The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; B-1 Debate

[Tease]

ROBERT MacNEIL [voice-over]`. This is the B-l bomber. President Carter said we didn`t need it. President Reagan says we do. But he faces mounting opposition that says the B-I bomber is a waste of money.

[Titles]

MacNEIL: Good evening. The Navy marked Veterans Day today by commissioning the new Trident-class nuclear submarine, U.S.S. Ohio. Vice President George Bush officiated at the ceremony at Groton, Connecticut, where the Navy took command of the most expensive vessel in its history. The Trident cost $1.2 billion. Meanwhile in Washington, a new battle is raging over equipment for another part of the strategic nuclear forces, the manned bombers. At his news conference yesterday. President Reagan strongly defended his decision to build 100 B-l bombers, the plane President Carter canceled as unnecessary. Fresh opposition to the bomber has built up in Congress on two grounds -- that it may be virtually obsolete by the time it`s finished, and that it will cost too much. Adding fuel to the opposition is the feeling among many congressmen that if budget deficits require more spending cuts, some will have to come out of defense. Tonight, two questions: does the United States need the B-l, and can we afford it? Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, first, on "do we need it?" Those who answer yes, including President Reagan, argue for the B-1 on the basis of a gap, a gap they claim that will develop between the declined effectiveness of the current but aging B-52 bomber fleet, and the development of the super new bomber known officially as the advanced technology bomber, known popularly as Stealth. Here to give us that argument is General Robert Mathis, the vice-chief of the Air Force. He`s a 33-year veteran of the Air Force, a former fighter pilot, who held several major commands before becoming the Air Force`s number-two man in March, 1980. General, President Carter concluded four years ago that the B-l wasn`t needed. Was he just dead wrong, or have things changed since then?

Gen. ROBERT MATHIS: Well, I think a number of things have changed along the way. Of course, I think at the time we believed that we needed the B-1 at that time; I think we need it today. I think President Reagan has reviewed that program, and he is assured that we need it today. We have a very old B-52 fleet. The oldest ones are built in the mid-`50s; the newest ones in the early `60s. And I think it`s time that we need a new bomber.

LEHRER: Now this gap that I mentioned. Explain that to me in the simplest possible terms. For instance, the B-52 fleet. You say it`s aging. When is it going to lose its effectiveness in terms of being able to penetrate Russian airspace?

Gen. MATHIS: It should be able to penetrate for some time; it`s a matter of degree. As we go on through the `80s, the Russian defenses will become stiffer and stiffer, and this B-52 which was built a long time ago will be more and more expensive to modify and to maintain. We need to put new electronic countermeasures equipment on it so it can counter the Russian radar, so that it can penetrate. And as we go farther into the 1980s, we`ll find it more and more difficult to do that job without having a new bomber, one in which we have new methods for penetrating.

LEHRER: And the B-l, under an ideal plan, would be operational -- these 100 B-l`s would be operational when?

Gen. MATHIS: Well, the first squadrons should be operational by 1986, and then the others will come on soon after that. And they will be operating in the latter part of this decade, and then on -- they should be able to penetrate, though, in the Soviet Union, if need be, on into the mid-`90s.

LEHRER: AH right, now, how does that B-l, then, fit into the time frame in terms of when the Stealth would be developed and available?

Gen. MATHIS: The Stealth should be available -- in the early 1990s we believe we`ll have the first of those in. Now, you have to understand that the B-l is essentially a known quantity, while the B-1 that we`re building today would be a different one than we were going to build four years ago because we`ve improved the technology since that time. The Stealth is still a number of years off. We know generally what we want to build, but we have a full development program to go yet.

LEHRER: Well, as you know, and as Robin mentioned, one of the crucial arguments against the B-l has always been that it will be obsolete by the time it`s operational. How do you respond to that basic question?

Gen. MATHIS: Well, that`s been the argument by a number of people along the way for almost any new weapons system. They`re always looking ahead to something that some day will be better, and let`s not spend the money on what we`re building today. But I submit that right now we have our young men standing alert on airplanes that are between 19 and 25 years of age, and I think it`s time we need to change that.

LEHRER: Are there any other missions that the B-1 is designed to accomplish besides being able to deliver nuclear strikes inside the Soviet Union?

