The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Carter and the B1 Bomber

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This program is made possible in part by grants from public television stations, the corporation for public broadcasting, ex-on corporation, and the Ford Foundation. . This has been one of the most difficult decisions that I've made since I've been in office. In the last few months, I've done my best to assess all the factors involved involving production of the V1 bomber. My decision is that we should not continue with deployment of the V1. And I am directing that we discontinue plans for production of this weapon system. Good evening.

President Carter stunned and angered a lot of people today by following a consistent line from his rhetoric as a presidential candidate to a decision as President. He killed the V1 bomber project. During the campaign and particularly in a statement to the Democratic platform committee last summer, Carter had called the V1 a wasteful program that should not be funded. His press conference announcement this morning followed that same line that there were other ways of accomplishing the same defense purposes without the super expensive V1. So why then the surprise reaction today? Well, because most everyone had believed the recent leaks and hints that the president was going to reverse his campaign position and come out in favor of the V1. That was the word all over Washington and the House had even voted 243 to 178 last Wednesday to appropriate funds for the project. Republican House Minority Leader John Rhodes thus called the Carter decision a gratuitous insult to the House. GOP National Chairman Bill Brock called the decision a tragic error.

Another Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina said it hinders our position with the Soviets. All of the reaction was not negative, of course. V1 opponents were just as vigorous in their praise of the decision. Senators George McGovern, John Culver and Robert Byrd using terms like Wise, a victory for common sense, a prudent decision. Well, tonight we examine the president's decision and the reaction to it. And first, Ashina Alexander, who was sitting in for Robert McNeil in New York. As the uproar in Washington indicates, the V1 is something more than just another airplane. This was the plane that could do almost anything. Both fly at supersonic speeds or fly under Soviet radar, only 200 feet off the ground at 600 miles per hour. Not surprisingly, it would have been the most expensive combat plane in history, each one costs about $102 million. But at his press conference this morning, the president emphasized that he had based his decision to abandon the V1 on military grounds alone. And that he had some support on this from the Pentagon.

The Secretary of Defense agrees that this is a preferable decision. And he will have a news conference tomorrow morning to discuss this issue in whatever detail you consider necessary. The existing testing and development program now underway on the B1 should continue to provide us with a needed technical base in the unlikely event that more cost effective alternative systems should run into difficulty. Continued efforts at the research and development stage will give us better answers about the cost and effectiveness of the Varma and support systems, including electronic countermeasures techniques. During the coming months, we will also be able to assess the progress toward agreements on strategic arms limitations in order to determine the need for any additional investments in nuclear weapons delivery systems. In the meantime, we should begin deployment of cruise missiles using air-launched platforms, such as our V52s modernized as necessary. Our triad concept of retaining three basic delivery systems will be continued with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a Bama fleet, including cruise missiles as one of its armaments.

We will continue thereby to have an effective and flexible strategic force, whose capability is fully sufficient for our national defense. While the President officially halted B1 production, he did not rule out the possibility of future use. He told his news conference that production could be revived if relations with the Soviets deteriorated. Jim? He was happy with the President's decision as Senator Wendell Anderson, Democrat of Minnesota. Senator Anderson was a member of a Congressional delegation to the White House last week that urged the President to stop B1 production. He is a member of the Senate Armed Services and Budget Committees. First, Senator, will you as surprised as everyone else by this decision? No, I was chairman of the Democratic Party's platform committee.

Jimmy Carter made it very clear in the campaign of 1976 that he's opposed to the B1 bomber. One of the major issues in the campaign on the difference between he and President Ford was the fact they differed on this issue. I did not know for sure what he was going to do, but when I met with him, I met with the press afterwards. I made it very clear that he didn't say anything that would suggest to me that he was going to break the commitment he made with the people last year. Well, in what's your theory as to what happened, everyone thinking that the President was going to be. The President told the truth, he wanted to look at the subject very objectively he did, and I think he made the right decision. Right decision in terms of national defense, right decision in terms of even strengthening more his credibility with the people. All right, I want to get back to that in a moment. But when you left the White House last week, then you did not believe that he had reversed it. He was going to reverse his position. What I said was this, that there was nothing that was said at that meeting that would have allowed me to draw a conclusion that he had changed his mind. He didn't say anything that would have confirmed my hope that he'd come down this way. But I did not believe all the stories that were floating around this town the last 10 days.

