U.S. and China; 2
Despite our differences with savvy at Russia we have worked hard and painfully over the past 20 years to improve relations with that country. We have had some success. We can at least hope for peaceful coexistence. We have not made any effort to act toward communist China as we have towards job yet Russia. We have refused recognition. We have opposed your admission into the United Nations. We have refused to trade with her and have severely restrict restricted opportunities for personal visits and exchanges. Has this served our purpose in seeking peace. Or are we on a collision course which might lead to war. If we had treated communist China as we had Soviet Russia or if we should start a similar approach now would it improve relations and the chance of peace in Asia and the world. Or would it react to the advantage of communist China and to the disadvantage of the United States and her allies in Asia and elsewhere.
In this the second in a series of five programs dealing with the problem of United States relations with mainland China we will review the history of our relations with China over the past 20 years. We will compare the years with the evolution of our relations with Russia over the same period. In the light of this historic review in comparison we will ask whether our relations with mainland China are such that we are on a collision course. Finally we will consider whether we should attempt to open up and improve our contacts with China through trade exchange of persons entrance into the United Nations and recognition or whether we should continue to follow our present policy. The first speaker on this program is Professor John King fair bank director of the East Asian Research Center Harvard University who will present the historical review. The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen I of course I'm
an optimist and as an optimist I favor peace and victory. But I'm afraid all of us have to be pessimists. I foresee that at the end of this year we will still be on a conventional ground war with mounting casualties unable to use nuclear weapons because of the Russians unable to win on the ground because the Chinese are unable to get out. In other words this is a good time for discussion and our effort at discussion has to try to get beyond the formulations or the half truths are perhaps I should say the incomplete statements which are made by all parties. For instance he can would have us believe that this is just a. Locally based. War of liberation or rebellion.
And we know that the North plays a part in it. And yet Washington would have us believe or would like to have a statement accepted that this is essentially a case of aggression from the north and that might be called a half truth because while there is that element we know perfectly well that it is based in the south. It has taken local route. In other words all of these half truths trying to get at an approximation of the truth have got to be seen in perspective and in three dimensions. The Marxist Leninist effort in the world is based on some great half truths. The trouble is that they are half truth. In other words partly true as well as being half untrue in a manner of speaking. The Americans as a sea based power are in danger of being sucked on to the land. The fact that we want to go
away after a victory doesn't necessarily mean that we will be able to go away because we may not get a victory. And now we're beginning this morning looking back at the United States and China since 1945. Let me pursue this in five parts. Part one looking back at this 20 year period let us remind ourselves of the tremendous growth and change accelerating growth accelerating change in the world seen this 20 years includes the beginning of the nuclear age. Missiles the space age the Cold War balance of terror that includes the economic revival of Western Europe economic revival of Japan and Germany who had the good fortune of being defeated by us. The growth of the American and the Soviet Russian
economies this 20 year period includes politically and 19th century colonialism in Asia and Africa tremendous change in the corresponding growth of the United Nations and the growth of local warfare in many parts of the world. And in those 20 years it has been an absolutely unprecedented American program of aid for the development of other countries and also an unprecedented build up of American arms used for containment and deterrence in an effort of stability. And finally we have got co-existence of a sort between the Americans and the Soviets in all this picture of the last 20 years. There's only one really unchanging thing and that is the American Chinese stalemate and hostility which leaves us today on a collision course. In other words I think if we look back over this 20 years and see this tremendous amount of
change which baffles the imagination and then consider how little the Peking Washington relationship has changed. We may get the feeling that we're in for some changes in that relationship apart to China and there's 20 years has gone through a great revolution so great so vast affecting not only the largest number of people in human history but making such enormous changes structurally institutionally in people's lives in the state and the economy in the society that you just have to call it a great revolution perhaps the greatest in human experience. And it's not easy to say it is either good or bad anymore than you say human history is good or bad. You just got to accept it. There's a great revolution. I would suggest that the main
feature of this great revolution in China in these 20 years has been the mobilization of the populace that is bringing the vast mass of the Chinese people into a kind of participation in political life bringing them by communist means persuasion terror ideology indoctrination. All that mixture of motivations that the communists have learned how to use. But bringing them into political life mobilization is perhaps a neutral term. I'm not saying this is a good thing and it's not a bad thing necessarily this is something that's happened. If you look back over this 20 year period and the Civil War or the rebellion of the Communist staged in the period 46 to 49. Part of their victory was due to the popular support they were able to mobilize for their so-called liberation army. And then if you look at the period since 49 you see the Chinese
