Special of the week; Issue 17-70 "TransAtlantic Forum"

The British Broadcasting Corporation in collaboration with the national educational radio network for the transatlantic forum in this edition of the domino theory today the program introduced in London by Terrence Kelly the domino theory today. Well before I embark on a definition of that title may I introduce because in New York how different souls break assistant managing editor of The New York Times and the author of a number of books from the communist world in London. Kenneth Mackenzie who writes for The Economist and who also specializes in the area of the world with which we'll be concerned in this discussion. Southeast Asia. Well I thought I'd embark on a definition of domino theory but in fact I'll quote the words of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia some time before his overthrow. He had this to say about American withdrawal from Vietnam. In all ages this departure would be interpreted without exception as a defeat an avowal of the weakness of the American giants. If the Americans quit Vietnam Asia will the Philippines and Thailand already the Soviet Union is installing itself in India more

solidly than America. Pakistan still plays neutral but becomes more and more friendly with China. OK out in print you know we have the dominoes but if one comes to be taken by the communist Laos Cambodia Thailand I would follow. First of all how New York do you think that you know. But it's being born out in view of the recent events in Laos Cambodia is well the Prince whose views are very much more like a windmill than a game of dominoes. Has merely repeated the platitude. Of course Asia is stirring it's been stirring intensely. If we want to start to fix a date on it I'd say it's been stirring since the end of World War Two and it's not likely to stop stirring whether or not CNN rises or falls again. It's part of a

Continental process. To my way of thinking. The shaking up of all the countries and small nations and some that are not really Nations as a result of the relaxation of the enormous grip of the European powers either through overt or subvert colonialism in that area and I don't think that we're going to see any end to that. It is that they don't want to process can they. Well personally I would say it is. But first of all I'd like to make very clear what I mean by the domino theory and I don't mean what was projected by Mr. Dulles and his henchmen of the late 50s when to give the impression to the world that Saigon fell and Bangkok automatically fell on Friday and Saturday or Sunday I don't mean anything like that by the domino theory. I mean that if the key country in Southeast Asia which I regard as South Vietnam goes Communist the psychological effect throughout

Southeast Asia throughout the whole of Asia for the next five or 10 years or more will be extremely harmful to western says and what I mean is that there would be a slow but very steady erosion of all the ideals of Western democracies throughout Southeast Asia. If that is Viet Nam fall. And I'm not suggesting for a moment there's going to be any big melodramatic sequence of events all within a week or a fortnight. You say that like a logical brain. Well I'm my own feeling is that I would agree a good deal with what Mr McKenzie has said. I never have believed in in the Douglas version of the domino theory but at the same time I think it's absurd to suggest that what happens in one country does not have some effect on the country adjacent to it it may or may not cause that country to move in the direction

of the first that is to say the fact that Indonesia throws out the communists may or may not have some effect politically on the up. Obviously there are cause and effect there but the primitive idea that one falls in the others topple of course is utterly absurd. The greatest domino of all China fell in 1909 and it did not produce a series of small dominoes in Southeast Asia. What do you think that any one individual company and organization is pushing Cambodia do you think. Well the Cambodian situation seems to me to be. About as complex as any situation can well be. Cambodia has been an anachronism in Southeast Asia. Living on the edge of a raging war which leaped across her front here of course in many different forms.

More perhaps most dramatically in the form of the North Vietnamese using the adjacent areas as refugees as refuges and also for the smuggling of materials in and out. No country is small and is badly administered and poorly organized as Cambodia can live next to a large war without feeling its effects. It's been surprising that Cnut through his gyrations and his melodramatic maneuvers has been able to maintain as much neutrality in Cambodia as he has been able to. To maintain. As for outside influences being involved in a scene I would say it is the case remains to be proved I think that the basic facts so far is as his loss of position are concerned are to be found in Cambodian politics which are very intricate. So you know to my knowledge it was in very serious trouble long before he went off to France for his semiannual of swatting down process and I think he thought that when he got to France

that the politicians who were hostile to him would fall out like thieves and he would be able to return and right the situation. He miscalculated and things went against him but I don't write him off as yet he may well come back. He said he's like he's not like Humpty Dumpty doesn't fall off the wall and into pieces that can't be put together again he's more like one of those Russian toys you know that do that you knock over and it immediately comes back up right again. And they call them. How about the situation and the generating crisis that affected by outside influences. I don't think it will I don't think that Laos is a domino but I think Laos which I don't very much that Laos is a country in the first place I think that it is sort of a feudal con juries of principalities or something of that nature and it is been in a state of enormous disorder for a great many years and certainly has been ever since the so-called