All right, you know, a lot of people have suggested today, Senator, that the President was playing some kind of dramatic game on Congress and the rest of the people. You buy that? I do not. You think he just... I think he's very direct, very open, very honest, and I'm just pleased with this decision, and not that surprised. All right, let's go to the decision itself. You think it's a good decision. I do. Tell me why you think it's a good decision. First of all, the B1 bomber I think is a good airplane. Too expensive, but there are other unmet defense needs in terms of strengthening NATO. I think it makes much more sense, for example, to develop fully the cruise missile. You can build 200 cruise missiles for the price of one B1 bomber. A cruise missile does not take a pilot. It's an incredible weapon, and I think that the Russians have made it clear. They're afraid of the cruise missile. They never talk about the B1 bomber, and I think the Russians are right. And you feel that just from a defense standpoint, the military standpoint, that this system that he outlines will work. Absolutely.

And there will not be vulnerable in any way. We don't need the B1 in order to defend ourselves. That's correct. All right, Senator, thank you. On the other side of the B1 issue is Congressman John Russolow, a Republican from California. Congressman Russolow has been a strong supporter of the B1. Congressman, will you surprise today? No, I really wasn't, because I was disappointed, terribly disappointed, because I've followed the development of the B1 bomber for some time. It's of course produced in California, and I know something about it, probably not as much as Dr. Perry here has learned in three months since he's been with the administration. But I think enough to carry the arguments why it's needed. I was not surprised from the standpoint that President Carter said he would complete his commitment in the campaign. So I agree with Senator Anderson that he has completed that commitment. And he is now, I think, in disagreement with the Congress, which has a joint responsibility in deciding how we should arm our country. So I'm very, very disappointed that he made the decision not to utilize the B1 bomber go ahead with its production.

Because I think we need both the cruise missile and the B1 bomber, they have different missions, though they supplement each other. I see. Well, there were a couple of other surprises in there. The leader of your party in the Senate, Howard Baker, has accused the president of acting against the best interests of the United States in order to fulfill a campaign pledge. Now, those are two serious charges, and I wonder if you agree with either one of them. Well, I would agree that definitely that it's adverse to the best interests of the United States' defense establishment and our weapons capability. So I think we need both the B1 bomber, which is a highly sophisticated weapons system, as is the cruise missile. And I believe the callback capability of a B1 bomber, because it is manned, is an important aspect. And that the B1 bomber is more fully developed as a weapons system, more fully tested.

We have two actually being tested, a third one on the way, whereas the cruise missile has further to go in its development as Senator Anderson indicated. So I believe that we need them both, and would come down hard that they're both needed. How about the second part of the question, do you believe that there was some political motive behind this, or do you think the president's decision was made on purely military grounds? No, I don't believe it was made on purely military grounds, but I admiring for his decision to fulfill his campaign promise. He evidently felt that was equally important. I think the president Ford was right in his decision to go ahead with the production, and Senator Anderson is right. That issue was debated in the campaign, and I am sorry the president made the decision to stay with his campaign promise. I wish he'd made the decision the military decision to go ahead with it.