Communist regime effecting a takeover of the economy getting the inflation under control. Beginning industrialization partly by its capacity to motivate and manipulate the public. The people common man. You see this particularly in the case of the peasantry as the Peking regime takes over the peasantry through the program of land reform. How that program moves from just simple mutual aid which is a very sensible thing among peasants cooperatives on a voluntary basis and then into cooperatives which are involuntary which turn into real collectives where everybody really has to join in they in a cooperative or collective where in effect through land reform and good things the village is brought under control of the communist regime through a revolutionary change of sorting out of people
motivation of them. All of this leading to a mobilization. I may use that word again. Then if you look at the takeover of the Chinese Communists among the intellectuals their program of thought reform in the early 1950s and since building on their earlier experience as they as they grew up before the war thought reform which continues through constant discussion in small groups constant self-criticism constant learning of the party line and so on. This leads to a control over the individual and manipulation of the individual. A mobilization of the individual so that the intellectual all the literate people in fact the whole country are brought under government leadership. They are subject to government stimulation. Well this is a kind of totalitarianism which again is so vast and so comprehensive as to be almost beyond good and
evil. As an adjective we can say this is a terrible thing. On the other hand it's used for some very good ends as well as some evils along the way and getting a balance on that I think is well you can try it but it's not possible to sum it up in one word. The net result of this certainly has been in these 20 years of the Chinese great revolution to produce a strong government. For example they not only have their military organization which is under top control and not independent which is not unlike the traditional military structure of the old dynasties they also have their bureaucracy or civil government which is fairly under control like the government of older dynasties. And then they have a party which controls all this which now runs to 17 million or maybe 20 million members which is one of the enormous working
bodies of organized people anywhere in history which takes the place of what there used to be in China in the Person of the dynasty which had its emperors and the successor to the Emperor came from the dynasty. Plus the censor at the institution of censors who went around looking for malfeasance and could room on straight and impeach Plus the institution in the palace of the eunuchs who were servants of the Emperor. In other words there is a modernization and a modern modernizing in general of all the supervisory organs. In addition to the military and the bureaucratic the supervisory organs of the party for control over the whole mechanism. And then something more has been added to this strong regime and Kang and that is mass organizations. A new thing which brings everybody into contact with the government and its
campaigns these campaigns mounted one after another gets you into mass demonstrations. Study groups hating certain evils taking off after certain targets. Remaking the society knocking out the landlords of the capitalists whatever it may be and incidentally hating the Americans when necessary. And this is a constant theme. In other words this government as part of the revolution has penetrated the population as never before. So the traditional structure of China has been revived and intensified. The classical orthodoxy of certain teachings that were true should be learned by everybody. The indoctrinated elite that is the leadership group who knew the classical orthodoxy and could follow the rules laid down. And finally the top autocrat the power holders with their continuity at the top in charge of the whole organization. Well this used to be a superficial thing under the old dynasties. The same elements now are still there strengthened
and expanded. At the same time it's not just an old dynasty there are new features. The Marxist Leninist doctrines taking the place of Confucianism. Bringing in all the worship of science and material progress the idea of progress a Western idea. They bring in the kind of a god like Terry and ASM you have under totalitarian control where everybody is equal more or less at least equally manipulated. And we shouldn't underestimate this they got to Terry in asm if you've been in the old China where the peasant was illiterate and now the peasant becomes literate and connected with official life. This is this is a great change and you may call it a great improvement. Finally a new feature is the nationalism which has such ancient roots in China which is all the stronger because of the old Sino centric China as the center of the world concept of 2000 3000 years of history when of course we can raise certain queries about
this two decades of great revolution in China. One may well ask whether economic growth might not have been much the same without the communists. They claim economic growth is their greatest raison d'être but in fact if you look at the Czarist Russian example Czarist Russia was developing industrial age and the rate if it carried on would have been something like the communist success in Russia. Again if you look at the nationalism of the present regime and became Sino centric nationalism a sense of superiority such as all great modern nations have tried to get. You may well ask why there even without the Chinese Communists this would not also have come with the Chinese revolution. Wouldn't any Chinese regime have asserted itself in some very great and upset ing degree. In other words the Chinese revolution
even without communist leadership would have posed a great problem for the modern world because of its degree of change. When I face the problem of how to get this revolutionary China into the international order join allies as now I notice. Recent quote that the United Nations doesn't matter anymore. China is going to form its own order and it's perfectly plain I suppose that Indonesia would not be out of the United Nations if China had been in. At least China as more difficult more different from the rest of the world and on the other part it is more different from the west than russian communist regime. It has a different standards to a greater degree different values for instance concerning the role of the individual in the group in the state at the same time China has more revolutionary ardor. It is more demanding. And so I come to this part three American Chinese relations since 1945.
