The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Genetic Engineering

ROBERT MacNEIL: This is deoxyribonucleic acid -- DNA, the stuff of which all life is made. It exists in virtually every cell of every living thing. Now scientists have learned how to rearrange it; in short, to create new forms of life.

Good evening. The hottest scientific controversy since man learned to split the atom is now raging over a new branch of biology called genetic engineering. This tampering with the most basic ingredients of life raises moral and ethical problems as grave as nuclear fission did. The National Academy of Sciences today ended an emotional three day forum on what to do about it.

Genes are the biological codes which tell each cell in each living thing its particular function and form. When the cell reproduces the genetic code goes with its ensuring that for the life of that organism the formula remains the same. Fingernail cells go on producing fingernail cells and not earlobe cells, for ex-, ample. The substance forming the genes is DNA -- deoxyribonucleic acid, a complex stew of many proteins. Scientists can now take a piece of DNA from one species and splice it into the DNA of another. These two rings represent DNA from two different species, say a virus and a bacterium. By taking a piece of the bacterium DNA and inserting it in the ring of the virus a-new substance is created, a new form of life. It might be a new drug of tremendous value infighting disease, or it might be a new virus terribly dangerous to man.

Some scientists want the research banned, and a large number want it controlled. Tonight we explore the benefits and dangers;. inherent-in this research. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, the basic scientific theory behind this, particular kind of DNA research has been around for a while, but it wasn`t until the early 1970`s that the technology was developed to make it work. That development was done in the San Francisco laboratories of Stanford University and the University of California. Scientists there discovered that you could cut a piece of DNA from a living species; and let`s say that these two wires represent two pieces of DNA from two different living species. Simply, what they do is cut a piece from this one -- if my wire cutters work -- and you have a strand of DNA; and then you splice it and insert it like this. That final creation is known as recombinant, or recombined, DNA and that in fact could then take on a new life of its own. In those early experiments in California they fed that new creation into a simple bacterium known as E. coli. Here`s how it looks in a highly magnified photograph and in animation:

NARRATOR: An E. coli bacterium ruptured with detergent lies with its DNA strewn around it. But also in the photograph, magnified 100,000 times, is a tiny loop of extra DNA, called a plasmid. This plasmid is the key to the new technology of gene transplantation. To the E. coli plasmids are added plasmids from a different species of bacterium. Both plasmids are snipped open with a special enzyme. The E. coli plasmid is cut only once; the other plasmids are chopped into pieces. E. coli plasmids reform with fragments from the second plasmid tucked within them.

The result is a few hybrid plasmids made of the recombined DNA of two different species of bacteria.

LEHRER: One of the pioneers in the development of this technique is Dr. Paul Berg of Stanford University Medical Center. Later Dr. Berg was involved in organizing the first scientific conference on the possible hazards of this kind of research; that was in 1973. Doctor, you were the one who got this particular kind of research started, and then you spoke out about the possible dangers of it. What happened to cause you to do that?

Dr. PAUL BERG: Well, we could foresee that there was going to be great interest in this technique and that many people were excited about the opportunity that ,was created by it. We could also see that some of the experiments that might be done might perhaps create some dangerous situation. We were not sure that we could answer all the possibilities, and so we called for scientists throughout the world to pause, to temporarily defer certain experiments until we could meet to discuss the nature of the possible hazards and the kinds of experiments that could or should not be done.

LEHRER: What was the nature of your concerns? Can you give me an example that we could understand of the kinds of things that concerned you at that time?

BERG: Yes. We called attention to two specific kinds of experiments. We cautioned individuals about inserting genes which would code for antibiotic resistance; this would create` an organism which would now be capable of growing in the presence of normally usable antibiotics. We thought that might create a dangerous situation.

LEHRER: In other words, create a virus for which there, was no treatment.

BERG: Not a virus, a bacterium.

LEHRER: All right.

BERG: We also cautioned against the possible introduction of genes which code for dangerous toxins into bacteria which are normally harmless; this might create an organism which would become hazardous because of this capability to produce a hew form of toxin. We also called attention to the possibility of introducing genes from viruses that are known to produce tumors in animals. We were concerned about the nature of such experiments and we suggested that such experiments should not proceed until they could be analyzed in great detail.

LEHRER: What kind of safeguards do you think there should be for this kind of research?

BERG: I think one has to distinguish between various forms of this research. Recombinant DNA research is a name that`s applied to a large range of experiments. You described the basic technique, but many kinds of combinations can be made which mimic those that occur in nature; those are not assumed to be potentially hazardous and not to create anything different than what occurs normally in natural life. There are, however, combinations which do not, we believe, occur naturally, or are thought not to occur normally to any appreciable extent; and it`s this type of combination that one can. raise certain conjectural concerns about. And `the guidelines which were issued by the National Institute of Health were particularly oriented towards requiring certain types of containment procedures in order to deal with these so-called "novel" forms.

