The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; 6106; Afghanistan

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Last Thursday the United Nations General Assem-bly demanded for the second time this year that the Soviet Union remove its troops from Afghanistan. Once again the vote was overwhelmingly against Moscow -- 111 to 22, headed by an unusual coalition of third world nations. The first vote was last January shortly after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan with 85,000 troops to wipe out rebel forces threatening the Soviet puppet regime. Moscow has not heeded either vote, nor has it defeated the rebels, despite heavy losses on both sides. First hand accounts of the fighting are rare, but here is a report sent from the rebel side nearly two weeks ago by Viznews, the news film agency.

OWEN PATERSON: These pictures taken by a rebel cameraman above a village in the Logar Valley show one of the Soviet search and destroy operations. The approach of the armored convoy sent Mujaheddin fleeing to the hills. But villagers, hiding behind garden walls, had to run for their lives when the convoy`s fire was turned in their direction. Operations like this one represent the free fire tactics adopted by the Soviets this summer. They give you license to indiscriminate attacks on villages. Rebels are driven away, but when the armored infantry retreats, it leaves behind high civilian casualties and destroyed communities, which lead to ever-growing refugee numbers. Outlying villages are also targets for shelling and attacks by helicopter gunships. The rebels have long insisted they needed heavy weapons to defeat the Russians. Now a number of them are armed with rocket launchers, thought to have been bought by sympathetic Arabs with a possible American or Chinese involvement during shipment. With such armaments, the rebels are able to ambush heavily armored Soviet convoys. In this exchange, the Mujaheddin claimed to have stopped 70 tanks and lorries, despite aerial harassment. The rebels say they were able to blow up an ammunition carrier and damage a number of trucks. The rebels are carefully selecting their attacks, concentrating on hit-and-run operations which promise the best chance of capturing arms and ammunition. Owen Paterson reporting,

MacNEIL: Since that report, other Afghan sources have reported rebel hopes fading with arms and ammunition declining unless they get outside help. Tonight, the war as the Afghans see it, and want us to. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, there are two groups of Afghans in the United States now pleading for help, military and diplomatic. Among those pushing for military help is Saduddin Shpoon, a University of Kabul professor who was active in the armed resistance to the Soviet occupation. Professor, how much armed resistance is there left now to the Soviets?

SADUDDIN SHPOON: Well, the armed resistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan is as strong as it was. I don`t agree with the theory, or with the claim that the Soviets are gaining ground. They are not gaining ground. And the lull of the winter is as much a setback for the Soviets as it is for the armed resistance.

LEHRER: Well, what is the situation, in general terms, now? How much of the country and Us functions does the Soviet Union control, and how much do the resistance forces control?

SHPOON: The Soviets usually control a few of the cities, the air fields, the barracks. And they are confined in their tanks and entrenchment`s. And the freedom fighters control the rest of the country during the day and night, and these cities -- these Soviet strongholds -- during the night. As a result, when the Soviets impose curfew at night, it`s a curfew on themselves, and not on the freedom lighters.

LEHRER: How well organized are the resistance forces now?

SHPOON: After the Soviet invasion, the resistance force has started to organize itself, because it has to cope, not only with the Afghan army -- like during the Amin and Taraki -- but against a very sophisticated war technology equipped with lasers, with computer-ized war machinery, with MI- 24`s And, so, accordingly, the freedom fighters are organ-izing themselves in modern guerrilla warfare.

LEHRER: Where are they getting their arms?

SHPOON: They are still fighting with the arms captured from the Soviets, from the defectors, from the army, and a few other pieces that they had from the past; and also some that they can buy on the free market in the border stretch called Dara [where] there`s a free market.

LEHRER: Professor, you`re not suggesting, are you sir, that it will be possible for the armed resistance to actually rid Afghanistan of the Soviet Union -- that the resistance, in other words, will defeat the Soviet army and they will leave with their tail between their legs?