Well here let me try a few well-chosen words on the subject of our relations with China and others. We can argue about this at great length but I think as a matter of fact that the main lines of Narbonne pretty well shaken down and accepted. For example in nineteen forty five to forty eight during the war on the mainland between the Chinese Communists and the nationalists it now appears that the Nationalists were somewhat weaker than they thought they were. They had been weakened by eight years of Japanese aggression and the historical discussion now is whether their weakness came mainly from Latin or mainly from their lack of a genuinely revolutionary program. In the hall they didn't show a great capacity for revolution in the village. This the American mediation in that period of time of General Marshall the aid program that followed were in a context where the
Americans definitely did not want to get into a land war in mainland China. We had demobilized with unprecedented speed in 1945 and 46 there was no demand that the Americans move into the Chinese scene and try to change the course of China's history from the inside. The net result in 1945 was that when the British recognised hoping to solve their problem that way Taiwan was isolated with a remnant of the nationalist regime. The American contemplation of rare recognition of the new communist power in Peking was thoroughly thwarted whatever ideas we may have had about recognizing this new situation were stalemated because we became very quickly the main enemy of the new regime. We remain in that position ever since it seems almost as though the
regime has to have a main enemy and couldn't get along without it and we are the biggest thing on the horizon and they couldn't get along without us as a main enemy. At any rate in 1950 you recall the Korean War brought us into actual fighting with the new peaking power. Stalin presumably was behind this Korean War. It was a very cunning move. If it has succeeded he would have had influence in Japan as well as Korea North China. It failed only because the Americans and the Chinese fought the Chinese volunteers who came and stalemated our troops. They claimed victory at the same time. Taiwan again became our ally as in 1954 we supported them militarily and have been ever since and and in other
words we are still underwriting the Chinese Civil War. Well this history of relations since 1945 one could go on expatiating and dealing with different aspects. It certainly adds up to a situation in which the Americans have been involved in a containment of the Chinese Communists for 15 years now point for Taiwan since 1945. I think one thing to remember about the time on prosperity of today is that it was preceded by 50 years of Japanese rule 50 years of Japanese development. In the period 1945 to forty eight there was an early very corrupt exploitation by the mainland regime carpetbaggers and so on this led to a protest and considerable massacre 1947. The intensification of a problem of politics between the time when he's Chinese and the mainland Chinese which is still under the surface. However after
1949 the Taiwan regime developed a program of land reform. There was considerable economic growth. This was on the whole quite successful. The time Ani's Chinese today are participating not only in the army but in local government. They are getting education. They are part of the economy and its growth. The political life of Taiwan is still in a Chinese style under a sort of modified party dictatorship. Since the Korean war the Americans have given aid and military aid as well as economic. There has been a large military burden in the Taiwan scene. I think the main feature of time on today is the patriotic pride of the regime. John Kai-Shek still clings to back to the mainland as is Gaul. He will not give up his posture.