LEHRER: Are you satisfied with the NIH guidelines? they take care of your concerns?

BERG: They do. I believe that the guidelines are sufficient to meet all of the perceived risks, and moreover I believe they`re even excessive on the basis of any experimental evidence we now have.

LEHRER: In short, then, you think the time has come to move on with this kind of DNA research and don`t worry about it, right as along as these kinds of guidelines are followed? ..

BERG: I think that the guidelines must be followed; I think the work can go ahead if those guidelines are followed. I should point out that one should not assume that this work is going ahead, pell-mell. The pace at which the work can proceed under these guidelines is a crawling pace; it`s only a fraction of the rate at which this research could proceed if there were no such guidelines.

LEHRER: Do you regret now that you raised the question in 1973?

BERG: I`ve tried to beg off answering such hypothetical questions. I think in that time and place it was the right thing to do. I don`t know what I would answer if I had to do it over again, at least on the basis of our present experience. At that time it was the right thing to do, it was an important thing to do, and I`m glad we did it.

LEHRER: I think you`ve answered my question. You`ve had some second thoughts, right, Sir?

BERG: Yes.

LEHRER: All right, thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: The other side of the gene controversy is Dr. Ethan Signer of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he`s a Professor of Biology. Dr. Signer wants all such research banned. Dr. Signer, why ban it?

MacNEIL: We`ll come back in a moment to the possible benefits of this. Are you going so far as to say the things that might happen that we can`t visualize yet could lead us into a Huxley`s brave new world situation where we were tampering with human genetics to produce characteristics we wanted if somebody could control them, things like that?

Dr. ETHAN SIGNER: Because we don`t need it, and also because it`s dangerous.

MacNEIL: Please, would you outline your idea of the dangers?

SIGNER: Yes. There are three kinds of dangers. First of all there`s the danger of certain kinds of laboratory accidents of exactly the kind that Paul outlined earlier. These are potentially dangerous things, potentially dangerous organisms that might be let loose in the environment, that might escape accidentally and cause an epidemic that can`t be controlled -- something like that. That`s fairly bad if it happens, but precautions can be taken against it, it`s true. What`s much worse are the dangers that we can`t envision yet, the dangers we haven`t thought of yet; because as everybody has pointed out, this is scientific research, we don`t quite know what it`s going to come up with. So I`d like to point out that six or seven years ago we hadn`t even thought of this particular technique. So obviously there are things we can`t think of; and there are things we haven`t thought of yet in terms of hazards. But the worst -- by far the worst -is the potential that this technique introduces for genetic engineering of people, for human genetic engineering for changing the character of people`s genes. That`s practically an invitation for abuse, the use of this technique. And finally, let me make one thing very obvious: this is not a search for truth that we`re talking about -- recombinant DNA; this is not a search for basic scientific knowledge. This is a technique. It`s like a big screwdriver. Nobody`s saying we shouldn`t search for knowledge, nobody`s saying we shouldn`t search for truth; we just shouldn`t use this technique.

SIGNER: Yes, absolutely.

MacNEIL: Let`s come to the possible benefits. It`s said that this sort of experimentation could produce results that might balance, at least, or possibly outweigh the risks. For instance, a cure for cancer, the elimination of genetic diseases like diabetes if you could put something into a person`s system that would eliminate the deficiency that produces diabetes.

SIGNER: Well, look, really. How seriously can we take these proposed benefits?

MacNEIL: You tell me.

SIGNER: It`s really pie-in-the-sky. I think we can`t take them seriously at all. The reason is we already have very good potential medical care that`s not getting to people. In this country, the wealthiest country in the world -- in history -- we have very poor medical care compared to what we can deliver. So as far as potential benefits of this kind of technology, first of all, the benefits are only potential; they`re not certain. Second of all, we already know that what we can deliver to people we`re not -- we haven`t got enough doctors, we haven`t got enough hospitals, the drug companies rip us off continually, the quality of medical care is very poor. So I don`t expect this technique to give us anything that will be given to people any better.

MacNEIL: But if the benefits are only potential, surely the. risks are only potential, too; are they not?

SIGNER: Yes, certainly; but it`s the potential risk that can do us in, whereas the potential benefits aren`t what we need right now. Take cancer; you brought up cancer. Now, many people have said that most if not all cancers have environmental causes and can in principle be prevented. We`re not doing anything about that. If we`re serious about cancer, then we should wipe out cancer in the way that`s open to us; that is, by preventing it on an environmental basis. If we want to do this research then we should discuss whether or why we should do this research and not try and justify it with cancer, for which a cure, namely prevention, is available already.

