China: Policy and perspective; China's foreign policy, part two
In this fifth special program on China debit missing girl concludes his analysis of Chinese foreign policy. The Cornell University scholar delivered his talk during a conference held by the University of Chicago Center for Policy Study with the support of the Johnson Foundation of raceme Wisconsin. Today Professor examines the failures and successes of China's foreign policy. There were some basic laws it seems to me and the Chinese in Chinese foreign policy and I would say they exist today. And exist. Have been sort of central to this basic about the ration. First I would want to say that the Chinese were right about the vulnerabilities of imperialism it seems to me. That in a strictly peaceful coexistence competition in the Third World that is if everybody stayed hands off in the not in Asia Africa and Latin America in a prolong competition between the
military hunters and the Compiz the Dari classes of the bourgeois nationalist regimes and the absentee landlords and a communist party that had 20 years to organize organize as an opposition and resistance in the countryside. I don't think the Chinese have a very have very considerable doubts about who will win that struggle over the long run. I really don't think the United States has very many doubts either and that explains a lot about policy. That. Basic I think analysis then of the vulnerabilities was successful. I think it was it was essentially correct. They were wrong however I think in the. Assumption the basic assumption they had that the Afro-Asian world could be united in support of a communist strategy that is that they or their interests were parallel to China's in the degree to which an anti-imperialist gratitude could be formed. They were also I think wrong and. They were obviously wrong and in assessing that the Soviet Union would would also see
or could also be brought to see that its interests were so it were also parallel to those of China in waging the struggle along these lines. In effect then one could say the. Basic flaw in the tinies analysis was that she saw no inherent contradiction. Between China's own interests. In organizing a coalition between nationalism and communism. For the purposes of undermining the foundations of imperialism in the APAR way and world. And the interests of other communist states now it notably the Soviet Union. And for some of the Afro-Asian states themselves who were nationalist but did not share the degree of a of an anti-imperialist directed. Policy to the extent that China did. It is an incontestable or an uncontestable fact that since 1955. Neither the Soviet bloc or the Afro-Asian world.
The two components the time it attempted to organize. Neither of these blocs had been really willing to rally to oppose Lee what the Chinese regard as the forward American position in Asia. None of them have been prepared to do it to the extent they have they had the interest in doing it to the extent that the Chinese have. A very in the Chinese view since 1955 there's been a very forward American policy in Asia. All the way from Japan through through Pakistan. I think there's a good deal of evidence to back this up. The Soviets and the Indians on the other hand have been increasingly from their point of view disinterested in opposing the United States to the limits that the Chinese feel would be necessary. And in the face of this collapse of the Maoist coalition. The Maoist strategic preference for handling this. Situation.
And the forward advance of American power which. Is much more formidable than the Chinese. The question posed by the two the Russians and I think to the Chinese was how they should respond to this so this growing unfavorable situation from their point of view. These events I think want to dismiss the matter of the Indian collapse of the first breach in the alliance with Mao and hope though that the Chinese thought they had formed in 1955. Began within a year or so after the band I'm compensated had concluded its work. The Indian gang from the Chinese point of view the Indian disaffection defection from the anti-imperialist alignment became manifest after 1956. Nehru completely switched began to switches position in 57. Prior to that time you'll remember he'd been a very strong advocate for colonial independence and opposing imperialism and mis treating the United States often at least
orally in terms of how tough we've been on the Chinese and how awful military pacts and alliances were and all of the kinds of features that the Chinese like to see and neutralised anti-imperialist leaders. And then in 57 he began to take the position that. The main thing was to prevent an outbreak of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. And in order to do that it was necessary to make that theme the predominant. Objective of the policy of the nonaligned world that if they had to prevent a Soviet American confrontation. And the issue of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism became distinctly subordinate. The Indian government of course from 56 on became heavily dependent on the United States for economic aid and a great degree of that also came from the Soviet Union. So that in effect Nehru was policies and they carry a great deal of wait for a while and the nonaligned world ran very much counter
to those of the Chinese since it undermined the whole idea of an anti-imperialist coalition. From 57 on neighbor was essentially working at cross purposes from those of the Chinese and I think a great deal of the. Ultimate. Severity of the boundary dispute with India Springs largely from that fact rather than the particular issues raised in the in the North Korea agency or in the dock area but we might talk about that later. Two. Neighbor then the Bandung conference really meant. That the Asian countries and in particular China was to give a pledge. That she wouldn't intervene in the affairs of the Asian powers. Other Asian countries. But there was no reciprocal. Validity. To any kind of Tiny's claims that the Afro-Asian countries had been abandoned owed any particular allegiance to carrying out an anti-US struggle. But that had clearly been the implication that the Chinese placed on the significance of Bandung. The crisis with the Soviet Union.
