The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; The Falklands -- Blockade Day

[Tease]

ROBERT MacNEIL [voice-over]: As British naval forces close in on the Falklands and Argentina pours in more troops, Secretary of State Haig says, "Time is slipping away from us."

[Titles]

MacNEIL: Good evening. For some hours today it looked as though Secretary of State Haig's desperate intercontinental diplomacy might be solving the Falkland crisis. Argentina said it had given Haig a message for Britain, offering to withdraw its troops from the occupied islands under certain conditions. White House spokesman Larry Speakes said at noon, "There's certain hope that war between Britain and Argentina could be averted." Then Haig emerged from fresh talks with British leaders, and said he was not at all hopeful, adding, "Time is slipping away from us." While some progress had been made, Haig said, there is no truce or hesitation or pause in any of the military preparations. That meant that Britain's battle fleet was still steaming southwards while some four attack submarines were ready to sink any Argentine naval ships violating a 200-mile blockade in force since midnight Sunday. While Argentina kept its ships safely out of range, it continued a massive airlift of troops and arms to reinforce its Falkland occupation. Tonight, as Secretary Haig heads back to Buenos Aires, what are his chances of success? Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, Alexander Haig learned how to shuttle from the master, Henry Kissinger. But when Kissinger was diplomatically shuttling in the '70s and Haig was his deputy, the backs and forths were over much shorter distances, all places within a few hundred miles of each other in the Middle East. Haig's trips are mammoth in comparison. His shuttle began Friday morning with a seven-hour flight to London. After 17 hours on the ground there, it was 17 hours in the air to Buenos Aires and a meeting with General Galtieri, then another 17 hours back to London Sunday, and now a return trip to Buenos Aires tonight. Nobody knows for sure when or how it will end, but as Robin said, there are what we journalists call "growing indications." Here to give us a reading on those is Leslie Gelb, national security correspondent for The New York Times. What is your reading, Les? Is Haig going to pull it off or does it look dead now?

LESLIE GELB: The White House today says the signs are hopeful; Alexander Haig says signs are not hopeful at all. Takeyour bet. It's my guess that we're not much beyond where we were last Friday, Jim. That Haig is there saying, "Don't fight; keep the forces apart. Let's see if we can work out some arrangement on sovereignty that will save everyone's face." The British are saying, "We may be willing to juggle on the sovereignty issue, but we're really not going to give up control of the islands. We're not going to abandon the Falklanders." The Argentinians saying, "Well, we're prepared to back off and not fight, too, but we want the issue of sovereignty to be clear. It's ours, and we're not going to take an Argentine presence off the Falkland Islands." In other words, Jim, we're still in that diplomatic box.

LEHRER: Is it boiling down, Les, to a situation where Haig is trying to find a way out of this that saves face for each of the governments, and in the process saves the governments?

Mr. GELB: Sure. The only way out of it is to try to save face because both Mrs. Thatcher in London and General Galtieri in Buenos Aires have taken such tough positions on this, and their political futures hang on it. If they fail on the Falklands, their governments could well fall. It'll take a kind of master stroke to create a cloud of dust -- the hearty "Hiyo Silver!" -- to give everyone the sense that they've gotten something out of it. You know, Henry Kissinger might have been able to figure out the answer to this. He might have given Britain a part of France and Argentina a chunk of Brazil. Short of that, it's hard to see how you're going to find that face-saving solution.

LEHRER: And nothing has really changed since Friday, has it?

Mr. GELB: Not that we know. But, Jim, as you know from the last couple of days, the State Department, the White House, are keeping this one very close. They don't want these two powers to come to blows; they don't want to have to choose sides. If they have to choose sides, they'll probably lean toward Britain, but then it's all a mess.

LEHRER: How do you interpret the fact that when Haig got off the plane in London yesterday he was -- well, you know, I don't think -- he used the word "optimism," but he indicated that, "Hey, look, maybe we've got something here." That is a very loose paraphrase of what he said. But then when he gets back on the plane today, it's an entirely different tone. What does that indicate to you?

Mr. GELB: Well, it could either mean that he got nothing in London, or it could mean that he got something, but he wants to sound pessimistic so that when he flies back to Buenos Aires he can apply a little more pressure on the Argentinians. And at this point we just don't know. He may be playing the game very shrewdly or he may be in very deep trouble.

LEHRER: When he uses the phrase, "time is slipping by," or is passing, here, what kind of framework of timing is the State Department thinking about? How much time do they feel they have for Haig to work his magic?

