U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Debate between Assistant Secretary of State for Pan Eastern Affairs, William P. Bundy and Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska

At this time I should like to welcome all of you to this foreign policy forum sponsored by the Reform Democratic Clubs of Manhattan's West Side 20th Congressional District and the Foreign Policy Association. We have long believed that it is important to bring to the community important and vital public issues. And certainly there is no issue of more concern today than the question of war and peace. And the question of United States Foreign Policy and as of the moment all of the eyes in this country and the world are centered upon the situation in Southeast Asia and Vietnam. I think tonight we are really, all of us, are

delighted that we have 2 spokesmen who will deal with the question of our policy in Vietnam. We have the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, William Bundy, and- [applause] [applause] Uh, [applause] Out of, out of- out of respect and courtesy for all speakers I would hope that you would applaud when you feel it in order and refrain if you feel any other emotion. [laugher and applause] We also are honored to have the Senator from the 49th state of the Union, Earnest Gruening, a former-

[applause] [applause] He's really a former neighbor of ours, having some 40 years ago, lived at 103rd street and Riverside Drive. [laughter] The format will be a presentation by Mr. Bundy of the administration's policy for approximately 15 to 20 minutes. Then to be followed by a presentation on the part of Senator Gruening, which may in part differ from the position taken by Mr Bundy. Then, 5 to 10 minutes rebuttal. After that, the

floor will be open for questions. Our first speaker tonight is William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. He belongs to a family well noted for public service. His brother as you know, is McGeorge Bundy, who is the White House Presidential advisor on Foreign Affairs. Our speaker tonight came to the state department from the department of defense where he was Assistant Defense Secretary for International Security Affairs. He was one of that brilliant group of vigorous young men who was brought into into government service by our late President, John F. Kennedy. He has been very much concerned and involved with the formulation of Foreign Policy and the Far East and particularly and the Vietnam situation. He is, among other things I might mention, a democrat. He is a person who brings a great deal of understanding and

experience to us tonight and I think that we certainly owe a deep debt of appreciation and gratitude to him for having been willing to travel from Washington tonight to present the administration's point of view and also for being willing, as i think it is terribly important, to speak out in a forum such as this, on the administration's policy, to have an opportunity to debate, face to face, many of the questions involved and to permit participation by the general grassroots of this Congressional District. So I want to thank him and introduce to you the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. [applause] [applause] Congressman Ryan, Senator Gruening, ladies and gentleman. Uh, I certainly don't feel there's anything unusual in a representative of the department or the administration

addressing a gathering of this sort and I'm particularly honored to share the floor tonight with a man whom I deeply respect, Senator Gruening. Even though we shall disagree, I think, in a great many respects. I have a warm personal feeling for Reform Democrats as a Democrat all my life politically, and that having [crowd commotion] having had a- having had a great friend named Jim Lanegan who had something to do, I think, with the origins of Reform Democrats in this city. And also some warm feelings toward Columbia and this general area of New York. Now, I want to talk this evening to a subject that is of the greatest importance to all of us. And certainly not less so do any of us who went through as I did, 4 and a half year of military service, and who felt deeply the lessons of the 30. I'd like to attack the subject tonight in several ways, but

first to look at what our basic objectives in our states and our national interests are in Asia as a whole and specifically in Southeast Asia. Secondly, to look specifically at the history of the situation in Vietnam, how we came to be so deeply involved, and why we think it's a vital importance today, and the general situation today. And lastly to talk about what our hopes for peace are for Southeast Asia as a whole. A more lasting effect along the lines of what the President said in his speech of April 7th. Now first of all, what is at stake in Southeast Asia and what are our objectives? Well I think our objectives for the whole of Asia, for Southeast Asia particularly are quite clear. That the nations of the area should develop as free and independent countries according to their own views. We hope that means they'll evolve toward democratic structures, but that's for them to

work out. And there's no question that the future of Asia will be determined by Asian peoples. Secondly, that the nations of the area should not threaten each other. And thirdly that no nation or combination of nations should seek to exert domination over the area or wide areas of the area of Asia. That last one after all is the fundamental reason why we fought against the military leaders of Japan in the last war. It makes a great deal of difference to us whether in the next generation the Asia that evolves is an Asia that such as I've described. Of these independent nations developing on their own ethnic and historic base, which is more or less the case except for the divided countries of Asia today, or whether we have in effect another wave of what might be called an Asian Civil War if you call the 1st

and 2nd World Wars in Europe the European Civil War, which I think is an accurate way to describe it. For you cannot contain such wars. They are bound to hit nations with which we are vitally and intimately connected and to threaten our own national security. And that surely is the lesson that we all learned, I think, in the 30s and the 40s. Now that general proposition leads us to a question of Southeast Asia. Why is Southeast Asia important to us? Well I think a glance at the map will give you some idea. Because it- although it's distant to us, it does have great strategic significance. It is located across the East/West air and sea lanes between the Indian subcontinent and Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines in the Pacific generally, it dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian oceans, and in communist hands this area would pose a most serious threat to the security of nations such as India to the West

and inevitably uh the nations that would be further down, Malaysia and so on and of the Philippines. Not simply and immediately, I'm not talking in the domino theory sense of automatic results, but because the impetus of aggression feeds on itself, uh, and the forces that are seeking to resist aggression are inevitably disheartened by each successive advance. And this again is a lesson of the 30s. Not in a domino sense then but because what happens to Southeast Asia and the key countries and it is bound to make the protection of the independence the other nations of the area progressively of the pacific areas as a whole, very much more difficult. So that's the fundamental relationship of Southeast Asia to our objectives for Asia. We seek no territory, we seek to overthrow no regime that is now entrenched there. We seek no bases in Southeast Asia and we will withdraw our military power the moment that the security of those nations is

assured. You have heard the president on this, and we mean it. But, we are and we must, because no one else is there to do it, play the major role with the assistance of a great many other nations, although we are playing the major role in Vietnam, others are playing a major roles in the defense of Malaysia against the threat from Indonesia. This is not a one-sided or a- or a one man burden at all. But it is a job that at the present time and for a period at least, until the rulers of communist china see the impossibility of expanding territory, and the rulers of North Vietnam who of course are different, it's not a monolith, but who are have their own expansionist aims until these expansionist aims are frustrated. And we see developing something like what has happened in some- the case of Soviet Russia since roughly 1955. We have got a job to do of helping. The nations have got to do it for themselves basically. The war in South Vietnam depends

fundamentally on the South Vietnamese. But we have an absolutely crucial role to play in helping them maintain themselves so that the Asia of the next generation will not be one of domination, instability and threats to our own national interest and to the whole piece of world. So that, I think fundamentally, is what it's about in Vietnam. Now let me talk specifically about Vietnam. It really is of course a tragic history of a colonial regime that did not prepare the nation for independence. Uh, and ended up fighting a war against a nationalist movement that was taken over by communist leaders. We- and and so in '54 you had the Geneva Accords, which established 2 nations with a ?inaudible? status at

least equivalent to North and South Korea or West Germany today established these 2 nations divided by a demarcation line with a provision for elections, free elections, to be held on the question of reunification in 2 years. And I could dwell at length on that but I'd rather just set it down as a thing that I'm sure will be asked in the questions. Uh, the conditions for free elections simply did not exist in the North and there was really no claim that they did in 1956 so that provision was not carried out. And you had the development in effect of 2 separate nations which had always been significantly different. Even though they're both Vietnamese. Uh, and with significant differences. And you had the development in the South, under Ngo Dinh Diem, of a government that for its first 5 years accomplished a great deal for its people. Uh, it instituted a- [crowd murmurs] I said it accomplished a great deal for its

people. And it did. Uh, it instituted a land reform program under ?inudible? It expanded education enormously and so on. And what had been expected certainly had been expected by Hanoi to be a situation that would simply fall apart, had a life of it's own. I don't say that the people were totally in support of their government at all. But they were clearly and identifiably working into a position where their dominant sentiment was anti-communist and opposed to domination from Hanoi. And that i think has been verified by their whole conduct throughout the last 10 years and particularly in the last 5. [crowd murmurs] Now, Hanoi always intended to have the South. They expected to have it happen by peaceful means. When this didn't happen in the first 5 years and when there was this relative degree and remember we were dealing with a whole new country here. The stakes were made of course. The

government was not a model of democracy, it had a good deal of repression in it. But not compared to Hanoi. [applause] So in '59, not seeing the South collapsing and falling into its lap, Hanoi began the systematic program of the infiltration of trained, subversive military and guerrilla and all sorts of personnel to the South with military equipment directing them in a systematic movement to overthrow and subvert the government of the South. From the start and as the government, while government has consistently said in the white papers of both 1961 and 1965 without deviation, engaged in a course amounting just as clearly as the sending of conventional armies or in a much more subtle way to aggression against the South. Now at the same time, the Diem government developed increasing weaknesses.