Gen. MATHIS: The B-l will be a very flexible airplane. It will be able to carry out a conventional role that`d be such as carrying bombs to far- distant places. It will be a method by which we can project our strategic power around the world.

LEHRER: General, if the B-l is not built now, what do you think the consequences of that decision would be?

Gen. MATHIS: I think we`ll have some difficult days ahead. I think it`s going to be very expensive to maintain the B-52 fleet. It will be expensive to modify them to try to make sure that they will still be able to penetrate the Soviet defenses. After all, if you give up on trying to be able to penetrate, then they can concentrate all of their defenses on the standoff portion of our fleet. It makes it very easy for them.

LEHRER: And the military consequences of that would be what?

Gen. MATHIS: Well, I think at some point if you let your strategic forces decline, you left yourself open for blackmail.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: With the other side of the argument we have a man who has been following the B-l controversy since 1976. He is Dr. Gordon Adams, senior research fellow at the Council on Economic Priorities, a non-profit group which researches issues concerning defense, employment and the economy. His study of the B-I has been part of an ongoing project on waste and accountability in defense spending. You have heard what the General says, Dr. Adams. He says basically the country needs the B-l to tide it over between the aging B-52 fleet and the oncoming but yet untried Stealth bomber.

Dr. GORDON ADAMS: Yes, Robin, that is the argument that is often made, and what is not realized is that in fact we have a penetrating system that is in fact cheaper than the B-1 bomber, and more certain than the B-1 bomber, has a longer lifetime than the B-1 bomber, has been extensively researched, and is actually ready now. Somehow, the combination of the B-52 and the Cruise missile has been left out of this discussion. And I think, in a sense, Jimmy Carter was right to cancel the B-1 in 1977, because he had available an option -- the Cruise missile -- which would be capable on the B-52 of penetrating those improved Soviet air defenses until the 21st century. Now, what`s interesting about that is that the testimony of the Air Force itself -- General Ellis, the former SAC commander; General Burke, who is the R&D chief there; and General Allen, who is General Mathis` immediate superior -- have all testified over the past four or five years that the B-52 as an aircraft is structurally sound until the 21st century, to be used in that role.

MacNEIL: So in other words you`re saying, even though the Soviets have improved their air defenses and the B-52 sometime soon wouldn`t, by itself, be able to get past them, it can go up to them and fire Cruise missiles beyond them, and that that would do the task that General Mathis says the B-l is needed for?

Dr. ADAMS: That`s correct, Robin. We have put -- as Genera] Mathis knows -- about $ 10 billion into modifying and upgrading those B-52s. They were once very old aircraft. They now have some new wing skins; they now have some new insides; they have new electronic countermeasures. And we have put a lot of investment of taxpayers` monies into making those aircraft that can gradually supplement their penetration role with a Cruise missile carrying role that will do the penetration job in place of the bomber for 20 more years.

MacNEIL: Well, what do you say to the argument that President Reagan made at his news conference yesterday, that the B-l would be something like 100 times harder for Soviet radar and air defenses to detect than the B-52?

Dr. ADAMS: Well, the one thing that is certain -- and I suspect he is correct -- the B-1 is certainly a less visible aircraft than the B-52. Many defense experts do feel that improve-ments in radar are very likely to catch up with that penetration capability rather rapidly. Radar is very capable of adapting in that way. What is interesting is that the Cruise missile has an even smaller, what they call, radar cross-section than the B-1. And that missile can be adapted even with elements of the Stealth technology that we`re now researching to become even less visible.

MacNEIL: If it would cost a lot of money, and we`re going to get into the cost itself a bit later, but if it would cost a lot of money to upgrade and keep up to date the old B-52 bombers, why are you against replacing them with the B-1 bomber?

Dr. ADAMS: I`m not so sure that it would cost more to keep the B-52 in that Cruise carrier role until the year 2000. In fact, Appropriations Committee testimony by the Air Force recently suggested it was. as a program, significantly cheaper than building the B-1. See, we don`t know what the B- l is going to cost, and I`m sure we`ll have some discussion about that. The figures change wildly. But we do know we`re going to have a capable system.