I think has now to be addressed and so it came to the floor for and was to provide I think the really crushing setback to the the Chinese. We mentioned earlier that the Soviet Union had used the concept of peaceful coexistence been in a different vein. This concept of. Peaceful coexistence had occupied a position traditionally in Soviet foreign policy of reflecting a rightist defensive consideration in Moscow's policies either under periods when the revolutionaries. Was on. Or in conditions when the socialist state was threatened by stronger and hostile outside powers. It had this kind of occasion in 49 and 52 when Stalin used it for the purposes of attempting to dislodge and to undermine the NATO's foundations. But the Russians. Concern with the concept of peaceful coexistence. Had always been.
Related to a strategic focus on Europe. And in the West. The effects of the Second World War. The growth of the division of Germany and the confrontation with a very strong nuclear armed United States had also served to reinforce this concern that so far as you were talking about peaceful coexistence it had to be concerned with the West. The Asian concern was very much reduced in Soviet thinking and never seems to have gotten beyond the tactical consideration that it might be useful in denying the Americans certain wrong materials or strategic bases. But as far as its being a decisive policy that could somehow help them win the longer term struggle with the imperialist powers. The Russians never conceded the idea of the Asian theatre as being very significant. Consequently the significance of an alignment in Asia or and focused in the Afro-Asian world to weaken the sort of enter land of imperial of imperialisms power power structure never sold very many marbles in
Moscow and there were some historical reasons for this of some considerable but let it be to the Russians. In Lenin's time certainly from the Baku conference in 1921 on. There had been an early feeling that Asia was the storm center of world revolution. You'd watch the German and the and the and the French and particularly the German Communist Party go down to crushing defeat the revolution that was supposed to come off in Moscow after 1980 never went anywhere it got crushed. And partially is I think a matter of hopeful speculation. The. Slight revolutionary tremors that were felt in India Indonesia and China in the 1920s looked hopefully to the to the Bolsheviks as the possibility of a great upheaval. But by the time it finished with the Communist Party in April 27 there wasn't much left of that. By the time the Dutch had put down the communists in Indonesia and 26 there wasn't much of that. And by the time the British had finished the Indian Communist Party in India in the 1920s there wasn't much there.