He is a man of pride like the people in. The American interest in my view always in an independent Taiwan. Whatever the local government may be I think it cannot easily be in our interest to join the mainland Chinese patriots of all caps seem to be rather opposed to an independent Taiwan in principle. However the Taiwanese Chinese have an independent Taiwan and there it is now part 5. The future of American Chinese relations. My own view of this is that the Americans need a more balanced program. We thank of the military activity that we're pursuing. We have an economic program. These are the material things that we understand best. I think there's a third element in the power situation in East Asia and all over the world in fact that is you might
call social political organization or the reorganization the mobilization theme that I mention of the common people in their villages and this is a an element a factor that we don't have much direct contact with. And fourth I think you might say there is an ideological factor having a view of the future for these people a strategy of change or revolution a revolutionary ideology. Well the fourth thing is the military the economic social political organization and the ideological element a strategy and aim these four things all contribute. In my view to a balanced program in the modern revolutionary world the Chinese communists I think make their efforts on all these four levels. In Vietnam today the American effort is strongest in the military and economic con that we are fighting
have a technique village revolution which is descended from the Chinese Communist technique that they learned in their revolutionary rise in China. It's been further developed it is based on the social political organization of the village taking the people in the village and getting them into a new structure of relations. Getting them mobilized and under control getting them motivated the motivation is not merely by terror. You use terror to assassinate the representatives of the government. You use indoctrination you use ideology. You give them a vision of the future. You give them the half truth of Marxism Leninism the story of why the foreigners are there the same time you organize them. And this social political organization is a technique with great potentialities. This is the important part of guerrilla warfare. The fighting part is a minor part of the effort that goes into
social and political organization of the villages far greater than the effort that goes into the mere fighting of a guerrilla war. You can have a successful guerrilla movement on the basis of the social political reorganization of the village. You can't have it without. So I would say that the United States has got to pay attention to this question of social political organization of knowledge in Southeast Asia and other countries Asia and Africa for example in northeast Thailand. We know perfectly well the effort is going on there as it went on years before in South Vietnam. At the same time the United States has an obvious program of appealing to nationalism self-determination which is a worldwide phenomenon. I would suggest avoiding negotiations with the Vietcong may become impossible in the end.
But in any case we have to compete with them. And the element of village revolution. You can't do that directly. That is American troops going in with Candy for the kids cannot provide the competition that the Vietcong represent in the village. The Chinese communists are not in there themselves they have merely taught the method. They have spread the doctrine. The technology is the thing it is spreading. And the American problem is how to work with nations of that area and elsewhere who want on a noncommunist basis to carry through their own type of revolution as a basis for political control and if necessary military defense. Well this is what I would suggest as a balanced more balanced effort to take our minds off the bombing program as though that were going to be a solution that at best I think is just a holding operation and we can argue perhaps whether it is
effective and doesn't play into the hands of the Chinese more than we realize giving us a bad image and so on stirring up the opposition hardening the people that are bombed against us. This can be argued whether it is really effective. One effect of the bombing of course is to buck up the South Vietnamese army. You can argue back and forth I will leave this to the president but I think we all have to leave quite a lot to him in fact. A second point however quite aside from this matter of balance and putting our effort into the understanding of the village and what's going to happen to it in the future in other words how the people living are organized. Quite aside from that I think a second effort in our future American Chinese relations has to be the problem of war with China how to try to avoid this war with China at least on a big scale. Probably our choice is a big war or a smaller war
and peace is perhaps beyond us. At any rate you can have worse wars and you can have less bad wars. Whatever we come out with our effort is to try to mitigate the kind of disaster that we can get into with China. Because let's not void the issue here. The world power balance could be considerably shaken and changed if we got into the wrong times of warfare with China. If the Chinese for instance got us into ground war on their terms and their terrain in south China fighting on the ground unable to use our nuclear power because the Russians couldn't permit us to we might get a stalemate and that would in fact be a Chinese victory. And this might lose us in the process of our thrashing around to try to defeat the Chinese. Success might lose us a good deal of the cooperation of Japan and India make it more