It narrowed in and drew in on itself. It alienated increasing sectors of its people. It alienated particularly too many, far too many, of the key trained men who were necessary to run the whole government and the whole country. End in the end, Diem was overthrown and most unfortunately killed in November of 1963. But this internal ferment, which is still going on and throwing up what I think will be an increasingly nationalist and dedicated group of men to lead the government, is an entirely different thing than the Viet Cong movement supported from the North. We know who Diem's opponents were. Many are in exile. Many, indeed the key figures of the present government, were the opposition to Diem. Dr. ?inaudible? himself. The caravellist group. All these men, who are today at the core of the government,

these were the men who were opposed to Diem, the Viet Cong movement supported and given its main spring from the North, was and is an entirely different thing. And I think there are in fact about 1 or 2 insignificant figures in the opposition to Diem who have gone over to the Viet Cong, but no more. The 2 are quite different things. And that of course is part of the concern that is sometimes stated in the sense that this should be described as a civil war. Of course it's Vietnamese fighting Vietnamese. Just as it was Koreans fighting Koreans in the Korean war and we didn't think of that as a Civil War. The fact is, you have this phenomenon, I hope temporary, of divided countries and to attack across clear demarcation lines after they've been divided and while they're recognized and pending the processes that might lead to their reunification is just as much an aggression as an attack in an undivided country against another undivided country. There can be no doubt

about that in international law or any other basis. And that's why we've been on this job by the commitments made, carried out, and executed and approved in the appropriations by the congress under the President Eisenhower, by the decision of President Kennedy that we may have to increase our effort in November and December of 1961 in response to the growth of the threat. And by the series of decisions that President Johnson has made, finally being driven to the point in the face of the increased infiltration of attacking North Vietnam itself. Against military targets and as measured and serious and sober a way as you can possibly carry out a military campaign, but with a clear aim and intent of bringing pressure on the North to cease this aggression. No more, no less. And that is where we stand today. I won't take this time to go into the difficulties that exist. Of course it's a tough situation on the ground.

But by no means is it true that the Viet Cong- [audience chanting] Stop the war in Vietnam! [crowd commotion and chanting] [crowd commotion and chanting] [crowd commotion and chanting] [crowd commotion and chanting] Stop the war in Vietnam! Bring the troops home! Alright! Please- we're here- If everyone- [Repeated chanting] If everyone- if everyone will permit- [Repeated chanting] I ask everyone to remain seated! [Repeated chanting] I ask everyone to remain seated, and let's have an orderly- Let's have an orderly

meeting. [applause and commotion from audience] We're- we're gathered here for a discussion of the issues and it's important that we have that discussion. Now, everyone remain seated and if everyone will be calm, we will continue with the presentation by the Assistant Secretary of State. [applause] [crowd chatter] [crowd chatter]

[crowd chatter] [crowd chatter] Alright now, we will return to the- we will return to the presentation being made. Let me urge everyone, please, give your attention to the speakers. You may or you may not disagree with the views of either of the speakers. This is admitting for information for an understanding and it's important for everyone to have a clear understanding of what the policy of the administration is and it's important that everyone be in a position to understand

what criticisms may or may not be leveled and to think in terms of what, in your own mind, our policy should be after you've heard the discussion tonight. But I hope that we will proceed throughout the rest of the meeting in order and good manners and with respect for the views of everyone. Thank you. [applause] Mr. Bundy. [applause] I think you've got my speech. Didn't mean to. What's left of it. I think I left off at the point of saying that- [laughter] I could not take time to go into detail on the situation within South Vietnam at the present time. I cannot- I won't go into detail on the situation within South Vietnam, except to say that it is most emphatically not true that the Viet Cong control such expensive areas

or that the government is holed up in the cities or anything of that sort, that his thing cannot be reversed. In round numbers, we would estimate that the Viet Cong exercise something pretty close to real control. Even men with variations, they don't dare trust a reporter to go around without a battalion with him as the reporter for the Express has just testified in Paris. About 25 percent of the people, not more than that in any event. It fluctuates. And that they have the capacity for organized harassment in one degree or another, terror assassination, and I hadn't taken time to go into the whole nature of the fight it's been and the thousands of civilians as well as military people who've been killed. The officials that the all character of things of that sort with another 35 or 40 percent of the people. That kind of harassment is possible. But the government has a great many assets still. Uh, it is conducting this effort, I think the present government is starting to

become really effective bringing in provincial officials, getting a real spread of its of its authority in the sense of what it's doing through the countryside, working not of course, at all, only on the military front. But on the economic, social, and all the other fronts that go with what is in the last analysis a fight for the minds of people and I think in this fight, as I said, the evidence seems to me overwhelming that the great majority of the people have shown that they are, I don't say devoted to any government in Saigon at any one moment, but fundamentally anti-communist and ready to see this thing through if it can be done. And that, incidentally, is the verbatim conclusion of a very experienced and, as far as I know, totally nonpartisan Frenchman, General Both, who was reporting in Realite recently, having just gone back to the area after having served that during the war. The way they have suffered casualties, the way that refugee movements, when they've taken place, have been entirely from Viet Cong areas and the

government areas, the way that the people have not, despite all the intimidation of which the Viet Cong have been capable on a massive scale, ever evoted with their feet the other way, I think shows where the great majority of the people feel. Now today, we stand in a situation where we're applying with the South Vietnamese government military pressures against the North, where the effort is being pushed to its absolute maximum in the South and there's no doubt that that's where the war must be won. One must never lose sight of that and that's been the main focus of the efforts and the consultations that we've had in government this week, including the Honolulu conference from which I just returned. That's where you got to focus. And I think the job can be done if you stick with it. Now the other side of the coin, of course, is that we must leave no stone unturned to see if a honorable, peaceful settlement that will in the first instance,

secure an independent South Vietnam, and in the second look toward a time when North and South Vietnam can determine their relationships by peaceful means, including the possibility of reunification. That's what we're after. It's right fundamentally in the spirit of the 54 Accords. And we are looking for any opportunity to see whether that can be negotiated. And the president said, quite explicitly, that we would accept unconditional discussions at anytime. He underscored opposition further and spelled it out in his response to the appeal of the 17 nations led by Yugoslavia, repeating the willingness to engage in unconditional discussions. And if you compare our response with the responses which, we don't think have been made officially, but have been in the form of public statements by Hanoi and ?inaudible? I think you will see that theirs is not an unconditional response. That it sets up terms that in their first- that in their- in their very nature would not

produce the kind of independent South Vietnam, free to make up its own mind what its future should be but rather a South Vietnam that would inevitably form of an amish ten of them all and that there are still preconditions not always clearly defined sometimes the cessation of attack, sometimes withdrawal, uh and that, as the Yugoslavs said themselves the other day, uh the precondition position of both powers seems to them clearly unacceptable. Uh, Speaking of the withdrawal of American forces. So the negotiating door is open and we are using every diplomatic channel open to us at all times. But so far, I think it's fair to say, that there has been no indication that the other side is ready to work toward any settlement that would not produce domination from the North. Conquest, in effect from the North. And, I think, they still think the tide is running their way. And that's what's got to be changed before you can get the kind of balance in which negotiation and eventual peace in the country and in the area will be possible.

