The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Interview with Michael Checinski

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Poland celebrated New Year`s tonight in small family parties; the curfew relaxed, but bigger celebrations banned under martial law. On the eigh-teenth day of military rule the authorities claimed all factories running at full capacity for the first time. They also chose New Year`s Eve to publish steep price increases in consumer goods, raising butter, for example, from 54 cents a kilo -- just over two pounds -- to $ 1.90. But, for all the evidence that the military was in control, the outlawed Solidarity union is still actively urging resistance. How Poland survives the first few weeks of the new year will depend to some extent on the temperament and flexibility of its present ruler, General Jaruzelski. Tonight, some unusual insights into this enigmatic man from a former Polish officer, Michael Checinski, in an interview recorded yesterday. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, Michael Checinski first took up arms to defend Poland when he was a teenager, helping organize the Jewish resistance to the Nazis in the Warsaw ghetto. He was later captured by the Nazis and sent to the Auschwitz death camp for extermination. But he escaped and made his way to Czechoslovakia. There he joined the Red Army and continued to fight the Germans. Returning to Poland after the war he became an officer in the Polish army, and spent the next 10 years in its counterintelligence corps and then lectured at the Polish Military Academy. He rose to the military rank of lieutenant colonel and, in the late `50s, earned a Master`s degree and a Ph.D. in economics. He left Poland in 1969 and immigrated to Israel. But he has continued to closely monitor events in Poland through contacts with former colleagues and friends in the Polish army, including some currently at the highest level of leadership. Colonel Checinski is known particularly for his special insights on the current Polish leader. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, and the men around him. His expertise on the military- industrial complex in Eastern Europe is also regularly sought by American organizations and think tanks, including the Rand Corporation and the Russian Research Center of Harvard, where he has been based for the last two and a half years. And he is the author of a new book entitled Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism. He is with Robin in New York. Robin?

MacNEIL: First of all, what kind of a man is Jaruzelski? You know him -- you knew him.

Col. MICHAEL CHECINSKI: I knew him not close personally. I have much possibilities to observe him. I was a candidate to be even his victim in 1969 -- he wanted to send me to the prison for about three years. I was saved by the minister of defense -- at that time. Spychalski. But I know him.

MacNEIL: Now, is his first allegiance to Poland or to Moscow?

Col. CHECINSKI: I think the answer is very complicated. To give a simple answer, yes or no, will be a --

MacNEIL: Misleading?

Col. CHECINSKI: Misleading, yes. Maybe I can start from his, I will say, [incompre-hensible]. And you will keep the answer by yourself to understand his situation today in Poland. I must say that I have difficulties to accept all the views what I am listening and what I watch on the TV. And, even yesterday, it was two programs and you, too. And this is close to my view also about Jaruzelski. First of all. he is from a family -- I can say, a good Polish family, a Catholic family. His father was administrator of a landlord -- a Volynia in Poland. And that area was occupied by the Soviets in 1939; and almost at the first days, when the Red Army arrived in that place, they shot his father to death.

MacNEIL: Was he there?

Col. CHECINSKI: Well, I can`t tell you how he was. but I know --

MacNEIL: They know -- he knows that the Soviet army shot his father?

Col. CHECINSKI: Absolutely. You know, he was in the family; it was -- they shot him probably because they thought that he was the owner of that farm - - that`s a landlord, you know -- and he was only the administrator. And the whole family of Jaruzelski was sent to Siberia at that time, 1939. And -- maybe not to Siberia, maybe to Kazakhstan: I`m not sure. In any case they were sent deep to Russia, in a camp. And 1943, when the Soviets started to organize a pro-Soviet, Polish army, the so-called first Kosciusko Division, he volunteered to that army. To say that he volunteered as a Communist will be. of course, not correct: it was [incomprehensible]. He volunteered because he wanted to fight with the Germans, and --

MacNEIL: He wanted to fight the Germans.

Col. CHECINSKI: Of course.

MacNEIL: Not with the Germans: he wanted to fight them.

Col. CHECINSKI: To Germans, yes. And not only he -- thousands of Poles had no other way to fight the Germans; only in that division, because on this army lived Russia at that time. He is very intelligent, he is very gifted, he is very clever; and to say about him that he is like a Stalinist, you know, in different places, that he is a [incomprehensible] -- sense of feeling about Polish interests, or something of the sort -- I think this would not be totally true. He is [incomprehensible] in the military, and he made an excellent career as an officer. He was the first commander of cavalry reconnaissance units -- you know, it`s in the front -- and then --

MacNEIL: People who went behind the lines and -- behind the German lines.