Laotian agreements which have not been observed by anyone so far as I know it. Various areas of the country have long been held by different groups or clique so the central government's authority is extremely limited and it's a very weak and powerless type of government in such a situation with a again with a war on its doorstep. It's very natural that the more powerful forces around Laos have have taken advantage to use Laos for their own particular purposes the so-called trail runs during for much of its course through rugged Laotian territory and has been used traditionally by the North Vietnamese for the transport of supplies to the south. The Americans have been in Laos for many many years. It's really rather amusing and the Iranian I think that it only had in the last few months the American presence has suddenly become so visible and so much of a scandal internationally speaking. I remember when I went into

Laos the first time some four years ago I was astonished at the American activities going on there and so have many many other correspondents who have written about it but no one paid much attention as long as the Vietnam War in Vietnam was was going on raging So why only now that the war in Vietnam has begun to die down we suddenly see the events in Laos perhaps a bit more clearly and of course they are being used by both sides the Americans have certain motivations there and so of the North Vietnamese can again. Yes it's not a country at the moment it's a completely split top. I would rather take the opposite view that if America decided to defend it to the south the extension ought to be prepared to defend us.

What the interest of the no me in the situation of these two countries. Well of course there are two runs and two different levels there is a very practical military immediate military interest of the North Vietnamese in Cambodia in the border areas which they use so-called sanctuary where they maintain large stocks of supplies the air forces retreat there or stay are stationary there ready to dart into an order very important sort of strategic and marshalling area for the military operations in Vietnam itself and much the same sort of utility is given to Laos where the Holcim and trail enables them to bring down supplies. It went one time with a with a good deal of impunity actually not for a long long time because. With the bombing in the north in North Vietnam the American air forces simply shifted a great deal of that tonnage over to Laos on the

trail now that's the first and most direct interest that they have in those two countries. There is a secondary interest however and that is from the north from Hanoi standpoint. The war is more or less at a standstill it's difficult to get anything going either militarily or diplomatically and I think that quite clearly they they hope that through the use of crises over Laos and over Cambodia to work it to their advantage perhaps by compelling the Americans to rethink their wrist strategy in Paris or possibly so far as the war is concerned in Vietnam itself. I can be a diplomatic weapon. Yes I think it is. I feel that the war in Viet Nam has reached a stalemate that is fractionally in favor of the Americans in the South Vietnamese. I think for that reason we have seen this diversion to Laos over the last month or two and I

said some months ago that Laos could conceivably prove the Americans Achilles heel in Southeast Asia and into China might be argued now that Cambodia is going to be the Achilles heel but the situation is so confusing. Cambodia at the moment nobody can say but I think there has been a deliberate Samy Diplomatic Tactical diversion. Too late on the part of the Hanoi Politburo because they have realized they are not winning out and start there. Could I make one comment on that I think that you know the situation and Laos in the first instance the step up in fighting there came from the American side rather than the other way around. I think it's quite clear that the large scale fighting of last summer was at the American instance and in part this may well be because simply for such a simple reason as the fact that the American bombers were

no longer being permitted to fly to the north and so they diverted their operations into Laos the CIA which as large scale operations in South Vietnam were being closed down or moved in on by General Abrams and so they moved over to an area which they controlled largely themselves. It was quite evident in the in the fighting for the Plain of Jars last summer and autumn that this was an American initiative it was also equally obvious that unless the United States was going to move in much more strongly that when the other side wanted they could turn the tables and indeed that's exactly what has happened. Whether the North Vietnamese now having having changed the situation around to their own advantage though really the positions are not much different than they were a year ago. Whether they're going to press forward remains to be seen I would be a little bit dubious of it myself. The top American military commander General was in London General Abrams just recommended a policy of caution on troop withdrawal from Vietnam and it seems

that many people are getting worried that they had to go get the meat is going too far. Do we think that the domino theory is perhaps coming back into favor in official circles in America and something I haven't seen any indication of that quite honestly and so far is the military word of caution about the pace of troop withdrawals it is just that and frankly there has been the same word of caution each time we've gone to another stage and while it may well be that Mr. Nixon will move a little more cautiously this month than he had intended just because of the number of real uncertainties out in the field I would not anticipate any change in that policy I think we're moving almost irrevocably step by step to disengage out there and even know many people including myself have some very great concern over the so-called Vietnamization policy. I've seen no sign that Mr. Nixon and Henry

Kissinger have any qualms about it at this point. Do you think they should be cautious. Can they. Well I think there's an inevitable disengagement. The question is how far the disengagement. I thought at this stage Nixon would be justified in holding it hostage. I personally would be disappointed if he announced major troop withdrawal in April the 15th when it was expected to make its next announcement. I would have thought in the context of the present situation would be absolute folly. Well the president has a problem. His critics in Congress who are very strong and who are skeptical of his course have becoming become increasingly vociferously as the situation in Laos has become much more public and and gotten a lot of headlines in Cambodia and I would say that if the president then.

