The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Falklands -- Surrender?

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Fighting stopped in the Falkland Islands today. The British said they were arranging an Argentine surrender. The Argentines said only that their commander had agreed to a ceasefire until tomorrow morning so he could consult the junta in Buenos Aires. Late this evening, London time, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher went to the House of Commons and made this statement.

MARGARET THATCHER, British Prime Minister: After successful attacks last night, General Moore decided to press forward. The Argentinians retreated. Our forces reached the outskirts of Port Stanley. Large numbers of Argentine soldiers threw down their weapons. They are reported to be flying white flags over Port Stanley. Our troops have been ordered not to fire except in self-defense. Talks are now in progress between General Menendez and our deputy commander, Brigadier Waters, about the surrender of the Argentine forces on East and West Falkland.

MacNEIL: The ceasefire followed a sudden attack by British forces last night in which they took the last key Argentine positions overlooking the capital, Port Stanley. In Washington, Pentagon sources said their information was that Argentine forces were already surrendering. They said the Argentine commander, Gen. Menendez, gave up because the morale of his soldiers had been shattered by the British assaults and the naval blockade which had cut off their supplies of warm clothing, food and ammunition. Argentina seized the Falkland Islands on April 2nd. Tonight, what happens now that Britain has made good her pledge to retake them? Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, the Argentine leaders in Buenos Aires had said from the beginning they would never surrender, vowing to defend Port Stanley to the end, but apparently their military commanders on the ground in the Falklands or Malvinas came to a different conclusion today after some Argentine troops threw down their arms in the face of the British attacks, and white flags were hoisted over Port Stanley. We get an assessment of the Argentine situation now from Henry Raymont. Mr. Raymont lived in Argentina as a young man and then covered Argentina and the rest of Latin America as a journalist for 30 years, first for United Press and then The New York Times. Until recently, he worked for the Organization of American States, the OAS; he now writes articles for several Latin American newspapers and U.S. magazines, and does reports for National Public Radio. He returned a few days ago from Argentina. Does it sound to you as if this is a ceasefire or surrender dictated by what was happening on the grounds and the conclusions of the commanders, or by what was happening in Buenos Aires?

HENRY RAYMONT: Well, I think that General Menendez was considered the most diehard, to-the-last-blood commander, and my feeling is that the junta has decided that there has been enough bloodshed. General Galtieri has been saying this, although at the same time he had said, at various times, we will fight to the end. There's problem of semantics. I think, that Argentina undoubtedly will carry the Falklands-Malvinas case back to the United Nations. They now have the backing of the non-aligned bloc, and they will continue a very -- I presume -- a very aggressive international diplomatic campaign, which is what the previous government of General Viola had mapped out, and that was this was going to be done around the negotiating table and not on the battlefield.

LEHRER: How will the junta explain this to the Argentine people?

Mr. RAYMONT: There has been a very drastic change in mood. I would almost put it to the 3rd of June, when the newspapers on June 4th started carrying headlines in Buenos Aires that Suzuki and Mitterrand and Reagan were going to press Prime Minister Thatcher at Versailles to be more moderate and to agree to a ceasefire and to a negotiating position. And I think from that day on the writing was on the wall. And the mood in the city changed drastically; people became less aggressive against the British and against the Americans in the newspaper columns and -- with some exceptions.

LEHRER: But will the word "surrender" be used? I mean, what will be the explanation -- the rhetoric, for want of a better word -- that will surround this conclusion for Argentina?

Mr. RAYMONT: Well, theoretically, the worst thing that could be done is for the british to insist on humiliating the Argentines, driving them against the wall. Argentina has had several decades now of humiliating experiences in terms of their own internal upheaval; a country that at the turn of the century had true dreams of glory. It's a wealthy country and it saw itself as a potential world power. All this the Argentines saw go away through inflation and through political upheavals -- government coups; one government came, constitutional regimes fell without much of a murmer; various generals came in. All of this, I think, has demoralized the country, and when you're dealing with a country that has gone through that kind of a trauma, I think certain clinical principles would be well advised, and that is you do not corner them. And I think that if the British can moderate their rhetoric and call this a ceasefire and a withdrawal with some honor left, then --

LEHRER: And drop the word "surrender."

Mr. RAYMONT: Drop the word surrender, yes. Now, that may be politically costly, I'm sure Rod knows that, in London.

