People under communism; Aims, strengths, weakness

This is people under communism a series of documentaries interviews and talks based upon documented evidence and expert knowledge about the power and intentions of the Soviet Union. The series is presented transcribed by the National Association of educational broadcasters in consultation with scholars from the Russian Research Center Harvard University the Russian Institute Columbia University and the Hoover Institute and library. Stanford University. The program you're about to hear in people under Communism is an analysis of the aims strengths and weaknesses of Soviet strategy by Dr Moreau thing Saad a professor of Government at Harvard Dr thing Saad is the author of books on American government and is also known for his writings about the government of the Soviet Union. He has traveled in Russia interviewed many former Soviet citizens who have escaped to the west and is director of political studies in Harvard's Russian Research Center. Now here's Dr. Fein Saad to speak on the AIMS strengths and

weaknesses of Soviet strategy. What are the intentions of the men of the gremlin faced with the gathering strength of the West. How will they react. Will they launch a war before the Western military effort has reached its peak. Will they wait in the hope that time will improve their position. These of the The West will a negotiate a settlement with the West in order to venture an answer to these questions. It is important to understand the framework of ideas within which Soviet policymakers function. The interpretation of history which Communists use is one in which history marches on their side. The current Moscow slogan is still all roads lead to communism. Communists regard the system of capitalism as

inherently unstable. In their view it contains the seeds of its own destruction. But this satisfactions which it generates will lead to its eventual overthrow long term perspective of communist thinking is one of capitalist disintegration and eventual world communist triumph. But communism as a system of ideas provides no revolutionary timetables. It fixes no schedule of insurrection or conquest. It contemplates the possibility of advance and retreat. And it's day to day strategy and tactics are developed with respect to the obstacles which confront it. While a long term goal of the Kremlin is world communism. The problem which the Kremlin constantly faces is how to give practical

effect to its intentions. This is essentially a problem of comparative capabilities. The capacity of the Kremlin to realize its object use is determined by the strength it can muster the military strength the economic strength the propaganda strength and so forth. It's a function of the power of the Soviet Union and of the power of its satellites of the support which the Soviet Union can command in the non Soviet world and of the character of the opposition to it. The Kremlin is dedicated to the proposition that the survival and expansion of its power depend on strength. It sees the secret of the Soviet Union's future as a great power in continued rapid industrialization and in a mighty military

establishment. Stalin put it way back in 1931 to slacken the temple of industrialization would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. No we refused to be beaten. One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered from falling behind. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence. If you do not want this you must put an end to this backwardness in the shortest possible time. There is no other way. That is why Leneen said during the October Revolution either perish or overtaken outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. We are 50 or 100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good the distance in 10 years. Either we do it or they

crush us. Early in 1940 six million cough Stalin's trusted lieutenant returned to the same thing. Our friends respect us said modern golf because we are strong and will only respect us as long as we are strong. The weak are not respected. We are a mighty force already today and this should be remembered by those who think that our people shed their blood made tremendous sacrifices and won victories in order to let others enjoy its fruits. Now these quotations furnish a key to the Kremlin outlook on the world. The impregnable ety of the Soviet Citadel depends on its military economic potential as Soviet relative strength mounts its capacity to exert pressure on the non Soviet world increases

correspondingly. Weakness in the West is an invitation to Kremlin adventure strength operates as a deterrent. Beneath the surface of shifting tactical expedience the long term strategy of expansion provides the impelling drive the politics of communism is built around the conception of the placable capitalist enemy who has to be overwhelmed and destroyed lest he in turn destroyed communism. Now this hostility constitutes one of the basic premises from which the Kremlin operates. The temporary ally of today represents a political enemy tomorrow. Professions of friendship tend to be discounted as Waialae or naive stratagems which are designed to allow the vigilance of the Soviet leadership long