SHPOON: No, not at all. We don`t have that kind of illusion. We know our limits, and we know our capabilities. We intend to and have succeeded so far, and we will succeed to stall them, to hurt them -- and to stop their base, their machineries, and bring pressure on them, on their war economy and their war machinery for as long as it takes for them to sit down for a political negotiation.

LEHRER: I see. What do you want the United States to do in this matter that it hasn`t done up till now?

SHPOON: Well, United States can do a lot and so can the rest of the free world. I think we have contributed a lot in unmasking the face of the Soviets, and exposing them to the world, and showing their real expansionists plans and ambitions. And, I think that directly affects the decisions -- that must directly affect the decisions of the free world.

LEHRER: Do you want the free world to give the resistance fighters, the rebels, more arms?

SHPOON: Yes. Arms is one of the items on the agenda.

LEHRER: Do you want it to be given to you directly, or through third parties, or do you care?

SHPOON: Well, as long as we get it inside.

LEHRER: You don`t care how it gets there?

SHPOON: I don`t care how it gets there. As long as it gets inside without jeopardizing the positions of our neighboring countries, it`s welcome.

LEHRER: Mr. Shpoon, thank you. Next to a representative of the Afghan group commit-ted to a peaceful, diplomatic solution to their country`s problem. He`s Akhtar Mohammed Paktiawal, an Afghan career diplomat who made international headlines when he defected last month. He was the leader of the Afghan delegation to a UNESCO conference in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. After making a speech denouncing the Soviet domination of Afghanistan, he flew to West Germany where he was granted political asylum. Why did you defect, sir?

AKHTAR MOHAMMED PAKTIAWAL: Well, since the first intervention of the Soviet Union in April, 1978, I was trying to be some kind helpful to my country people to stop Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan. So, I did not have this chance. So, I tried to be helpful to my country in some way. You see, in April of this year, I had a chance to go to Wellington to a conference. I tried to disclose Soviet`s disaster -- they are doing in my country. But I thought, at this very small conference, it would not be useful, so better wait and do it in Belgrade which is bigger conference. So, I was planning to do this, and I did it in Belgrade, and said the facts about Afghanistan in front of the world -- how the Russians is killing us, and how they are dominating us --

LEHRER: Let`s take those one at a time. You said they`re killing you. You mean literally killing the people, your people?

PAKTIAWAL: Yes

LEHRER: I read a report today that some 50,000 Afghans had been killed one way or another since the invasion. Does that gel with figures that you have?

PAKTIAWAL: No. I would say 16,000. At the hand of Amin regime, this was announced 15,000 -- by Babrak Karmal. Almost another thousand was killed by car-men on the streets, so it`s almost 16,000.

LEHRER: Sixty thousand.

PAKTIAWAL: Sixteen.

LEHRER: Sixteen thousand.

PAKTIAWAL: This 16,000 is dead people. They`re taken at midnight from their houses -- families together -- clergies, teachers, professors, engineers, doctors. They were taken to the jail -- tortured first -- and then they were killed in Pol-I-Charki [a jail in Afghan-istan]. Even not shot. Most of them were killed by passing the cat-o`-tail around them.

LEHRER: Is that same sort of thing going on now -- still going on? Anybody who --

PAKTIAWAL: Well no, you see when Babrak Karmal came, he announced that he would not kill somebody. He would not put somebody in the jail. But, you know what they are doing now? They don`t take them to the jail. They are just killing them on the street, before they take them to the jail.

LEHRER: Do you feel that the armed resistance, that Professor Shpoon and his people are mounting, is going to eventually lead in a successful outcome. In other words, to get the Russians out of your country?

PAKTIAWAL: Well, this is very difficult, you see, to kick out Russians with this big power, you see. But, we are fighting against them with old guns and the guns that the Mujaheddin are taking from Soviet troops or from Afghan troops, where they are joining them, you see. But we are resisting. We are looking forward for the peace-loving people of the world to help us to find a solution for this.

LEHRER: A peaceful solution?

