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There is no evidence however that it was sent from the USSR for that purpose. And according to the amount of it with whom I've had extensive talks. It was all either a surplus of equipment left by the Red Army or equipment of it that had been supplied by Moscow to the Yugoslav army. Now Never having been for the Greek revolution in the first place by 1947 Stalin actively opposed on one occasion he sent word to Greece to that effect and at least twice he scolded the Yugoslavs for their continued support of the great Darrelle of the second time was after the American intervention had been mounted and it is doubtless true that this was a factor in his position. The first time he warned the Yugoslavs against aiding the Greek revolution however was before strong military involvement on the part of the Americans was certain. Doubtless this reflected both his belief that communist revolutions without the Red Army could not succeed as well as his well-founded fears that the Greek communists were very much under Tito with influence as effective as General Van Fleet's forces may have ben
in defeating the Greeks the Greek communists. There can be little doubt that Stalin's action against Yugoslavia first expulsion from the common form and then imposition of an economic blockade or as much if not more responsible for the failure of the Greek revolution. All this remained and remains unknown to the Americans. And at the time the haste with which the Truman Doctrine was prepared precluded finding out. And even today 20 years later it is an implicit article of American Cold War faith that our military intervention saved Greece from domination over and over again. Our intervention in Greece is cited as an argument for American military action in other places. The success of our containment policy in Europe then became the proof of its validity in Asia. Meanwhile having misunderstood Munich we were a stopped from trying to reach a modus vivendi with Moscow because almost any agreement with the Communists was seen as
appeasement. Believing in a Soviet dominated communist monolith. We for example missed Mr Ross who was an assistant secretary of state in charge of Far Eastern Affairs who contended that. The new communist regime in China was simply acting as an agent of Moscow. We first opposed the communist government in China on the theory that it was inspired and directed by Moscow. And then while the fury of the Soviet Chinese dispute mounted we continued to talk until very recently at least about the Sino-Soviet bloc. The idea of international communist conspiracy still grips our thinking. The second misunderstanding is about the nature of the world. Completely convinced that communism sought to dominate the world militarily. But it was I'm capable of winning popular support independent of Moscow and or Peking. We have been unable to appreciate the reality of revolutionary
nationalism in the underdeveloped countries or even a legitimate national interests different from our own in other areas rich beyond Crozier's dreams. The United States and its foreign policy has had some of the same difficulty in understanding the hopes and fears of the world's underprivileged masses as an understanding those of our own underprivileged masses here at home. Devoutly convinced of the Mollen material superiority of our way of life. We have been unable to see that it is not necessarily meaningful or good for all other paranoid about communism. We have equated anti communism with freedom and democracy and anything not definitely anti-communist as a threat to our security. The third and related misunderstanding is about international politics. The contemporary international political system is dominated by nationalism. It is plural and it is a model. The United States seeing its security jeopardized by communism has sought security
by trying to come back threat of communism. Seeing the threat of communism everywhere we have become convinced that our security depends on our willingness to intervene everywhere. Thus we have fallen into the trap of searching for absolute security not realizing that this is a camera and that the pursuit of it means less security because it inevitably involves us in conflict with other nations. As long as American foreign policy remains based on such concepts as these it is hard to see how we can ever get out of Vietnam or if we could be fortunate enough to extricate ourselves from it and a world still whole. How we can avoid soon becoming bogged down in another part of the globe with all the same problems contradictions and dangers that we now face and be damned. Now this poses a serious problem. Because ultimately our security and our ideals depend on achieving some kind of disarmament and an effective universally recognized United Nations Organization.
But meanwhile the use of national power military violence and intervention for national ends are hard cold facts of international life. By no means only practiced by the United States violent international changes revolutions and wars of national liberation. Can alter the batter of the balance of power in a way dangerous to us. Plot by the forces of history the United States is a great world power for which the old pre World War 2 head in sand ism is no longer practical or possible. And if American ideals mean anything at all we should in some way utilize our vast resources of mind and material for human betterment. The problem is how to gear this American position in the world with its need for participation in international affairs with a restraint and self limitation that is so necessary yet so badly lacking. In other words how to fashion a foreign policy designed to keep us afloat in a revolutionary world of thermonuclear powers.