term hostility to the west is not however incompatible with temporary arrangements from which the Kremlin hopes to win advantage. But compromise is never viewed as a desirable form of accommodating competing interests. It is at best a disagreeable necessity. The essence of politics remains the clash with the enemy. The real measure of Kremlin intentions at any given point must be sought in its appraisal of the relative balance of strength in the Soviet and non Soviet parts of the world. In all of the crucial probing actions of the post-war period Iraq and Griese burly in Korea the Kremlin has pushed its provocations almost to the breaking point but thus far it is withdrawn in the face of indications of further pressure

ran the danger of igniting a world conflagration of which the outcome was uncertain. One of the few inside glimpses which we have of the Kremlin's calculations is provided by an exchange of correspondence with Tito which Tito published after his break with a common form in a letter of May 4th 1948 dealing among other things with Yugoslav resentment of the Soviet Union's failure to help it seized by military action. The Kremlin representative wrote. Since all other means were exhausted the Soviet Union had only one other method left for gaining Tria asked for Yugoslavia to start a war with the Anglo Americans over a tree S-10 take it by force. The Yugoslav comrades could not fail to realize that after such a hard war the USSR could

not enter another in rebuking the Yugoslav Communist Party for its alleged boastfulness a Kremlin representative pointed out that it was a Soviet army which had created the conditions which were necessary for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to achieve power. Unfortunately he added the Soviet army did not and could not render such assistance to the French and Italian Communist parties. The letters to Tito strongly suggest that they only check on Soviet expansion into Western Europe in the immediate post-war period was its own feeling of weakness rather than any scruples about the utilization of force or concern about the interests of its wartime allies. If the Kremlin evidences similar hesitation today it can be assumed that it continues to appraise the risks of

military action is greater than the tempting gains. The rearmament of the West is calculated to increase these risks and to force the Kremlin to turn to other methods to promote its And now the dynamism of the Kremlin is not limited to military weapons. The doctrine of close of its that war is the continuation of politics by violent means has its communist corollary in the proposition that politics is the continuation of war by other means. In the communist arsenal the political and military weapons are interchangeable. The choice depends on time and circumstance. When the Kremlin appraises the hazards of total war as a threat to its own survival

it seeks alternative means to promote its objectives. It husbands and builds up its own military and economic power for a possible future trial of arms under more propitious circumstances. It uses the interval of truce to consolidate its control over its own satellites and allies. It attempts to exploit the rivalries and noncommunist States in order to hamper the organization of a grand coalition of its antagonists. It tries to lower the fears of its potential enemies by proclaiming itself the exponent of peaceful coexistence between capitalist and socialist states it seeks to foment civil war in a more vulnerable noncommunist States by supporting the efforts of local communists to stir up unrest and seize power. Carrying on its political offensive the Kremlin is deeply

mindful of the fact that the ideas which possess the minds of man determine the direction of their loyalties. Propaganda plays a central role in mobilizing support both at home and abroad. The Kremlin propaganda effort is worldwide. Those specific appeals vary with the groups which communists seek to mobilize or neutralize to the Western European working man. For example the Kremlin says What do you gain from NATO's role in American military aid. The profits go to your employers and their American Wall Street masters the rearmament programs in which you are being asked to embark will mean a further decline in your already low standard of living. Your country is being transformed into a vassal of the United States. Your fate is to provide cannon fodder in a hopeless useless war against the Soviet Union. If you allow

yourself to be used as pawns in the American game your country will inevitably be devastated. Your real friend is a Soviet Union. The land of socialism. Only the Communists can help you to overthrow your capitalist masters and establish socialism. So the European middle classes and intellectuals the communist ass what has America to offer aside from its technical proficiency. If you follow the American lead you will be flooded by a shoddy theory or mass produced culture. Can't depend on America. It's far away. Concerned with its own affairs. It has withdrawn from Europe before it will do so again. The Soviet Union is in Europe to stay away must be found to live with it. If you join up with the Americans you risk war with all of its disastrous consequences. Take your stand with the Soviet Union is to

assure peace. Nor do these exhaust the range of Kremlin appeal those skillful use is also made of age old nationality antagonisms to the French the Czechs the Poles and others who suffered under the Nazis. The United States is represented as a great apostle of German rearmament seeking to rebuild a powerful Germany which will again overrun Europe and repeat the horrors of occupation to the Germans. The communist speak the language of unity only alliance with the Soviet Union can guarantee the restoration of German unity. Or as Stalin put it in his historic message to grow out of all the experience of the recent war has shown that the greatest sacrifices in this war were borne by the German and Soviet peoples that these two peoples possess the greatest potentialities in Europe for doing great deeds of world significance.