PAKTIAWAL: A peaceful solution, a political solution. This is the only way to solve the -problem. This confrontation of arms doesn`t solve the problem. I don`t believe that some country should fight against Soviet Union to solve our problem, but --

LEHRER: How can their be a peaceful diplomatic solution. I mean, where would that come from? What would be the --

PAKTIAWAL: You see, what we are trying is to -- to get all the Western countries and non-alliance countries, Islamic world to take the same position in solving Afghan`s problem. You know, there are still some countries of -- even some Islamic countries -- working against Afghan problem. And some non-alliance countries still abstain in the cause of Afghanistan. So we are trying to converge, you see. the idea of the whole world to push Soviet Union --

LEHRER: But, thus far. that approach hasn`t worked has it. sir?

PAKTIAWAL: No, it hasn`t. But still, the world should try it. Try it. and try it again, you see. The Soviet Union should leave. This our own right to determine on which kind of social and political and economical system we want. This is not Soviet`s right. It pulls a kind of government, or puppet government, or a social system, and the people doesn`t like it.

LEHRER: I see. Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Another view now from an Afghani who lives here, but had traveled back and forth to Afghanistan until the 1978 Soviet intervention. He is Zalmay Khalilzad, professor of political science at Columbia University. Professor Khalilzad has been a consultant for the U.S. Defense Department and has done research on options for American policy. Mr. Khalilzad. how do you view the situation now -- from your information? Is the Soviet position improving?

ZALMAY KHALILZAD: Well, I think that based on the indications that I have seen, it is very difficult to make the case that the Soviet position has in fact improved. All indications are to the contrary. that while initially the Soviets controlled not only the Afghan cities and highways but some of the countryside, recently there have been challenges to Soviet control of some of the Afghan cities. In September, for example, for several days it was unclear as to who controlled the city of Herat in western Afghanistan - - whether it was the Soviets or the Afghan partisans.

MacNEIL: Well, would you say that the position of the Afghan resistance fighters has improved?

KHALILZAD: I would argue that the position of the resistance has improved. That is based on several reasons. One, I think they have access to better weapons now than they did initially, that they have access to better officers and command and control problems. At the same time I think that the morale of the resistance is higher today than it was at the beginning of the conflict.

MacNEIL: Well, how do you explain the reports that we`ve been reading recently in our newspapers that the resistance may be fading, and that they arc very short of arms and supplies, and that their morale is lower?

KHALILZAD: Well, obviously, when you compare the forces that the resistance move-ment is faced with, with the Soviet army, and when you compare that with the capability of the resistance, in terms of equipment -- at this lime -- then the resistance is not as well-equipped as especially the partisan would like to. But, when you compare the resistance movement to the period right after the invasion, their situation has improved. But the resistance has problems of its own. Its problems have to do with lack of unity among the various groups fighting the Soviet Union. It has to do also with enormous economic and food-related problem that the areas that are the scene of greatest resistance is faced with -- in fact, the Afghan problem or the resistance problem may be. not only in arms, but in organization as well as in food and supplies.

MacNEIL: How divided are the Afghan people themselves about continuing to fight, and continuing to offer armed resistance to the Soviets?

KHALILZAD: My sense. Robin, is that the Afghan people arc generally united in their opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. They arc divided in organizations, or in means and ways of challenging the Soviet control.

MacNEIL: Do some want to stop fighting because it`s too costly`.`

KHALILZAD: It appears that some argue, as Mr. Paktiawal has just argued, that armed resistance is not the way to defeat the Soviets. But I think that still is a minority opinion. It seems that most Afghans believe that armed resistance is an essential component of a strategy to force the Soviet Union to withdraw. While continuing fighting, ways and means have to be found for political settlement.

MacNEIL: As Dr. Shpoon suggested.

KHALILZAD: As Dr. Shpoon has suggested.

MacNEIL: We`re now going to have a new administration in the United States. What realistic policy options remain open for the U.S.?

