The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; 7046; Iran: Bombs Continue

[Tease]

JIM LEHRER [voice-over]: Another bomb explodes in Iran. Another funeral is held. Another round of questions begins about the survival of Ayotallah Khomeini`s Islamic Republic.

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LEHRER: Good evening. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the ousted Iranian president now living in France, last week gave The New York Times a hit list. He named five officials back home in Iran whose killing would collapse the Iranian government. Two of those five are now dead. President Mohammed Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammed Java Bahonar were among seven people murdered yesterday in a fire bomb explosion in Teheran. Bani-Sadr today blamed it all on the repressive reign of Ayotallah Khomeini. "`He tried by all means to impose a dictatorship in Iran." Bani-Sadr said. "He is responsible for this." Bani-Sadr called on the people of Iran to rise up now and take control of the government declaring, "Victory is near." Bani- Sadr did not take credit for yesterday`s bombing, and neither did the Mujahedeen, a leftist student group which supports Bani-Sadr. Whoever did it clearly had some inside help, because the bomb was planted in the heavily guarded prime min-ister`s office. Khomeini, in a national radio address, vowed that the Islamic revolution would continue on course. But others are not so sure. It`s the central question we explore tonight following this latest spilling of blood in Iran. Robert MacNeil is off; Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in New York. Charlayne?

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Jim, yesterday`s fatal bombing was the second in the last two months aimed at revolutionary leaders in Iran. The first, an explosion at the headquarters of the ruling Islamic Republican Party, claimed the lives of 70 leaders, including the chief justice and principal strategist Ayotallah Beheshti. As in yesterday`s attack, no one has claimed credit for the murders, but more than 600 opponents of the regime, many of them members of the Mujahedeen, have been executed in the wake of the June incident. The leader of that group, Massoud Rajavi, fled Iran with Bani- Sadr just prior to the incident. Bani-Sadr said the bombing was a response to those executions. For a report on today`s events in Iran we go now to Charles Hodges of Viznews.

REPORTER: Both President Rajai and Prime Minister Bahonar, pictured here in a recent meeting with the Ayoiollah Khomeini, had been in office for less than 30 days. Khomeini has claimed that the assassinations will not damage the Islamic Republic because, he says, there are queues of people waiting to die for it. As if to testify to Khomeini`s claim, a million people came out onto Teheran`s streets for the funeral procession. Amid chants of "Death to America," the speaker of the Majlis blamed the killings on what he called United States mercenaries, and also on Iraq. He demanded that all counterrevolutionaries be put to death because the people, he said, were screaming for revenge. Revenge there will certainly be. More than 600 executions have been reported in the past two months alone, mostly of left- wingers opposed to the Islamic regime. The murders of the president and the prime minister are bound to unleash even more. Under the Iranian constitution, a new election must take place within 50 days. Until then, the speaker of the Majlis and the head of the Supreme Court will preside with the Ayotollah Khomeini over a nation that gets closer every week to outright civil war.

HUNTER-GAULT: For more details on what is happening in Iran, we go now to a man who closely monitors events there. He is Ali Banuazizi. former editor of the Journal of Iranian Studies, and a visiting scholar at Harvard University`s Center for Middle Eastern Studies. Mr. Banuazizi. who do you think is responsible for the bombing?

ALI BANUAZIZI: Well, I think all the speculations are at the moment centering on the Mujahedeen; however, I`m very impressed by the sheer technical competence of those who planted the bomb, as well as the previous bomb that exploded the headquarters of the ruling Islamic Republican Party. So it`s possible that there may be other groups involved.

HUNTER-GAULT: You mean you don`t think that the Mujahedeen would have that kind of technical capability?

Mr. BANUAZIZI: I think it`s unlikely that they would be able to pull off something with such degree of exactness and effectiveness.

HUNTER-GAULT: Why is that?