And from that day on the Russians and Stalin in particular was in the driver's seat never considered the possibilities of these Asian communist movements having really a great deal of significance. Indeed we know he was. Very much. Very much just concerned and had a low estimate of the prospects for success of the Chinese communist revolution until it was already on and sort of tidal wave force. It was this strategic framework the concentration on Europe. That Shaped Khrushchev formulation of the peaceful coexistence concept of the 20th Party Congress in February 956. The idea that there could be peace between communist and noncommunist states that peace was a good idea. And that communist pary communist states want to interfere in the car in the affairs of other internal communist parties. It was really nothing very novel it struck American newspapers as
being novel I think because they were paying much attention to events in China. There was nothing particularly novel about that since the Chinese have been talking about the same thing five years earlier. And had already put those policies into effect abandon a year and a half before that. What was significant about the peaceful coexistence line in later in this is that it was to become the crucial element of the dispute with Moscow. Was that the Russian leader advanced the idea that peaceful coexistence could extend to relations between imperialist powers and the socialist bloc. Namely that the lion and the lamb would lie down together. There had been no precedent for this in communist doctrine down to that point. Khrushchev maintained that the power of the communist bloc. Was now submarines substantial enough. It would permit the deterrence of imperialism the source of all war cording to the. To the Marxist scriptures. That there were powerful progressive and communist
parties principally in Europe and France and Italy. Which would be able further to deter the communists from the capitalist power from launching war. And that is a fact. And over the long run. That in fact it would be possible. For a peaceful transition to take place. In these countries because of the strength of the Communist movement. Favorable agreements could therefore be worked out between the communist powers and the west which would be favorable to the overall advancement of the movement. And it became quite clear. That the Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence. Was that the imperialists could be defeated and that the revolution could be advanced. By the deterrent power of the socialist camp and mainly of course that meaning the power of the Soviet state. The United States was supposed to be deterred from intervening in the revolutions in other countries in the world particularly the third area because of this great deterrent power. The new states when
opt for socialism because they saw the great advances taking place economically in the Soviet and Chinese society namely therefore communism would succeed by emulation. The interests of China and other communist parties in the third area. What happened to await their for a victory. By the Soviet Union over the West in a prolonged period of peaceful coexistence in the West in which a complicated long term pattern of maneuver negotiations conciliation blub struggle and other events would have to take place before the NATO's structure was weakened and Breaux was weakened and broken up before the United States was pushed out of Europe and before the Soviet predominance and this phase of the struggle had been formed. The arguments of China and the interests of China and other countries in Asia and these other relevant areas that they could not take precedence over this nor could they. Add up to a substantial case for the deflection of Soviet power
in any of these areas. There has been I think or there was no. Compromise. Or concession from the Chinese side despite the fact that in this. Sort of growing confrontation with both their Soviet ally and the United States. There was no. Conciliation among the Chinese to the Russians. In my opinion. Because from the Chinese point of view it became increasingly difficult after 1956. To draw any other conclusion than that Soviet power was increasingly becoming essentially anti-Chinese and dedicated to a form of containment substantial perhaps different in name but not in form. From that that directed American policy. There was no Soviet aid to China after 156 though it is in that year that the Soviet Union lost the first of its large foreign aid programs to other countries such
unreadable proletarian advocates as Nasser in Egypt Nehru in India and Sukarno in Indonesia. Vanguards of the world revolution. Every one of them. There was no aid to the Chinese at this time nor any subsequent large scale aid though it made a difference unquestionably I think in the scope and the degree of the attempt Firstly attempted five year plan in one thousand fifty seven. The eight as I mentioned went to these other countries which began to look somewhat like perhaps the Russians would rather see stability in these areas and a competitive effort launched by Moscow in relation to China. There was also I think the much important and much under estimated. Move of the Russians in October of 1996 to establish diplomatic relations with Japan. It is. A very key country for the Chinese and I would argue that this
from the Chinese point of view undermined. The intent and the spirit of the 1050 Sino-Soviet pact. Whereby the two powers had consistently down to that period of time denied recognition to Japan pending Japan severance of her ties with the United States severance of ties with Taiwan. And the accordance of recognize of course and the neutralization one should say of Japan since it was in a military alignment with the United States. I think it could hardly be seen from the Chinese position that by the Russians taking this board step it would weaken Japan's. Ability to maintain these positions on the contrary it strengthened it since it was quite clear to the Japanese at the time that if the Russians could. Be brought around so soon to accepting the notion of two Chinas. And accepting also the fact of the permanence of Soviet of amount of American and Japanese military alignment sooner or later a much weaker
China would also be obliged to accept. These conditions. The more serious. Elements I think came out however in 1058 benign. The Chinese have argued it has never been publicly repudiated by the Russians. As a 58. The Soviet Union made what kind of recalls and reasonable military demands on China which would have placed according to China Chinese territory under Soviet military control. Seems difficult that. It could have been anything else other than demands for its help it's going to take nuclear bases in China. Since I can't imagine any other conceivable form of Soviet military deployment on mainland China that would have companies that end. In June of 1959. Again undisputed by Moscow the Soviet Union tore up the earlier 1958 nuclear agreements on sharing nuclear. Technology and the
provision of a apparently a prototype model. A nuclear bomb with the Chinese. And in September. The tax statement on India which the Soviets took a neutral dispute on the Sino-Indian boundary. Conflict rather than having supported the Chinese. They real potboiler I think took place in October of 1999. However. When on his return from the talks with Eisenhower at Camp David according to the Chinese Khrushchev suggested that. China accept the de-facto existence of two Chinas that is of Taiwan's independence. And not attempt to task this ability of the capitalist system by force. It was only about six months after this five months after this in April of nineteen sixty it was not until that time. That the Chinese launched. A public and open challenge of Soviet authorities apparently reluctantly and after a prolonged debate and consideration. This took place in the famous series of.