Now, I come last to the kind of hopes we have for the area as a whole. The President, of course, spoke at length on this the other day in his Baltimore speech. And that's what of course we all want to see. A Southeast Asia, which has great wealth, as a matter of fact, in a natural self sufficiency in most areas in food, developed and expanded and a lot of the people improved. That's a job we care much more about than the, unfortunately, essential job of security in which we are now engaged. We would like to see cooperation between all the peoples of that area. Including North Vietnam, in conditions of peace. For the peaceful development of that whole portion of the world. We hope that they will associate themselves in a massive cooperative effort on their initiative with the U.N., of course under U Thant we hope taking a leading part in setting this thing up, and

with United States, as the President has made clear, prepared to contribute very greatly indeed uh in total investment into the area over a period of time. So there is no doubt of what kind of Southeast Asia and what kind of Asia as a whole we're seeking. But to get there you've got to face up to the fact of this aggression from North Vietnam against the south which must be beating back. And I would only end with the President's words if North Vietnam holds to this aggressive path as the President has said, 'We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. And we will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a {mini misagreement.}' Thank you very much. [applause] [applause] [applause] [applause]{MC} Thank you very much Mr.

Bundy, for your exposition of the administration's policy. We look forward in the rebuttal period and the questioning period to further elaboration of some of the points which you have made. At this time I should like to present to the West Side a person who person who really knows the West Side. Lived on the Westside at a time when he was managing editor of 'The Nation' some years ago. One who has been a doctor, a journalist, a reporter, and a person very much concerned with the development of the

forty-ninth state, Alaska. From the time that he was appointed by President Roosevelt to direct the territories and island possessions of the United States at the Department of The Interior, he was deeply concerned with state. And he later became its governor where he was instrumental in forging many forward-looking and liberal policies. He was instrumental in the fact that the Territorial Legislature of Alaska, for instance, enacted one of the first laws against discrimination in public places. Later he became the prime mover in the statehood movement. And that goal was achieved and he was elected to serve in the United States Senate as Senator from Alaska. As a United States Senator, his voice has been heard in many important and liberal causes. He has undertaken, in the last

year and more, an analysis and a critique on the Senate floor of the administration's foreign policy and Southeast Asia. In March of 1964, he delivered a speech on the Senate floor entitled 'United States should get out of Vietnam'. In March 1965, he again delivered a speech entitled 'The United States should get out of Vietnam.' This [applause]this is an issue to which he has given great thought ,great care, and great attention. I present to you a courageous member of the United States Senate an

outspoken American. One, I'm sure, we are proud to welcome to Manhattan's West Side to present his views on the situation in Vietnam. Senator Ernest Gruening. [applause] {Senator Gruening}Representative Ryan, Assistant Secretary William Bundy, and friends. My uh total disagreement with the policy of the Administration in Vietnam arises from a totally different interpretation of history. And uh

I think I can justify that by siting the facts. [applause] [applause] [applause] Now uh, for a thousand years the countries of Southeast Asia lived in varying degrees of independence and conquest. And one of the characteristics of Vietnam was it persistently fought Chinese domination. (clears throat) And then, beginning about a century ago, in that great surge of Colonialism, when European powers moved into Asia and Africa and took over relatively weaker nations, the French moved in and established the colony called Indochina. And following the breakup after World War 2, and the invasion by the Japanese of that era, and the great surge of anti-Colonialism, independence

the people of that area sought to free themselves from the Colonialism which the French wanted to reimpose. And, very unfortunately, the United States aided the French in that endeavor. Although, they tried to make it clear that part of the aid was contingent on an ultimate declaration that the French would agree to give the people a greater independence than they had before. But that was never made clear to the people of that region nor was it agreed to by the French until they were overwhelmingly defeated at Dien Bien Phu. And we then moved in having aided the French, both with money and, somewhat, militarily. And at that time there were advisors in the Eisenhower Administration who wanted to go in and take over. But President Eisenhower felt that should not be done unless certain preconditions could be established. And among those were the United States would not go in all alone. That we would be joined in this endeavor by other nations, Great Britain and others. And that that move would have the assent of Congress. And both those conditions were unobtainable.

And so we did not go in militarily on a heavy scale, but we did move in after the French went out with a military mission. And from that time we were really the dominant advisory force in South Vietnam. Now the Geneva Agreements to which President Johnson has referred, and which we should go back to, he says, provide among other things that the three countries that were born out of Indochina, former colonies Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, that the last of these was to be only temporarily divided into two halves, North and South Vietnam. But at the end of two years, and this Geneva Agreement was ratified in July of 1954, the two years thereafter there would be an election which would unite these two halves and decide who would be the elected representatives.

We opposed that election. We counseled our puppet, Diem, to oppose the election. And so we began right then, and there, in violation of the Geneva Agreement because our leadership, our control, our advice that caused that election to be rejected. And the reason wasn't concealed. It it was feared that it would go to Ho Chi Minh. And from our standpoint it was highly undesirable that a Communist regime should take over. Well I do not have any enthusiasm for the oppressions of Communism, but when an election is setup legally, you can't simply say we won't play because we're gonna to lose. That isn't the American way, either. That would seem to be more like the Communist way as we understand it. And when we refused, and we persuaded Diem, who was nothing but our puppet, to refuse to go to that election then, and only then, did the Civil War start. And the Civil War was essentially, and for a long time, a civil war in South Vietnam.

There began to be, after a while, some infiltration from the North. I think the Assistant Secretary said it began in 1859. Maybe I misunderstood him. But long before that, we had established ourselves militarily. And by introducing large numbers of arms we were, again, in violation, of the Geneva Agreement, which specifically provided that no additional arms, no new arms that hadn't been there before introduced. So we violated the Geneva Agreement in two respects. We violated it by playing our part in nullifying the election which had been promised. And we played our part in introducing additional weapons. Now, further than that, we also violated the United Nations' charter which is very specific on that situation, and I think I should read it to you. Because I think that, if we are going to understand the situation, we have to get an understanding of what really happened. United Nations Charter, in article 33,

says; 'The parties to any dispute {from the crowd; 'louder'} the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to a endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation. Inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.' There are eight different peaceful methods of approaching the situation, none of which we followed, although we were signatories to and adherents to United Nations Charter. We did not in this situation this dispute, which seemed likely to endanger the makings of international peace and security seek first of all, as the article requires, a solution by negotiation. We did not seek a solution

by inquiry. We did not seek a solution by mediation. We did not seek a solution by conciliation. We did not seek a solution by arbitration. We did not seek a solution by judicial settlement. We did not seek a solution by resort to regional agencies or arrangement. And we did not seek a solution by other means of our own choice or their own choice. Well, now here we have a situation where the United States, which in its official position, claims that we are doing what we are doing because other people could not be trusted, because they violated agreements, are, ourselves, guilty of violating the the uh treaties, under which we are presumably operating, on three distinct and separate occasions. And it's perfectly understandable that when it was agreed by the signatory nations, and although we didn't sign the Geneva pact, we made a unilateral commitment that we would adhere to it and support it. It is not surprising that revolt sprang up. Now, there was a commission ...there was a... appointed there to see that these engagements were carried out and

that commission was composed of a representative from India, a representative from Canada, and a representative from Poland. And, the representative from India and from Canada have listed a great number of violations on the part of South Vietnam, meaning United States. [applause] By which we brought in a large number of arms, which were definitely in violation of the treaty. Now, they also pointed to some violations from North Vietnam. But I But I cannot see, when you compare the two, that our violation was not earlier, larger, and more official. We were there officially, the United States. Now, when President Johnson says, the justification of his actions, that three Presidents have promised to aid Vietnam and by gosh, we are going to keep our promises. Well he counts himself. That makes the third and that leaves only two. Well let's take the first one. The first one, under Eisenhower, was really ourselves asking us in. [laughter/applause]