difficult to work with the Soviet Union. In other words get us on the short end of things. In other words I think the implication here is that we cannot prevent the rise of Chinese influence in the world. It has been an unchanging situation for too long and as Chinese power grows at home it's bound to be expressed abroad. Our problem is how to mitigate cut down the military confrontation. That means building up the other kinds of confrontation. In other words I think even if we do have a war we've got to confront China with a more balanced program. Now this concludes it seems to me military effort is. You don't get anywhere you know calm and recognize joining us and we give it to you that solve the problem this is foolish appeasement in other words the old axiom doesn't stop any problem. Military containment. Maybe you call it that. This is not enough. We have to happen this summer geopolitical competition
and I was speaking about competition in the villages of the rest of the world so that they can carry through the great changes that modern times are bringing to them. This kind of competition at the village level is something we can't do directly but we can help. This is one of the main things we've got to do. Mention that moment ago I would add a third point at the strategy level level of ideological approach to this whole thing. It seems to me we've got to offer the people in Peking some possible games for their world position. You've got to offer them not just the prospect of being defeated or being victorious against their enemy by stalemate ing us and so on. You've got to offer them some possible gains by not fighting to get something if they turn away from our military posture against them and do not go in for large scale war against us we've got to offer them this when all this means figuring out various kinds of opportunities
for the Chinese to meet their needs of Chinese pride. I think we should make use of Chinese pride in other words. I think that Chinese pride. You can phrase it in other ways nationalistic Sino centric. Pride of race and culture the integrity of culture sense of superiority. I think this is one of the great motive powers in the Chinese Communist situation this is one thing they're using for their revolution. You find this Chinese pride in Taiwan. John Kai-Shek has as been a very difficult ally because he's a man of great determination and pride. He will not give me on a certain point you can kill him but you can't change this prompt the same way when there's a good reason for this. The Chinese have lived their lives 3000 years in East Asia more or less alone as the top country in the world and the universe as they say yet they have been the
center of things more than that. Their sense of superiority has a further basis in culture and part of their whole system of government has been government by virtue. This is the ideal pattern of Confucianism. The man who is virtuous in his conduct has a prestige a leadership which gives him the throne a chance to be the ruler. You could see this throughout Chinese history. The idea that the ruler is a man of ultimate virtue and therefore deserves to be the leader and the model for mankind. This is a basic Chinese concept and the recognition therefore of the leader's position preeminence and all that sort of thing is part of Chinese politics. Well that's a large subject there that we need to explore and investigate and understand better because the motivation of the Chinese revolution comes from somewhere. It's not just an accident comes partly from Chinese history as well as from Chinese communism. And
this is something that we might well try to manipulate. After all our Chinese allies manipulated us for a long time with some success. The Chinese allies of the Soviet Union and manipulated the Soviet Union into a terrible situation. The Chinese capacity for dealing with the pride of individuals is very great. They understand these things psychology. Now it seems to me that this is part of the unused potentiality of the situation for us to deal with this problem of Chinese pride. Chinese sense of a place in the world. They say to themselves we are kept out the imperialists must be destroyed. We are leaders of the new revolution. We will take it world one mile believes that he has a formula that will sweep Southeast Asia and Africa too. We have to stand up against this at the same time I think we've got to go around behind it. We've got to look at the kind of pride
you can use other words to the sense of mission of destiny and so on that is behind this. And you know other words one way to remove some of the steam from the Chinese revolution. And it's a problem for us in the danger of military confrontation is to try to accept the Chinese revolution in the world scene when all this is tough. How do you do that. We can't do it directly we say we accept you while they say go to hell. And what they would never say that lexicon that they would be polite but it would mean the same thing. For example we have to defend an independent timeline. There is no chance in the world it seems to me that we can permit Taiwan to go over to the mainland. It is too close to Japan. Japan is too much of a key position in the world. The industrial capacity of Japan if it goes in the communist bloc completely upsets the world power balance.
