The Robert MacNeil Report; Israeli Commando Raid

ROBERT MAC NEIL: Good evening. Reaction has been pouring in from all over the world today to one of the most spectacular military events of modern history Israel`s daring airborne commando rescue of 101 hijack hostages from an airport in Uganda. While Israel itself erupted in national ecstasy almost unknown since the 1967 war, other nations showered her with praise or condemnation. In general the West hailed the raid, while Arab and African nations condemned it in the strongest terms. Apart from a reference by the Soviet News Agency Tass to Israel`s "latest act of piracy," the communist world largely kept quiet.

Some Western nations sounded as elated as the Israelis. The Times of London said "Israel has taken everyone`s breath away." West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt expressed "deep satisfaction," virtually echoing President Ford`s words yesterday. And there were favorable comments from France, Denmark, Sweden, New Zealand, Japan and the Philippines. But the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Mauritius, passed a resolution calling the raid "Israeli military aggression" and demanding an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council. In this they were supporting President Idi Amin of Uganda from whose protection the hostages were snatched. Amin has issued a long statement of outrage and self-justification, claiming that Israel has acted with violence while he was still trying to secure freedom for the hostages peacefully. But so far, no formal request for United Nations action has been received at U.N. Headquarters here in New York. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, who had been quoted as saying in Cairo that the raid was aggression, issued a clarifying statement here this afternoon, claiming he had said only that Israel had violated Uganda`s sovereignty.

Tonight Jim Lehrer and I examine the many questions Israel`s action leaves unanswered. Will it have dangerous repercussions in the Middle East? Will it unify the quarreling voices in Africa and the Middle East? But first, the raid itself. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, the Israeli government has not released many details of the raid itself, but based on a wide variety of other sources, what happened can be pieced together this way: An Israeli commando force consisting of from 200 to 300 armed soldiers took off from Southern Israel in three transport planes. They flew undetected due South, probably over the Red Sea and Ethiopia, landing finally at Entebbe Airport, outside Kampala, Uganda. It was night time, 1 AM, and it was pitch dark. The Israelis first threw some grenades or bombs or something as a diversionary effort to distract the attention of the Ugandan military guards and the hijackers. Then they stormed the old terminal building where the hostages were held. There was a brief but intense exchange of gunfire. An estimated twenty Ugandan soldiers, the seven hijackers, three of the hostages and one Israeli officer in the raiding party were killed. Many others were wounded although injury counts vary. The hostages were then hurried some 600 yards out from the terminal building to the waiting transport planes. And then, some 36 minutes after they landed, they were in the air. The three planes stopped in nearby Nairobi, Kenya, for refueling and to have some of the people treated at a field hospital, and then flew back to Tel Aviv, 2300 miles away.

Now there are many gaps in that story, of course. Fortunately the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Simche Dinitz, is with us and maybe he can help us fill in some of the blanks.

Mr. Ambassador, to begin with, did you detect anything that you would like to add or subtract from that account that I just went through?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: No, Mr. Lehrer. I really think that your account has been very brief and very concise and based on all the available information that was released to the public.

LEHRER: What about the route of travel? There`s some dispute about that. Did the planes follow the Red Sea in order to avoid going over Arab territories and to avoid detection, and then come in through Ethiopia to Uganda?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: That of course falls into that area that we unfortunately have to keep secret because that`s part of the military operation. And I think for understandable reasons, the army is not anxious to reveal the tactical aspects of the operation, but I can assure you that whenever we can avoid Arab territory we do.

LEHRER: All right. So it would be safe to assume that Arab territory was avoided in this case. Right, sir?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: As far as possible.

LEHRER: Obviously you had to have some help from the Kenyan government for the refueling stop in Nairobi. Were they in it from the very beginning, or was it a last minute thing? How did that work?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: No, the Nairobi government did not really have any part or parcel of the operation itself. They handed us help in refueling on the way back, and as you said, in taking care of the wounded in the field hospital. That was an humanitarian act, and they have done it in regard to civilians who had just been freed from hostage. We are very grateful to the Kenyan government for their action, but by no means does it implicate them in the operation that we have taken.