Mr. BANUAZIZI: Most of these members of this group are young people. Islamic socialists, and to the best of my knowledge, and according to sources that I`m familiar with, they have not had the kind of training that would be required for this type of terrorist activity. On the other hand, this is pure speculation on my part--

HUNTER-GAULT: Well, who else might be--

Mr. BANUAZIZI: --that they were involved. Well, there could be some remnants of the Shah`s military. There could be other groups that might have had training outside of Iran. But also, it could have been the Mujahedeen.

HUNTER-GAULT: What would be their motives -- whoever?

Mr. BANUAZIZI: Well, this is, I think, an extremely serious blow to the regime of Khomeini. To put it in perspective, as I think you just did in your introduction to this program, it comes on the heels of the bombings of the IRP headquarters, the escape by the president -- the former president - - of the country, and the head of the Mujahedeen, and now we have this third, extremely competently executed, attack on the regime. All along, the regime has been trying to assure the people that it is in power, that there is internal security in the country. It has resorted to an increasing level of violence against the opposition. More than 600 or 700 people have been executed in the past two months, and it seems to me that with this incident we are going to see an escalation of the violence both on the part of the regime and on the part of the opposition.

HUNTER-GAULT: What do you think the relationship of whoever planted the bomb is to Bani-Sadr?

Mr. BANUAZIZI: I don`t believe that there is any relationship -- any direct link -- between those who planted the bomb and Bani-Sadr. If one could assume or accept this notion that the Mujahedeen were behind this, that they had done it, clearly there is a formal tie between that group and the former president, Bani-Sadr. The head of the Mujahedeen, as you mentioned before, is currently in Paris, and he`s playing the role of the prime minister in a form of provisional government that Bani-Sadr considers himself to be the head of.

HUNTER-GAULT: Well, just very, very briefly, with two of the five on Bani- Sadr`s hit list now dead, how close is his claim that the regime is about to fall?

Mr. BANUAZIZI: Well, I think in the short-run, if by the short-run we mean something between three to six months, I doubt very much that the regime would collapse. However, I think, as I mentioned before, we are going to see an increasingly violent set of events in the country. And if such events were to lead to an actual civil war, which I believe is quite likely, then the fall of the regime within the next year or two, I think, would be quite probable.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right. We`ll come back. Jim?

LEHRER: Another view of it now from Dr. Sepehr Zabih, an Iranian now living in the United States, where he teaches political science at St. Mary`s College in California, and is associated with the Institute for International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. He is currently working on a book about the Iranian revolution. Who do you think is responsible for yesterday`s bombing, Doctor?

Dr. SEPEHR ZABIH: Jim, I would add at least three other groups. One would be the minority faction of Fedayeen which broke with Khomeini about a year ago. The second group would be the small Trotskyite group known as Peykar. Thirdly, would be a Maoist group known as Ranjbaran or Torjalist [?] Party. I suggest that in terms of experience and background, the Mujahedeens are the primary suspect. And I tend to disagree a little bit with my colleague from New York in terms of lack of training. I would like to mention that the Mujahedeens have been involved in urban guerrilla warfare for at least 15 years. I recall how many times the SAVAK, the former Shah`s secret police, declared that that entire leadership is decimated and they are out of action, and in a few weeks we hear that they have ambushed a car carrying American diplomats or American advisors, and assas-sinated some of them. So it might be also interesting to note that from everything that we know, it really was an inside job. Which simply means that whoever did it - - and to be most likely, it was the Mujahedeen -- they have been able to infiltrate, including perhaps some of the Pasdaran, or the revolutionary guards, which were given the task of watching the headquarter of the prime minister day and night, It is, however, not unlikely that some elements of the military have been involved in terms of perhaps providing those kind of technological helps to which Professor Banuazizi referred. We should remember that after all the pilot who flew Bani-Sadr and Rajavi to Paris was an army officer, was an air force officer. And from what I understand, they have been quite successful in infiltrating what is left of the Iranian armed forces.

LEHRER: I see. What is your analysis of whether Bani-Sadr is right when he says-- when he says victory is near -- meaning the collapse of the Khomeini regime?