LEHRER: But let me ask you this, finally, from an Argentine standpoint. Do you think the junta can survive this and stay in power?

Mr. RAYMONT: I don't think that the chief of the navy can survive this because it was the navy more than any other branch in the armed forces that precipitated the invasion of April 2nd. And --

LEHRER: But you think General Galtieri can survive?

Mr. RAYMONT: He just may. He just may. He seems to display considerable humor, and if he can -- if he can appear as a rational leader who has seen that this has become too costly an exercise, I think it is possible that he can cling on, and he has -- in the last few weeks they have accelerated the move toward some kind of representative government, and there could be a coalition formed, a Cabinet with representatives of the political party where you have a civilian-military junta, perhaps, rather than strictly three generals.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: There will also be a political aftermath in London as Britain counts the cost of retaking and holding the islands. To assess that we have Rod MacLeish who has just returned from London where he was covering the Falklands story for National Public Radio. Rod, judging by the cheers we just heard in Parliament, the first reaction in Britain will be joy, perhaps understandably. What happens after the joy?

ROD MacLEISH: Well, I think, Robin, that a long, long road lies ahead. For starters, the British believe that a period -- a long period between the end of the war and the final resolution of the Falklands question must now be endured. This means probably garrisoning the Falkland Islands to some degree. To what degree militarily, we don't know. I think that Mrs. Thatcher's formula after May 19th, when the final negotiations broke down at the United Nations, was repossession, restoration, and reconstruction of the Falkland Islands. And it's important to remember that in a debate in the House of Commons on the afternoon of May the 20th, Mrs. Thatcher completely withdrew all previous British negotiating offers. So it looks to me as if negotiations of any substantial kind are a long way off. Britain has some real problems in trying to maintain her NATO obligations in the North Atlantic, especially the North Sea, while maintaining this military force that she deems necessary --

MacNEIL: So you think Margaret Thatcher is going to want to hold on -- the retaking of the islands having been more costly in lives and money than perhaps was first foreseen, she is now going to want to hold on to them for awhile?

Mr. MacLEISH: Oh, absolutely. I think there is no way politically she can give them up.

MacNEIL: What about the point we just heard Mr. Raymont discussing, that it would be better from an Argentinian point of view if the British didn't rub their noses in it; for instance, if they used "ceasefire" instead of "surrender." Is that likely?

Mr. MacLEISH: Well, these are semantic terms, Robin. The British are not a revanchist people.They're not a -- Mrs. Thatcher's government does not seek revenge and glory of that kind. They just aren't that kind of people. But I think there would be a massive distrust of the Argentines for a long time to come. The question of, will they start a harassing operation -- there will have to be a British attempt counter this diplomatic campaign -- worldwide diplomatic campaign and at the U.N. that Henry speaks of. But I think at home, domestically, the cost, the reckoning, of this war has yet to come. And that's the interesting part.

MacNEIL: How quickly will the political recriminations start up now that the actual fighting is over, with questions about why the Thatcher government let this happen in the first place?

Mr. MacLEISH: The first wave of recrimination will come from the left of the Labour Party -- Tony Benn's people, who have been against the war from the beginning, who in a rather fervid atmosphere in London still demonstrated against the war in public. They will begin. Then there will probably be some kind of inquiry, I would imagine, on the intelligence mess-up or lack of mess-up before the war began. Mrs. Thatcher told the House of Commons that the British only knew two days in advance before the invasion. That certainly will feature in an inquiry. I think when the cost sinks in and lives, materiel and so on -- the atmosphere -- the fervid atmosphere will cool. It's been a patriotic war. It's been a popular war. But I think there is always a time for second-guessing and second-thinking, and that should come within, oh, the next month or two, I would think.

MacNEIL: But is there any threat to Mrs. Thatcher herself politically?

Mr. MacLEISH: I wouldn't think so, no. I can't see any threat to Mrs. Thatcher. She is the Prime Minister of perhaps what will be Britain's last old-fashioned, conventional war.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Assuming the fighting is over in the Falklands, what special opportunities or problems are there for the United States now?Here to assess that part of the story, Riordan Roett, director of Latin American studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Mr. Roett is a specialist on southern South American politics, and is a frequent visitor to that area. Can the United States get involved again now?