LEHRER: All right. Some of the troops of the raiding party were in civilian clothes, and it`s been widely reported now that one of the reasons that the raiding party was able to land relatively unscathed was the fact that they had radioed ahead and said that these planes actually had Palestinian prisoners they were bring for a swap. Having the troops in civilian clothes was part of that charade. Is that, in fact, correct?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: There were many reports on this. There were some reports that our troops had civilian clothes, and others said they had uniforms. And some said that they had contacted the radar tower - the controlling tower and said that they are bringing prisoners, and others said that they have landed without the controlling tower detecting. I really do not think that I could shed light on this. I`m sorry. But rather leave this area of ambiguity as it is. The purpose of our forces there was not to mislead anyone but to get there as quickly as we can to take the hostages and fly with them and the Air France crew back to Israel with as little bloodshed as possible. And I think that we have executed very well.

LEHRER: Mr. Ambassador, there were tremendous risks involved. Not only in the execution, but possible repercussions and that sort of thing. Considering all of that, you sit here tonight, happy satisfied, the risks were worth it, and it`s a delightful thing from your standpoint in every way?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: Extremely happy; extremely satisfied. Not only because we were able to restore to Israel the hostages, but I believe we were able to do a little bit more. I believe we have restored to the international community a little bit of sense, maybe courage, maybe confidence that terrorism can be resisted and ought to be resisted. And in this respect I think the action should be viewed not only in terms of the splendid, as you called it, military operation, but rather in the message that it carries: that force must be used if we are to block terrorism. It is an old American saying, "Millions for defense, not one cent for tribute." And I think we have just followed in the fine and the noblest American tradition when we have done what we have done.

LEHRER: All right, sir. Thank you. Robin?

MACNEIL: Zbigniew Brzezinski is the former Director of the Trilateral Commission and is now the Director for the Research Institute for International Change at Columbia University. Professor Brzezinski, you were in Israel just before this commando raid a few days ago, and you met some senior Israeli officials. Did you have any inkling from them that something like this was going to happen?

BRZEZINSKI: No, I did not, but I must confess I had a hunch that something might happen. It isn`t in the Israeli style to take something like this lying down, and the circumstances were such that it seemed increasingly likely that a very unpleasant outcome would be the ultimate result unless something very decisive was done.

MAC NEIL: Do you in fact believe that the Israeli claims - do you see the evidence for the Israeli claims that General Amin, the Ugandan President, was in fact siding with the hijackers?

BRZEZINSKI: Well, it seems to me that this raises in some respects a new and very fundamental issue. Terrorism is outrageous but it`s particularly outrageous if there is official governmental complicity in it. In this particular case, the fact that the Israelis could go 2,000 miles, could rescue these people, losing one man, seems to me to prove conclusively that there was complicity, for the government on the ground with its troops at the airport, for seven days did nothing to free the hostages. It was clearly and obviously collaborating in this enterprise.

MAC NEIL: General Amin, of course, claims that he was instrumental in freeing 140-odd before the raid took place.

BRZEZINSKI: Yes, but at the same time he transmitted messages indicating that the others would be killed within a certain deadline, and the Israelis did get in there, did stage an operation, did free the men, losing one man. The Ugandans if they were genuinely not members of this enterprise, could have done the same

MAC NEIL: From your reading of the position the Israelis were in, as well as the Israeli domestic, political situation as you saw it a couple of days ago, how much was this a lack of options in the immediate situation, and how much do you think a need in domestic politics for some tough gesture such as President Ford`s Mayaguez operation a year ago?

BRZEZINSKI: There may have something to that, but fundamentally I doubt it. I think basically, first of all, the Israelis are predisposed to react strongly to circumstances of this sort. Secondly

I think there was widespread recognition that if, in the face of the threat that was made, the Israelis were forced to release the terrorists whose release was demanded, that this would be tantamount to such a tremendous victory for international terrorism that the longer range political circumstances, consequences, domestic and international, would be very costly indeed. Finally, there was increasing anxiety over the fate of the hostages in a negotiating process which was remarkably cumbersome, totally unpredictable, and extremely difficult to conduct. I think it was this confluence of pressures that made the Israelis judge, and rightly so now we know, that a risk in military operation was still the lesser risk than simply waiting.

