The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; 7203; No-Nuke Pledge

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Four men who held senior national security jobs in previous U.S. governments called today for a drastic change in Western nuclear strategy. The four men are George Kennan, former ambassador to Moscow; Robert McNamara, former secretary of defense and recently head of the World Bank; McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; and Gerald Smith, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In an article prepared for Foreign Affairs magazine they proposed that the Western alliance declare it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a war. The four argued that long-established American willingness to use nuclear weapons first is losing credibility, is damaging the coherence of the alliance, and threatening the safety of the world. The proposal was rejected in advance in a speech yesterday by Secretary of State Alexander Haig. He said existing policy is the only effective intellectual, political and moral response to nuclear weapons. Tonight, the new nuclear debate: the "first-use" issue. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, Secretary Haig yesterday put the no-first-use idea in the same rejected pot with the nuclear-freeze movement, but the two are not directly related. The freeze proposal has to do with the numbers of nuclear weapons; the other with when they're used. For years NATO military strategy has been based on a possible first-use nuclear response in the event of a war, and if the Soviets, say, were overrunning Western Europe with its conventional forces, NATO could counter with nuclear firepower. This possibility thus deters the Soviets and its Warsaw Pact allies from considering a massive conventional thrust. It's this idea the four former officials now reject and in their article urge the Reagan administration to do the same. One of the four, McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, is with us now. Mr. Bundy, in the simplest of terms, what would we gain by renouncing first-use?

McGEORGE BUNDY: We think that the most dangerous thing that the world and humanity faces is the prospect of a general nuclear war, and we think that where we now are with this proliferation of enormously complex and excessive nuclear forces in our country and in the Soviet Union -- in the West and in the East, if you will -- it's really almost impossible to see how any first use of nuclear weapons could result in anything but a general nuclear catastrophe. And thus we believe that the credibility in the threat of first-use is going down and that the danger of any first use is going up in a way which makes it the course of wisdom and prudence for the long run to find a way out of this posture.

LEHRER: In what way is the credibility down? Because the idea of a limited nuclear response? You think that's where the credibility has gone?

Mr. BUNDY: Yes, the point I think is that the danger for either side of making the war nuclear is so great that the resistance of senior political authorities to any military recommendation for an early use of nuclear weapons would be very strong. And many military commanders have made that point. And as time goes on the believability of doing it, and the wisdom of doing it, become increasingly questionable, and the danger of relying on it increasingly great. And more than that, reliance on nuclear weapons distracts us from the need for the real and usable kind of deterrent -- the conventional deterrent.

LEHRER: You and your three colleagues -- your three co-authors -- supported the policy of first-use when you were in your respective positions in government in the past. What has changed?

Mr. BUNDY: Well, several things have changed. First, let me say that I think we have different histories on this point. George Kennan, for example, was arguing against any first use of nuclear weapons more than 30 years ago. And Jerry Smith was arguing against it more than 20 years ago.

LEHRER: But they were in administrations where a first use was in fact administration policy.

Mr. BUNDY: That's true. At least the possibility of first use. American superiority was very different. The number of nuclear weapons on both sides was very different. It's gone up about 10 times in the 20 years since Bob McNamara became secretary of defense. But let me add that McNamara was the leader in an effort to lift the threshold at which any nuclear use would occur by strengthening the conventional forces of the alliance. And he was moving, as far as he could take his colleagues with him, toward a much-reduced reliance on nuclear weapons as the basic deterrent of the Atlantic alliance.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Mr. Bundy, let's look over some of the points that Secretary Haig made yesterday with reference to his speech. One objection raised by the Secretary to the proposal put forward by you and your colleagues is that it would suit Moscow's purpose. Here is an excerpt from Secretary Haig's speech at the International Club in Washington.

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, Secretary of State [April 6, 1982]: The improvements we are making in conventional forces -- in their readiness, mobility, training and equipment -- are designed to ensure the kind of tough and resilient conventional capability required by the strategy of flexible response. It is important to recognize the interrelationship of these three types of forces. The requirements in each category are dependent upon the scale of the others. Their functions are similarly linked. The Soviet Union understands this. That is why they have consistently proposed a pledge against first use of nuclear weapons -- an idea which has achieved some resonance here in the West. NATO has consistently rejected such Soviet proposals, which are tantamount to making Europe safe for conventional aggression. If the West were to allow Moscow the freedom to choose the level of conflict which most suited it, and to leave entirely to the Soviet discretion the nature and timing of any escalation, we would be forced to maintain conventional forces at least at the level of those of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.