And it is a logical conflict for principle suggest themselves for such a foreign policy reorientation. Core interests first coexistence second core interests third neutralisation and fourth internationalization. And I'll say a brief word about the. The essence of coexistence is that the great powers agree de facto not to use armed forces against the interest of any one of them. This is obviously much more than simply not agreeing to destroy each other first of all there must be understanding and acceptance of peaceful ideological competition and conflict. Paradoxically while it is the fact of opposing idiology that makes the need for coexistence so pressing and so difficult it is only acceptance of this fact that makes coexistence possible. This means great powers must recognize each other's right to work vigorously for the triumph of their own ideas and against the triumph of the ideas of others while renouncing military force as an instrument to the sand. Despite the
agreement of the Kremlin and the Vatican about this point it is not altogether clear that the United States really accept it so deep is our anti-communist phobia and misconceptions about communism. Despite the war in Vietnam however we may be closer to accepting it now than some years ago. Chinese militancy might be considered to preclude agreement with such a concept. But there is nothing in Peking so stated position which would preclude. And although we do not know to what extent China's policies are a reaction to perceptions in Peking of American hostility it is reasonable to assume that this plays some role and possibly the dominant role. The second prerequisite for coexistence is agreement among the great powers not to use force to try to alter the essential world balance of power. This means first of all their acceptance of the territorial status quo and agreement not to accept not to assist other states in trying to upset a system in a military way. This is particularly important in regard to states established since World War
2 while a major problem is that of direct military involvement. All other kinds of great power involvement cannot be ignored either. American support of West Germany's refusal to accept East Germany in the ordered Nysa frontier is the clearest example of such involvement jeopardizing coexistence because it touches the vital interests of a great power. In this case the US as our great power involvement in the Arab-Israeli dispute is an salutary and dangerous as it is is still of a different character. A second and infinitely more complicated ass aspect of acceptance of the existing balance of power involves internal conflicts. No concept of coexistence can as a practical matter rule out violent internal change that is revolutions in various forms. The heart of the problem however involves not violent changes such but the intervention of great powers and internal conflicts. Now given the hard cold realities of national power and its utilization it is unlikely that any meaningful international understanding could rule
out all and any such intervention. What is needed is an agreement on some rules of the road defining where and how our power can be used so as not to jeopardize coexistence. What must be proscribed therefore are those types of intervention in terms of conflicts which great powers consider a threat to their most vital interests. Such intervention invariably produces counter intervention and thus great power military confrontation with the risk of thermonuclear war. Both the Soviet intervention in Cuba and the American intervention in Vietnam although different fall under the heading while American intervention in the Dominican Republic and Soviet adventure in Hungary did not. The dimensions of the problem can be seen in connection with the Soviet Union and the United States. Both states have a firm policy of extending their military protection to friendly governments threatened by outside aggression regardless of where these governments are. But what about revolutions or counter revolutions. The USSR is indicated for example that
it will not necessarily intervene in wars of national liberation unless the capitalists do so. Does this mean that the United States could not extend military assistance to a government that asks for it without the Soviet Union extending military assistance to the revolutionary movement or vice versa. The concept of intervention itself needs define. We are primarily concerned with military intervention troops and so forth but similar questions arise in connexion with assistance limited to arms shipments and the like. Now an answer cannot be offered without reference to the principle of core interest principle of core interests is essentially this. Every nation large and small has certain interests which it considers so vital to it that threats to these interests are considered as threats to the very existence of the state. Traditionally a threat to core interests has meant war because core interests being considered vital are not subject to compromise with weaker
states the core interest is usually only territorial integrity and more powerful states tend to have wider Cori but core interests are by nature limited not global and thus they have a close relation to geography. The nations may and usually do as secondary tertiary interests and so forth. The main point however is that some interests are more important than others and invariably the closer to home the more important they are considered the geographical aspect of this concept is still of the utmost significance. Despite the attrition of modern technology and time and distance rational determination of core interests in relation to available power and awareness of core interests of other states is the essence of foreign policy formulation. The object here would be to seek understanding's with other great powers not about which areas they will intervene in but about which areas they can agree not to intervene and the point would be not to agree for example that American
intervention in Latin America or Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe or Chinese intervention in East Asia was permissible but rather to agree that there would be no American intervention in Eastern Europe or East Asia. No Soviet intervention in Latin America or East Asia. No Chinese intervention in Latin America or Eastern Europe for example since a military intervention is usually stimulate or at least justified by the intervening states fear that its action is necessary to keep another power out agreements of this sort would reduce also the propensity of great power intervention and even their own core interest areas. If earlier wisdom was seen in keeping such decisions close to the chest for a pledge to stay out of some area might encourage another power's intervention today in the thermonuclear age wisdom surely is in reducing ambiguities as much as possible. A nation might decide deliberately to challenge the core interest of another but it should realise what it is doing and what the consequences are likely to be.