Mr. GELB: That's a critical question, and I think it goes to the very heart of how the State Department is now estimating the situation, and the Pentagon, for that matter. Because, as the planners in these places now see the situation, time is on the side of the Argentinians. As long as they hunker down, get back into port with their ships, don't lose any men, sort of tarry in their diplomacy -- advancing ideas instead of concrete proposals -- the British hand weakens. Because the British are strong now, when there's a prospect that they can use force within the next couple of weeks -- give the Argentines a real bloody nose. But as time goes on, Jim, it becomes more and more difficult and more and more costly for the British to keep open that 8,000-mile supply line. So at some point the balance begins to tilt toward the Argentinians, and I think Haig understands that, and that's why he has decided to continue with this shuttle, to try to bring matters to a head as quickly as possible.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: For a British point of view we have Geoffrey Smith, political columnist and editorial writer for The Times of London. Mr. Smith arrived in this country last week on an assignment. Geoffrey Smith, is time perhaps slipping away for Mrs. Thatcher?

GEOFFREY SMITH: I think time is in one sense slipping away from everybody who is involved in this dispute, but I don't see that it is slipping away more from Mrs. Thatcher than it is from the Argentinian government, because the economic and diplomatic and international pressure on the Argentine is bound to be severe now, and will become all the more stringent over the days and weeks ahead.

MacNEIL: Augmented late last week by the unprecedented vote of the European Economic Community to back up Britain by imposing a ban on imports from Argentina and on arms shipments to Argentina.

Mr. SMITH: That's true. The economic pressures on Argentina will become quite severe, and I don't think that this is something that a country that is already in very considerable economic difficulties can simply sit back and watch happen.

MacNEIL: The longer this continues, however, for Mrs. Thatcher, does she not stand in some risk -- as the first euphoria of sending a fleet out from Britain subsides -- of having her political support begin to erode?

Mr. SMITH: There always is a danger of that happening if this seems just to be going on endlessly without any solution in sight. But I suspect that that's a little further off, and that what Mrs. Thatcher must also be, I think quite considerably, afraid of so far as her own position is concerned, is being forced into a settlement that will not be satisfactory to British opinion, or indeed to the Falkland Islanders themselves.

MacNEIL: What would the political consequences for her be? In other words, that would be something less than face-saving for her, wouldn't it?

Mr. SMITH: I think that if she is forced to accept a settlement that is regarded by British opinion as a surrender, and in particular regarded by her own party as caving in to international pressure, then this could mean that her own position as prime minister would be in jeopardy. What I don't think is in jeopardy is the position of the Conservative government.

MacNEIL: You don't think the government would fall and there would be a general election as a result of such a settlement?

Mr. SMITH: No, I do not. I do not believe that as a result of any settlement that a general election would be called in Britain earlier than it would otherwise have been called.

MacNEIL: Which is a year and a half off, two years?

Mr. SMITH: It has to be called by the spring of 1984. It's possible that it might anyway be called in the autumn of '83.

MacNEIL: From your knowledge of the character of Mrs. Thatcher and her behavior in crisis, as time stretches on is she likely to weaken or become more intransigent?

Mr. SMITH: If it's a choice between those two words, I would say more intransigent, but I'm not sure that I actually would accept that. I do think that as the pressure increases her tendency will be to become tougher and less inclined to give in.

MacNEIL: This is, I know, part of the field you cover. What do you make of how this unusual or special relationship between the Reagan administration and Mrs. Thatcher's government is working in this particular crisis?

Mr. SMITH: Well, we can't be sure exactly how it's working in detail in terms of the actual negotiations taking place between the principal individuals involved, but it is inevitable that quite a severe strain is put upon this, because the United States government, as mediator, conciliator, or whatever word one likes to use, is trying to bring Britain and the Argentine together, and this inevitably implies bringing a certain amount of pressure to bear on both sides. Now, if the outcome of this pressure is that a settlement is reached which is regarded by the British government and by British opinion as being broadly satisfactory, well, that's fine for the special relationship. But if either there is no agreement, and then the United States government doesn't seem to be backing Britain up, or there is an agreement which is regarded as distinctly unsatisfactory, then I think that the implications not just for the relationship between Britain and the United States, but also for the whole of Europe and the United States -- the implications then would be very serious.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: An analysis of the Argentine perspective, now. It comes from Edward Milenky, a specialist in Argentine foreign and security policy. He's a foreign affairs officer with the Department of Energy's international security affairs and defense program, but is not here speaking for the U.S. government tonight. Mr. Milenky, do you agree that time is on the side of the Argentinians?