MacNEIL: Mr. Bundy, how do you answer that -- that NATO has consistently rejected such proposals when they come from Moscow because, in his words, it was "tantamount to making Europe safe for conventional aggression"?

Mr. BUNDY: Well, of course we don't think Europe should be made safe for conventional aggression, and we argue at some length in our article that there has to be adequate assurance of the quality and effectiveness of the conventional deterrent of the alliance before any first-use policy could be definitely rejected. So we share the view that conventional aggression needs to be guarded against. And elsewhere in his speech Secretary Haig says that even under his view the conventional forces of the alliance must be strong enough -- I am quoting -- "to defeat all but the most massive and persistent conventional aggression." So that he is a partisan of stronger conventional forces. We take it one step further because we don't think it's just a Soviet interest; we think it is our deepest interest not to be the agents of a general nuclear war.

MacNEIL: What about the fact that Moscow has a number of times proposed a no-first-use pledge? What do you make of those suggestions by Moscow? Most such suggestions by Moscow have been treated in the West as opportunistic and therefore not to be embraced by us.

Mr. BUNDY: Well, I think the four of us in this argument are moving from a conviction of what is in the interest of the United States, and of the allies of the United States. The fact that the Soviet Union is also interested in the policy of no first use is not a reason for neglecting our own interest. Indeed, it is a reason for some encouragement that if we can move in that direction, then there may be the beginnings of a certain underpinning of understanding that would allow eventual progress, faster than we have made, on both the limitation of nuclear weapons and perhaps even the modification of the size of the conventional balance.

MacNEIL: How about the Secretary's point that the no-first-use pledge, removing that threat of the first use of nuclear weapons, would let the Soviets, if they wanted to be aggressive, pick the nature and timing of any escalation -- would leave the running of the war in their hands?

Mr. BUNDY: Well, I think that we do -- I should make if very clear, and perhaps have not done so so far, that we believe in the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent fully adequate to prevent the Soviet Union from supposing that it would ever be to its interest to, itself, initiate the use of nuclear weapons. We're not talking about the abandonment of deterrence, but about the reinforcement of deterrence in conditions which have profoundly changed. And we believe that it is in the interest of all that there should be mutual nuclear deterrents, and in the interest of the alliance that it should deter conventional aggression by adequate conventional strength.

LEHRER: Mr. Bundy, Secretary Haig in his speech yesterday also spoke directly to you and your fellow no-first-users on the question of our conventional forces.

Sec. HAIG: Those in the West who advocate the adoption of no-first-use policy seldom go on to propose that the United States reintroduce the draft, triple the size of its armed forces, and put its economy on a wartime footing. Yet, in the absence of such steps, a pledge of no first use effectively leaves the West nothing with which to counterbalance the Soviet conventional advantages and geopolitical position in Europe.

LEHRER: Are you prepared to advocate the draft, triple the size of our armed forces, and put the economy of this country on a war footing?

Mr. BUNDY: Well, you know, that rather sweeping prescription suggests to me that Secretary Haig had not had a chance to read our article before he made his comments. And I regret that, but the truth of the matter is, I believe, that there isn't that much difference between the kind of force he is recommending -- forces strong enough to defeat all but the most massive and persistent conventional aggression -- and the kind we are recommending -- forces sufficient to deter. Now, we don't know, and we say that we don't know, and we think really nobody knows exactly what kind of change and improvement the conventional forces of the alliance would need. Certainly the question of manpower in the United States is such a question, and we say so. We do not reach a conclusion on it because we don't know the answer. We think nobody does.

LEHRER: Including Secretary Haig? In other words, when he says that it may take a draft and tripling the size of the armed forces, for instance, you just think he's wrong?

Mr. BUNDY: I simply don't understand the basis of the argument. Very sober arguments have been made by respected analysts, in and out of government, suggesting that much more moderate changes in the overall conventional effort would produce forces which would give convincing conventional deterrence.

LEHRER: Let's assume for discussion purposes that Secretary Haig, however, is right. In other words, it would take that kind of effort to put our conventional forces at a par with the Soviet Union. Do you think the American people would buy that tradeoff -- no-first-use policy in exchange for that kind of conventional effort?

Mr. BUNDY: I really can't assume that he's right because that seems to me a very sweeping set of statements based on very little visible analysis, and what we called for is a study of the requirements, and a study also --

LEHRER: I'm getting at --

Mr. BUNDY: Go ahead.