Now such contradictory themes may appear to cancel each other out. But Communists make a virtue of contradictions. They do not take the trouble to deny they reiterate and reiterate on the assumption that each audience will respond to the song it wants to hear. To the peoples of Asia and Africa the Kremlin says the United States is the home of lynch law and the color line of racist theories of white supremacy. American support makes it possible for the French to maintain their toehold in Indochina for the British and Dutch to remain in Southeast Asia. It is the United States which devastates Korea threatens the integrity of China and seeks to extend its dominance over the middle and Near East. We say the Communists make no distinctions of color and race. We practice what we preach. We give our support to

all colonial peoples to help them get rid of the imperialist yoke. We have shown that it is possible to industrialize without the aid or control of foreign capitalists. Follow our formula and our leadership and you too can become great industrial powers. This is the voice of the Kremlin as it speaks to the world. We may be aware of the realities of a ruthless dictatorship which lived behind the facade of fair words but to millions of people in Asia and Europe the Soviet creed comes in a language of emancipation with promises of peace racial equality and abolition of economic privilege. What the Kremlin says wins converts and converts our soldiers in the world army of communism. Kremlin strategy seeks to exploit our weaknesses and capitalize on its own strength.

What are the elements of strain and weakness of the Soviet bloc. Let us consider them in terms of military power economic strength and internal morale. First military power in purely military terms. The Soviet bloc commands a formidable array of power. The best information we have indicates that there are over 4 million men in the Soviet armed forces and that another three quarter of a million are being added to the Soviet airforce making a total of more than four and three quarter million. In addition there are another one and I have made it more or less dependable soldiers under arms in the Eastern European satellite states as well as several million in the Chinese Communist army. The Soviet air force is supposed to have some 25000 planes including about 500

bombers of the B-29 type. In addition the Soviet Union is reported as producing about a thousand jet fighters a month a rate which is said to be in excess of our own Soviet Navy is not too important except for a substantial fleet of snorkel submarines which could conceivably interfere seriously with our sea communications in the event of war. At present the Soviet Union has superiority both on the ground and in the air. Though our own power is building up to narrow the gap. The best reports we have indicate the Soviet Union has 26 divisions in Eastern Germany including 68 armored divisions and another 30 divisions in the satellite areas and on the western border of the Soviet Union. This compares with the twenty two divisions in a tone presumably the Soviet armies could if they had wanted to have overrun Western Europe in the period since the end of the

war. And conceivably they might even have the power to overrun it now. Why haven't they. I'm inclined myself to emphasize three factors. First in the early post-war years American position of the atomic bomb operated as perhaps the greatest single deterrent to Soviet aggression. As the Soviet Union moves ahead in atomic production this operates a somewhat less of a deterrent. Second the knowledge on the part of the Kremlin that the occupation of Western Europe would not mark the end of the war but would probably be the beginning of a long drawn out struggle of uncertain outcome in which all the reserves of America would be deeply engaged. That knowledge too serves as a deterrent. Third there is the hope that Western Europe may still be

conquered by political rather than by military weapons. That is the communist parties and their allies may be able to wind power through subversion and infiltration. Let's turn next to economic strengths and weaknesses. Although the Soviet Union is well on the way to becoming a powerful industrialized country it still lags considerably behind the United States. It's nine hundred fifty one steel production was thirty one million tons. The comparative figure for the United States is ninety five million tons more than three times as much. The steel production of the East European satellites is 10 million tons. The production of Western Europe is 50 million tons. If the Soviet Union could capture the steel facilities of Western Europe intact it would almost be on a plane of equality with the United States. It is of course hardly likely