RIORDAN ROETT: I think the U.S. probably should get involved again now. I think it's time for dealing with the realities of the situation, and that will require, I think, a good deal of diplomatic effort, and the U.S. should be involved.

LEHRER: Primarily in what effort specifically do you think there are some opportunities for the United States?

Mr. ROETT: I think task one is going to be for the U.S. to begin dealing with the British very quietly behind the scenes to try to influence the Thatcher government to deal with a good deal of patience and with a good deal of face-saving with the Argentinians.

LEHRER: To drop surrender from their rhetoric?

Mr. ROETT: I think that's absolutely essential, and to move forward towards a quick negotiated political settlement.

LEHRER: But you heard what Rod MacLeish just said, that that's not in the cards from the British point of view, that they are planning for an extended occupation or whatever before they sit down for any serious talks about the future of those islands.

Mr. ROETT: Countries have many publicly announced plans that can be changed, and I think that just as we stood very strongly behind the British during the war, we must now stand very strongly behind a political and negotiated settlement.

LEHRER: What would be the basic U.S. line to the British? I mean, what would be in it for the British to go along with U.S. pressure at this point?

Mr. ROETT: I think that the British have now reclaimed the islands.They have indeed demonstrated thay they do hold the islands.They have indeed proven sovereignty, and now it is time to move on to a final solution to the islands, and that ultimately is going to mean Argentine control of the islands themselves.

LEHRER: Do you think that it will be part of U.S. policy to try to preserve the junta and General Galtieri?

Mr. ROETT: I hope not. I don't believe it's our role in the world to preserve military juntas. I would hope that we would be supportive of whatever political process begins to emerge when the junta begins to change in composition, and I agree that, certainly one, if not more, members of the junta will probably disappear into the annals of military history very quickly in Argentina.

LEHRER: Meaning the head of the navy, as Mr. Raymont said?

Mr. ROETT: If not General Galtieri. I think there is a possibility that he may indeed have to become a scapegoat at some point.

LEHRER: Has the fighting stopped soon enough for the -- I started to say "reported," but I will just say it: The problems that the U.S.'s decision to side with Britain has caused in U.S.-Latin American relations for that to be healed?

Mr. ROETT: I think there is a great deal of controversy over how deep the wounds are in U.S.-Latin American relations. There is no question that Panama, Venezuela have taken a very public and strong position critical of the United States. It's also very true that Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and other countries have been very careful in their criticism of the United States. I don't see a general systemic crisis in the Americas, nor do I see the U.S. being driven out of Latin America. What I do see is a need for a rather thoughtful and sensitive reassessment of our ties, first, with Argentina, obviously, and, secondly, with those countries who have so strongly come out publicly in support of Argentina. That can be done, I think, diplomatically.

LEHRER: But can it be done diplomatically if the United States cannot get Great Britain to soften its approach toward Argentina in victory?

Mr. ROETT: Ah, that is the key question, and that is why I argued before, the U.S. must become involved quickly to begin to pressure the Britons to prove our good faith with the Latin Americans. And now that the war has come to an end, we do understand the importance of some form of unity in the hemisphere.

LEHRER: In other words, you don't believe Latin America would believe that the United States does not have clout with Great Britain right now?

Mr. ROETT: They would find, I think, it very difficult to accept that position.

LEHRER: Thank you.Robin?

MacNEIL: Further perspective on the changed military situation in the Falklands, now, from Jack Child, an expert on the Argentine armed forces. Mr. Child was born in Argentina, served in the U.S. Army as a Latin American specialist. He taught at West Point and the Inter-American Defense College.He is now assistant dean of the School of International Service at American University in Washington. Mr. Child, Argentine military sources were saying, as reported by the wire services this afternoon, that the General Menendez had been given permission to talk to the British as long as it did not compromise the honor of the argentine armed forces. Will this outcome be seen as an honorable outcome which has not compromised their honor?

JACK CHILD: It's possible. In order to do that the Argentines have to sell it first within their own military and then to their people as a moral victory, suggesting that what they did was not to surrender but simply to magnanimously agree to end the fighting so as to avoid further blood being shed. I think it's important to note that the Argentine military in particular has placed great emphasis on the fact that when they took the Malvinas-Falklands on the 2nd of April not a drop of British blood was spilled, and they've always maintained that it has been the British who have been the aggressors. So I think they may try to present it along those lines, perhaps making reference to the Pope's call for an end to bloodshed, and say that they are the ones who have made the magnanimous gesture. If they can do that and do it successfully, they may survive.