LEHRER: Well, what I'm getting at here is the priority. How do you weigh the priority of getting rid of first use versus a massive conventional buildup? That's what I'm trying to get at.

Mr. BUNDY: We believe that getting rid of first use is right, but we further believe that a careful study of what is needed will show that the costs are acceptable and indeed that it's the best bargain ever offered for the people of the alliance.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Mr. Bundy, a further objection by Secretary Haig is that a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first would undermine the credibility of the alliance and limit the United States' commitment to Europe. Here are the Secretary's words.

Sec. HAIG: Neither do Western proponents of a no-first-use policy acknowledge the consequences for the alliance of an American decision not to pose and accept the risk of nuclear war in the defense of Europe. A no-first-use policy would be the end of flexible response, and thus of the very credibility of the Western strategic deterrence. In adopting such a stance, the United States would be limiting its commitment to Europe. But the alliance cannot function as a limited-liability corporation. It can only survive as a partnership to which all are fully committed: shared benefits, shared burdens and shared risks.

MacNEIL: We take these one at a time for clarity, Mr. Bundy. First of all, the last point: the United States would be limiting its commitment to Europe. How do you answer that?

Mr. BUNDY: Oh, well, I don't think that's an accurate description of our proposal at all. Let me repeat that we believe in the maintenance of nuclear forces for nuclear deterrence. This is particularly important in our relationship with the Federal Republic, which is the most exposed of the major NATO allies, and which has no nuclear weapons. It's very rare in history that a nation undertakes to use weapons as dangerous as nuclear weapons in defense of another country. We have made that undertaking with the Federal Republic; we all believe in it; we believe it should be maintained. But only to prevent nuclear attack.

MacNEIL: But wouldn't pledging not to use nuclear weapons first limit that pledge to Germany? Instead of saying, in effect, "If the Soviet Union attacks you, Germany, we're going to risk the United States going to nuclear war to defend you," by saying no first use, would you not be diluting that commitment?

Mr. BUNDY: Changing it, certainly. Changing the terms, because we would be saying that we believe the way to meet conventional aggression is by adequate conventional defense.

MacNEIL: What about the Secretary's point that this would be the end of flexible response?

Mr. BUNDY: Well, I think flexible response is not the great god Jehovah in this matter. The safety of the alliance is the important concern, and effective deterrence -- believable deterrence -- is the requirement. Flexible response is, I think, becoming less persuasive, a little bit more a matter of repeated Brussels Doctrine than of reality.

MacNEIL: Of course, this goes to the nub -- part of the nub of the difference between you. He says that would undermine or end the very credibility of the Western strategic deterrence in the alliance, and you say that it would strengthen the coherence of the alliance. How do you explain that difference between you?

Mr. BUNDY: Well, I believe that the Secretary's position simply does not take account of the fact that it is becoming increasingly clearly understood that no one has been able to produce a believable way of having a limited use of nuclear weapons that gives any confidence at all that it would not escalate to a common international catastrophe of a totally unprecedented scale. And as that becomes recognized, the believability of a first use will go down, and not just in the United States. In Europe.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Our final excerpt, now, from the Haig speech. It deals with both the military and political factors involved in a policy of deterrence -- a policy he does not want changed.

Sec. HAIG: Deterrence has been supported because deterrence works. Nuclear deterrents in collective defense have preserved peace in Europe, the crucible of two global wars in this century.Clearly, neither improvement in the nature of man nor strengthening of the international order have made war less frequent or less brutal. Millions have died since 1945 in over 130 international and civil wars. Yet nuclear deterrence has prevented a conflict between the two superpowers -- a conflict which, even without nuclear weapons, would be the most destructive in mankind's history. The simple possession of nuclear weapons does not guarantee deterrence. Throughout history societies have risked their total destruction if the prize of victory was sufficiently great, or the consequences of submission sufficiently grave. War and, in particular, nuclear war can be deterred but only if we are able to deny an aggressor military advantage from his action and thus ensure his awareness that he cannot prevail in any conflict with us. Deterrence, in short, requires the maintenance of a secure military balance, one which cannot be overturned through surprise attack or sudden technological breakthrough. The quality and credibility of deterrence must be measured against these criteria. Successive administrations have understood this fact, and stressed the importance of the overall balance. This administration can do no less.