[laughter/applause] [applause] And it's in the record. It's in Eisenhower's own statement that he suggested to our military that they consult with the rulers of South Vietnam, who were our puppets, to see how we could work out a working arrangement to defend them. In other words, we were the people who asked us to ask ourselves to come in there and defend them. [applause/laughter] And uh the fact of the matter is that we have never quite leveled with the American people. Uh, these so called advisors. [applause] These so called advisors that we went in there, pretty soon, were anything but advisors. Pretty soon the were engaged in combat. And under those circumstances it's not surprising that the people of North Vietnam also violated, uh,

the idea of aggression. But, their aggression was never official. Never on the same scale, and it came after ours. And I think history will demonstrate that. Now, immediately after the signing of the Geneva Act, uh, we organized the Southeast Asia Treaty Conference. And the purpose of that was to unite the nations of Southeast Asia in a pact which would enable them to repel aggression. And those uh other signatories of SETO, so called, were Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, The Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand. They have the same obligation under the the treaty that we have. But why aren't they there? You don't see any Australian boys dying on the front. You don't see any Pakistanis dying on the front. In fact, I uh, some months ago I published in the Congress, The Congressional Record, a list of the great financial military aid we'd given to Pakistan an amount at that time {say} eight

hundred million dollars in military aid. And a eight hundred thousand dollars in economic aid. And with all that aid, one might well wonder why they weren't using that aid to help this common cause to which they were pledged by treaty. Well, I'd after I'd published this in the Congressional Record, I had a letter from the Ambassador of Pakistan which said, in effect, we're not gonna use it down there, we're gona use this to fight India. [laughter] Well, that wasn't the purpose that money was given, it was given for the purpose of fighting communists. And if we are as we allege are fighting communists in Vietnam and Southeast Asia that would have been {a} place for them. Now, it is probable, that, as a result of our great efforts, there may be some token representation from Australia and New Zealand, recently. But for all intents and purposes, we are going it all alone. And I object to the idea of sending American boys into remote jungles to fight a communist war, all alone. [applause] If the cause is good, others should be with us. [applause] It is my conviction that American Security is in no sense endangered by whatever happens in Vietnam.

[applause] [applause] If we feel obliged to do that, we would be going into the Congo. We would be going all over the world fighting these wars which are, very largely, ideological. I don't mean that force occasion doesn't serve a purpose, but to think that we can win that war militarily is a terrific delusion. It can't be won that way. [applause] I do not like the cruelties, ruthlessness of any totalitarian system. Whether it be of the left or of the right. Whether it be communist or fascist. But the one way to defeat communism, or any or any form of totalitarianism, is to prove that our system, the system of freedom, is a better

system. [applause] And that may have been, and undoubtedly was, our intention at the very beginning. But But unfortunately, we were unable to find public-spirited and honest public officials among the South Vietnamese who would carry out that program. Now, uh, Secretary Bundy has pointed out that uh there were some good things done by the Diem regime at the very beginning but certainly toward the end, and for some time we were still supporting it, it became highly oppressive. It jailed all kinds of people. It tortured people in jails and it revolted the people. And the persecution of the Buddhists, who are majority of the country, was the thing that finally set off the revolt which turned him off and sent him into exile and death. Now uh happened afterwards? We tried to establish the idea that there was a stable government there. And, as you know, the government changed from week to week and from day to day. And this thing became such a {mess} that we finally had to take the war over ourselves.

And the policy has changed from the very beginning. At first we were saying 'we can't win this war, it's got to be won by the South Vietnamese, we can only help them.' Well how far we've departed from that. And then we took this fantastic excuse of the {radon play coup} in which a small band of Viet Cong infiltrated an encampment of ours. This is two hundred miles south of the dividing line. The South Vietnamese people were sufficiently uninterested in trying to protect us or warn us of the attack. They used American weapons, which they had taken from us, which was most of the weapons they had, to kill these 8 Americans. And as a result of that, the next day this was taken, uh, used as an excuse to start bombing North Vietnam. Which is a wholly disastrous piece of folly. It will never succeed and it [applause] makes us absolutely disgraced before the whole world.

[applause] [applause] There was no connection between the two. Granted, granted that there is infiltration from the North. And understandably there is infiltration from the North, but it came later, and wasn't comparable in extent and in official nature with our own taking over one side of this fight. And, uh, to start bombing North Vietnam because of this {payco} incident is another perversion of the facts of history. We were losing the war down there and this was a way out. And today we're in very, very sad mess, because after two months of bombing we're no better off. [laughter/applause] We should stop it. And we should've never begun.

[applause] Now, if you analyze President Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech, there was a slight glimmer of hope in it. And that he'd reversed the previous administration policy of saying that they would only negotiate if the other crowd agreed to quit. Well, that was wholly unrealistic, because if Saigon should tomorrow do everything it could to call off the civil war, it might diminish the extent of the effort but it couldn't change it because this is still primarily a civil war in South Vietnam. In the second place [cutlery falls to the floor] the president's pronouncement for the future emphasizes there's got to be a separate South Vietnam. Well that is absolutely in violation of the Geneva Agreements. The Geneva Agreements provided there should be a reunited

Vietnam. And how can you expect North Vietnam to make peace under those terms? Even if there's a fantastic little bribe of a billion dollars to do something for South Vietnam as a price for making peace. Well that isn't going to work and it shouldn't work. Now the only thing we can do now that we've escalated the war so much that its very much difficult for Johnson to get out of it as he could of very easily a year ago. A year ago or even more when he was elected in his own right. He could very well have said, and those of us who are critical of our policy of being there. Urged that he say in effect that he'd inherited this possible and that he would take to the United Nations or call another, uh, meeting of the Geneva Treaty Nations and see if we couldn't work out a solution. But that was not done. The advice of Secretary McNamara who gave the same bad advice to President Kennedy four years ago, to escalate the war was followed, and the result is we're in a steadily escalating war with great danger of a nuclear holocaust

not far ahead and that is something we want to avoid at all costs. [applause] [applause] The fact of the matter is that the white man can not settle Asian problems. And he certainly can't settle them by force. We might conceivably with aid generously given if we could of found public spirited and honest officials to help us administer it. Which I think we tried to do but failed in doing we might have succeeded. But after you've been bombing villages within a {town or pound} for several years. Burning a lot of innocent people, killing a lot of children, not deliberately but incidentally to our bombing. And then bombing another independent country. It's going to be very difficult to persuade people that you're their friend. In the next place it's a war we can't win. And I say that very advisedly.

I don't think we can win it militarily but we might. If we send a million men over there that uh, Hanson Baldwin, the military critic of the New York Times, who often speaks for the Pentagon, urges and sent more, uh, bombers there and invested a lot more lives, we might hold the country militarily. But what then? What then? What's going to be the ultimate solution? Are we going to occupy it indefinitly? Are we just going to exterminate the people and think we've solved something? We'll be earning the undying hatred of the people of Asia and Africa and the lost faith of all our allies. ?inaudible? [applause] Sooner or later, this will be settled at the conference table, so why not now, before we've sacrificed a lot of fine young lives. [applause] [applause] Let us recall the history of Korea. And there were

substantial differences in the Korean War or police engagement ?inaudible? this one. In the first place, there was overt aggression from the North in the very beginning, which was not the case itself in South Vietnam. In the second place, we went there under the mandate of the United Nations, and the troops of fifteen other nations were fighting side by side with ours. And third, the South Koreans wanted to fight. Those three factors are not present in this particular situation. There was not overt aggression from the start. We we were guilty of more aggression to begin with than the other side. And in addition to that we're fighting all alone. And there's no great indication that the people of South Vietnam really want to fight very hard. Otherwise we wouldn't of had to escalate. They've had an army of half a million men. Why haven't they been able to win the war? And yet despite those differences, remember the great cry of relief that went up for the American people when Ike said, I will go to Korea. And if instead President Johnson said, I'll go to Vietnam he'd have had the same kind of a cheer.

[applause] Thanks, Senator Gruening for his statement of position on this very vital issue which confronts us. We will have rebuttal. Senator Gruening, ladies and gentlemen again. There are a great many differences between the fact that Senator's history in mind. I just want to touch on one or two fundamental things. One is the question of the provision for elections in 1956. The

position that the South Vietnamese government took is adequately described in piece by Max Lerner in the New York Post in January 1955 after interviewing Diem. Diem was quite clear that the agreement was there and had stipulated that the elections are to be free. And Lerner's account goes on that Diem said everything now depend on how free elections are defined. He would wait to see whether the conditions for freedom would exist in North Vietnam at the time scheduled for the elections. He asked what would be the good of an impartial counting of votes. If the voting had been preceded in North Vietnam by a campaign of ruthless propaganda and terrorism on the part of a police state. I think we can all find ourselves with that in agreement with that description of what is involved in a free election. Whether in this country or in Asia. Now I come to what

the situation was in North Vietnam in 1956. And to the explanation why although North Vietnam kept shouting for the elections. It at no time, made any gesture to admit to North Vietnam any adequate supervisory mechanism to police elections. And the reason for was very clear. Now I'll read you now from an official North Vietnamese document. It happens to be a report by General Giap. Spelled G i a p, On, aided in October 31, 1956, of the situation that he was describing to his own party and his own government. I'll just read short excerpts of it. "We attacked the land-owning families indiscriminately, according no consideration for those who would serve the revolution, and to those families with sons in the army. We showed

no indulgence toward landlords who participated in the resistance. Treating their children in the same way as we treated the children of other landlords. We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front and seeing enemies everywhere, resorted to terror. Which became far too widespread. Whilst carrying out our land reform program, we failed to respect the freedom of faith and worship and many areas. In regions inhabited by minority tribes, we've attacked tribal chiefs too strongly." And so and so on and so on. The fact is very simple. There was no possibility of free elections in North Vietnam in 1956. That's the simple explanation. It is consistent with the position that our government took and with the position that Diem took. So that I think that point is quite clear. I would say one other thing. Even if that were wrong.