MacNEIL: Let`s ask Dr. Berg, what would we lose if we followed Dr. Signer`s prescription and banned all this research?

BERG: I think it would be disastrous. I think we would lose the opportunity to probe into the very nature of the genetic chemistry of mammals and humans. I think that would be a disastrous loss to mankind to lose this opportunity. In my view, the most. practical benefit that will come from this type of research is the knowledge that we`ll gain about the structure and workings of human chromosomes and the genetic apparatus. I think that`s an important benefit; it has nothing to do with promising pie in the sky. I think it`s a certainty. We already have achieved a great deal in the two years since the method has become available. From past experience I think it will follow logically that many benefits which we don`t even foresee now will follow from the knowledge which is gained of the basic structure and workings of the human chromosomes and genes.

MacNEIL: Dr. Signer, don`t you, as a biologist, thirst for that same knowledge?

SIGNER: Oh, absolutely, but we can get it just some other way; after all, we`re very smart and we can figure out some other way to do that. We don`t have to use this technique. It`s a technique, it`s not the knowledge that I`m talking about; it`s not the knowledge that those of us who ire opposed to it are talking about, it`s only the technique.

MacNEIL: Can I ask you both this question: is this a moral, principally, or a practical question? Is it that we cannot control the risks or that we ought not morally to be undertaking the exercise at all, Dr. Signer?

SIGNER: Well as with all important questions, the morality and the practicality are really the same thing. We shouldn`t do it.

MacNEIL: Expand that a little bit. Why should, we not do it, morally?

SIGNER: Why should we not? For the same reason we shouldn`t do it practically.-- because it`s risky and we don`t need it, and it`s asking to be abused.

MacNEIL: Berg.

BERG: I disagree totally and completely. First of all, I think it`s facetious to use the argument that this is just a technique, that Ethan Signer is not against the search for knowledge, he`s just against this as a technique. But the search for knowledge requires many techniques. We use many different techniques in the laboratory; this is one of "the most powerful- new methods" that has come along to help biologists of our generation, and it may have the most profound implications for our search for such knowledge. Without it I don`t think that we can approach the problem of understanding the structure and function of human chromosomes at all. If we didn`t need this technique we`d all be turning out the data without it. The fact that it`s been developed is what has made it so exciting and what has aroused such great interest in the use of the technique. If we had alternative ways, people would not be worried about whether it could be used or it could not be used.

MacNEIL: The fact that you raised the concern several years ago personally suggests that you feel some moral queasiness over this area, does it not?

BERG: Mr. MacNeil, this issue was raised at a time when practically no discussion or even knowledge of the technique was implanted in the scientific community. There were a few of us who were involved in this research; we began to have some concern that the lack of knowledge itself might in fact lead to some untoward outcome. We felt it an obligation to inform our colleagues throughout the world of our own uneasiness, or at least the uncertainty that we had as to what would be the outcome for certain kinds of experiments. We never had in mind to call for a ban; we don`t believe the work should be banned. I`ve been reassured over the last two years that some of the concerns I had early on were heedless.

I think the work can proceed and should proceed, and I think there will be great opportunities and benefits that will accrue from it.

MacNEIL: Yes, Dr. Signer?

SIGNER: I`m against it, obviously. I`m not sure what you`re asking.

MacNEIL: I was just wondering if you had any reaction to the last point by Dr. Berg.

SIGNER: The main point that Paul`s saying is that we need this technique to gain increased knowledge, and I think that`s totally untrue. We can get the knowledge by some other technique. If we can`t do this, let`s go back to the laboratory and study further, and let`s get other techniques. As Paul said, it`s one of many techniques. Well, we won`t use this one; we`ll use the other ones, and we`ll get new ones. That`s what we`re in business for. We`ve done it before, we`ll do it again.

BERG: If I might add, there are a variety of procedures that are used in the search for knowledge, particularly on this matter of understanding the structure of complex chromosomes. I would want to know whether Ethan Signer would want to outlaw in situ hybridization, radioautography-- all procedures and techniques which are used to allow us to study chromosomal structure.

SIGNER: Of course not; no, just outlaw this technique -- the one that allows for genetic engineering and is so risky and-unpredictable and dangerous.

MacNEIL: Okay; thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Despite -the differences within the scientific community the research in genetic engineering is even now going on, some ,of it maybe slowly, as Dr. Berg said; but some of it is at federally funded research centers, some of it in private industry. The government announced yesterday that it will convert its facility at Fort Detrick to a center for genetic research, and a number of drug companies have applied for patents on the work they`ve been. doing while still others are tooling up. Except for the federally funded projects there has been very little policing of what kind ` and how much gene manipulation research is going on. But calls for legislation and controls are being heard from all quarters and tomorrow a government interagency task force is expected to formulate its recommendations on recombinant DNA guidelines. One member of that task force is Dr. DeWitt Stetten, who is also Deputy Director for Science at the National Institute of Health. Doctor, has the time come for there to be federal laws governing recombinant DNA research, private as well as government financed?