The strategy of flexible response and the forces that sustain its credibility reflect more than simply the prevailing military balance.Western strategy also reflects the political and geographical reality of an alliance of 15 independent nations -- the most powerful of which is separated from all but one by 4,000 miles of ocean. Deterrence is consequently more than a military strategy. It is the essential political bargain which binds together the Western coalition. Twice in this century America has been unable to remain aloof from European conflict, but unable to intervene in time to prevent the devastation of Western Europe. In the nuclear age neither we nor our allies can afford to see this pattern repeated a third time. We have therefore chosen a strategy which engages American power in the defense of Europe at the outset, and gives substance to the principle that the security of the alliance is indivisible.

The control and reduction of nuclear weapons based on deterrence is the only effective intellectual, political and moral response to nuclear weapons. The stakes are too great and the consequences of error too catastrophic to exchange deterrence for a leap into the unknown. The incentives for real arms control exist, and we have both the means and the duty to apply them.

LEHRER: Mr. Bundy, do you see what you and your colleagues are suggesting as "a leap into the unknown"?

Mr. BUNDY: It's a change, but it's not a change in dedication to and belief in deterrence. Quite the contrary. We believe that a deterrent posture in which there is an effective conventional balance, in which nuclear weapons are reserved for nuclear deterrence, is a better overall deterrent posture, and that it is affordable, that these rich and populous nations can do it without a permanent war economy or anything of the sort. And we also believe that the prospect of nuclear arms control goes up if we reduce the role of nuclear weapons to nuclear deterrence.

LEHRER: And why would that be?

Mr. BUNDY: Because the requirements for the kind of force that would give survivable second-strike credibility are very different from those of a force that might have to engage in starting a nuclear war-fighting campaign. Let's take the simple example -- it's very doubtful to us that the neutron bomb would be a desirable item in the policy that we recommend.

LEHRER: There is some element of risk, though, in what you're recommending, is there not? I mean, you --

Mr. BUNDY: The risk in what we're recommending is as nothing compared to the risk that the world would face if anyone ever makes a first use of nuclear weapons in the Atlantic alliance.

LEHRER: And that is a certainty in the minds of the four of you?

Mr. BUNDY: It's not a certainty, but it is so great a risk that the fact that it is not a certainty that it would not happen is in itself almost enough.

LEHRER: Mr. Bundy, what happens now? The four of you have written your article; your article is now published; it is now in the public domain. The Secretary of State, speaking for the Reagan administration, says, "Buzz off, fellows." What happens now? You go back to your four respective places, or are you going to push for this?

Mr. BUNDY: Well, we're not under the illusion that four people who are long-since out of government are empowered to make decisions, but we're certainly empowered as citizens to urge our convictions, and I suspect we will continue to do so. We've also, as you know, in this article, and I think I've said this before, but let me repeat it. We're not talking about an instant decision. The Secretary's instant rejection relates, we think, more to the immediate politics of the alliance than to the long-run interest of all the countries concerned. What we are urging is that this matter be studied. We hope governments will study it. And if executive branches don't, then legislators can. We also hope and believe that private groups will study it, and not just in this country, because the day is long past when these matters can be decided in the kind of terrible secrecy that surrounded them in the first years of the nuclear age. These problems can be studied by all of us, and I strongly agree with Senator Jackson when he said, as he did last week, that the people can understand the nuclear issues.

LEHRER: All four of you, I am sure, have very good contacts based on your experience in government and in other responsibilities with leaders around the world, particularly in Western Europe. Was this idea floated in advance in, say, Germany and France and Great Britain, and some of the other Western European nations?

Mr. BUNDY: What we have done, both with our own government and with officials in this country and elected representatives here, we have also done in Western Europe, and that is to ask people to read the article and see how they feel about it, to emphasize to them our view that our conviction is something which should be tested against studies and examination of what's needed.We have not yet heard enough to be in a position to give you an account of the judgments because copies were only circulated within the last few days.

LEHRER: Mr. Bundy, I think what I'm essentially asking you is this. Are the four of you going to lobby for this? Is this an intellectual exercise on your four gentlemen's part, or is this something you really believe and you're going to lead a crusade?

Mr. BUNDY: Well, I wouldn't want to be so pretentious as to claim to be leading a crusade, but I think that in a senseI can assure you that we did not write this article merely for intellectual entertainment. The subject is much too serious for that. The danger is much too great, and I would expect that the four of us would continue to be active in whatever ways we find, and we're grateful to you for your willingness to hear me this evening.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Mr. Bundy, thank you very much. That's our time tonight.Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night. Robin.

MacNEIL: That's all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.