Even if the Diem government had not been entitled to reject free elections as not being capable of being carried out in the North. That would never have justified the course of conduct, amounting to aggression, engaged in by the North from 1959 at least, and I should have gone back a little further because there are certainly agents and assassinations well documented by Professor ?inaudible? that go back to an earlier period than that and have direct ties to the North and his judgement. That would never be justified. Take the case of Korea. Where now a United Nations resolution calls for access by United Nations and some electoral process in the North as is the South. The North has made no gesture to carry that out. Would any of you here tonight say that that justified South Korea, with or without our support, in attacking the North? I think we've got to recognize things for what they are. And this is an aggression.

And, in date, in the sending of men, in the sending of equipment, as the evidence abundantly shows. It ante-dates any violation by us of the equipment and military manpower provisions of the 1954 Accords. Our provision of military equipment was authorized specifically under the Accords on a rotation basis and was regularly reported. Our manpower was based on equivalent types of manpower, mostly American, that had been there before. Now, it is true that in November of 1961, after this North Vietnamese effort had been in full swing for two years. And after it was beginning to constitute a vital threat to the government of South Vietnam. That government requested and we supplied the additional manpower in the form of advisers, helicopter pilots, other forms of assistance which I don't think were ever

in the slightest degree concealed from the American people in any way. We went forward with that effort. And President Kennedy issued a very clear statement, in December of 1961, explaining that because of the wholesale violation by the North, in an aggressive fashion, seeking to subvert another state. We were compelled, acting at the request of the government of South Vietnam and in its defense to consider ourselves relieved of the manpower ceilings to the extent necessary to assist the government of South Vietnam. And I put it to you, that it is perfectly clear who the aggressor was on this historical sequence. Let there be no doubt about it. And that aggression having continued, there can be no doubt at all in international law, the elementary right of self defense, that the South Vietnamese government was entitled to call on our help in attacking the seat of this. We would have been entitled to do that in

any time in law. It did not appear wise until it became clear that the infiltration and the attacks, including attacks, but not at all limited to attacks on our own people, were constituting such a vital threat that it could only be met in that way. And that's the history of the thing on this point. We're not trying to do anything, I repeat, but meet a reality. I would love to believe that this could've been arbitrated years ago, I know no gesture by North Vietnam to that effect, I would love to believe that it could have been negotiated in an honorable way that would preserve the independence and freedom to determine their own future of the people of South Vietnam a year ago, the Senator says. I simply don't think that the evidence we have of the behavior of North Vietnam fits that description. We're going to be constantly alert to the possibility of the change of heart that would permit an honorable settlement. We shall leave no stone unturned.

But the fundamental position is that we must go ahead doing what his wise and measured simply to compel a cessation of aggression, and not for any other purpose, and this is what we're going to do. [applause] [boos] [Voice of moderator] Senator? Well it's very clear that there is a difference in the interpretation of the facts. Now the fact is that when we send helicopters and advisors who prove to be combat people and planes and all kinds of other weapons, we were in violation of the Geneva Agreement! [applause] Now if we could

change the rules simply because we think it's to our national interest to stop what we now think is the advance of China, why don't we say so frankly? We're not leveling again with the American people. Our excuses have changed and changed and changed, and it seems to me that up to date, whatever may be China's purpose, and it's perfectly understandable that the Chinese should expect to have a very considerable say as to what happens in the future of Southeast Asia, just as we would not for a moment permit the Chinese to come over here and tell us what should happen in Mexico and Central America. That's in their sphere. [applause] Now I know, and I repeat, that I have no sympathy with the brutality of the totalitarian methods, and we've seen it in the world,

and they're horrible and they're loathsome, but i think the basic reality is that we have no business in Southeast Asia. [applause] Their history is different, their heritage is different, their way of life is different, and for us to go in there and think that we can, whatever may be our laudably expressed intentions, determine their fate is folly. It isn't going to happen. And sooner or later, it's going to be settled down there. Now there may be some very cruel performances, and there have been very cruel performances, and they've been cruel on both sides, and when you bomb people, villages, near [inaudible] you can't allege that you're an innocent participant, and that the other people are the only people committing atrocities. We have been guilty too. [applause]

[applause] Now when President Johnson says that the one reality of the situation is that North Vietnam has attacked South Vietnam, this in itself is a change of policy. We are changing our excuses, we're changing our justification, and we're now taking over the war altogether ourselves, and it is not going to solve the problem. Now I advance you that it's much more difficult for us to get out of the mess we're in now than it would have been a year ago, but I still think we should make every effort to stop the killing, and the first thing we should do, for the time being at least, to stop the bombing of North Vietnam. [applause] If as the administration alleged up to the time of the

Johns Hopkins speech, that we had no one to negotiate with and we couldn't negotiate and it was generally said that we had to negotiate from strength, well we've demonstrated our strength. We've demonstrated our strength in the air, we've demonstrated our strength from the sea. What more do we have to show? I think we've proved that pretty conclusively. [inaudible from audience] Now, there's one more thing that didn't come up in the main part of the debate, and that is that the basic justification—I noticed that Secretary Bundy more or less pushed aside temporarily the Domino Theory, but the Domino Theory has been advanced almost invariably and without any exception by all the spokesmen of the administration. And the Domino Theory originated by Secretary John Foster Dulles was that if Vietnam fell, all the other Southeast Asian nations would fall, then Philippines then Australia then New Zealand, and we'd be fighting before long on the beaches of Hawaii and California. Now that is absolute rubbish. [laughter]

[applause] I'm not prepared to say what might happen to Southeast Asia, I think it would be almost impossible for us alone to hold a part of the continent of Asia, and I don't think we should try to. But when you get off into the Pacific, we have complete control. It is not true as former Vice President Nixon has stated, that if we let go of Vietnam all the Pacific will become a red sea. What about our Seventh Fleet? What about our tremendous airpower? Any attempt to invade Australia or New Zealand, if our government were asked to come and help of course we would do, and that would be a defense I would justify, I'd be willing to fight, because in that case we would be coming to the aid of a free nation, clear in its purpose and its desire not to be overrun. That would be quite different that the situationrelations in this poses is that not to be overrun [applause]

in Southeast Asia. So that I think the Domino Theory can be discarded, as a matter of fact the middle domino, Cambodia, dropped out of its own accord a year ago. [laughter] And Prince Sihanouk said we don't want your aid anymore, and we'd done everything we could there. They don't want us over there. And the fact is the Vietnamese don't want any outsiders. They don't want the French, they don't want us, they don't want the Chinese. And they're absolutely right. [applause] Now what would happen if we had some kind of a negotiated peace, and the cry would go up that the Communists ?were violated? immediately, and there would be a fraud, well I think what you'd get in Southeast Asia— I don't know for sure, no one is a prophet—I think you'd get in Vietnam the kind of Titoist socialism, communism,

that we invested two billion dollars to set up in Yugoslavia. We thought it was a good idea over there. I think if we'd used this method in the first place the situation would be very different. Those people don't want to be dominated by the Chinese, but our policy is very likely to bring in the Chinese, because they may, in view of our bombing, consider that the lesser of two evils, and once the Chinese get in may be difficult to get them out. Now actually, although we have muttered much about China, and the President mentioned it in his Johns Hopkins speech, today it seems the Chinese have shown a singular self-restraint. But it may be that they're tickled to death by the situation. We're in there bogged down in a costly war, losing American lives and about to squander billions of dollars, fighting a small nation, being held to a standstill by a small Asiatic nation, and emphasizing the great difference between the white west and the yellow Asiatic. And that's not good

for us, and it's not good for our image in the world. And i think that whatever the result is, if we pull out in any way, the result will be better, than if we stay in, which can only result in an accelerating war with more and more casualties on both sides, and ultimately a stalemate, and a settlement at the peace table. [applause] [applause] Would not a withdrawal by the United States from Vietnam lend support to the Peking view that peaceful coexistence as advocated by the Soviets, is a betrayal of Communist interests? And that the United States will back down when confronted with force?