KHALILZAD: I think for the United States the Soviet invasion has posed several chal-lenges. The U.S. faces a challenge of what policy they can follow to make it unlikely for the Soviet Union to pursue a similar policy elsewhere in that very important region. Two. that the U.S. has to find ways and means of redressing the military imbalance in the region, to that it can contain Soviet expansion if it does occur. And it also needs to develop a relationship with sympathetic groups and powers in the region that can help the United States follow an effective policy in that part of the world. And. in this strategy of contain-ing the Soviet Union, an important element of that is that Afghanistan does not become pacified under Soviet domination. And the options to -- in that regard, are complicated, and it has to do not only with the U.S. desire, but also with the policies and preferences of some of the countries in the region, in particular Pakistan. I think that the Afghan resis-tance, level of effectiveness does not depend on the Afghans alone, it also depends on what the outside powers, including the United States, and the regional powers do. And. there-fore, the incoming administration faces a challenge in Afghanistan, and in the area beyond Afghanistan.

MacNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Dr. Shpoon and another Afghan university professor involved in the armed resistance to the Soviets met this afternoon with a group of United States Senators. One of those senators at the meeting was Senator Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, a mem-ber of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator, did Dr. Shpoon and his colleague convince you that the United Slates should do more to help their country, or to help the resistance movement?

Sen. RICHARD LUGAR: Yes. and I think it`s fair to say that the senators who attended the meeting all wanted to do more. They signified that by their interest that this issue continues on. It`s not a dead issue by any means. And, there is a new administration coming on. and some opportunity for rethinking.

LEHRER: Well, you must have done some rethinking yourself on this. Where do you come down in terms of what kind of help you can give to these folks -- that the United States can. realistically?

LUGAR: Well. Jim. on this show, almost a year ago. I suggested both overt and covert aid. including arms to Afghanistan, as a responsible move at that time. Now. it seems to me that that would still be good advice, but I would temper it with these thoughts subsequently -- that we have another opportunity, with Governor Reagan coming to power, to have a multi-national look at this. In other words. I think we bungled it before -- with our NATO allies, and with others, who might have helped us -- and we have another opportunity to explore with Pakistan ways in which we might be helpful without jeopardiz-ing Pakistan`s relationship with the Soviet Union, in particular. Now, Governor Reagan has talked about linkage. He has talked about the various costs that must be assumed by the Soviets. And we have the further thought, that if we are not effective with regard to Afghanistan, the Soviets might be adventurous in Poland, for example, or in some other places. There are a number of areas that are related in a way, and the Reagan administra-tion offers some new opportunities to explore what linkage means, and how we are more credible with the Soviets than our allies.

LEHRER: But Senator, it still goes back to the question, does it not, that we even discussed a year ago on this program, how does the United States provide arms to Dr. Shpoon and his people without becoming an involved party, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, and all that means?

LUGAR: I suspect that we delimit our involvement. I would not be opposed to saying up front that the United Nations has condemned this aggression. We have condemned it. The president of the United States, President Carter, said it`s the most important thing, the most tragic thing since World War II. Now, having said all of that, it persists, and after a year up front, we`re prepared to send arms to Afghanistan if the Soviets are not prepared to come to the table, and to begin to talk about a political solution. Which does not mean pacification -- as my friends have said tonight -- but a very definite change in the aggressive policies.

LEHRER: Do you think that the armed resistance route is the route to a solution?

LUGAR: Well, I think it is an essential part. I would agree with our guests today, who would say that of course a political solution must occur. The Afghan freedom fighters will not be able to defeat the Soviet Union in great numbers, if the Soviets devote themselves. But, our guests also said that it`s costing the Soviets $15 million a day to continue this on. It might cost the Soviets even more. And as we change the calculus of this, I think we`ll make progress.

LEHRER: You have great communications within President-elect Reagan`s camp. If he, or someone representing him were to come to you and say, `Okay, brother Lugar, tell us what you think we ought to do as far as Afghan is concerned,` what would be at the top of your list right now, specifically?