MacNEIL: What have you got against the B-1 in its strategic role as outlined by its defenders -- and you just heard it by General Mathis -- what have you got against the B-l itself?

Dr. ADAMS: Its penetration capability, I think, is not significantly better than the B-52. of which we have more than twice as many. And, as a Cruise missile carrier, it is totally redundant with the system I`ve been describing. We have an air-based, penetrating strategic system in the B-52 plus the Cruise, and lots of time to look forward to its replacement, The B-1 is simply redundant.

MacNEIL: What about the other argument that the B-l has an added role as an up-to-date conventional bomber which could fly American forces or bombs to places like the Persian Gulf?

Dr. ADAMS: Well, I suspect, Robin, if you ask any Department of Defense personnel what they would like, the answer is always, "More." In the conventional area, we have rather significant capabilities that we`re putting considerable money into now, ranging from the FB-111 and the F-111 s, many of which are stationed in Europe, and therefore within range of conventional targets. When we have other aircraft with considerable range like the F-I6, the F-15 and the F-14 and the oncoming F-18 that are carrier-based, all of which are capable of both fighter and bomber activity in a conventional mode, at $300 million a crack, the B-l simply strikes us as an excessive duplication of a large capability for conventional bombing.

MacNEIL: General Mathis, you heard Dr. Adams say that the B-52 fleet equipped with Cruise missiles can do it into the 21st century and you don`t need the B-l.

Gen. MATHIS: Well, I understand. I`m not quite sure where he gets all his data at this point in time because -- in the first place, I`d like to answer one question. He mentioned that the cost figures were varying wildly, and I`d like to say that the cost figures that we submitted last spring have not been changed except for the additional costs that we added in there for the carrying of Cruise missiles on the B-l. But to get back to the --

MacNEIL: Strategic role.

Gen. MATHIS: Right. But, to get back to the matter of whether the B-52 will or will not carry Cruise missiles, certainly it will. I agree completely that the B-52 will last a long time. We`ve modified it; we`ve spent a lot of money on it. It will in fact carry Cruise missiles, but it`s also a very large machine. It has a radar cross-section -- that is, it is visible to a radar about 100 times more than the B-l -- the B-52 is. Now, then, as it goes in -- as we get to the end of this century, we`ll find that it`ll be harder and harder for the B-52 to penetrate. So then we go to the argument, "Welt, we`ll just stand off and fire the Cruise missiles in." That`s fine, except that this now allows the Soviets to change all their tactics in their defense, makes it much easier for `em because now we stand off and all they have to worry about are the Cruise missiles. But, one other thing that comes to bear --

MacNEIL: Can I interrupt you for a moment --

Gen. MATHIS: Certainly.

MacNEIL: -- and just get Dr. Adams` response on that point -- that that`s going to make it a lot easier for the Soviets, because all they have to do is defend themselves against Cruise missiles.

Dr. ADAMS: Well, I think the General is well aware, as I`ve said, that the Cruise missile has a smaller -- much smaller -- radar cross-section than the B-1 itself, and is going to exist in much larger numbers than any B-l bomber that`s penetrating Soviet airspace. I would say that, in effect, by putting 3,400 Cruise missiles on B-52s, we`re complicating the Soviet Union`s problem, not making it easier.

MacNEIL: What about that, General?

Gen. MATHIS: Well, we`ll still have B-52s going in with Cruise missiles. We`ll be able to carry Cruise missiles on the B-1, for that matter, so we`re not giving up all our Cruise missiles in order to do this. But there`s one thing that we have not addressed, and that is the fact that we do need to have a B-1 enabled to go in and penetrate so that we can find these imprecisely located targets. Now, I`m not talking about mobile targets such as just a tank or something, but I`m talking about the Soviet field armies, which we believe that if we get involved in a war with them, they will have these field armies out away from their population centers, from their normal targets, and these are what we will need the B-l to go after.

MacNEIL: So they`d have a reconnaissance role as well as a bombing role, you mean?

Gen. MATHIS: Well, they`ll be going in, at some extent, with their radar locating these other targets and going after them, and this is what it takes a manned, penetrating bomber to do.

MacNEIL: Well, what about that, Dr. Adams?