MacNEIL: From your knowledge of the Argentine military leaders in Buenos Aires, will they simply go away now and forget about this?

Mr. CHILD: No, they won't. If I can quote one of the retired military leaders who was president, President Lanusse, he said, "This battle may end, but the war continues." And several of the Argentine military have taken the same line, that perhaps this may be a temporary setback, but the struggle will continue. And, again, there are several historical precedents in Argentine history suggesting that they have faced up to the British, have taken initial losses, and in the long run come back and achieved their objectives.

MacNEIL: I heard from I forget what source this afternoon some Argentinians speculating on a kind of Dunkirk, that they'd take their man out, but like the British, come back. Does that make sense to you?

Mr. CHILD: Yes, it does, not necessarily in the same way. I think you're going to see variants, butI think they will continue the struggle at several levels -- political/diplomatic at one level. I think they would be inclined to continue harassment, to increase the tremendous price that the British may have to pay to keep those islands.

MacNEIL: You mean not confining themselves to the diplomatic channels of the United Nations, but actually physically and militarily harassing the British?

Mr. CHILD: Yes, I think that's a very real possibility.

MacNEIL: What would it take -- turning around now -- what would it take militarily for Britain to hold onto the islands, given the danger of such military harassment by the Argentinians?

Mr. CHILD: In a word, a great deal. And it's a fairly complicated process. You would need to have a land garrison of some size. You would need to have a fairly extensive air defense, an air defense artillery system to confront any aircraft coming across. You would also have to have some kind of protection against the submarines, which implies that anything coming to the Falkland Islands-Malvinas from Great Britain would have to be convoyed in some way if the Argentines choose to use submarines.

MacNEIL: Would that mean that the British would have to put more into the islands than they've found necessary simply to retake them?

Mr. CHILD: No. I think the overall scale of effort would drop, but it would still be a substantial effort.

MacNEIL: I see. Do you believe that the Argentinians are likely, just from your knowledge of the military mine there, to want to keep on harassing, or, like officers and gentlemen, will say, "Okay, you've won this one, and we'll leave off for awhile"?

Mr. CHILD: Well, at one point it seemed as though there was kind of a 19th century, or even earlier, chivalric attitude. You recall the episode when the British surrendered and the sword business and the handshake. I think there is some of that, but the Argentines are also rather bitter about a few other incidents, such as the sinking of the Belgrano, which, as you recall, was done outside the so-called rules of the game. So there may be an inclination to say the British are not being terribly sportsmanlike, and therefore we have a right to break a few rules ourselves.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Do you expect that to happen, too, Henry Raymont, that even if there is a ceasefire, even if there is a surrender in terms of Port Stanley, that the Argentine government will continue the military effort in one way or another?

Mr. RAYMONT: It's possible, but I found considerable sentiment, not expressed publicly, but considerable sentiment in Buenos Aires that the invasion had been a terrible mistake and miscalculation, and miscalculating the reaction of the British. On the other hand, it is also true that the sinking of the Sheffield that came the day after the Belgrano, and very heavy losses inflicted on the British navy by the Argentine air force mainly, has sort of balanced a [unintelligible], their self-esteem, and I think there is a possibility for reaching some kind of a gentleman-like accord because remember that the Argentine forces who were sent to the island are conscripts. I mean, they've had at best six months of military training. And the British sent professional soldiers in. And I think all these things are going to be played up.The British sort of lived up to a colonial or imperial caricature by sending in the Gurkhas. And the Argentines made a big thing and they said, "We're going to send in the Guchier of the Corrientes." These are guys who fight with long knives. Well, they didn't send them in, but it was a nice sort of symbolic retort to the British affront.

LEHRER: Let me ask Rod MacLeish this question: when Alexander Haig and Ronald Reagan do as, around the table here everybody seems to think they ought to do, particularly Mr. Roett, which is to really try to put some pressure on the British and say, "Look, cool it a little bit. Drop surrender; do all of these kinds of things," do you think the word surrender -- do you think the British are going to be susceptible to U.S. pressure on this?