Articles found together called The Long live Leninism series in which they laid down a challenge to the revisionist line of the Soviet leadership. A basic position which has not which to all the subsequent I think the subsequent. Editorial barrages and statements of positions have largely fled just filled our flasks out the basic statement laid down in that in that document rather than than having substantively changed it. Prior to this that is to say prior to April 960 it is very difficult to make a case that the Chinese were sought to replace Soviet leadership in the bloc or for that matter sought to certainly to force upon the Soviet Union a tougher policy on the question of rebel forcing revolution. What they did say what they have consistently sought was a tougher Soviet stand on how you dealt with the United States particularly in those areas that were of immediate concern to trying to.
But on the question of they're attempting to seize leadership from the Soviet Union on the question of their decision of their interest in pushing revolutions at a higher pace. Than the than the Chinese that than they were than the Russians. I think there's much much less evidence and it is much less clear. I would say that you could not support that. Actually prior to this time China's considerable influence and leverage had been used to sustain and support the Soviet leadership of a bloc that was threatened by internal disintegration since the time of Stalin's death in March of 1953. The old dictators did dept created an authority crisis in the communist movement which the Chinese attempted both. In. Their efforts in Eastern Europe where they had to go in and help the Russians find a formula to solve what it been produced by the collapse of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe under Khrushchev policies. And in one thousand 56.
And 57 in the period of the anti-party struggle when I would remind you a. An And a Stalinist faction composed of mowing cops. You remember. And Molotov attempted to overthrow the crew shop leadership. This is a good rock'em sock'em right wing Stalinist tough on the west tough on peaceful coexistence group. It was this group that contended with with coup shopper power and lost out in July of 57 and it seems to me that had it been the Chinese interest at this time to have such a tough rough Stalinist leadership then they certainly ought to have supported Khrushchev's enemies rather than him than himself. They so far as I can tell their neutrality was one that they bring Khrushchev. And they hailed his victory when it took place I don't know to what extent they were involved in the interparty struggle. And the quest it was not in their interest to see a Stalinist leadership because now it's down to honest leadership would have been prepared to share the directorship of the world movement
would be king and I was down this government would have genuinely been willing to follow a position or a strategy that had been suggested by Moggs I don't. The Chinese thought however that Khrushchev would be a person who they might. Be able to sell this. Particular strategy to be had become dependent upon them for. Necessity necessity necessary support in Eastern Europe. And. They thought it would be possible. To bring him around to their point of view. But it became clear however the Khrushchev's own attitude changed in the period after 57 after he'd won the victory over the anti party group he no longer really needed the Chinese and he began to regard their assertiveness and their feelings that they could provide the formula. For how to rule organize communist relationships within the Bloc and how to carry out the struggle against the West began to regard these developments as essentially a threat to
Soviet interests and a threat to Soviet had Germany in the Communist movement. It was not until after However these events in 58 and 59. From the Chinese point of view the betrayal of Chinese interest in service to negotiation with the United States. The EU the blouse that from their point of view were inflicted on the Chinese by couple by policies on the part of the Soviet Union that were contrary to Moscow's contrary they were to be kings. In other words it was not until the events between the year 58 in and 60 that the Chinese decisively drew the conclusion that there couldn't be any peaceful coexistence or any further alignment with Khrushchev. His policies would have to be overturned or his leadership undone. Therefore the and I might add in this connection you go back over the Chinese documentation. It's quite clear that it was not until 1960 that the issue of peaceful transition and peaceful coexistence in the sense of the revolutionary line became