All well there has been no more flagrant violation of the core interest principle than the Soviet missile intervention in Cuba. Still the United States has been the most persistent violator examples are our military activities in Iran Turkey and other countries up against the Soviet border in the Korean War the American approach to the Yellow River clearly threaten China's core interests. And in Korea we are again intervening militarily in an area of great geopolitical importance to Peking. And additionally in bombing North Vietnam attacking an area of great ideological importance to Moscow. There probably has been no better example of what I would call the isolationist type of thinking at any time than the recent American official declarations that. The Chinese that are bombings on the Chinese border do not risk Chinese intervention because the Chinese know that this does not threaten them. A foreign policy
in harmony with the concept of core interest would necessitate our growing back. From some of our global military commitments and concentrating on more limited objectives. Even so all our clear a core interest areas those we would insist on others staying out of would of course be expensive certainly including Latin America and Western Europe with West Germany at minimum. But they could not reasonably be expected to extend to the mainland of Asia or to areas juxtaposed to the Soviet Union. Now ideological considerations and foreign policy tend to be the enemy of core interest principle as can be seen by the case of both the United States and the Soviet Union. If the United States has thus far been less restrained. The USSR is absolute pledge to defend all socialists regimes no matter where existing may be more dangerous both because the more serious role of idiology inside be it thinking and because of the possibility of more socialist regimes arising in areas of American core interest. A clearer interpretation of the Soviet position
here would have to be one of the objectives of an understanding on core interest. And obviously for it to be meaningful such an understanding would have to include ultimately the Chinese as well. An objection that might be raised to such an understanding is that what we are afraid of is not only military intervention but also subversion and that the communist powers have the inbuilt advantage of the existence of indigenous Communist Party. Of course if the primary concern of American policy is to combat Communism as a social system no matter where and regardless of national power connotations then we are rejecting the idea of co-existence itself. But if our primary concern is to prevent the accumulation of possibly hostile powers then this objection is invalid. It is quite likely that additional states will acquire some kind of Communist regimes. But this does not necessarily mean that they will conspire with other communist states in ways and MKL to American security
the independence and nationalism and different interests of communist countries especially those removed from the great centers of communist power. It's not a matter of speculation but a fact. As for subversion it doubtless occurs and from both sides. But it can seldom if ever be successful without an internal situation amenable to it. That communist take advantage of backward and chaotic social conditions is well known. No one would suggest that the American government deprive itself of the possibility. Of helping improve such conditions and thus the menacing the communist chances. It is true however that debase our foreign policy on the principle of core interests would mean that in large parts of the world the United States would have to eschew the temptation to intervene militarily against revolutions just as the communist powers would have to forego military intervention to help them in other areas. It would be sad that knowing there would be no American intervention might
encourage the communists. It can also be said that it might encourage non communist regimes in such areas to face up to their own social problems. By the same token communists in other areas might be less likely to ferment revolutions if they understood they could not count on help from Moscow or Peking. Now we come to neutralization. Here the effort should be made to achieve understanding that regardless of internal changes no country in these areas would become a member of any bloc or power system. That is they should be neutralized and not aligned with some kind of international guarantee. Nor would the effort. I neutralization have to be confined to such areas neutralization could be sought and should be sought I think even in areas which might reasonably be considered as core interests by a great power. There are many small countries which are unwillingly within the core interests of a great power which would find us attractive. It would permit them to solve their