Col. CHECINSKI: Correct. Yes, yes, he was very, very courage, courage, courage --

MacNEIL: Brave.

Col. CHECINSKI: Brave. Brave man, yes, I`m sorry. And he advanced very quick, and he became by the end of the war a close, I will say, not [incomprehensible], but a close officer to one of the most important Soviet officers in the Polish army, Poplawski. General Poplaw-ski. He was at that time deputy minister of defense. He is a Pole from Russia, and he`s [incomprehensible] of the Polish army until 1956, as deputy minister of defense. Jaruzelski was a very careful -- advanced by Poplawski. Not because he was a Soviet man, but because he was a gifted man. He wrote for Poplawski alt his features -- he was simply very clever and very intelligent. In 19 -- because I --

MacNEIL: Could I interrupt just for a second to come back to how he got into the Polish division of the Red Army, or the unit that was formed. What did that do to his family ? The Soviets had killed the father: what did that do to the family and what did that do to him? Surely he must have hated the Soviets,

Col. CHECINSKI: Yes, that`s a very important question. In fact, the family is deeply anti-Soviet -- his family, and they can never forget it, what the Soviets did with the father. He has a large family -- not only a mother, not only sisters, but he has all the relatives and so on -- and the whole family was against that. And they interrupted all relations with him. absolutely. After the war he has no relations with the whole family --

MacNEIL: With his own family.

Col. CHECINSKI: With his own family, which is living in Poland.

MacNEIL: He doesn`t talk to them.

Col. CHECINSKI: I don`t know what today, but, until that time when I left Poland, I know exactly that he has no relations with the family. And --

LEHRER: You said -- excuse me. Colonel -- you said that he was a gifted man. Gifted in what way?

Col. CHECINSKI: Well, gifted as a military man, first of all. He was excellent -- he is, I will say, in his nature he is a military man. Let me go ahead with his career, and maybe it will make you clear how he come to be a minister of defense. It`s very important to know. He was nominated as deputy chief of department for military schools and military academies in the Polish army -- I think in 1947. And he was, until 1949 or 1950, he was after that nominated chief of that department. His chief was a pre-war Polish colonel, Kragewski, a lieutenant colonel. And he replaced him, and that Kragewski started to be his deputy chief. And then he make very quick career, supported by Poplawski, General Poplawski, who was vice-minister of defense. He was sent to the military academies; he -- then Poplawski told him, "You must go to a military unit to be a commander," and he started to be commander of the Twelfth Motorized Division in Szczecin, and he was one of the best commanders in the Polish army, of the division. And now it`s a very important point. You are asking me why you -- what in that sense he was gifted.

LEHRER: When did he become a politician? I mean, politics obviously is involved in getting ahead in the army, as it is anywhere else, but --

Col. CHECINSKI: I`m sorry. This is what I want to explain. In 1956 Poland was, as you know, big changes were in Poland, and Gomulka started to introduce, I will say, a more nationalistic, more independent policy. He didn`t succeed; this is another problem. But he tried. And the minister of defense at that time was Spychalski, a former victim of the Stalinist terror. Spychalski started to look for someone who can replace the chief of staff of the Polish army. It was General Jerezy Bordzilowski, a Soviet Pole, but a Soviet man totally subordi-nated to the Soviet rule. He was chief of staff after `56, long years, but it was very difficult to replace him by someone who was able, really, to be chief of staff. And then Jaruzelski was, first of all, by Minister of Defense Spychalski elevated to the position of head of the political administration of the Polish army. It was 1961, if I am correct.

LEHRER: Was he, then, very active in the Communist Party as well?

Col. CHECINSKI: Well, the question is without an answer, because, if you are in a high position in the Polish army, it is not important, are you active or you are not active. You are a Communist from being in that position, and you must not be a Communist who believes; you must be formally a Communist, and this is important. Now, when he was elevated to be chief of the military -- of the political administration, he was absolutely against that. And this is very important. He wanted not to be a political officer, in no one way. He has no political ambitions; he want to be only a military man, a military commander. But Spychalski explained to him that this is only, I will say, a station to jump to that position of -- to be chief of staff, and then he --

MacNEIL: So he agreed to become a politician because he`d be promoted -- it was the way to promotion?