Dr. ADAMS: Oh, I suspect that in the combination that we have of other fighter aircraft and other radar, in addition to satellite surveillance, we`ll be in a pretty good position in any real combat to know where those field armies are located. They don`t move that fast, and we`ll be able to target and retarget systems we need to strike them.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Moving now to the second question concerning the B-l: can we afford it? Afford how much? -- follows that one immediately because not everyone does agree on what it will cost to build those 100 B-l`s. The Air Force -- the Pentagon -- says it`s $200 million a plane at current prices, some $20.5 billion total, but a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee heard testimony this week on that issue, and concluded that it was low and decided to add 3% to the estimated cost, up to $22 billion. That is still much lower than a recent Congressional Budget Office estimate. The CBO says everybody`s fudging the figures. The real cost will be close to double the Pentagon estimates, nearly $40 billion in all, or $400 million per B-l. Pinning down that cost is part of what`s involved in the congressional argument over to fund or not to fund the B-l. We join it now with two senators, both members of the Senate Appropriations Committee`s Defense Subcommittee, each with a different view on B-1. There`s Senator Ernest Hollings, Democrat of South Carolina, and Senator Jake Gam, Republican of Utah. Senator Hollings, first, where do you come down on how much these planes are going to actually cost?

Sen. ERNEST HOLLINGS: There`s no question about the CBO figures. They`re on target. In fact, after all, it was President Reagan who just recently, you know, quoted Dr. Alice Rivlin and the CBO as an authority. So what you have is really about $400 million a copy. And there`s no question but what -- let me go right to the need for a new bomber. We looked for one back in the `60s, and you remember the B-70 was canceled by McNamara, and then we looked for one in 1977 that was canceled by President Carter. And the Air Force, if they really knew they could have a successor to that B-52, like the Stealth, that was going to be built, they`d give up on the B-l because it has only got a three-year usefulness. There isn`t any question about that. I can quote Secretary Weinberger here, just last week. He says, "I think there`s no question whatever that we will not be able to use the B-l as a penetrator after 1990." Now, that`s Secretary Weinberger, so you`re going to get them, really, in 1987. When they used the `86 figure earlier this year, that was October, `86. We`re already two or three months gone into this fiscal year; we`re lucky to get a defense appropria-tions bill for next year. So it`s slipped for `87. You got a three-year usage for a $400-million plane, and you just can`t justify that. We do need a penetrator bomber, and we gonna get one in the Stealth, and there`s no question about its technology. It works.

LEHRER: Senator Garn, first, where do you come down on how much it`s going to cost? Do you go with the CBO or do you go with the Pentagon?

Sen. JAKE GARN: Well, Jim, first of all, we`re not comparing oranges and apples. We in the Defense Subcommittee added 3% per year, which was an average cost overrun of many airplanes built over the past 20 years. And then we added 10% inflation per year. The CBO estimate put some things into the B-1, and some structural changes that are simply not going to be made. But I think it probably will eventually, over the life cycle of the airplane, including all the costs, cost close to $40 billion. But I don`t think that is the real issue at this point all by itself. I wish I had time to debate point by point Dr. Adams. He is entitled to his opinions; he is not entitled to his own facts, and some of those things he states are facts are utterly ridiculous in his scenario. I never cease to be amazed at people who have no personal or practical experience who sit in think tanks and come up with these scenarios. But we don`t have time to do that. But let me say this. The B-l is an old, outmoded bomber. I disagree with the General. I don`t believe it will be a penetrator even for another three or four years, if it is now.

LEHRER: You mean the B-52?

Sen. GARN: The B-52, excuse me. The B-52. Many of the crews that are flying it were not born when it became operational. To say that it is structurally sound into the 1990s -- John Coburn and I argued that four years ago. So is the DC-3. What`s it going to do? You gotta look at capabilities. I`ve flown both the B-l and the B-52 personally. You talk about low-altitude capabilities. The stability from a pilot`s standpoint -- entirely different. To just throw these figures out, as Dr. Adams did, don`t make any sense in that comparison. Let me finish this point, because the other side of it -- this is not just an interim bomber. The Stealth is a paper airplane. It does not exist. It was leaked during a presidential campaign, and the existence of the program shouldn`t even be known. We shouldn`t even be debating it now.