I think there are substantial arguments that the B1 bomber is also needed. Well, he has said that he was going to go ahead with testing and development of the B1. Does that give you any comfort at all in this situation? Well, only to the degree that he'll eventually go ahead with the production, so my answer to you would be, if that eventual decision means, there will be a more expensive decision by waiting, because we can produce five, six, eight bombers now for less cost than we could two or three years from now. If the decision is that the Russians won't keep their promises in salt and all of that, and I don't think they will, they can't even keep fishing agreements. I don't know why we would suddenly believe that they will keep weapons agreements. Thank you, Jim. The thrust of the reasons given by the president for deciding against the B1 did center around military considerations, and the capabilities of existing defense systems, and one of the key advisors in this particular area to the secretary of defense and the president is Dr. William Perry, director of the Department of Defense Office of Research and Engineering. Dr. Perry is the third ranking civilian at the Pentagon.

First of all, Dr. Perry was the defense department surprised at the president's decision. Somewhere and somewhere not, I was not. You knew that he had made this decision that he was going this way. No? The president kept his own counsel, but I was not surprised. All right, sir. The conventional wisdom, Washington conventional wisdom, which has been proven very wrong in the last few hours today. But anyhow, the wisdom going in was that the secretary of defense Brown and others at the Pentagon generally very much did want the president to go ahead with the B1. Is that correct? The secretary of defense has already stated that the decision of the president was consistent with his recommendations. And so I would say the answer to that question is no, but the Pentagon was not pushing them for the B1. We can't speak about the Pentagon as being a monolithic body. The secretary of defense thinks the decision was a wise decision. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to go ahead with the B1.

Did, all right, then you pretty well answered. I was going to the advice that the president, the president not only at this press conference, but at earlier press conferences. And throughout this decision-making process has said that he has gone through a lot of material, listened to senators, such as Anderson and others, got all kinds of advice when through stacks of paper he said today. What, how would you summarize what the Defense Department's position was? What did you give him? Let's put it that way. Did you give him options? Did you give him? What did you give him? Defense Department described options and recommended options and gave an analysis of the military effectiveness and the cost effectiveness of different options. These were presented to the president. The secretary of defense discussed these options with him and made his own preferences known by those discussions. And we asked- And what were the secretary Brown's preferences? Just a moment, Congress. Let me finish with Dr. Perry and then we'll open it up, all right? Because that's exactly what I was going to ask though. Could you- No, it wasn't what I was going to ask. How would you characterize what options from a military standpoint the president had before him in making this decision?

All of the options included a capability for maintaining a strong triad that is maintaining the man bomber is an important and effective part of our strategic strike forces. What they involved was different mixes. And some mixes, the B-52 and the cruise missiles were predominant and other missiles and other mixes, the B-1, was the predominant force. And one can analyze each of these from a point of view effectiveness and from a point of view of cost. Our conclusion was that the proper mixture of cruise missiles with B-52s provided as effective a strike force as did the B-1 and that is significantly reduced cost. Well, the cost thing has also been suggested by those who favored the B-1 that by the time B-52s have been refitted for cruise missiles, new launching devices have been designed and made viable for the cruise missiles that it might cost almost as much as the B-1 bomber program. Is there any validity to that? Our analysis does not support that conclusion.

Could you give me a ballpark figures? It is very difficult to answer that question in a simple way. It depends on the size of the force you are talking about and the inflationary factors you look at. But generally speaking, we are looking at cost reductions in the order of about 20 percent over a long period of time. Alright, Congressman, now you can ask your question. Yes, we got the impression in Congress on many occasions that Secretary Brown and others, and of course the Air Force itself, really felt that because the B-1 bomber had greater capabilities as a man bomber, even with the upgrading of the B-52, that therefore the capability factor would have to be taken into consideration, admitting that the B-1 bomber cost more, but the B-52 couldn't possibly be stretched out into the total capability of the B-1 and the B-52 could both carry the cruise missile. The B-1 with the cruise missile would be a very potent force, but it would be a very expensive force.