MAC NEIL: What effect if any do you think this is likely to have on the Middle East situation where it is now? With diplomatic negotiations for an overall peace settlement apparently stalled with a very messy situation involving the Palestinians and the Lebanon.

BRZEZINSKI: I would say that in terms of the Arab, Israeli problem, my own personal feeling is that this will not have any fundamentally important impact. I think it will have -- and I would say on the whole -- a desirable impact on Israeli public opinion. It has given it a lift. It has given it a new sense of confidence. But it has done so in the context of what I perceive to be an increasingly pervasive recognition of the desirability of a longer term settlement. And hence, in that context, a new surge of optimism and confidence might help the Israelis to approach the future with greater confidence.

MACNEIL: You mean psychologically preparing them more to make some concessions than they might otherwise have been prepared....

BRZEZINSKI: Psychologically reassuring them that they have the capacity for self reliant action if such action is needed.And therefore, giving them the feeling that the accommodations that have to come at some point can be undertaken in the context of relative security.

MAC NEIL: We`ll pursue these in a moment. I`d like to introduce Professor William Quandt who is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, and a former member of the National Security Council Staff. He is one of the country`s leading experts of the Palestinian role in the Middle East.

Professor Quandt, you`ve been keeping in close touch with the Palestinians. What effect do you think this action is going to have on their position in the Middle East?

QUANDT: Well, right now the Palestinians preoccupied with the events in Lebanon. I suspect that after the initial reaction to the events of couple of days that they will return to that preoccupation. I think that the one group that stands to suffer in terms of it`s over all image within the Palestinian movement is the group that was responsible for this particular raid, or hijacking of the plane to Uganda the Popular Front.

MAC NEIL: Can you satisfactorily identify that group for us? Because the hijackers have been, disowned by the Palestinian organizations they claim to belong to.

QUANDT: Well I don`t think there`s any mystery about which group it was. I believe it was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine which has since 1968 been headed by George Habash. It is a radical and often dissident part of the Palestinian movement. It has not been a formal part of the Palestine Liberation organization since 1970, and generally Habash and the PLO chairman Adafot have been at logger heads. There had been a tentative reconciliation because of the events in Lebanon, but the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is not a member of the PLO Executive Committee now.

MACNEIL: Do you feel that this gesture could have been designed by these more radical Palestinians to embarrass or frustrate the more moderate Palestinian leadership which has been emerging and gaining international respectability?

QUANDT: That`s a possible motivation for their action. I think more generally they want to improve their standing within the Palestinian community, and an action like this is popular among the Palestinians, particularly if it succeeds. Right now in Lebanon of course the situation is such that moderate Palestinians are having a very hard time pulling themselves together, and I think the atmosphere is one which encourages. Extremists try to gain a certain amount of support. I would guess that was one of the motives behind the hijacking.

MAC NEIL: And you think that motive has been defeated by the defeat of the operation?

QUANDT: I think it helps make the radical alternative look unattractive.

MAC NEIL: Have we, the United States, vitiated any influence we might have had in this slowly progressing diplomatic situation in the Middle East by President Ford`s almost reflexive approval yesterday of the Israeli raid?

QUANDT: I don`t think so, at all.

MAC NEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Yes. The next question of course for all three of you gentlemen is what does happen next. Mr. Ambassador, a few moments ago you said that this raid sends a message now to the entire world. Now, are you not fearful that the other side, say, in the Middle East dispute must now send a message in return, and what do you think that might be, and are you worried about that?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: May I, before answering your question, reflect upon a couple of thoughts that were said by my collegues Professor Brzezinski and Professor Quandt.

LEHRER: Sure.