That has stimulated the Soviets to change their defense bureaus and what they`re doing in their defense. I would be willing to bet anybody on this program that you will not have an operational Stealth bomber before 1995. That`s 14 years away. The B-l has a lot of capabil-ities the Stealth does not have, and will continue well beyond the year 2000 as a conventional bomber, as a penetrator. We need the B-I on its own merits. We can`t afford an old airplane and the costs of upgrading it, and we can`t afford to bet on a paper airplane that does not exist except on somebody`s think tank drawing board.

LEHRER: Do you take Senator Gain`s bet, Senator Hollings?

Sen. HOLLINGS: No, I can tell you now, I`m on that Defense Appropriations Committee. Senator Gam was not at the briefing of the CIA. Ordinarily I wouldn`t reveal it except it was on the front page of the Washington Post, and we had a very thorough briefing -- "we" being Senator Stevens, the chairman of that subcommittee, and myself -- and there`s no question about penetration capability up until 1990. The B-52 equals the B-l. There`s no doubt in my mind about it. I`m not playing games with the penetration capability. But thereupon in 1990 you`ve got Secretary Weinberger, you`ve got Fred Ikle, the assistant secretary of defense, right on down the line. So what you`re really going to have to move to is that Stealth bomber, and that`s going to be the penetration bomber.

LEHRER: Now, he says it`s a paper airplane. Isn`t that --

Sen. HOLLINGS: Well, look at the Air Force -- we`ve got the penetration -- I mean, the Stealth fighter right now in the last month issue, the Lockheed Stealth fighter. We`ve got a program -- the production program is funded at approximately $1 billion. That`s in the open right here for fiscal 1983 for Stealth fighters. I wish we could go into it thoroughly. There`s no question in my mind. I`m not playing games on that one. We`ve got the technology and it`s working.

LEHRER: What about the simple question of the -- not very simple question, but the question of budget priorities now?

Sen. HOLUNGS: Well, that`s the important one. Now, what do I do with really $40 billion? I`ve got all kind of bombers that`s been listed here. You got the F-15, F-15E coming, the F-18, the F-16 was used by the Israelis to bomb Baghdad, and everything down the line to E-6s, the E-7s. Now, for a penetration bomber, and that`s what I want, I`m going to have to go to my Stealth. I`m going to have to jump that technology about three years, and come forward and use that monies to get to my army and navy in readiness all outfitted. You`ve got half of the army is in civilian clothes. That`s the National Guard and Reserve, and they don`t have any equipment. We got F-15 planes mat are grounded now. We don`t have the parts. We just pulled one carrier out of the Indian Ocean. We`ve cut back on steaming arrows; we cut back on fuel; we don`t have but one week`s supply of ammunition in a lot of places. They have got 50,000 tanks; we`ve only got 9,000 tanks. They`ve got 290 submarines; we`ve got 91. I`m trying to play catch-up ball. They got 76 T-80 [?] infantry fighting vehicles; I`ve got zero. I need priority for my army in readiness right now.

Sen. GARN: Let`s talk about the CIA testimony for a minute. No, I wasn`t at that briefing, but I have served on the Select Committee on Intelligence for the last five years. I`ve had those briefings many, many times. The CIA testified about early warning radar, and the B-l and the B-52 are essentially the same -- to discover that they are coming. That is an entirely different operation than target acquisition, tracking and destroying.

LEHRER: What about the --

Sen. GARN: Entirely different. When you have a difference -- I`ve looked at many radar scopes of 1/I00th difference in radar cross section; it`s absolutely ridiculous to say that the penetrating capabilities of a B-I and a B-52 are the same. I`m going to get Fritz, who is my friend, to look at a radar scope sometime with me, and we`ll show him exactly what the difference of that is.

Sen. HOLLINGS: I served in radars during World War III. I`ve seen many a scope, to my regret, during a three-year period.

Sen. GARN: During World War III?

Sen. HOLLINGS: World War II.

LEHRER: What about the priorities question, quickly, Senator? You heard what Senator Hollings said on it.