Dr. ZABIH: Well, there is no doubt that this regime is going to fall, but really when and how early after the murder of four people or five people, it is difficult to say. I have no doubt that if the opponents of the regime succeed in murdering Khomeini, that would be a perhaps final blow. But I suggest that Khomeini`s ability to survive should not be under-estimated.

LEHRER: Why has-- why is it that Khomeini has not been a target of assassination yet?

Or. ZABIH: Well, I have understood that some attempts have been made. I believe the answer is that his residence is very well protected. The elite of the Postirans are in charge of protecting him. There are some rumors that this also includes some Palestinians who are very well-trained in protecting. And also we should remember that Khomeini never leaves his residence, whereas these other people leave home, go to headquarters of the political party, or what have you.

LEHRER: Is it possible to know at this point whether or not the people of Iran still support the Islamic government, and support Khomeini, or how the division goes at this point?

Dr. ZABIH: Well, I would suggest that the funeral of this morning is an indication that Khomeini as a person still has a large following, I would say, amongst the urban poor, amongst those destitute, amongst those homeless people as a result of the war in Iraq, who have been resettled in the capital city. But if I were to mention any percentage, I would say that his support has been radically eroded. I do not believe that he enjoys the support of more than about 25 percent of those who supported him in the early days of the revolution.

LEHRER: Finally, is he likely to make any effort to accommodate his opposition, or will he continue to hang tough and send either more martyrs out, as he said in his radio address--

Dr. ZABIH: Yes. I should say that last week he made a very significant statement, appealing to the dissident groups to repent and come back. And I suggest that he is not totally incapable of, for example, responding to an appeal that I believe is now being circulated amongst five grand ayatollahs, appealing to him that he should dismiss the present parliament, he should reappoint maybe Mr. Bazargan or someone else, and he should simply modify his position so that the regime would survive.

LEHRER: Thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: Now we hear from someone who follows the secular opposition in Iran. He is Eqbal Ahmed, a senior fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. Mr. Ahmed, do you have a theory on who planted the bomb?

Mr. EQBAL AHMED: Not really. I don`t think we -- any of us -- know exactly who might have done it. The suspects have, by and large, been outlined to you.

HUNTER-GAULT: You agree with what both gentlemen said?

Mr. AHMEO: By and large. I would put somewhat different emphasis. I think among the suspects are the-- I think first thing to be said is that it is most likely an internal job. That is, this killing, like the killing of June 28, is a reflection of the continuing struggle for revolutionary power in Iran. I don`t think there is any foreign involvement in it, and there is no evidence of overt foreign involvement -- either American or Russian or French. The most likely candidates for suspicion are, number one, the Mujahedeen. They had good motive -- the motive is, among others, that of the 1,700 or so people who have been executed in Iran by the Islamic government since the last 29 months, about 600 of them are cadres of the Mujahedeen Party. [Though] its leadership has now gone abroad; they still have a strong organization estimated as strength 15,000 to 20,000-- might have done it. I would disagree about the competence. I think they do have the competence to do it, but it seems clear in retrospect that the June 28 bombing was not done by the Mujahedeen. They did not claim it. They had motives to claim it. and the-- the main warrant of arrest that went out from the Islamic Republic was against a man called Reza Kolahi, who was officer of the revolutionary guard of the Islamic Republican Party, and not from the Mujahedeen.

HUNTER-GAULT: So that was about something else altogether?

Mr. AHMED: That`s sort of about something else, yes. That leaves you with a second speculation, namely, it poses reflection of which nobody has mentioned here of an in-ternalist struggle within the Islamic Republican Party itself. Now, both Dr. Bahonar and Mr. Rajai, who were killed in yesterday`s bombing, were compromise candidates in the contest that developed between five or six people including Jalaledin Farsi, Ayatollah Rafsanjani, Mr. Ayat, and Mr. Nabavi himself. Three of them are also suspect because in the previous bombing of June 28, they had left the hall which was bombed just about two--- two, three minutes earlier. So there is a sort of rumor and suspicion -- speculations -- about this could be an in a struggle internally within the party.