Compounded this by announcing or saying something publicly indicating that he was holding back on his withdrawal policy he would open himself up to to quite a severe political attack in Congress and I don't really believe he wants to do that so my own suspicion is that he will continue his policy perhaps indicating some prudence you will recall that last fall at one point he held off a bit. This was in the time of just before his November 3rd pronouncement but he then picked up the pace of withdrawal shortly thereafter I wouldn't expect anything much more than a repetition of that this time. Well Comey moved to the attitude of some other countries to the Domino Saturday. What about China. How far do have aims coincide with those that's not yet in relation to the other small countries of Southeast Asia. Mackenzie you know this is the 64 million dollar question of any kind.

Obviously a communist supposed to get off the government and the government in Peking have a great deal in common. But traditionally it is enmity. I can expect this to happen I would not be a puppet peak which. Some people did. I think there's a lot of truth in that but in the present state of the game in Cambodia it seems to me that Peking and hand on Rodman on the same track. And it looks to me to think he's going to return to power. Then he paused and I think this is a very intriguing development. I would have thought this would have made a slightly unpopular with a large section of the Cambodian population. But I think I would agree that if we were to return to

power with the Chinese Bandits behind him or even in dollars or Chinese funds or indeed Vietnamese support anything more than the most trenchant nature it would it would not enhance his prestige in Cambodia because if there's one thing that Cambodia fears it's more than anything else it is the Vietnamese and next to that of course are the Chinese very critical Sihanouk was very weathervane ish about his own relations with the Chinese. I have noticed a certain difference in at least on the surface in policy between Hanoi and Peking so far is a scieno is concerned Hanoi is generally speaking it seems to be quite. Openly kept the Chinese diplomatic statements have been somewhat more reserved and it's notable to me that the Chinese ambassador has retained a position in the pen he's not been withdrawn and the Cambodian stary in Peking has

switched sides and is he declared his allegiance to the new government and he's remained in this post in picking what that may impend I don't know but it does suggest a difference since the Hanoi and Viet Cong representatives were pulled out of power. Again you think on the whole I'd rather agree with it in terms of the interpretation of the countries concerned. You don't think that the Chinese are not interested in the export of revolution to Cambodia has had nothing for it but it's a curious situation. The regime is very much in the FS I think and its effect of imponderable has got to keeping with Peking to a certain extent for obvious reasons. Hanoi has had to leave Cambodia and I think it's almost a game of blind man's bluff between to the side. How about the Russian the crisis in Cambodia and Laos seems a little

ironical that the Russian is like a communist country. Backing the claim of the hereditary prince in a house in Salt Lake. Well it's ironic but Heavens knows Russian foreign policy has had very little to do with the mikes or any doctrine of revolution almost from the very days of Lenin. So that it is it's traditional that they play the game for whatever they possibly can secure. It's not clear to me as far as the Russians are concerned either how far they are going to play the Scieno game I think it's quite inconceivable for example that they would permit him to create a government in exile in Moscow or something of that kind he again is not. He's not there. Dish of tea if I may say so. I think the Russians know that if you could spot on this one because you know it's all the way much upon a little business in their estimation and very much up to the side I mean seems to be making peaking on with

its base at the moment. The other thing that intrigues me is it's what Russia's going to do at the U.N. This is an interesting one because the president can the new can body and regime has appealed to the U.N. to Santas and observers and so forth. Will the Russians use their veto if and if so what how just found three act after that because I think there was a precedent in 1959 a very comparable roughly comparable situation unless when Dagenham a shawl after after a Soviet veto decided to send a representative I think it was a thing called the human to me or your will it was in Cyprus more or less as a personal envoy. Now this is a very interesting development of the thing and I think I don't want to spread the subject too far away when I'm going to be on dominoes but I think the way the Russians handled the situation that the at the U.N. is going to be very intriguing in the

next few days. Can you foresee which way they're going to play it has been talked like no I can't really because I'm not at all certain as to what form the question will arise in the U.N. and I don't think the Russians themselves perhaps at this moment will know or know what their position is. Events in the next few days will probably determine it and it will be a very pragmatic position that they take certainly whatever they think they can get the most mileage out of. But I honestly don't believe they see this is a question which has a great deal of asset value for them. They're not going to gain a lot of prestige in Southeast Asia by supporting Prince Sihanouk. They're not going to gain very much by opposing it I think they would tend to stand a little bit to one side. Well what about the outcome plays you have a small country to Southeast Asia. Do we think that they can stay out of the conflict when they turn into already American bases for example more gracious.

