, and come on board in one form or another?

LURIE: As a matter of fact, I would say, about a year ago when I spoke with President Sadat in Cairo, in so many words he told me that King Hussein agreed already with an initiative. In brief, King Hussein was, you know, juggling around. The great thing that is happening now from the Saudi Arabian point of view, and the Jordanian point of view, if this deal goes through, finally, they have something to join. Until now, you`ll note, they had nothing to join. (GARBLED) on the table(?) was the animosity of the other Arab states. Now there is a block, okay.

MACNEIL: Okay. I just wonder, one more point briefly, Mr. Sisco, I asked you a week ago or so, when we looked at Mr. Carter setting off whether he was going to have to buy a treaty. Is it likely that the American people, when the details come out, are going to find themselves faced, and the Congress, with a rather large bill for the various guarantees necessary?

SISCO: Robin, it will be a large bill. But a very small one indeed, relative to the cost of money, material, and people in the event the Middle East were in time thrown into another war.

MACNEIL: Mr. Jonkoff, would you see that a bill where there might be any difficulties in the Congress?

JONKOFF: No, I don`t think so. I think the American people, particularly in the last 16 months, has had a tremendous, very valuable education in the realities of the Middle East. I think the problem has been that the achievements have been narrowed to smaller, and smaller proportions while the cost is going up and up.

MACNEIL: Well, we`ll have -- I hate to interrupt you. We`ll have to find out when Mr. Carter comes back as to the details what the cost-will really be.

Thank you both very much for joining us.

Good night Jim.

LEHRER: Good night Robin.

MACNEIL: Thanks Mr. Lurie.

That`s all for tonight. We`ll be back tomorrow night. I`m Robert MacNeil.

Good night.

(SIGNATURE MUSYC UP AND OUT)