Dr. DeWITT STETTEN: I believe that one must admit that the time has come that there will be regulation. I think there`s scarcely any doubt of that. Indeed, at least two measures have been introduced into the Congress in the last few days, and hearings on these measures have been scheduled for the weeks ahead.

LEHRER: What kind of basic legislation or laws do you favor?.

STETTEN: I would like to preface this by saying that the work which is supported or conducted at the NIH and by recent understanding of the interagency committee work which is supported or conducted at other governmental agencies will conform to the guidelines. And I believe that this -- whereas it has been called voluntary compliance -- is not really voluntary because we have one very important sanction; namely, money.

LEHRER: Explain that.

STETTEN: Any scientist who wishes to do research in this area sponsored by the National Institutes of Health is required to conform to the guidelines. And we believe we can adequately control this and regulate it depending, at least in part, upon the existence of an institutional biohazards committee at his institution which will keep tabs on what he does and make sure...

LEHRER: But what about research that`s being done in private,. laboratories?

STETTEN: Research which is not federally sponsored at the present time is under no regulation that I`m aware of. There are...

LEHRER: But you think it should be, is that correct, Sir?

STETTEN: My feeling is that whether I think it should be or not is almost irrelevant; it will be..

LEHRER: Now, what are going to be the enforcement problems` there? How are you going to enforce these guidelines in non-federally funded enterprises?

STETTEN: In the legislation which has been proposed in the .proposals which have been considered at the prior meetings of the interagency committee the responsibility is assigned to one or an other cabinet member; the Secretary of (blank) is given certain authorities by the proposed law. He has the authority to license, he will have, probably, the authority to register the investigator -- that is, to license the facility -- he will have the authority to subpoena, to enter and inspect, to secure reports and -to look at records, I would suppose; he will have the authority to disseminate, to distribute the information which he collects, with the exception of those proprietary items which industry by the Freedom of Information Act has protected to itself.

LEHRER: Let`s ask Dr. Berg and Dr. Signer what they think of these proposals. Dr. Berg, can you-all live with that?

BERG: Well, it`s a little hard to talk about the hypothetical case. I think one would have to see the legislation before one commented on it specifically. I`m concerned about one major thing.

I think in attempts to legislate and to, regulate down to the last iota of security or safety that this work will be smothered in places where there`s not any concern for safety. I think it may well call an end to this research because it will become too difficult to do or it will make it impossible for investigators to get insurance coverage or to take on the responsibilities for that are demanded for by such bills. I`m concerned that in this hysterical attempt to cover all possibilities that in fact the research.. will be impeded to a point where we will lose the opportunities that I talked about.

LEHRER: Should there be no federal laws governing all research in this area?

BERG: I believe that all recombinant DNA research done in this country should be under the guidelines. I think all recombinant DNA research throughout the world is coming under one form or another of the same kind of governance.

LEHRER: But without a federal law, how would it ever be applied to the private laboratories?

BERG: I would like to see the government be as ingenious in its discovery of ways to cover those contingencies as I think the investigators have been in coming up with this kind of capability. I`d like to see us perhaps invent new procedures that allow us to cover those areas which need the coverage, without stifling the opportunities that are created in others..

LEHRER: Dr. Signer, what`s your view on federal regulation?

SIGNER: I`m very much for federal regulation. `It`s kind of interesting, Paul, that you`re in favor of the government inventing new procedures, but you`re not in favor of the scientists in venting new techniques to replace this technique. I`m definitely in favor of regulation; I think the government should ban this. I`m very much concerned...

LEHRER: Nobody`s talking about banning here, in terms of the -- you think the government should ban it, but...

SIGNER: You wanted my reaction to these regulations.

LEHRER: Right.

SIGNER: Okay; I`m unhappy about them because they make it appear that the issue is an issue of safety -- it`s whether we can be safe or not. And as I see it, that`s not the issue at all. The issue is whether we should do this stuff in the first place. I don`t think one is ever going to be able to control the drug companies they`re in business for secret research -- for patent rights, and so forth -- that`s really a source of danger.

LEHRER: If, in fact, the issue -- or one of the major issues -- was safety, do you think that the basic guidelines that have been laid out in the NIH and now may be applied to all researchers would take care of that one area of DNA research?

SIGNER: But it`s not. The issue is not safety.

LEHRER: Okay. On that we have to leave it. Robin?

MacNEIL: Thank you all very much in Washington. Jim Lehrer and I will be back tomorrow night. I`m Robert MacNeil. Goodnight.