Taiwan is right there next door. South Korea we are in South Korea we are in Taiwan in a defensive stance. We have the Seventh Fleet in other words in the channel that cannot be taken out. There is no way of giving up the defense of an independent timeline. And yet I would combine that with the thought that you have got to give the people in Peking more position in the world. Well perhaps the best thing is for Mr. Johnson to offer to go to Peking to negotiate and I recommend that as a symbol of this effort that I think we've got to make get around behind the motivation of the people and became who are outsiders who have been kept out in the cold and at the same time are beginning to feel that they don't want to even come in that they can go it alone. They can organize the revolutionary world they can be the center of the New World and the imperialists will crack. They believe this the more they believe it the more difficult they are to deal with. At the same time that we're moving on this military
revolutionary socio political organization Miles. Well that's a tall order I mean it's not a simple program. It's not going in just one direction. And perhaps we Americans are a little too simple minded to play this kind of a game. The Chinese I think are complex minded and have been playing us all along and we probably just have to go up to their level of sophistication. The next speaker is Senator George McGovern Democrat of South Dakota and former director of the Food for Peace program who will speak for a one view point on changing United States policy toward the communist government of mainland China. Over the years it seems to me that our preoccupation with the issue of diplomatic recognition has made it almost impossible to consider other ways in which we might be developing useful contacts with the people of mainland China. We are it seems
so gret by our past policies that we make it very difficult to explore new initiatives that might be helpful and might advance our own national interest. Yet it seems increasingly player that there is much to be gained in the long run by at least limited contacts with mainland China. I do not for a moment believe that broadening U.S. relations with China or admitting her to international organizations will dramatically transform peeking into a democratic congenial regime. But I do believe that it may provide a discipline towards less belligerent action and toward conformity with the norms of international relations. I think as long as we treat China as an international outlaw that we cannot be surprised if she reacts by scorning our standards and judgments and the
judgments of the international community through greater contact with other nations including our own. It would be far more difficult it seems to me for China to act as a law unto itself. Now the Chinese leaders have used world hostility to generate almost a phobia within their own country. And this response is then exploited to win backing for difficult domestic and foreign efforts. But by easing the obvious signs of world hostility as best we can we might ultimately contribute to a relaxation of the both the end terminal and the ex Journal pressures with reference to mainland China. So while it may be difficult and some will argue impossible it is nevertheless worth trying in my judgment to bring China into a more constructive and useful relationship with the international community. I suggest that instead of being
transfixed at our current diplomatic dilemma that we right raise our eyes to consider other aspects of the problem. The time is perhaps not propitious for the United States to consider diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China. In fact I personally doubt that we will be able to accomplish such a step in the lifetimes of Mao Tse-Tung or Chiang Kai shek and the revolutionary fervor of the first generation communist leaders and such factors as Nazi Tang's personal grief over the death of his son in Korea on the one hand and the bitterness of the nationalist defeat on the other side are still very close and probably too close for a lasting settlement. But there are other approaches which we can follow that might open the way for useful relations between the Chinese and ourselves. It makes no sense for the United
States not to be in touch with a country of 700 million people. And I think our government might emphasize again are willing to increase contacts by eliminating the requirement of special passports to China and allow adult citizens to travel at their own discretion when they can secure visas. The right to travel freely should be a basic right of American citizens. And I think. Thank you. Thank you I think thank you I think our government has nothing to lose by reasserting that stand although I personally would not expect any immediate results. Such a step in the long run would make our own principles clear to the Chinese and to all the world and would put the responsibility for any restrictions that might develop on the government in Peking. This in itself it seems to me would be a helpful
pressure. I would also recommend efforts to improve the climate for economic relations between the two countries. Now I know responsible Chinese official that I know of has ever proposed increased trade with the United States and there probably is no immediate likelihood of a flourishing trade but the removal of President blanket prohibitions against trade with Red China prohibitions that go back some 15 years would enable individual U.S. firms to deal with the country much as they have with the Soviet bloc States and Europe. Today the only goods that cross borders are publications and credit material between libraries and various institutes in the two countries. But that trickle could grow to develop into a greater trade so that we might sell the Red Chinese commodities and goods on the same
basis with which we deal with the Soviet Union. Now such an act on our part would not weaken as I see it American Security in any way and it could on the other hand it produce China's industrial managers and herd leaders to American goods and methods. It could stimulate demand among the engineers and the technicians in this enormous country for greater access to U.S. technical data. It could open the way for sales of wheat and others crops that we produce in this country to a nation which on doubt it has many hungry mouths. In recent years. China's fast growing population combined with unfavorable weather conditions and the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Every salted in chronic cereal shortages in that country and as a consequence the government in Peking has purchased large quantities of wheat from Canada Australia
from France and other sources and Canadian farmers and exporters are experiencing a considerable economic stimulus as a result of sizable sales to China and the Soviet Union. The Canadian The Australian and the French governments have relaxed acreage controls. They've utilized their surpluses and stimulated their agricultural and related industries. One wonders if such a policy. With reference to our own agricultural production is not in the national interest of the United States is struggling. To control the output of our farmers by acreage controls by land retirement schemes of one kind or another and in government finance storage programs. And yet the amazing productivity of the American farmer has outstripped every effort at control. Farmers However instead of being praised for their efficiency have been can down.