HUNTER-GAULT: Well, let me just ask you briefly this question. How much damage have these murders done to the IRP, and is the claim of Bani-Sadr that the government is about to fall valid at all?

Mr. AHMED: The government-- no, I don`t think that is valid. I think Abolhassan Bani-Sadr is being once again a little bit more optimistic than he ought to be. The regime is weak, as Mr. Zabih and also you [Mr. Banuazizi] pointed out earlier. There will be more turmoil in Iran. There is a possibility of possibly the turmoil leading up to the third element -- which I didn`t mention -- namely, the armed forces. It could be a job done by the armed forces. In the armed forces there is a very strong royalist element. There is also a very strong pro-American element. There is, in addition, some evidence that the armed forces have infiltrated the revolutionary guards, the Pasdaran. I think that in Iran we shall see evidence of continuing turmoil for the next year, possibly two years. And one can only hope that great powers will keep out of it as much as possible.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right.

Mr. AHMED: It`s a revolutionary situation.

HUNTER-GAULT: On that note we`ll move on to our next guest. Jim?

LEHRER: Finally, an American perspective from William Sullivan, who was the U.S. ambassador in Iran from 1977 to `79 when the U.S. embassy was seized and hostages taken. He is now retired from the Foreign Service, and is the director of the American Assembly, a private study group on domestic and international affairs headquartered at Columbia University in New York. He is also working on a book about his experiences in Iran. Mr. Ambassador, who is on the top of your suspect list, to begin with?

WILLIAM SULLIVAN: Well, I think it doesn`t avail us very much to try to find suspects in this. I would agree that it seems to be a very professional job, and that therefore it can be winnowed down to those people who would have the competence to do it. I should think that those who might have had the training to do this sort of thing would be people who had previously been in the Shah`s armed forces, people from the Fedayeen who had been trained in the camps of George Habash, and the third element -- which hasn`t been mentioned here -- would be the Tudeh Party, the communist party which has been trained in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Those people would have the competence. They would also have, through various routes of infiltration, the possibility of getting into the compound, of being able to do the job.

LEHRER: Mr. Ambassador, what is the United States` interest in this at this point? Are we better off if Khomeini hangs tough and hangs in there, and the Islamic government stays, or if Khomeini falls?

Amb. SULLIVAN: I think the United States should not try to get itself involved in the internal affairs of a country whose politics and whose social aspects are very difficult for us to understand.

LEHRER: I wasn`t suggesting involvement. I was suggesting, in the natural course events, which would be better for the United States?

Amb. SULLIVAN: Well, the prime thing that should be of concern to us would be the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Iran -- of the country being able to hold together as a unit rather than splitting up and breaking up into a lot of different regional groups which would then weaken the integrity of that part of the world and make it more dangerous as far as the sources of petroleum for us, Western European and our Japanese allies from the Persian Gulf area. That seems to me to be the primary strategic concern from the United States. As far as other, humanitarian concerns are concerned, we obvious-ly ought to be aware of the possibility that this chaos will become widespread, and that many, many more people will be slaughtered. But for us to be able to try to side with one faction or another, it seems to me not prudent. We have to address this problem by understanding what sort of revolution this was. This was a revolution that had a negative consensus. The consensus was to get rid of the Shah. The people who took part in it came from a broad spectrum of political groups, none of whom could agree with the other about how the future of the country would be governed, or how they would put together any sort of regime.

LEHRER: So in other words, this kind of thing should have been expected?

Amb. SULLIVAN: Yes. I think it had been foreseen by most of us who were there. We thought that chaos would result from the disintegration that we saw in 78 and `79. The only sort of unifying factor is the Shiism that is represented by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the nationalism that is also represented by most of the people who were engaged in the revolutionary activities. I think when it sorts itself out eventually, Iran will be governed by a group which is Shia, and which is nationalist. But other than that I think it`s very difficult to try to pinpoint who the individuals will be.