EDWARD S. MILENKY: No, just the opposite. Time is against them.

LEHRER: Why?

Mr. MILENKY: They're facing rampant inflation in their economy. The coalition that supports this regime is composed in some senses of opposites that don't get along. The maintenance of a supply line of about 400 miles is, in some respects, an economic burden equivalent to Britain's 8,000-mile supply line. And let us not forget also the sanctions that have already been mentioned.

LEHRER: Do you think those will have a serious effect?

Mr. MILENKY: Well, they've lost nearly 50% of their export market with a single stroke of the pen. The Canadians today have taken away --

LEHRER: Joined it today.

Mr. MILENKY: -- still more of the market. They can't survive. They earn a very large percentage of their national income from international trade.

LEHRER: Well, when we get down to the nuts and bolts of working out a settlement, the crucial thing that London is insisting on is that Argentina withdraw its troops from the Falklands. What is Argentina going to have to get in order to do that?

Mr MILENKY: They'll have to get sovereignty. Plain and simple. The Argentine flag flying over those islands, irrevocably and forever.

LEHRER: If they do not get that, will it wash in Argentina politically and with the public?

Mr. MILENKY: No, this regime will come down like a house of cards if they don't get sovereignty. And sovereignty may be variously defined, but it will have to mean an unequivocal recognition of what they regard as their rights in those islands.

LEHRER: What's your reading of what's happening now in these negotiations? I mean, I know it's all guesswork; that's all we're doing right now, because nobody is on those planes and in those rooms in Buenos Aires or in London. What's your feel for what's happening here?

Mr. MILENKY: The Argentines are hoping that the Britishwill shrink from using force. They are hoping also that they can make this a fait accompli. They are taken aback in many respects by the lack of support from other nations. They really expected a vote of support from developing countries -- from the Third World. As we mentioned last week, they've gone to great lengths to try to line up the Group of 77 and the non-aligned movement. These people have not come through for them. They had hoped that the Soviet Union would come through for them in a bigger way than they have, though the Soviets did sign a new trade agreement with them. They had hoped that the European Community, being attached to the income it earns by trading with Argentina, would not side with the British. They've been wrong on that. They had hoped that the U.S. would somehow value the assistance of Argentina in the Caribbean -- at least Argentine diplomatic support -- more than it has. It seems that all of their calculations in this respect have gone awry. They had hoped for more support from their immediate neighbors. They haven't gotten it. The Brazilians have taken a studiously ambiguous posture. And I believe there are other nations that would be happy to see the Argentines cut down to size. And, lastly, at home there are restive forces ready to once again begin their quarrel with the regime if the government shows signs of fumbling.

LEHRER: There was one element in the news that we have not mentioned, which was Peru today suggested a truce -- didn't define what "truce" meant, other than for 72 hours nobody would shoot. Apparently that's what it meant. And Argentina quickly accepted it, and there has been no word from London on that. How do you interpret Argentina's quick willingness to accept that?

Mr. MILENKY: Well, the truce gives them what they want -- possession of the islands. If there is a status quo, a freezing of the status quo, the Argentines come out ahead. Their troops remain on the island; they can proceed with establishing a civil administration; they can go on claiming that the islands are the 23rd province. They can hope that the British fleet will steam in circles until it runs out of diesel fuel.

LEHRER: Let me ask you just your own perception now of what's happening. Do you think that Alexander Haig is going to be able to pull this off?

Mr. MILENKY: There is a possibility. It depends on whether or not someone can concoct a diplomatic fiction which will give the Argentines the appearance of sovereignty. Frankly, I don't think so. I can't see a formula that the British government, if we've had an accurate reflection of its opinion, can accept. I can't see a formula under which the Argentine flag would be hauled down and those troops sent home which would wash in Buenos Aires. The only possible way out is for the regime to fall and a successor government to come into office and quickly clean up the mess in order to just close out the whole dismal chapter.

LEHRER: All right. Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: If diplomacy does fail and shooting starts, how do the military forces of Argentina match up with those of Britain 8,000 miles from home? For a view of that we have Charles Corddry, Pentagon correspondent to The Baltimore Sun, and regular commentator on the public television program, Washington Week in Review. Charlie, if it comes to shooting, what are the military strengths and weaknesses of each side? Take the Argentine forces first.