They've been blamed for the high public cost of our agricultural program. They've been subjected to tighter and tighter acreage restrictions and yet they have seen their prices depressed by surplus accumulations. Meanwhile the entire nation has suffered from a depressed agricultural economy and mounting up public costs in a failing effort to control the situation. Given these factors. Would it not be an our interest as a nation to lift some of the restrictions that have foreclosed US grain sales in China and in other parts of the communist world. We don't know what the response would be to efforts along that line but at least our position would would be Claire. I think such a trade would very obviously be of economic benefit to us. I believe it is also a sound political and moral position for the United States. It is a method of quietly demonstrating the production and
the efficiency of a free type of agriculture and it recognizes that even our political rivals should not be denied food which we have in abundance. Providing they are well right to purchase it. Partly as a result of U.S. policies partly as a result of deliberate Chinese action the leaders and people of that country have been cut off from most Western and from all American contacts or virtually all American contacts. Sino Soviet rivalry promises to increase Chinese isolation in the communist world but it could very possibly have the opposite effect in creasing China's need for intercourse and contact with the Western democratic nations. Now for decades the United States was the principal champion of the open door policy toward China despite some of the colonialist implications of that policy such things as these areas of influence and extraterritoriality
and the like it was a rational and open policy that was beneficial to both sides. But since 1950 we have substituted the closed door policy for the open door. Now there is little point in advocating a rash actions to force the door open at one fell swoop now. But I do believe the United States and her allies have much to gain by undertaking the patient and no doubt frustrating effort to restart. More normal international and economic and cultural relationships with the people of China. The most populous nation on the face of the earth with its highly significant position in Asia and its own nuclear capacity certainly must be included in moral counsels for all of our efforts at international peace and stability will be heavily handicap the next speaker is Senator Peter Dominic Republican from Colorado who has a
distinctly different viewpoint from that of the previous speaker. I was interested in just tearing my distinguished colleague George McGovern who I've talked with on many an occasion on this and other problems referred to the possibility of giving training to the Chinese as though the United States itself was going to be distributing goods to the Chinese people as you and I know nothing could be further than the fact. All we are asked to do is to sell our goods to the communist government of mainland China not to the people of China but to the communist government. And until such time as we learn in our own minds to distinguish between dictatorial governments which are over the people and what we can do for the people themselves it strikes me that we are liable to get caught in a trap whereby we are in fact supporting economically and even on some occasions militarily dictatorships over people dictatorships whether of the
communist left or the extreme right which we do not feel of any interest as far as the fundamental freedoms of people themselves. So it strikes me that this is one of the problems that we have to face any time we discuss this situation. If you have view communism as such as I do as a menace to the institutions of the free world then it would seem that it would be helpful for the free world to maintain good relationship with any ally who is willing to devote time and energy to trying and control these forces that are at large in the world. At the present time the Republic of China has one of the highest trained air forces that there is in the world. It's probably the best AF force that there is in the Far East at the present minute and this AF OSS is located on the island of Taiwan which is right what you would call in the center of stomach of the mainland of China yet has by virtue
of this by virtue of its ground forces held up at least four of the major armies of the Red Chinese from being able to move either north or south in a direction which would threaten the free world interest in either of those areas it has provided us on an intelligence basis with a great deal of information which is sifted and coordinated with intelligence information that we've got from others so that we would have some idea of where the aggressive forces of the Red Chinese are moving from time to time. And I would say that this is been of incalculable benefit as far as the free world is concerned. We have not been able to find any mechanism talking to the mainland Chinese except through their government. And as long as we're talking through that government we're talking to the people who are in control with an iron grip over the millions of people in Red China and they are in control in a terroristic form of government. Just as an example I hear