Col. CHECINSKI: Yes, because he told him that this is only temporarily. Then he was nominated to be chief of staff in `63 or `64.

MacNEIL: Well, without going through all the further stages -- I mean, he is now where he is, in the unique position of being the prime minister and the military leader of the country. What is curious, or what arouses my curiosity is of all that mixture of influences on him, how strong is his Polish nationalism now? Would it ever reach the point where he would feel he had to say to the Kremlin, "Enough. No more." -- and take the consequences?

Col. CHECINSKI: Well, again, to give an answer to that question we must first examine the relationships inside the ruling elite in Poland to understand --

MacNEIL: The people right around him.

Col. CHECINSKI: Around him. You can`t operate frankly -- you can`t operate inde-pendently if you are closed, if you have closed hands.

MacNEIL: In other words, if you`re surrounded by other people.

Col. CHECINSKI: Correct. And now what I want to explain is, I think no one mentioned that -- until today -- what is going on inside the ruling elite in Poland today. Spychalski -- I`m sorry, Jaruzelski has six vice ministers of defense. One of them is absolutely a Soviet agent. The second is a Soviet -- former Soviet officer. The third is absolutely subservient to the Soviets. I will not mention the names.

MacNEIL: So that`s three of them --

Col. CHECINSKI: Three of them.

MacNEIL: -- are pro-Soviets.

Col. CHECINSKI: Absolutely. And it`s not pro-Soviet they are all, but the problem is in the which hands you are pro-Soviet. If you are pro-Soviet as an agent you are absolutely dependent on Moscow. But if you are pro-Soviet because you understand for political reasons that it is convenient, it is something absolutely else.

MacNEIL: Now, what about the other three vice ministers of defense?

Col. CHECINSKI: The other three, I think, are correct. It`s like Jaruzelski: they are loyal to the Soviets, but I would like to say that they are also, from their point of view, they are Poles. You -- I understand it`s very difficult today to say something positive about all the people, because they raise their hand against the Polish nation, and from that point of view they all are, I will say, murderers. But, if you are looking at the situation in Poland what was going on in the last few weeks, you must -- all must estimate the situation differently. The situation was so: it was a Party plan. Jaruzelski now is, as you know. Party secretary, he is minister of defense, he is prime minister. The Party planning in fact gave Jaruzelski an ultimatum. "You will act against the nation or you will be replaced." Jaruzelski, if he will be replaced, I can only realize what will be in Poland. I think that bloodshed will be horrible. The other important thing is that Jaruzelski is now in a so- strong position, because he has all the factions in his hands, that that give him a more independent position vis-a-vis Party bureau-cracy. I do not believe that he really want to have a Solidarity: this is absolutely not true. He will never accept an independent Solidarity.

LEHRER: You mean, that`s based on his own beliefs; I mean, he just will never tolerate that; no matter what the Soviets want, he`s against it himself. Is that right?

Col. CHECINSKI: Yes, this is a different view. He is not suppressing the Solidarity only because the Soviets want that. I think he is suppressing Solidarity because he believes that it is impossible to rule over Poland with a Solidarity which is very strong, which has in fact, I will say, a -- is in fact a second center of power. And it is impossible to fit a second center of power in that system; absolutely no one will accept it.

LEHRER: So. the talk that we hear, the possibility of negotiations between Jaruzelski and those in Solidarity -- I mean, those aren`t going to lead anywhere, then, in your opinion, right?

Col. CHECINSKI: You mean such a possibility of -- to find a compromise with Solidarity

LEHRER: Yes.

Col. CHECINSKI: Well, probably that compromise what Jaruzelski want to have is not that compromise what Solidarity want to have. And it will be probably something between that what Jaruzelski want and between that what Solidarity want. It is a very specific situation, in my judgment, because the problem is not only Solidarity and only Jaruzelski. The problem is how far Jaruzelski can go being under the pressures of the Soviet Union. And Jaruzelski understand -- and Moscow understand, too, I`m sorry, not only Jaruzelski, that it`s imposs-ible to reconstruct the situation in Poland without to give the Solidarity some space for operation. It is not because -- I am sorry to say that, and I really respect that statement of President Reagan and State Secretary Haig. But the Soviet Union, if they will give some space -- and also Jaruzelski -- for Solidarity, it is because they fear the Polish nation. They know the Poles; they know that the Poles will fight until the last, even if they will not have some kind of compromise. And this is what they want to do.