CHARLES CORDDRY: Well, the Argentine weaknesses, Robin, are that the navy is so much outclassed by the fleet the British are sending that it's not even in the same league. The most specific point to make there is the British nuclear-powered submarines, which will not run out of diesel fuel or any other kind of fuel. They can stay there indefinitely; they cannot be found by the Argentine navy, and they can blockade as long as need be.

MacNEIL: And what about Argentine land and air forces?

Mr. CORDDRY: Well, of course it's hard to think that land forces would become involved, unless of course there were an invasion attempt on the Falklands themselves, and then you would have a matter of about 9,000 Argentines, I suppose. We don't know exactly how many marines the British are sending, but they left with 1,800. I think they've been increasing that. You mentioned air. Obviously the air power advantage would seem with Argentina. It is close to home. It has American A-4 Skyhawks, which have double the range of the Harriers the British are taking with them. However, on airpower at sea the Argentines have just about 14 airplanes, I believe, on an aircraft carrier known as the 25th of May -- El 25 de mayo -- and it was commissioned in Britain in 1945. It's rather old. But the British hope to counteract that, if it comes to that, with missile destroyers -- missile-armed destroyers, in which they're quite superior.

MacNEIL: Is there any indication of the fighting qualities of Argentine troops?

Mr. CORDRRY: I think the answer to that, Robin, is that you're not dealing with a Third World country in the sense that we're accustomed to, but other than that I don't believe I could answer that question. Their army is certainly larger than any force the British will bring along. But, as I say, I don't look for land forces to have a big role here.

MacNEIL: What you seem to be saying -- am I right? -- is that the British forces would appear to have the upper hand, at least in the modernity of the weapons.

Mr. CORDRRY: I haven't the slightest doubt in the world of that, Robin. The British have sent a very large fleet, which in some way is to compensate for the fiendish logistics problem they have. They have approximately 36 to 40 ships, I believe, mostly seven to 10 days away. This would make up for some of the logistic problem that they will suffer. These are new ships. They are missile ships. They do suffer from lack of air cover, that is true, but on the whole I would think that in any naval engagement the Argentine would be in disastrous circumstances.

MacNEIL: Which side are observers at the Pentagon betting on if it actually comes to a fighting situation?

Mr. CORDRRY: I don't know that I could improve on that bookie in London who -- what did he say? It was 60-40 in favor of the British? I asked one admiral if the British navy could sink the Argentine navy in 20 minutes, and he said they probably could.

MacNEIL: And what about the question of the British sustaining their effort, given the length of the supply line -- 8,000 miles long?

Mr. CORDRRY: Well, that, of course, is the real problem. That is the reason, I think, that my friend Les suggested that there could be a tilt toward Argentina if this is protracted. The nearest base the British can establish is on Ascension Island, which is 3,500 to 4,000 miles away from the potential scene. So that that would be a great problem. And I have to come back again to the submarines, which to me make all the difference. They do not have a supply problem.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Mr. Milenky, of course you also take a more than passing interest in the Argentine military. Do you agree with Charlie's assessment of the military breakdown?

Mr. MILENKY: Yes. I would add also there are political reasons why the fighting qualities of the Argentine forces really can't be measured strictly by counting up planes and weapons systems. First, within these armed forces we have a bewildering, almost byzantine quality to the leadership. There are an almost infinite number of factions. The regime itself, as I've indicated, is a coalition. The junta members have to worry about each other, they have to worry about their opponents at home; they have to worry about the unions, they have to worry about the effect on their own future of keeping so many troops away from their primary mission, which is the occupation of Argentina. That's the first problem. The second problem is the cost. As I indicated, I think maintaining this force on the Falklands is going to be as expensive for them as maintaining the British fleet will be for the British. And lastly we get back to the question of whether or not they can clean this thing up in a tidy and timely manner, because eventually the attention of the Argentine public is going to be focused back on the real issues, which are economic -- rampant inflation and high unemployment.

LEHRER: Which brings us back to you, Les Gelb. Both Mr. Milenky and Mr. Smith disagree with your assessment that time is on the side of the Argentinians. You have 30 seconds to rebut that.

Mr. GELB: They're wrong. [laughter]

LEHRER: They're wrong. Why are they wrong?