own internal problems with less worry about foreign influence. If the likelihood were reduced that internal developments in such countries would redound to the interest of the great powers there is reason to suppose. That the great powers also might look. As well as the small powers unfroze ation with favor. Now notarization would be most feasible where there are aspects of regionalism for the United States particularly it might offer a way out in Southeast Asia and it could be made even part of a settlement. Despite their various political complection the evidence is that the countries of Southeast Asia agree on their dislike of foreign intervention and fear China. Even representatives of Thailand a country with serious internal and external communist problems allied with the United States recently signed a statement calling for neutralization of all
Southeast Asia and withdrawal of all foreign military forces in the same way that core interests implies that in many cases the great powers would have to let competing forces inside a country determine its political and social makeup. So neutralisation implies they would have to let competing nationalisms inside a neutralized region work out their own destinies if sometimes this would mean a bloody slugfest. One can only say that such conflicts occur anyway and probably in a worst way with a great power intervention. Furthermore with neutralisation applied to the Near East for example while there would still be an Arab Israeli conflict both sides would be more likely to compromise on the basis of the realities. If there were less interest on the part of the great powers and supporting one side but the other. It clearly neutralized their East could receive competing economic aid rather than can be military aid. A conflict that's made less likely in all cases of course neutralisation could work
only if it were real and respected. With CIA and Soviet agents and the like. Kept well outside. Coexistence and core interests neutralization it would mean a foreign policy reoriented to diplomatic rather than military solutions. But these would be an adequate without the 4th principle of internationalization the world is one of sovereign nation states dominated by the spirit of nationalism. It is at the same time however a world in which these very institutions are no longer adequate to serve their own ends. And this is resulted in the rise of internationalism. Now ultimately if the world lasts. The nation states as we know them almost surely will go the way of city states dukedoms and principalities and merge into something larger. But this is at best or at worst a long time in the future. But the time being we can only utilize the instrumentalities of internationalization of
internationalism in a way that harmonizes with nationalism and assists nation state structure. A start has already been made with the UN organization. The kind of mitigation of international tensions in visit and a successful adoption of coexistence core interests the neutralization would itself permit the United Nations to fulfill many Cold War. To fulfill many tasks the Cold War and great power complex now keep it from doing the first thing of course would be to make the UN completely universal or nearly so by including China. Under such conditions there would arise the possibility of enlarging some of the automatic authority of the United Nations administered by the secretary without constituting a potential threat to any great power or any power at all here or economic aid in peacekeeping especially suggest themselves. There is much reason for agreeing with Senator Fulbright but the best way to accomplish what we really seek by foreign aid is to distribute it through the UN. The big
problem with foreign aid now is that we have to extend it through governments which often pervert it for a narrow and partisan political ends disruptive to economic development and the alleviation of bad social conditions. Foreign aid is a type of intervention. Not only do we in the United States lack competent personnel to deal adequately with the delicate relationships involved in such intervention but there is always a temptation to attach political strings of our own which actually inhibit our own purposes and then require military commitment. As a follow up. In most underdeveloped countries foreign aid whether intended for humanitarian or realistic economic development ends is likely to encourage the forces of social revolution. With our capitalist orientation. If the United States government were faced for example with choosing between economic progress or private ownership particularly private American ownership only one answer would be possible. In addition
some countries which need assistance refuse US foreign aid because of fear often justified that it would entitle them in the Cold War not only with the United Nations people be likely to be more competent but they would be better able to insist on criteria of economic efficiency and enforce internal standards of accounting and political propriety in handling foreign aid funds less inhibited by ideology. Norwood internationalized aid from the United Nations be likely to bear seeds of political or military entanglement. A multi-billion dollar UN aid program could really save the world and in ways favorable to peace and people as well as to the true interests of the United States. The United States would have to be the biggest contributor without much direct say in what happened after we gave the money. But such participation as I see it would not be generosity but enlightened self-interest and common sense. So with peacekeeping if the great powers could be persuaded they have nothing to lose or gain from UN peacekeeping its