that we would permit that to happen if we could prevent it. American coal production is double the Soviet 951 production. Two hundred and eighty million tons. Our oil production is seven times the Soviet production forty two million tons. There is obviously a very considerable edge of productive superiority on our side. But these figures furnish no occasion for complacency particularly when it is remembered that a much greater proportion of our steel or oil production goes to satisfy consumer demands which is Soviet planners ruthlessly limit in favor of armaments and you capital expansion. The Soviet production of machine tools for example closely approximates our on our reserve production is much greater. But in order to bring it into play we would have to cut

down on refrigerators autos and other similar consumer durable goods. Our reserve economic strength is substantially in excess of that of the Soviet Union. In comparative terms this operates as a limiting factor on Soviet aggressive designs. I come finally to the question of internal morale. It fell to my lot several years ago to spend some 12 weeks in western Germany and Austria interviewing recent escapees from the Soviet army of occupation and Soviet military government as well as former Soviet citizens who were stranded in Germany and Austria at the end of the war and who were unwilling to return to their homeland. When I asked these people about the motives which determined their decision to escape or not to return to factors he merged as paramount one was a desire to

enjoy the superior material attractions of the West. The other was a desire to escape the regimentation. The discipline and the hazards of the police state. Now the Soviet Union would like to present itself to the world as a monolithic structure of hundreds of millions of happy contented people devoted to communism. But if the evidence of these and other interviews is to be trusted behind the monolithic facade there exists a not inconsiderable degree of dissatisfaction frustration and hatred for the regime. This dissatisfaction is kept under rigid control by the powerful repressive machinery which the regime has developed. The omnipresent MGB are secret police and the forced labor camps which await those who make the mistake of expressing their discontent. Now all the interviews which I had gave no indication

that there was any imminent likelihood of an organized uprising which would challenge the authority of the regime. There was general agreement that the power of the secret police made that unlikely. But what the interviews didn't make clear was that the Soviet Union had more than each share of journal problems tensions and discontent and that while the regime could control its people it still could not really trust substantial segments among them. The existence of internal disaffection both in the Soviet Union and in the satellite areas is no secret from the Kremlin. It is a factor which the Kremlin has to take into account when each shapes its future plans. The knowledge that we are prepared if necessary to exploit

disaffection intensively may serve as an additional limiting factor on Soviet aggressive designs. It is I believe important to exploit the sources of internal disaffection which exist in the Soviet Union. But it is only one of many approaches to the problem. Our major effort must continue to be directed toward rallying the strength of the West to oppose Soviet aggression. Let me summarize my estimate of Kremlin intentions. The long term goal of the Kremlin is not socialism in one country but communism in one Kremlin dominated world. The Kremlin is prepared to move toward that goal as swiftly as we permit. It probably will not consciously

precipitate a World War in the near future unless it feels reasonably certain that it can win a cheap and easy victory. Meanwhile it will test our defenses political as well as military thrust and probe wherever it thinks it can achieve gains with a minimum risks and it will try to accumulate strength against the day when it feels prepared to throw down the gauntlet to the west. It was Lenny who proclaimed the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time and is unthinkable one or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes a series of frightful clashes between the Soviet republic and the bourgeois States is in navigable in the present juncture of world affairs. No man can be

certain that Lenin will not prove a true prophet. What can be said is that if the Kremlin decides to move it will move because of our weaknesses and not because of our strength. The only alternative to total war remains an unremitting effort to strengthen the defenses of the West to maintain the dynamics of economic expansion in the free world to sustain standards of mass welfare and to demonstrate the unity the gear and strength of the community of free nations. The aims strengths and weaknesses of Soviet strategy and analysis by Dr Moreau thing Saad director of political studies at Harvard's Russian Research Center. Dr. Fein sod's talk was another transcriber program a series of people under communism

a series as a whole was prepared in consultation with scholars from the Russian Institute at Columbia University the Hoover Institute and library Stanford University and the Russian Research Center Harvard University. Your program producer was Ralph telling me this is Parker Wheatley. These programs in people under communism are prepared and distributed by the National Association of educational broadcasters and are made possible under a grant from the fund for adult education an independent organization established by the Ford Foundation. This is the N A B take network.