LUGAR: Well, to consult with our NATO allies, to consult with Pakistan quietly, and not to make comments on this program or elsewhere. But to try to think through now, where do we go? And to make certain we have a multi- national solution that sticks.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Dr. Shpoon, what quantity of arms would make a significant difference in the ability of the resistance movement to make it more costly for the Soviet Union?

SHPOON: Well, the war is already costly to the Soviet Union. I cannot really give you the number of SAMs we need. I`m no military expert. And, I have -- I do not have detailed information on this. But, when and if this materializes, there will be a feasibility study to speak of, before it happens.

MacNEIL: Well, I`ve read conflicting reports that you are both asking for more arms and not asking for more arms. Are you, in fact, asking American authorities -- the Defense Department, whoever -- in one way or another, to help get some more arms to the rebel hands?

SHPOON: Well, we`re explaining the situation and the inevitable result is that -- well, after we explain the situation, that we need arms to light against the Soviets. And that should be obvious, shouldn`t it?

MacNEIL: Yes. Is that obvious to you, Mr. Lugar, Senator Lugar?

LUGAR: Yes, I think it`s obvious. But I suspect also that simply having some arms in that area might change the price of weapons and bullets and my understanding is that right now even these supplies bought in the free market are very, very expensive. And it`s obvious the logistic flow has been stopped by all sorts of reasons.

MacNEIL: What is your opinion, as a diplomat, Mr. Paktiawal, of the sense of the United States -- more or less openly -- getting some more arms to that area, and letting the Soviets know that they`re there, and can reach the resistance forces?

PAKTIAWAL: Well, I`m in the belief is. and the education is. that our confrontation will not solve the problem. It will make it more difficult for the people of the world. But the best way is to find some political solution. This is my wish -- that the United States should put some more efforts to find some political solutions for that.

MacNEIL: What could the United States do. Mr. Khalilzad, to work for a political solution more aggressively?

KHALILZAD: Well, I think that it is very unlikely, so far, there is in fact, no signal from the Soviet Union that anyone knows of, that the Soviets are interested in a political solution of the Afghan crisis. If there was any signal, I think the United States could do a lot. Do you know that some have thought that the Soviets came into Afghanistan because they feared that Afghanistan will turn into a hostile state to the Soviet Union, and in fact --

MacNEIL: Particularly to their Muslim population --

KHALILZAD: -- population. Well, if that was the purpose -- and that may be one of the many purposes for which they came in -- but if that was the exclusive purpose, they would have accepted the British plan for neutralization of Afghanistan, an international guarantee for a neutralized Afghanistan. They called that proposal `ridiculous`. So, it seems to me, that as long as we don`t have any signal at all that the Soviets are interested in a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and a political settlement which would involve the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, it is very unlikely that such a settlement, or such a compromise could be found.

MacNEIL: So, you think that there`s nothing that the United States could do now. really effectively, to push for a political solution -- the only thing is to step up the fighting a little bit more?

KHALILZAD: Well, I think that the United States has to follow toward that region as a whole a multi-pronged policy. It has to involve supporting sympathetic groups within the resistance, to increase the cost of occupation of Afghanistan. The United States has to strengthen its own presence in the region, to support the sympathetic countries -- and particularly Turkey and Pakistan -- and to keep up the channels of communication open with the Soviet Union, when and if they become interested in a political compromise that the U.S. should be there and accept to such a compromise.

MacNEIL: Are we settling in. Senator Lugar, for a fairly long term thing with the Soviets in Afghanistan?

LUGAR: It`s not really clear. I think as the Doctor just pointed out, there are no particular signals that we`re headed toward a political solution for the moment, but then the Soviets are looking for signals from Governor Reagan, from the new administration. They`re looking for a number of things, and this may be an opportune time to try to test the waters.

MacNEIL: Well, we`ll see whether that happens. Thank you all for joining us in Washing-ton tonight. Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night. Robin.

MacNEIL: Dr. Khalilzad. thank you. That`s all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.