The B-52 with the cruise missiles we believe would be as effective a force as it would be due to cost. What is the cost of upgrading the B-52? The aggregate cost would still be updating the B-52 and the cruise missiles is still significantly less than the B-1. It's almost 30-40 billion per copy, isn't it, for the B-52 million to upgrade it? No, that's not correct. Senator Anderson, let me ask you a point that Congressman Russell O'Rays has been raised also, and we'll get Dr. Perry on this too, that the question of the B-1 already being in a test stage where the cruise missile, as you said, still needs some development. Does that concern you at all? Testing has gone very, very well, and the truth is just in terms of cost efficiency. The cruise missile is an incredible weapon, has incredible potential. We're ahead of the Russians, substantially in that area. That's why they're nervous about it, and as I said earlier, you can build approximately 200 of them for the cost of B-1. They can be used on B-52s.

The B-52s, the GNF series, were brought up to date for between five and six billion dollars. Now that's a lot of money, but obviously the air force thought that the B-52s were an important weapon system, or they would not have recommended to the Congress that we put five to six billion dollars more into it. Let me say, I don't look upon this as a hawk versus a dove issue. It is. I really felt, and I've only been on arm services about five months. But I felt, for example, that the Navy desperately needs some ships. They have 440. As you know, this session of Congress is going to provide about 16 more. It makes sense to me. If there's a difference between the Russians and ourselves, it's in the conventional weaponry. I think NATO is too weak. I think if we're concerned with dealing from a strong hand with the Russians, I think we have to strengthen NATO. And I'd rather see, frankly, more defense dollars go into that sector. I just don't think we can afford the B-1. Let me ask each one of you. You want to comment on that, Dr. Per. I think I would like to comment on accenting the positive a bit on this. We think that the B-1 was a fine airplane, and we think it's been conducted as a fine program.

The reason for the decision was not a lack of belief that the B-1 was a fine force. It could be a fine force, but rather the recognition that the cruise missiles were evolving. And it's just been the last few years that we have fully recognized the significance and capability of the cruise missile forces coming along. And it was that factor, which is primary in the decision. And that factor was not available to the decision makers in 1970 when they decided to initiate the B-1 program. Congressman Russelow, how do you respond to that? Well, the mission of the B-1 bomber is different than the cruise missile. And the gentleman is correct. Dr. Per. He was right. We did not have the capability of the cruise missile. But when there was no B-1 bomber, it was right. When it was started. But the B-1 bomber has a more expansive capability. Totally, and a long range than the cruise missile. And I say we need them both.

Now, Dr. Per. He has said the B-1 bomber is a good program. It's basically come in very close to cost estimates, except for inflation. Its ability to take off from airfields is much greater than the B-52. The B-52 requires fewer – it can be utilized in fewer airports so that – and again, the total capability of the B-1 is far greater than the cruise missile by itself. So we need both. Now, that's the main difference in opinion. All right. Both you and the Senator have raised the question of the Soviet Union, and there are a reaction to this. Let's pursue that now. As part of his decision to halt production of the B-1, the President called for deployment of the new cruise missile, an unmanned low altitude weapon that can carry nuclear warheads. One reporter wanted to know what the President was trying to tell the Russians. Is this the decision on your part not to go ahead with the B-1?

Intended is any kind of a signal to the Soviet that you're willing to – that you want to do something quickly in the strategic arms talks. I can't deny that that's a potential factor, but that has not been a reason for my decision. I think if I had looked upon the B-1 as simply a bargaining chip for the Soviets, then my decision would have been to go ahead with the weapon. But I've made my decision on my analysis that within a given budgetary limit for the defense of our country, which I am sure will always be adequate, that we should have the optimum capability to defend ourselves. But this is a matter that's a very great importance, and if, at the end of a few years,

the relations with the Soviet should deteriorate drastically, which I don't anticipate, then it may be necessary for me to change my mind. But I don't expect that to occur. Senator Anderson, do you think the Carter decision on the B-1 will give us more flexibility in the thought talks with the Russians? I think that it demonstrates such good judgment. I think that the Russians know that the cruise missile can be launched from ships, from submarines, from other airplanes, from land. I think they understand now that the President will be dealing from a much stronger hand, and frankly, I think they're impressed with the decision. Do you agree with that, Dr. Perry? I think the cruise missile has much greater military significance than does the B-1, and I wouldn't be surprised if the Soviet Union thought the same thing. The cruise missile can do many of the things the B-1 bomber could do.