scope and utility would be greatly increased and particular it could serve to prevent it. Or to mitigate the consequences of conflict among states and neutralized areas and help to promote neutralisation by providing international guarantee. Under the wise direction of. Home I think in my opinion far and away the best of the secretary general of the United Nations. It follows therefore that the American government thinks he is the worst that the United Nations has on occasion attempted diplomatic as well as military peacekeeping in the Cuban crisis. This was successful and Vietnam it is not bad. But if we could be spared further Vietnam's in an atmosphere in which UN activity was encouraged the secretary general could do much to reorient the USSR and the United States toward detente and take the lead in the vital task of
repairing international communications with China for the United States the advantages of moving in such a direction as I've suggested seem clear freed of the feeling that our security requires us to police the world. We could concentrate on our own core interests as well as our own pressing domestic problems. A less adventuresome foreign policy would help restore our leadership in Western Europe where de-emphasis on military aspects could only promote unity and restore the respect with which much of the world would like to hold us and even more important perhaps we could give Latin America the attention it deserves without worries that the social reforms we know are necessary might work against. This might have the greatest benefit of all for Latin America is a powder keg with a fuse already lit. Even without the catalyst of Cuba it is obviously an area where to use Leninist language the objective
conditions are ripe for revolution to attempt to cope with revolutionary trends merely by continuing to back reactionary regimes or by emulating the Dominican intervention would only aggravate matters and be likely to lead a one to one or more Latin American Vietnam. It is possible that economic assistance could pave the way for revolution rather than revolution but it is far from certain that even an adequate aid program which the Alliance for Progress does not even remotely approach. It could work to its ameliorative effect in time. The safest course would be probably for the United States to try to out Castro Castro to steal a communist thunder and join up with the revolution that such an approach even if valid is so unlikely is all the more reason why a general reorientation of our foreign policy is pressing. Given powerful but shortsighted economic interests congressman
and the anti-communist phobia that has permeated our social fabric. The domestic difficulties of launching such a foreign policy reorientation may prove insuperable. Certainly it would take leadership wiser and more courageous than that which seems available at the moment. Yet at the same time the effort could be begun without seriously altering our proclaimed foreign policy objectives or without letting down our defense safeguards. You have been listening to the Institute on world affairs a series of lectures and discussions held each year on the San Diego State College campus. At this session the principal speaker was Dr. Fred Neel who is dean of Claremont Graduate School in Pomona California. The institute brings together noted leaders from all walks of life who address themselves to the perplexing problems that face mankind. The
Toward a new world
Pacem in Terris, Johnson & Vietnam, part two
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San Diego State University
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This program presents the second part of a lecture by Dr. Fred Neal, Claremont Graduate School.
Lectures recorded at San Diego State College's 25th Annual Institute on World Affairs. The Institute brings together world leaders to discuss issues in politics, culture, science, and more.
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Producing Organization: San Diego State University
Speaker: Neal, Fred Warner
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University of Maryland
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Chicago: “Toward a new world; Pacem in Terris, Johnson & Vietnam, part two,” 1967-12-28, University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed January 16, 2021,
MLA: “Toward a new world; Pacem in Terris, Johnson & Vietnam, part two.” 1967-12-28. University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. January 16, 2021. <>.
APA: Toward a new world; Pacem in Terris, Johnson & Vietnam, part two. Boston, MA: University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from