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: I shouldn`t say collegues because I`m

not a professor, but my friends. First of all, I want to strengthen the point that Professor Brzezinski made with regard to the collaboration of Amin with the kidnappers. I don`t think today there is any doubt that he has been with them, not only ideologically, but practically. He has supplied them with weapons. His soldiers alternate them on guard duties so they can rest. He has allowed additional terrorists to join them either from within Uganda, as you know he was training Palestinians in Uganda for actions against Israel. And all these things indicate beyond any shadow of a doubt that he was part and parcel of the operation. Whether it was all the way from the begining as some returning authorities seem to indicate that he expected the plane, or whether it was worked out after they arrived, that is not completely clear. But that he was part and parcel of the collaboration with the kidnappers, with the hijackers, that there is no doubt today. I want to affirm now for a minute if I may, to the point that was raised by Professor Quandt. Yes, there may be beneficial effects if indeed the radicalized movement would be isolated as a result of this. But, unfortunately the first reactions that we hear, and even those before, is that sometimes we Western experts tend to give much greater degree of distinction between the different groups consisting or composing the PLO than they themselves. Only a few months ago, Habash and Adafot appeared together and said, "We have the same name, and we have the same purpose, and this is the liquidation of Israel and the establishment of a secular state there." And the reaction today from Palestinian quarters- and I don`t know how Professor Quand will define them, moderate, semi-moderate or otherwise - have not been one of disassociation with the action but rather solidly lining behind it.

LEHRER: You expect them to do something then, right?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: Well, I expect that the Palestinians should show their moderation before they will be entitled to bear the title. Of course, when I say Palestinians I mean members of the Palestine Liberation Organization because there are Palestinians who live on the West Bank, and they are not all in collusion and in cahoot with the slogan of the destruction of Israel.

LEHRER: Well, lets ask Professor Quandt about that. Do you think that it`s going to be incumbent now upon the leaders of the PLO to do something, or to retaliate for this raid , or the whole Palestinian movement generally?

QUANDT: Well, as I mentioned earlier, I think the Palestinian movement as represented for the moment by the PLO, has its hands full in Lebanon. The opposition of the Syrian regime to the Palestinians in Lebanon has been a real shock, and it seems to me that that precludes any kind of effective action against Israel in the near term. Now that doesn`t mean that a small group of the PLO or of some dissident faction couldn`t decide on some kind of a move against Israel. But I would think that nothing dramatic is necessarily going to happen in the near future as a response to the really brilliant Israeli action in Uganda.

LEHRER: You don`t think there`s going to be a manhood question they`ve got to prove themselves now that they can fight back. No?

QUANDT: Not necessarily.

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: I think if they could they would have done it without any action on our part in freeing the hostages. I think Dir. Quandt is right. They are now busy with themselves in Lebanon, and there are many other reasons. There are tight security pre cautions that we take on international flights that we have, and many other countries do, and it becomes more difficult to take an action. But if they could, they would. They don`t need any "provocation".

LEHRER: Do you agree with Professor Brzezinski`s feeling that this raid will - should have no significant effect on the basic balance, of the over all situation in the Middle East at this point?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: I agree with Professor Brzezinski on this. I don`t think it will have any direct effect, but I think to the extent that Israel appears in the Arab mind and Arab eyes as one that cannot be destroyed by force or intimidation by violence, to that extent there would be slowly, gradually, a growing inclination `to negotiate peace with Israel. I think the Arabs will not negotiate peace with an Israel that they believe they can destroy or intimidate. They might negotiate peace with an Israel that looks to them as a tough object to crack.

LEHRER: Do you agree with that Professor Brzezinski?

BRZEZINSKI: Well, one way of analyzing that issue is to ask one`s self what would have been the consequences if either all the hostages had been killed or if the Israelis had been forced to give up the terrorists. Including for example that Japanese who killed so many people at Loud Airport. In either case, the consequences would have been much worse. In the former case there would have been a sense of tremendous outrage in Israel and probably a predisposition to take some violent action of a less morally positive character, a violent action less likely to win the kind of endorsement this action has won. And in the latter case, if the Israelis had been forced to release the terrorists, this would have been a boon to international terrorism. This would have encouraged perhaps some other equally evil minded governments to engage in similar acts of complicity. It would have resulted, in effect in a very serious deterioration of the international condition. So I think we have clearly come out ahead with this outcome.

LEHRER: All right, sir. Robin?

MAC NEIL: On the larger diplomatic scene, is this going to produce a real international crisis? The Organization of African Unity have backed General Amin in appealing to the United Nations for a Security Council. Professor Brzezinski, what do you think?