LEHRER: Thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: Mr. Banuazizi, first back to you on Mr. Ahmed`s speculation that this was an internal job, that this was about internal policies rather than about anything else -- within the IRP.

Mr. BANUAZIZI: I doubt that very much because, if a faction within the IRP were to involve itself in such activity, I think the costs would be very high for that faction, and they would clearly think twice, or many times, before doing something of this nature. On the other hand, I took Mr. Ahmed`s comments to mean that the people who were able to carry out this bombing had the inside connections. They had access and they were clearly in a position to call the shots. And they have been in the past two or three incidents that we talked about before.

HUNTER-GAULT: Mr. Zabih, you agree with that, is that right?

Dr. ZABIH: I agree that, yes, there was some infiltration, as I mentioned earlier. I also doubt the accuracy of the comment that it may have to do with the internal struggle, because it is really suicidal. There are very few people left within the leadership, and for that reason I believe that those organizations that we mentioned on this program are prime suspects.

HUNTER-GAULT: You buy that, Mr. Ahmed?

Mr. AHMED: I think that I didn`t-- there is probably some confusion. When I said it`s internal, I meant more to the external to Iran concept.

HUNTER-GAULT: What about--

Mr. AHMED: It`s an aspect of the struggle for power in Iran between and among various groups.

HUNTER-GAULT: What about Ambassador Sullivan`s point that he believed there were some outside elements involved?

Mr. AHMED: I don`t see that, quite frankly. I mean, I understand that both former and present officials of the United States government are rather keen to put some blame on somewhere with the PLO and somewhere with the Soviet Union. Quite frankly, the Tudeh Party has been actively and openly supporting the present Islamic Republican Party re-gime, and that`s one of the reasons why most of the independent Marxist and left-wing factions and nationalist factions of the country have been condemning the Tudeh Party. So I just do not see what interest the Tudeh Party would have to actually attack precisely the government that it depends on.

HUNTER-GAULT: Let me just ask Mr. Banuazizi on the point that Mr. Zabih made, that this was all really a severe blow to Ayatollah Khomeini, and that his support among the people is radically eroded.

Mr. BANUAZIZI: Welt, I very much agree with that. As I mentioned before, however, that is not to be interpreted as meaning that the regime is about to collapse. However, it seems to me that the people of Iran are beginning to doubt the ability of the present leadership to maintain itself. And I think as the revolution itself proved, when people come to believe that the inevitable in fact is not ineluctable, then I think the possibilities of change become much greater.

HUNTER-GAULT: Do you agree with that, Dr. Zabih?

Dr. ZABIH: Well, I agree in general but I see some interesting patterns between the summer of 1981 for Khomeini and the summer of 1978 for the late Shah. That is to say, we see that gradually alienated groups resort to armed resistance, armed struggle. I also know that there have been some strikes which have not been reported in the foreign press. As we know, Iran is-- in Iran the media is totally controlled by the state. So if we accept the existence of that [unintelligible], it may be that we can say that by maybe next January and February the event will clarify itself, and we`ll know whether this regime can survive or not.

HUNTER-GAULT: But in the meantime I take it from what all of you have said, more violence is inevitable on both sides? Ambassador, do you see that down--

Amb. SULLIVAN: Oh, I fear that it`s going to get a lot worse before it gets better. There`s going to be a continuing chaos. There`s no equilibrium among these contending parties, and there`s very little likelihood that even as-- even as the timeframe of January `82, I think, would be optimistic. I would suspect that we ought to look for continuing confusion and perhaps even territorial disintegration in Iran over a number of years ahead.

HUNTER-GAULT: Is Bani-Sadr kidding himself about coming back triumphantly any time soon?

Mr. BANUAZIZI: I certainly think so, yes.

HUNTER-GAULT: I`m sorry. I think we have to leave it there. Jim?

LEHRER: Yes. Gentlemen in New York, thank you very much. Dr. Zabih, thank you. Good night, Charlayne.

HUNTER-GAULT: Good night, Jim

LEHRER: We`ll see you tomorrow night. I`m Jim Lehrer. Thank you and good night.