constantly talked about. The fact that we have to get the Red Chinese into the UN that we have to recognize them in order to be able to deal and negotiate with them. But as long as I can remember since World War Two we have been negotiating out of them basket Doria level with the Red Chinese and Wausau simply trying to find out if nothing more where our own American citizens may be held in prison and mainland China. And we have not yet been able to find out what their location is. And we have had literally over 90 ambassadorial conferences with the Red Chinese in that area. So it doesn't get me any sauce of satisfaction to feel that we have got to be able to suddenly negotiate with a group of people at one level when we've been completely unable to negotiate with them at another level. It doesn't give me any satisfaction to feel that by having them recognized by having them in an international body such as the UN that we are there by going to give
recognition and some degree of legitimacy to a group who is determined and who has said under the present leadership that their one design is to overthrow the imperialist countries by which they mean the entire free world. And they've said so over and over again. So I don't feel that in the terms of determining what our relationship is between the United States and China that we should think in terms of the Red Chinese as far as their government is concerned except as a menace to this country and to the system which we believe is fundamental to human dignity and human liberty. On the other hand the Nationalist Chinese who have been such assistance to us the Republic of China in so many ways can it seems to me with the aid and assistance of the United States really take steps and try to stabilize that area. And I happen to know that they're already involved in a number of these steps. Now what are they. Well first of all the trade recognition and the trade dealing
with the so-called SEATO Nations and the uncommitted nations of the Asian continent can be helped materially by the the efforts aided by the United States the Republic of China Thailand New Zealand Austria Malaya South Korea the Philippines all these countries which lie like fingers on the on the end of this massive hand of mainland China. These can be consolidated to become some kind of a protective institution for the free world and for the can crawl some of the aggressiveness of the Red Chinese. Secondly I would think in order to make this even more important and more fundamental There could be some kind of a regional trading blocs amongst them similar to at least I think this is worth discussion to a community market in Europe. It strikes me that this is one of the things that maybe the Asian countries
should stop talking about and thinking about and as I said with the help and assistance that we can give. Thirdly I would think over a period of time that they ought to think in terms of military and political defensive time as against this aggressive force that is moving from mainland China. Because as surely as we do not do this are as surely as we find ourselves all of a sudden giving recognition and respectability to a force which is fundamentally opposed to our whole system of individual dignity. Just to show me the free world and the free people when the world's going to find themselves within the control of perhaps the most dictatorial force that the world has ever known. You have been listening to the second in a series of five programs considering the problem the United States faces in its relations with China. Your speakers have been Professor John King fair bank director of East Asian Research
Center Harvard University. Senator George McGovern Democrat of South Dakota and former director of the Food for Peace program and Senator Peter Dominic Republican of Colorado. As in the first program of this series our speakers in this program have again indicated how complex our relations with communist China are and how they relate to the whole of our foreign policy. They have also indicated again that there are varying approaches to these problems advocated by men of good will and that each approach has its prospects for good and ill. We have continued in this program to attempt to portray it through discussions by experts on the subject. Something of the complexity of the problem. The United States faces in its relations with China. We have tried to present you with a variety of viewpoints on the subject rather than to support any particular course of action. In our next programme we will take another look at the
- U.S. and China
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- Contributing Organization
- University of Maryland (College Park, Maryland)
- AAPB ID
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University of Maryland
Identifier: 66-SPII-2 (National Association of Educational Broadcasters)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
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- APA: U.S. and China; 2. Boston, MA: University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-np1wjm2p