The B-1 bomber was important. From a standpoint, it could escape radar, fly, close to the ground. The cruise missile can do the same. Congressman Russelow, are you in agreement with these other two? No, obviously, I'm not. I think we need both systems, and I think they're terribly important for different reasons. Now, the President said in his statement as we just listened to it that we need the optimum capability. And that's why many of us in Congress are majority in the House believe that we needed both. And that was included in our preparation bill that we voted for today. Both capabilities to be utilized and fully utilized. Senator Anderson admits that the cruise missile does many of the things of the B-1 bomber, but cannot do all of the things. The cruise missile can be launched for many places, but so can be one bomber. It can be launched for many places in the world and over which we would have total control and has a far greater sophisticated capability in its launch capability once it is airborne. So I think that that's where the difference.

I favor the concept as the President stated of an optimum capability. I wish that he'd been able to take into that judgment all the factors that obviously President Ford did. And obviously, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't think we can underestimate what the Joint Chiefs of Staff have said. And after all, they are the military expert. But Congressman, what about the question, though, which is what signal do you believe that this decision today, where I was as long as we're speculating, how do you think the Russians are going to receive this signal? I would think that they would say we have lessened our capability by not going into production on the B-1 bomber. And I believe my judgment would be that they would consider that a sign of weakness. Why is it then that they never talk about the B-1 bomber? They always talk about cruise missiles. Well, I have not been to those negotiations. My guess would be that if they haven't talked about the B-1 bomber, in the salt negotiations, and I don't think that's true. I think it is true. They raised the issue, as I interviewed a year ago, on several occasions. I don't think there's ever been a word printed to suggest that the Russians have ever brought up.

The B-1 bomber? Well, that is the reason I have not been there. On the basis of the reports we were given in Congress, they have mentioned it. But let me say this. If they didn't mention it, I don't think that necessarily means that they're not concerned about it. Dr. Perry, let's ask Dr. Perry. Any information on that to add to what you've already said that you feel that the Russians probably have read this decision the way we are. We, meaning the United States government, have made the decision today. No, that's just offering an opinion. I see. All right, let me say this, add on. The joint team to staff in their collection of information believe that it's a necessary part of our ability to defend ourselves and the allies with whom we have commitments. So on that basis alone, I would take their judgment. Senator? Well, there's a limit as to how many dollars we can spend for defense. I think the admirals in the Navy, they want more ships. Are they the generals in their army? They want NATO to be strengthened.

We can't do all those things and still come up with and spend $90 billion over 20 years for weapons system that might not be essential to national defense. Let me ask each one of you in a minute we have left. Is this an isolated decision or does this constitute any kind of major new thrust of military thinking in the United States? Dr. Perry? It's a recognition of the advent of a new technology and the desire to exploit that technology in the most effective way. Congressman Rusolo? Well, I think we should use to be using both technologies. They've both been developed. I've got that idea. And the B1 bomber has been proven over a longer period of time, and I support the cruise missile. I support what we put in the bill today in the house, both systems. Senator? We don't have unlimited resources. An occasion of President is going to have to say no to a sophisticated weapon system that's not on the national interest. And he did that today. Gentlemen, thank you very much. Good night, Chana. New York. Good night, Jim.

Other news permitting. We'll be back tomorrow night. Well, the look at the new look in the banking business. It's called competition. I'm Jim Lara. Thank you, and good night. For transcript, send one dollar to the McNeil-Lare report. Box 345, New York, 1-O-O-1-9. The McNeil-Lare report was produced by W-N-T-N-W-T-A. They are solely responsible for its content. The program was made possible in part by grants from public television stations, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Exxon Corporation, and the Ford Foundation. Thank you.

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