Name a country that isn't already involved. Thailand certainly is in up to its armpits. It's not a question of getting in. It's just a question of getting in further or some new development say some ground fighting in Thailand the Thais have done their ground fighting only outside their own country up to the present time that they are there in it shoulder to shoulder with the Americans there more for the war than we are and so I can't see that it would be a case of loss of virginity as far as the Thais are concerned. Other countries in Southeast Asia I have seen no sign that other countries are likely to be drawn in or want to be drawn in they tend to be drawing away from the war. Do you think I can say Thailand can avoid fighting on our own territory as things go on though that's not a few years. Well it depends just how things go on and I think the Thais are the sort of classic case of the whole domino theory.

If Cambodia should go communist India China should go commies I think the tires will be we will probably just convene and decide that to reinsure with the stronger side which of the candidates they're so close to this they can hardly keep out of it knows how to solve this. Said they're already involved in many ways. Well after Thailand then presumably it would be Malaysia that want to try again. Australia New Zealand and Britain Malaysia and Singapore they became involved. How about that can't again say well theoretically that's possible I think. I can't quite see how spells he has written a new stage of the game picking up any really active commitment to Southeast Asia despite certain people in the Conservative Party say the prospect is that if this stick to the southeast go it will be a steady erosion

of Western interest and that we will not be in a position to intervene in five or 10 years time that would be my basic argument you see a rapid erosion possible if Thailand goes off get deeply involved I don't think oh I don't I don't really think so in fact I would challenge the whole line of argument here. Thailand as I said is involved in this war very much on one side and the Thais traditionally have maintained their independence by being with the winning side by leaning toward the winning side by never becoming completely involved. I remember a conversation I had with with Komen several years ago on this precise thing I said What do you do if and when the United States pulls out of Vietnam he said. We'll survive don't worry about us we've survived for a thousand years and we've lived next to the Chinese all that period of time. Sure we may have to change our foreign policy but we will maintain our independence I have great confidence in the time. And as for the idea that if if

Cambodia should become communist that it would have a major effect on Thailand I don't believe it. Nor do I think it would have any effect on Malaysia in the whole theory that that you would get a proliferating chain going down through Malaysia the Philippines Australia New Zealand. No sir I don't think that's true. Well I mean food has always been I just caught a part in this basic issue because all the people I talk to tell me the very truth and I'm not saying you're wrong but I just get the very opposite information from other people who say that if these countries do fall that there will be a reaction. So who's to know at this moment who is right. Yes I am I'm not pessimistic in the sense that I think the countries of former India China could still be held I can body is terribly confused Viet-Nam I think is going better from the American standpoint. Laos is about 50/50 I think there's a sporting chance that the whole situation will be held and I think it's terribly important for the whole Western world that it should be.

But I think it's not health that will be a change. I think that's just the way human nature behaves that and this is ALL be I think you know at times go with the winning side. So I mean surely and by by implication you also see the path of the domino principle. You'll find a house in the old place. Well no I don't I don't think that I see anything as far as dominos are concerned I go back to what I said in the first place said that it's ridiculous to say that a country is not affected by what happens next door to it it may make it more antagonistic to that neighbor or it may make it less antagonistic but unless they're blind they naturally have to be affected by it. So far as the idea of the all of Southeast Asia falling unless America holds the line. Well I'd say that's pretty tough because America is not going to carry on the main major burden out in that part of the world indefinitely we're in the process of extricating

ourselves from that area and that doesn't mean that we wouldn't be concerned if there were a direct threat to Australia New Zealand possibly even the Philippines but I think you'd have a very difficult time selling American public opinion on picking up new burdens in an area where we're trying to lay some down. Well that we must leave the dominant how it unfolds in New York can't buy candy in London thank you very much. Trentham Magic Forum was produced in London by the British Broadcasting Corporation in collaboration with the national educational radio network taking part in the program with Harrison souls in New York and in London. Your chairman in London Terence Kelly. This is the national educational radio network.