critical. That wasn't a major criticism of the Chinese in their basic statement of criticism of the 20th party congress theses in 1956 in the two famous outer articles on the historical experience of proletarian dictatorship and the one in December of 56 more on the historical experience of proletarian dictatorship. There's no attack on the peaceful coexistence line in the map. In one thousand of Ember 1957 Mao is still saying that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union must lead not only the camp. They had to leave the anti-imperialist struggle and had to be the leadership of the Communist parties. And at the memorandum introduced in the outline of views on peaceful transition of member the eleventh of 1957 at that same conference it was the Chinese who were prepared to accept and ultimately went along with the Chinese theme on peaceful transition though they thought that the definition ought to be one in which they encourage both peaceful and violent violent means that there should be a dual or parallel emphasis on bout. They capitulated to that and allowed the Russians to go to have their version of the formula in the
57 decoration until 1960. Consequently from the Chinese point of view. It has been the intensified direction of an anti China policy on the part of the Soviet Union not the euphoric concern with Revolution. Nor the belief that this somehow the total power balance between east and west has changed. But I think has had the most. Important effect. On the Sino-Soviet dispute. I'd like to touch on one point on this matter that most of the. Books and pieces on the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute have stressed that as a 57 because of the Sputnik. If the Chinese became convinced of a. Strategic balance change in favor of the bloc and that consequently it was therefore possible to. Urge on the Russians or wanted to urge on the Russians a policy of greater risk than the Russians wanted to take because of the now change in the balance of forces.
We came to learn subsequently that there never was a Soviet strategic balance and in fact the balance of nuclear power from 57 on grew increasingly increasingly not in favor of the Soviet Union but in favor of the United States that Soviet diplomacy from 57 to 62 until the Cuban Missile Crisis had essentially been the attempt to exploit the nonexistent. Nuclear and missile gap. As a. Element in Soviet foreign policy. I simply think it strains credibility. To believe that the Russians knew what the real strategic balance was. We knew what the strategic balance was the Western NATO powers knew what the strategic balance was. And the only ignorant people in the world were the Chinese. So I'm inclined to think that they were that the Chinese as well and certainly in the. Course of the dispute. With the Russians if that was the strategy I think the Russians would unquestionably have informed the Chinese about what the real status of the of the pistol
weaponry was. And so I found it find it rather difficult to accept the thesis that it was actually this belief in the change of the balance of power which counts for the Chinese having been more militant. What accounted for the increased militancy and the issue of revolution. What is the effect of Soviet policy on China coupled with the increasing evidence. Of American activity in Asia and 1058 which further magnified Chinese alarm. You've just heard Professor David Massingale of Cornell University. And the conclusion of his analysis of Chinese foreign policy. His program was based on a special conference on China held by the University of Chicago's Center for Policy Study. With his support of the Johnson Foundation of race in Wisconsin the next programme in the series will be devoted to China's conventional military capability. Our speaker will
- China's foreign policy, part two
- Producing Organization
- University of Chicago
- Contributing Organization
- University of Maryland (College Park, Maryland)
- AAPB ID
- This program, the second of two parts, features a lecture on Chinese foreign policy by David Mozingo of Cornell University.
- A series of talks from the University of Chicago dealing with current events in China.
- Global Affairs
- Media type
Producing Organization: University of Chicago
Speaker: Mozingo, David P.
- AAPB Contributor Holdings
University of Maryland
Identifier: 67-46-5 (National Association of Educational Broadcasters)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
If you have a copy of this asset and would like us to add it to our catalog, please contact us.
- Chicago: “China: Policy and perspective; China's foreign policy, part two,” 1967-11-07, University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed September 21, 2021, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-1v5bh23c.
- MLA: “China: Policy and perspective; China's foreign policy, part two.” 1967-11-07. University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. September 21, 2021. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-1v5bh23c>.
- APA: China: Policy and perspective; China's foreign policy, part two. Boston, MA: University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-1v5bh23c