Mr. MacLEISH: I would think after a few days probably. But all this presupposes that the process of reconciliation is going to begin. Mrs. Thatcher used the word surrender in the House of Commons tonight, and given the patriotic and political atmosphere in Britain, I can understand why she did it. It's a moment of euphoria, obviously, for her.She is speaking to her own people; she has political problems of her own in the future. But remember the British have just won a war, and I think U.S. pressure -- it depends on what the United States wants to pressure them to do.They will certainly not be able to pressure the British into immediate negotiations.

LEHRER: What about withdrawal of British troops in exchange, say, for a United Nations or a multinational force to occupy the islands?

Mr. MacLEISH: Well, this was -- there was much talk of this in Whitehall last week and the week before. I take it that when President Reagan came to London on his tour that this was raised with him and with his officials, and it was very clear that the Americans were not in on this one. The British have believed -- they did believe that if there is to be a force, a third-party force, it has got to include Western Hemisphere people. And where are you going to get Latin Americans who would serve on that force? And apparently this country will not.

LEHRER: Jack Child, let me ask you. If Britain insists on staying there and follows the garrison scenario that Rod MacLeish laid out earlier and that Mrs. Thatcher has laid out earlier, will that be considered such an irritant to Argentina and the military that they will have to do something to react?

Mr. CHILD: Yes, I think they'll be portrayed as colonial invaders, intruders, and I think there will be a lot of pressure within the inter-American system, attempts to get the Latin American allies -- and, agreed, there are various shades of allies -- to support Argentina. But I think this could be a very, very expensive grinding down, a political war of attrition, if you will, over the long run.

LEHRER: Yeah. Do you agree with that, Mr. Roett?

Mr. ROETT: Yeah, I think the cost to the United States can be far greater after the fighting ends than the cost we've paid during the fighting.Emotional moments, I think, of reaction to support Argentina can be understood in Venezuela and in Panama. If we get into a situation where the British refuse to withdraw, refuse to negotiate, then the U.S. begins to pay a very, very high political cost in this hemisphere.

Mr. MacLEISH: I think we have just defined the coming crunch if the British won't get off.

MacNEIL: Well, I was going to ask you about that, Rod MacLeish. Mr. Roett said earlier the final solution is inevitably Argentine control of the islands. Does it seem that way in Britain?

Mr. MacLEISH: No. It was up until May 19th -- 'til the collapse of negotiations. But the important thing to keep im mind is Mrs. Thatcher, on the afternoon of May the 20th, in a debate in the House of Commons, formally withdrew every previous British offer made in negotiations, concluding, as one official said to us in Whitehall, "The Argentinians are not serious about negotiation." Now, with lives having been lost, with ships having been sunk, with this immense effort undertaken, there is no way that Mrs. Thatcher, even if she wished to, could say, "Okay, that's it. Let's pack up our bags and go home." I think, as I say, the talk in Whitehall is of this six- to 12-month interim period, and one presumes that means a garrisoning period.

MacNEIL: Mr. Roett, there is also talk that one has seen reported of perhaps making the Falklands an independent nation. Where does the possibility sit in your view?

Mr. ROETT: I think it's mandness. I think we're dealing with a situation where the immediate response from the British and from others is highly emotional. We need to understand that.And we also need to understand that the British would have a very difficult time maintaining their independent posture with regard to their allies in Europe and the United States if they insist -- if they insist on going against all good reason and counsel from the United States.

MacNEIL: How would an independent Falkland nation be viewed in Argentina, Mr. Raymont?

Mr. RAYMONT: Well, I agree with Riordan. I think that it's considered a joke because people are aware that Britain had no compunction about removing islanders, I think it was from Mauritius, when I think there were several hundred thousand Asians, but they are very insistent on standing on the rights of 1,800 kelpers. And I think the racial issue, by the bye, is another one that is being stressed, and that I think can have very detrimental effects on the whole inter-American community because you're now getting more and more the term Anglo-Saxon -- "The Anglo-Saxon alliance against us Latins." And Argentina, which had always been aloof from the rest of Latin America, is now emerging as something of a textbook case of Latin American unity around the brother who is being castigated by the Anglo-Saxons. And I hope that there is enough tolerance and enough -- a moment of reasoning now -- and going back to some history, too, where --

MacNEIL: I'm afraid we haven't got time this evening to go back into the history, Mr. Raymont. That is our time for this evening. Thank you all, Mr. Raymont, Mr. Roett, Mr. Child and Mr. MacLeish for joining us. Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night, Robin.

MacNEIL: That's all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.