BRZEZINSKI: We might even get a meeting of the U.N. Security Council, but my guess is, and I`m guessing here, that many of the other African governments, Mobutu`s or the Ivory Coast, certainly, and the-Kenya`s and others were first of all very embarrassed by what Amin did, were very embarrassed by his conduct. And secondly they are probably quietly very pleased by the come uppance he has gotten. So we may get some of the international routine carried through here, and perhaps even a majority vote in the U.N. which I expect would be blocked. But fundamentally, I don`t think this is going to result in any serious international crisis at all.

MAC NEIL: Yes. Ambassador, you`re probably even closer to this. Do you sense that this call for U.N. action is going to go through and something will happen?

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: Well, again I find myself in agreement with Professor Brzezinski. I think that a call might come because they have convened the United Nations on all sort of other silly pretextes and excuses, and why not this time. But if it will take place I really suspect that it is going to be one of the most grotesque spectacles in international relations, where the country that has tried to restore some sense and order to block international terrorism will have to defend and explain itself why did it. And I also find it a little bit surprising to hear the Secretary General call it a violation of Uganda`s sovereignty and consequences in the world. I mean I think that a Secretary General who has. an organization whose main duty is to maintain peace and law and order in the international community should have been in the other side. But strange politics create all sorts of stange bed fellows and I would say that if a meeting convenes at the United Nations that definitely is going to give us an opportunity to explain our case to the world again, and will put in an embarrassing position those who will complain. That`s my feeling.

MAC NEIL: Who would like to tackle this. What is international law on the rescue of one`s nationals? Isn`t it something with a lot of historical respectability? Do either of you two professors wish to tackle that?

BRZEZINSKI: Well, I think there are many precedents, in which it is quite justified, especially if a government, in the context of which other nationals are threatened, seems unable or unwilling to execute its normal duties. In this particular case it seems to me I`d not like to be in the shoes of the Ugandan ambassador if he has to explain what exactly the position of his government was. For there are only two possible interpretations.

1) That it was in a state of complicity with an act of international violence and criminality, or alternatively that it was no longer capable of exercising its own governmental functions in the heart of its own country, right next to its own capital because of seven, armed intruders. In either case, its a rather embarrassing position to be in. In the former case the Israelis were justified to come in and rescue these people because the government was in a state of complicity. In the latter case the Israelis were acting as the liberators of Uganda from the seven conquerors who apparently took it over.

MACNEIL: Yes. In a situation like this, could the U.N. actually do anything if it was defined as aggression? It isn`t like an alleged aggression that is continuing; it was something that was very swift. Isn`t it, by its very sort of fait accompli nature, over and done with, and very hard for the UN to do anything about?

QUANDT: I think basically the incident is over and done with in terms of the international community`s ability to do anything or desire to do anything. The hostages are free, and if there is a U.N. debate, I think it will be really a poor spectacle as all of the other speakers have said.

MACNEIL: Just one, final question. I`ll come to you because you`ve been paying particular attention I think to Africa. If it should have wider international repercussions, is it likely to have an effect on Africa which will be inimical to the West? Is it going to unify these Africans who have had great trouble at all their recent summit meetings getting together on a number of mutually interesting issues?

BRZEZINSKI: I think one has to differentiate here form from substance. It is quite possible that in the initial phases the Africans will have to stand together. And one can already detect in the behavior of the Kenyan government this inclination, this sense of unity. But in substance, I strongly suspect that most African governments were embarrassed by what happened, are pleased that Amin got shown up, and did not endorse what transpired from the very start. And thus, I don`t believe that this will provide the basis for sustained black, white confrontation.

MAC NEIL: Thank you all very much for coming this evening. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR DINITZ: Thank you for having me.

MAC NEIL: Thank you Professor Quandt, Professor Brzezinski. This evening the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Rabin, said that this act of the Israeli commando force would become a legend in military history, and it might well become that. It certainly does not look, if our experts this evening have - - are right about it, like having very much wider international and serious repercussions. Jim Lehrer and I will be back tomorrow night.

I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.