Well I don't know what the psychology of the Peking government is, we got ourselves into this situation and i think it's up to us to extricate ourselves. And it's much more difficult now than it was before. I think it would've been easy, I do think now, we've got to have some kind of negotiated peace. I think it'd be very difficult for us tomorrow to now simply pull out. I think that would be interpreted by our friends and others as a betrayal of our repeated promises, because the promises have been unqualified. But there's nothing in those promises that prevents us from trying to work out and negotiate a settlement, and I think that's what we should do. I think that we could have, at the time the Diem government fell, we could then have said well, this government ?inaudible? is no more, the people themselves can't establish a government, if you read Mr. Buchwald ?inaudible? trying to explain our policy to the

King of Denmark, you realize how absolutely ridiculous it was, it was one government today then another government tomorrow and one the day after, and there really was no government down there, and at that time we could very properly have withdrawn, but I think it's difficult now. I don't say we shouldn't but I think we've got to work out some kind of a negotiated settlement. And I think the voices for that kind of settlement are rising all over the country. And it's not only one group it's everywhere. [Voice of moderator] Addressed to Secretary Bundy: The president has indicated there should be a return to the essentials of the 1954 Geneva agreements. Do these essentials include elections, if so, what procedures and guarantees would the administration insist upon? The question of the future relationship of North and South Vietnam including the possibility of their reunification is one that is covered in the reply we made to the

17 non-aligned nations, in which we said North and South Vietnam should determine their future relationships through peaceable means. Now, that'll inevitably bring us up against the question of free elections in the future, I think our historic position in Korea and Germany has always been that we would in principle be prepared to see divided countries express their will through free elections. I think the question frankly must come up down the line. The sequence that we laid out in the reply to the 17 is a cessation of aggression, our military action would then become unnecessary, South Vietnam would determine its own future status and government without external interference, then we would be in a position to withdraw our forces if not entirely at least down to the minimum levels of the Geneva agreements, and fifthly, North and South Vietnam would determine their relationships. And that I think is the sequence that it would have to follow

as you work toward a settlement. And I think it could, quite easily as North and South Vietnam might elect to include this question of free elections, and it would still include the same question that arose in the quotation I gave of whether the conditions for such elections in the true sense of avoidance of terrorism, not simply a poll-watcher on election day, exist, or can be brought or allowed to exist, in a truly Communist state. [applause] [Voice of moderator] Senator Gruening, if bombing of North Vietnam is a precondition to negotiations, shouldn't the Vietcong stop their armed activity before negotiations? I think it would be extremely difficult to stop the Vietcong. This is a widespread popular movement, with no central direction. We could stop it tomorrow on the order of

the President of the United States. And I think it's important, a matter which did not come under discussion, to understand how it got that way, and the reason we are now waging an undeclared war, which I consider to be unconstitutional. [applause] [applause] Well I'm not a lawyer, but Senator Wayne Morse, who shares that view, is a constitutional lawyer, former dean of the University of Oregon Law School, and he has repeatedly asserted that we are acting in violation of the Constitution. Of course the Constitution declares that only the Congress can declare war.

Now it is true that the Congress approved a resolution, which was backed in the White House, and came right after the Tonkin Gulf incident, when the three ?PT? boats had attacked the seventh fleet [laughter] and the next day the President struck at the base from which they'd come and I think that was a proper retaliation, if a man slugs you, you slug him back once. It's alright. I could approve that, but unfortunately the resolution went far beyond that, and it asked for a blanket approval to allow the President to use the armed forces anywhere in Southeast Asia. And it passed the House unanimously and in the Senate there were only two of us who voted against it. And on that basis we're now bombing. And of course it makes it very difficult for our colleagues in Congress to do much about it because they've sort of painted themselves into a corner by approving that resolution. I don't feel that inhibition, but I didn't vote for it. But

I think many of them now feel it's very unfortunate that we're having this bombing which is not at all in my judgment apposite to the situation. It isn't going to stop the Vietcong. It may slow them down a little bit to the extent that it'll impede some of the infiltration from the North and some of the convoys that are coming down there now, but it's not going to stop them, and from experience in the past and the psychology of the situation it seems to me it's just going to intensify the bitterness and the determination to fight. That isn't the way to win the peace. [applause] [voice of moderator] On the point made by the Senator let me ask and paraphrase a question we have here. Secretary Bundy, how do you justify engaging in a non-ratified and undeclared war executed by the executive branch without the consent of the Congress? I think essentially I'm an

ex-lawyer before I joined the government 14 years ago, I say I'm an ex-lawyer so I won't attempt to speak with expertise, but i do think it's the considered opinion of the great majority of constitutional lawyers who have looked at this issue, with all respect to Senator Morse, that the president has the inherent power to take a very high degree of military action particularly where action has been taken against American forces or individuals as the triggering incident. But I, in other words I would say it rested from a Constitutional point of view, and there's probably somebody from the Columbia faculty who could check me on this, an inherent power of the president and that that was simply underscored and emphasized with respect to the situation in Southeast Asia by the congressional resolution of which Senator Gruening has spoken which was passed overwhelmingly in both houses and which specifically includes approval for the taking of all measures including the use of our armed force to support certain governments, specifically including South Vietnam by reference in Southeast Asia, so I think the power is pretty clear.

[voice of moderator] Senator Gruening, if we pull out and in effect let the Vietcong win the civil war, how can Vietnam be made a democratic nation? Why do you think there can be free elections when no other communist country has had free elections? Well it's never been a free nation in our sense of the word, [audience noises] I say it's never been a free nation in our sense of the word, and I don't think we should expect it, and I think you're going to get the kind of government that the people down there deserve. [audience noises] It may not be our ideal, but I think, I feel very much the way a great American statesman, Thomas

Brackett Reed, who was the speaker of the house at the end of the last century, and you know he retired from public life in protest to what he considered the imperialistic policies of President Mckinley. When we went out and took the Philippines at that time there was no certainty that we would set them free as we very properly did when we moved into Puerto Rico, and the manifest destiny was the watchword of the hour, and Reed uttered this dictum. He said, the best government of which any people is capable, is a government which they establish for themselves. With all its faults, with all its imperfections, it is still better than the best government established for them, even by wiser men. And I think there's a profound truth in that. [applause] [applause] [applause] [voice of moderator] Secretary Bundy, if we can live with communist states

in Eastern Europe, why can't live with communist states in Southeast Asia? [applause] I hadn't thought any of us thought it had been a good thing that the Eastern European states were conquered by Soviet Russia and have been held under domination for the last 20 years. [audience noises] I'm going on, may I. Now in other words, the extension of domination in the case of the Eastern European states, Soviet-Russian domination, led to a threat to Europe that had to be met by the whole NATO alliance and by the massive military and economic efforts starting in the Marshall Plan and in NATO to hold that at bay and to bring us to the, I believe, indications of a change in Soviet-Russian policy. All I say is, if you can do the job before you reach that point

in Asia, and avoid the threat to India and other areas that the communist domination of Southeast Asia would represent, you will have a much less difficult job to do. The sooner you get at this the better, otherwise you will have to face it further down the line and at greater cost. [applause] [applause] [voice of moderator] The Secretary has raised a question asked in the next question to Senator Gruening. That is, if we stopped fighting in Vietnam, wouldn't we fight in Thailand, or Malaysia, or the Philippines? I don't think that follows at all. [applause] [voice of moderator] For Secretary Bundy: We continually invoke the words "liberty" and "freedom."