Sen. GARN: I think I`ve already outlined it. We are badly deficient in strategic systems. We have delayed decisions on MX for years, so we`ve injured that leg of the triad. Now, by not building the B-l in 1971, we`ve reduced the effectiveness of that. Fifty-two percent of our warheads are at sea. It is time we got on with building up these other legs of the triad. No old, outmoded airplane that isn`t capable anymore, regardless of what you do to it. And as far as priorities, I will submit to you that if you continue the B-1 and the FB- III, that the cost of that will be very, very close to building a B-1 and the Stealth. Now, if you got that choice and the cost is about the same, do you have two modem bombers or do you have an old one?

LEHRER: Robin?

MacNEIL: General, is the cost of the B-l option in danger of siphoning money off and slowing down development of the Stealth?

Gen. MATHIS: No, we`ve got -- well, it depends on what the total budget is here, but I think that we have set the price on the B-I -- we came out with $19.5, or $19.7 billion. We added $800 million in order to carry the Cruise missiles, and we have a very tight control on changes. I think that we`ll bring it in fairly close, but I think, as Senator Gam pointed out, that the cost in the long run here to keep just the B-52 and the FB-111 in the inventory to year 2000 -- that cost is going to be more than it will be to develop both the B-1 and the Stealth airplane and maintain them to the year 2000.

MacNEIL: Do you have a comment on that, Dr. Adams?

Dr. ADAMS: Well, it`s a simple disagreement on data, both sets of data having been supplied by the Department of Defense to the appropriations committees, which, I should point out to Senator Gam, whose point he had I seem to represent -- the source for all of this data on the abilities of the B-52 combined with the Cruise missile are in fact testimony delivered before committees on which he sits and on which other senators sit. That is to say, this is government testimony. These are not facts pulled out of a hat somewhere. We have a capability, and we don`t, in fact, I`m arguing, have a gap. The cost and maintenance of these systems to the year 2000, reasonable people can disagree. The figures that I have seen are that if you maintain the B-52 with air-launched Cruise missiles and develop Stealth, you`ll be spending something on the order of $91 billion in fiscal `82 dollars. If you maintain the B-l as a Cruise carrier to the year 2000 and add Stealth -- 132 Stealth bombers -- the figures on cost that I have seen are $115 billion. It may seem like a lot or a little, but it`s a $24- billion difference in fiscal 1982 dollars,

MacNEIL: Senator Gam, do you want to comment on that? As Dr. Adams says, we don`t have a gap.

Sen. GARN: Well, first of all, I believe we do. The Soviets continue to build a backfire bomber after we canceled the B-1. But let me, for a hypothetical reason, accept his figure of $24 billion difference. I would certainly be willing, even if his figures are correct, to accept that $24 billion difference for a B-1 and a Stealth rather than continuing an old, outmoded airplane. It just doesn`t make any sense. The difference in capabilities are so dramatically different. The B-l is a conventional bomber as well. Senator John Glenn, in 1977, defended the B-1 totally on the basis of a conventional bombing mode alone -- forgetting the strategic options. I don`t think you can really compare a B-l and a B-52, any more than you can compare the Spirit of St. Louis and an F-15.

MacNEIL: Senator Hollings, what do you say? That the difference of $24 billion is im-material because you just need that increased capability so badly?

Sen. HOLLINGS: The difference in $24 billion means everything. For one thing, the President`s present defense budget for the next three years is off in inflationary figures -- the inflation rate -- by $24 to $25 billion. Now, what we could do with that $24-$25 billion is actually make the remainder of his defense budget -- really, which is the defense budget -- honest. It is more or less truth in budgeting. We`ve got people right now - - the chairman of the Budget Committee has a proposal to cut some $25 billion over the next three years. The chairman of the Appropriations Committee has a proposal to cut the budget some $25 billion. I`m trying to hold that $25 billion, and I can`t afford to take this expensive move with $400 million an airplane just for a three-year period when I know I can get the Stealth in 1990. And they`ve testified to that, and I probably could get it a little bit earlier. The technology is there, and it`s been proved. We need this money for so many other things in the Defense Depart-ment.

MacNEIL: We have to end it there, Senator. Thank you and Senator Gam for joining us this evening; General Mathis, thank you; Dr. Adams, thank you. Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night, Robin.

MacNEIL: That`s all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.