Mr. GELB: As we all agree, the Argentinians don't have to give naval battle, and are unlikely to do so. They'd be crazy to do it. As far as maintaining their force on the Falkland Islands, they don't have to do much to maintain them. They have their food there; they brought in their equipment. No one expects the British at this point to launch an invasion of the island. So the business of their having great difficulty in keeping their force on the Falklands equal to the British difficulty of maintaining the 8,000-mile supply -- the two just aren't comparable at all.

LEHRER: From a military standpoint, Charlie, what is the most likely scenario? The British -- let's assume there's no diplomatic solution and the British fleet arrives. And let's say there has been no bloodshed, no firing in anger between now and the time the British fleet arrives. What happens?

Mr. CORDRRY: That is really a hard question to answer, Jim. I would think that the British surface fleet might take up positions off East Falkland, and leave the distance between West Falkland and Argentina to the submarines. Now, you're saying this goes on indefinitely and what happens? Well, I can only surmise here that 9,000 Argentinians are not necessarily a large force in those islands, and they're probably -- Ed, are they concentrated in the Port Stanley area?

Mr. MILENKY: Port Stanley, that's correct.

Mr. CORDRRY: I would think. Now, the British marines can -- I'm really, you know, this is dreaming, but the British marines could find somewhere else to go ashore, and they could find someplace to put Harrier airplanes, because they don't need air bases. They take off straight up and down. So it could unwind into a bloody mess, but I cherish the thought that this will not -- what I've just suggested will not happen.

LEHRER: Mr. Smith, just in terms of the British public, your feel for it. If this scenario that I outlined happens -- no shots are fired, the British fleet arrives, sets up a blockade -- how much time do you think the British public is going to then give the British government for something to happen?

Mr. SMITH: I think a lot would depend upon what was happening diplomatically. I don't think one can set a certain number of hours or days, and say the British public would demand a solution within that limited period of time. What I do think the British public would want is a feeling that the government had got a grip on the situation, that it was not weakening under pressure in terms of its basic objective. And its basic objective is to secure the self-determination for the Falkland Islanders themselves. Now, as long as it seemed that the British government was remaining on course so far as obtaining that particular purpose was concerned, then I think British opinion would remain sufficiently strong behind the government.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Yes, tell me how much time we've got left? Two minutes. Thank you. Let's go back to how long these two countries can sustain this economically. Mr. Milenky, the Argentine economy -- how long would you give Argentina to sustain an effort like this, just with the effects that you described on their economy?

Mr. MILENKY: Well, they can probably go a matter of weeks at best. This is a country which earns a very large percentage of its national income from international trade. Moreover, the products that it exports -- wheat -- well, wheat can be stored, but beef can't be stored. Various kinds of other agricultural produce cannot be stored. They even, really, if one considers wheat, don't have the long-term storage facilities even for that. Once it begins to pile up at the ports and in the grain elevators in the interior, they're going to be in a lot of trouble. Cash flow is extremely important to this economy. If the embargo that the Europeans and the Canadians have laid down is at all tight, this will dry up the supply of many kinds of vital spare parts and raw materials to Argentina. And you will begin to see this very externally dependent economy run down like a clock, very quickly.

MacNEIL: Mr. Smith, is there not also an economic equation for the British? I mean, after all, British funds are not limitless. This is a huge military effort, the biggest one that Britain has launched anywhere since the Suez crisis, and probably since the Second World War. How long will Britain politically, and therefore economically, be able to sustain this, do you think?

Mr. SMITH: Oh, I think Britain will be able to sustain this effort for quite a considerable time. What is true is that the cost of doing so will be felt after the crisis is over. I find it hard to believe that this is something which is going to go on for an indefinite period of time. I think it'll be resolved reasonably quickly. But it is quite true that it does impose a considerable economic burden on Britain, but not one which will make it necessary to call off the operation.

MacNEIL: Mr. Gelb, finally, if things don't get settled quickly, what do you think the consequences are going to be for the United States?You heard Mr. Smith say earlier that the special relation with the Thatcher government would be eroded, and could damage relations with Europe. How's that viewed in Washington?

Mr. GELB: I think exactly the same way as Mr. Smith views it. There are already people who believe that our failure to take an even stronger stance beside Britain on this has damaged our relations with Britain as of now, and has sent a message to our NATO allies as of now. And I agree completely with Mr. Smith that our friends are going to be looking at us very carefully and judging us by how we deal with Britain in this matter.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you and Mr. Cordrry and Mr. Milenky for joining us this evening; Mr. Smith in New York, thank you. Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night, Robin.

MacNEIL: That's all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.