And our support of South Vietnam. Yet we've supported for years Diem, an offensive dictator, who murdered his opponents, the recent rotating governments have not been freely elected. There have never been elections or any real freedoms since we've been in South Vietnam therefore what, or how, do you define the freedom we speak of in South Vietnam? I would go halfway with what Senator Gruening said in response to an earlier question that you simply cannot expect new nations to emerge into an instant democratic framework. It's only happened I think in the newer countries only where in India and Malaysia there had been a really thorough job of preparation and that was not the situation in the successive states of Indochina, specifically in Vietnam.

But I would next say that Diem and his words was not one quarter as bad in repression as Hanoi day by day for the last year [audience noises] I stand on that because among other things, you could always find the opponents to Diem and they would express themselves freely. [audience noises] The very reports you got. In other words, [audience noises] [audience noises] I'll stand quite clearly on the record on this one. And it makes a great deal of difference whether a nation is free to change its structure as South Vietnam proved and has proven [inaudible]. [audience laughter] I think it's now settling down. It is increasingly running its own destiny and it makes all the difference whether a nation is free to do that or whether it is barred from doing that by the methods of communism.

[applause and noises] [applause] [voice of moderator] Here's a question, and please if we're going to have answers to the questions, please refrain from comments. Comment to yourselves, but not out loud or we'll never get through this, and please show courtesy to all the speakers. The communists say they will bury the United States. Why should not the United States counter communism wherever it is spreading? Senator Gruening: [audience noises] Well, I thought I'd made clear that you can't beat communism everywhere in the world by

military means. And that is our great mistake. I think if we go to the world and demonstrate wherever we have our aid program, that we're not supporting dictators either right or left, which hasn't been the case unfortunately, and show that our system, our system of of freedom, of civil liberties, which we don't always have at home either, is a better system, I think in time we'll win out. I think it's a slow process. I think the example that we're setting in Southeast Asia doesn't improve our image in that direction. I think that up to the time we went in there we were doing pretty well in many parts of the world, and I think we still are, but merely sending our young boys to die in jungles is not the way to stop communism, especially when the governments you're supporting do not exhibit the kind of solicitude to their people that we think they ought to show. And while it may be that, no doubt that Hanoi is very tyrannical, we're supposed to represent a better

system. And it's very unfortunate that we were never able to persuade Diem to stop his mass arrests, his arbitrary arrests, his torture of people in prison, and our own incidental bombing of villages with napalm. We weakened our own case tremendously by those tactics, and consequently it's only a question of degree as to which seem to the people or the victims to be worse. [applause] [voice of moderator] Secretary Bundy, will you please comment on China's role, specifically comment on the concept that this area inevitably launched China's sphere of influence. First, as to China's role, I'm not sure whether the questioner meant a specific role in the aggression against South Vietnam which, in specific terms, I think is principally consisted of supplying arms to North Vietnam, which in turn has sent them down. We don't have much evidence of any

direct shipments from Communist China. But we do have, particularly recently, evidence that a very high proportion of the arms that have been sent recently are of Communist China's manufacture. This was true of ninety percent of the equipment captured from about 200 or I think 150 weapons captured from two Vietcong battalions just the other day. Now the wider question, whether Chinese Communists, whether this is in effect Communist China's sphere of influence, is that a fair characterization of it? Actually, historically even that isn't a true statement in terms of political domination for most of the last 1000 years in the area. There were periods in the past when Communist China dominated it, and the map that you see of their ambitions today most certainly implodes it, but it is not true as a historic statement. But even if it were, I should have thought that the kind of world we're trying to see and that

in fact seems to fit with the whole course of nationalism, self-determination, smaller nations arising, the fusion of power and responsibility, is a kind of world that we believe will be much more peaceful and much more responsive to the desires of individuals in these countries. If it is not in the old fashioned form of spheres of influence. I think that concept in essence is the very kind of thing that we fought to prevent in Europe in World War Two--we could have saved a lot of life if we hadn't stood up to it--it's the same concept that we fought in Asia when it was being represented by a greater [inaudible] sphere fear of the military leaders of Japan and I would think that it had to be resisted and that it can be resisted because I don't think Communist China is going to have that kind of power in the next generation. [applause] [Voice of moderator] This question, although addressed to the senator, I think we'll ask the senator to

answer and then ask the secretary to comment on his answer. The question: Do you believe we could negotiate peace with North Vietnam without the participation of the Viet Cong? I decidedly do not think we could, I think that the Viet Cong is the opponent, and I think that the negotiations should be with the Viet Cong very decidedly. [applause] I think that is the inherent flaw in the present administration's stance, which declares flatly, as the president did at Johns Hopkins, that Hanoi is exclusively guilty and that's why we're bombing North Vietnam so that Hanoi will [inaudible]. But actually, this is much more a civil war, infiltrated to be sure, but it's all through South Vietnam and not North Vietnam and the Viet Cong is the opponent which South Vietnamese have negotiated with. [applause]

I'm afraid the facts that we can get lead us to the conclusion that the Liberation Front which is the political name for the Viet Cong, is entirely, or for all practical purposes at least, the puppet of Hanoi, and that Hanoi is the operating arm in this area. [audience boos/hisses] [applause] [Voice of moderator] To Senator Gruening, if we temporarily stop the bombing, as you suggest, would there be any reason to start again? What do you mean by temporary? [Voice of Bundy] Well I would hope that once we stop temporarily, we'd stop permanently. [applause] [applause] [Voice of moderator] To Secretary Bundy, this may be repetitive, but there are number of questions

we have which are somewhat similar, so i'm going to ask it. Please explain exactly how United States security will be adversely affected if all of Asia becomes Communist? Particularly if we know our system is the right one? [Voice of Bundy] I hope we never have to test that hypothesis but I would think very clearly that a Communist Asia which would necessarily be pretty cohesive, would be a tremendous threat to our security in that its ambitions would not be confined to Asia, and that all contact between us and Asia would be pretty effectively cut off for a very long time to come. But I think it would very definitely be a situation such as we envisaged if Nazi Germany had conquered Europe in the 30s, that it would be that kind of threat to us and that kind of threat to the peace of the world. [applause] [applause]

[Voice of moderator] On the same order, to the senator, you have said that Vietnam has no real military importance for us. Please explain [Voice of Gruening] Well I don't know that it requires any explanation, I just think that it has no more importance than say the Congo. I think this is a remote area, I think we are separated from it by a vast Pacific which we control militarily, and if Vietnam should fall to North Vietnam, South Vietnam, I don't think it would affect our security in the slightest. I don't share the Secretary's view that our security would be imperiled. [applause] [Voice of moderator] Question to the Secretary: Why not take the advice of

Lester Pearson, Senator Fulbright, and others including our guest tonight who suggest we try a halt in bombing? [applause] [Voice of Bundy] I think the suggestions of Mr. Pearson and Senator Fulbright are perhaps different from Senator Gruening's position if I understand it correctly. They would do it temporarily with the expectation that it would be resumed if nothing showed. This is a matter, as Secretary Rusk said to the press on Saturday and I think it was widely reported, that he and the president, all of us, have looked at very hard from time to time, to see if we thought it would give that kind of signal to Hanoi or possibly just the reverse. At this stage at least and without excluding the possibility of this happening in the future, our conclusion is that it would give the wrong signal, lead Hanoi to suppose we were weakening or would weaken, and thus lead away from any possibility of

negotiations or the kind of settlement I think we must have. [applause] [Voice of moderator] To both speakers, we'll ask Senator Gruening first to comment, and then the secretary, since the possibility of eventual United Nations involvement has been mentioned, what kind of United Nations action do you envision? [Voice of Gruening] Well I would like to see a cease fire initiated by us and [inaudible] to the other side, with a peacekeeping United Nations force. The kind we have had on the borders of United Arab Republic and Israel, which stopped some of the border incidents, and the kind we had temporarily in the Congo. It might not work but it's certainly worth trying. I think once you stop the killing and there's a

period of relative cessation of warfare, I think it's far more likely that you'll get [inaudible]. [applause] [Voice of moderator] The question was what kind of United Nations participation, if any, do you see? [Voice of Bundy] I would like to say I think I agree with Senator Gruening completely on this point. I don't see a United Nations role and indeed any role for the United Nations has been flatly turned down by both Hanoi and Peiping in the last two weeks as you probably noted. I don't see a role in restoring the situation. But I do see a very real possibility of a role in the kind of way that the Senator described, in policing a situation that has been restored. [applause] [Voice of moderator] With the consent of the speakers I suggest that we continue for another fifteen minutes and we will try to reach as many questions during that time as we can. Now

here's a question, let me address it to the Secretary, as the administration considered the risk of throwing Russia and China together? [Voice of Bundy] We've considered this very seriously indeed, and it certainly is something to weigh if matters should turn into a more serious form which of course we hope they will not. Up to this point I think it's fair to say the reading would be that the depth of hostility and opposition seems to be as great as ever. But I only claim that up to this point. I think it's a matter we have to weigh very carefully indeed. [Voice of moderator] Would you like to comment on that, Senator? [Voice of Gruening] Well our policy will not drive the two great Communist [inaudible] together. It looks to me as if, much reluctant as they are to get together,

our policy is very likely to produce that result. Now they're both going to object to our bombing of North Vietnam; that's already evident. And if they find this common purpose in that field, the first thing you know they'll be united in fighting us together. And that is a catastrophe that I would hate to visualize. [applause] [Voice of moderator] A question regarding the press in Vietnam. Mr. Bundy, you criticize the Viet Cong for sending a military escort with foreign correspondents. What about press censorship on American correspondents? [applause] I studied the instance which is reported in one of the Express articles by [inaudible], a French correspondent, that the Viet Cong said they wouldn't take him around because they'd have to have

a battalion to escort him, purely to illustrate the degree of control that apparently prevails even in areas considered by the Viet Cong to be theirs. I didn't mean that critical or one way or the other, it was just a statement and relevant to the question of degree of control. Now as to our own press policies, we've been working very hard to get the facts fully available to the press [audience boos/hisses]. And I think no war in history has ever been covered as closely or with as few restrictions as this one. [audience reaction] [audience noises] [audience noises]. And, there are restrictions that are now causing difficulty and which have been criticized, I'm not an expert on their technical outline, but I do know their purpose which is purely and simply military security and to protect the lives of our men and of the Vietnamese

engaged in combat operations. [applause] [Voice of moderator] There have been several questions on this very topic addressed to Senator Gruening, why don't we combine them all by having him respond to the Secretary. [Voice of Gruening] Well, in war, truth is always the first casualty. Now there will shortly be available a very interesting book, by the man who was for three years the correspondent for the New York Times in Vietnam, a newspaperman named David Halberstam. And I secured a copy in advance of its general distribution, and it's a revelation of the kind of distortion and suppression that characterized our relations with the American press during the years that he was there. And he spells it out in great detail, and in fact gets to the point where President Kennedy even asked Arthur Sulzberger

to remove him, because he was reporting that we were losing the war down there. And we were. And an honest newspaperman will report the facts as he sees them, but of course it's understandable that those who were there representing the government, wanted to put everything in as favorable a light as possible. And we have gone through the same kind of delusion for many years down there that the French did, they were convinced they were winning, whereas the facts were quite otherwise, and they finally had this terrific disaster, and had 175,000 casualties. And I think those of you who ought to get that book were it in circulation will have a complete answer to this question. We have NOT been reporting the war accurately although the efforts may be made here to do so. And only the other day, Malcolm Brown, the Associated Press correspondent, who's also got another book coming out called "The New Face of War," which is also full of interesting revelations, his arrest indicates they are not quite as free as they ought to be. [applause] [Voice of moderator] Here's a question that hasn't been asked, I don't think, and I will address it first to the Secretary and then to the Senator.

What should the United States government do if South Vietnam is attacked by a full-scale military invasion from Communist China? [audience noises] [Voice of Bundy] I wonder if I might collect my wits on that one by [from audience, louder] I wonder I wonder if I might collect my wits on that one by doubling back, just for a second, on this question of the press. I think I think there's a good deal of justice in what Dave Halberstam and others said about the press two years ago and more. And that was principally, and I think entirely, because the Diem government simply could not get the idea of the kind of truth we believe in, even in a war situation. [audience noises] Now that's not surprising and I don't have

to go into it further than that, except to say I'm referring to the period of at least the last year and more [audience shouts "It happened yesterday"/"the AP, right now"]. The AP, and the issue of AP, is an issue of access to a military operational base. If you can recite me any instance in World War 2 where there was unlimited operational acts, or any other conflict of any scale, where there was unlimited access and freedom to report, I'd be glad to know about them. These restrictions are purely and simply operational. And they are the part that is necessary to protect the lives [shouting from audience] of the men conducting the operations. That's the simple fact. Now, if I may go on to the question. The question is what should the U.S. government do if South Vietnam

is attacked by a full military invasion from Communist China. Well, I certainly hope, and I'm sure we all do, that that contingency never arises. And I don't think the chances of it at the present time are at all great. If it should happen I think we would have to weigh all kinds of responses and I think it would be most unwise of me to speculate on what those would be. [applause] {MC} Senator Gruening; Do you advocate withdrawal of all American troops, and I assume that means from the South, at the present time? [Voice of Senator Gruening] Well, I've been advocating it for over a year. A little more difficult to do now because of the intensification of the war, and our repeated and unqualified promises of support.

But, sooner or later, if we believe what we say, we ought to get out militarily and leave the country to settle it's own destiny. [applause] {MC} To the Secretary; How does How does the United States intend to negotiate with a government it does not recognize? {Mr. Bundy} Oh I think that presents no problem. [laughter] We have been at a conference table with that government and with Beiping which, of course, we also don't recognize, in connection with Southeast Asia in the past. At the Laos conference in '61, where we were full participants, which we weren't, of course, in '54 in Geneva. And I don't think that presents any problem. [audience noises] {MC} I think there's time for about two or three more questions for each speaker. And

I'd like to take questions that deal with general policy rather than specifics. To Senator Gruening; What proposals would you make concerning economic development programs for Southeast Asia? {Sen. Gruening} Well, I think that once peace is established, and we can do the kind program that we are trying to do in South America. Alliance for Progress, economic aid, education, health measures, land reform. We've tried to do that down there but we've not been very successful. We haven't been able to find the people down who'd carry out these reforms. And in all these cases, unless people can be taught to help themselves, these reforms don't amount to anything. You can't do things for people, you've got to help them do things for themselves. [applause] {MC} For Mr. Bundy; Do you think President Johnson is adopting many of the military policies advocated by Senator Goldwater? [applause/laughter]

[applause] [applause] {Mr. Bundy} I'm not sure I ever fully understood what Senator Goldwater was advocating [laughter] [laughter/applause] It seemed to me he was talking about the use of nuclear weapons for defoliation one day, negotiating with Communist China the next, and then some vaguely defined scheme of bombing supply lines the next. But, assuming that he was talking about the latter, all I can say is this is something that had occurred to a great many other people as a necessary, or possibly necessary, measure. I should doubt very much if the measured and careful way in which President Johnson is carrying out is the way that Senator Goldwater would have done. [applause/background noise; sotto voce "This is going to be your last question"] [background noise] {MC} Now the final question for Senator Gruening.

Does the climate of opinion in Congress today... the final question. Does the climate of opinion in Congress today make it difficult to oppose the Administration's policy. Why aren't there more discussion of the issues in Congress? in Congress? [applause] {Sen. Gruening} Well, Senator Mansfield, our majority leader, is extremely knowledgable in matters of the Far East. He was out there 10 years ago. And he made a proposal that we convoke the Geneva nations again, and he made a very constructive proposal. It was not given very much space in the press. And it's rather unfortunate because this is an important fact. When the majority leader, whose policy is to carry out the wishes of the administration, diverged from it quite substantially in his suggestions, although in a very polite manner, I think it's rather unfortunate it didn't get more discussion. I think you will have a discussion in the Congress, and I think we should have a debate there, which, unfortunately, has not been present to date. I think

the difficulty is, the great difficulty is, the great inhibition upon most members of Congress is that when they signed, when they voted for the resolution, giving the President unlimited powers, they foreclosed future action. If they hadn't done that I think there would be much more discussion. But I think if the war escalates and there are more casualties and we seem to be getting deeper and deeper, I think we're bound to have these debates and should have them.