LEHRER: Do you think that that is what`s going to happen? There are some predicting now that eventually this will lead to civil war. Do you believe that`s where this thing is headed?

Col. CHECINSKI: That it will -- that they will find a compromise?

LEHRER: No, no. Just the opposite, that they will not be able to find a compromise; that this will lead to a civil war -- revolution, as --

Col. CHECINSKI: I understand your question. I listened yesterday, I watch Professor Rurarz` statement that --

LEHRER: He is the former Polish ambassador to Japan, who defected to the United States, who was on our program.

Col. CHECINSKI: I am really encouraged by his statement that he is ready to go and to fight and so on; but, being realistic, it is little chance that that way of fighting will really be too much helpful. The way what I would like to see is -- this what Walesa probably supports. It is for one side to organize a very strong pressure: I will say at that moment a passive pressure by not working, by not -- the economy can`t work in such situations -- impossible.

MacNEIL: Ambassador Rurarz, who was on our program, said that he predicted that the Poles would be so infuriated by all this that it would come to armed resistance, that they would actually start fighting the authorities. Do you -- without saying whether you approve of that or not -- do you think they will?

Col. CHECINSKI: Yes, they will

MacNEIL: You think they will.

Col. CHECINSKI: Yes. If I know the Poles, they are very emotional; and they are a great nation -- they will not accept such kind of suppression, and there are a lot of young people who can go to the -- in summer to the -- if they will not find some compromise, some solution, they will fight.

MacNEIL: And do you think Jaruzelski knows this as well as --

Col. CHECINSKI: Absolutely. Jaruzelski understands absolutely the situation in the country and in the army. By the way --

MacNEIL: So -- can I just interrupt -- so that you would think that Jaruzelski`s motivation would be to find some compromise that would prevent the young Poles, the hotheads, taking up arms and starting civil war.

Col. CHECINSKI: Very correct.

MacNEIL: You think that will be his effort.

Col. CHECINSKI: Very correct. May I make an additional explanation. There were some informations in the mass media that the Polish army is suppressing` the Solidarity. In my judgment, it is not the Polish army; it is also not that what Professor Rurarz said -- Soviet clothes in Polish uniforms. They are special units inside the army which are absolutely able to suppress the Solidarity. And the army, in my judgment, is close in the barracks, and is guarded by that special units.

MacNEIL: Because they don`t trust the army to do that, because they wouldn`t be reliable.

Col. CHECINSKI: Absolutely; it`s correct. They have special units; they have WSW -- this is Military Internal Service, like a gendarmerie. They have about 25.000 such organized units, in addition to 20,000 not dispatched units. And they can mobilize additional 20.000, so we have 50,000. They have about 60-70,000 KBW -- this is the Cop of Internal Security; this is also not army. They are like Soviet Union KGB units, and there are about 60.000. They can mobilize additional 40,000; you will have 100,000. They have, in addition, about 25,000 or so ZOMO -- this is Motorized Police Units. And so you have together about 150,000 people -- without the army.

LEHRER: Have you been surprised at all. thus far. at the lack of what you`d call serious violent militancy, in terms of resistance to the military crackdown?

Col. CHECINSKI: You mean, what I expect?

LEHRER: Yes. I mean, does it surprise you that the reaction has not been any more violent than it has been up `til now?

Col. CHECINSKI: In. you mean, now or in the future?

LEHRER: Up `til now; in other words, the reaction of the people of Poland to the military crackdown. Does it surprise you that it hasn`t been any more violent than it has been up to this point in time?

Col. CHECINSKI: I understand your question. So, well, I have no really enough information -- and no one has -- to make a correct judgment. But I can only tell you what I feel, what I understand, knowing the Polish people and the Polish nation. First of all. the young people will not give up. and no one price -- most of them. And, if it`s no violence now, it doesn`t mean it can`t be tomorrow or after tomorrow. You need some time to organize a resistance. And they will really do. though. I have no doubt. They will -- and Jaruzelski fears that horribly. Is that your answer, the answer to your question?

LEHRER: Yes, sir. Let me ask you about the sanctions that President Reagan has imposed on the Soviet Union. You think they`ll do any good, sir?

Col. CHECINSKI: Well, it`s a very difficult question for me. But. first of all, I really think that President Reagan with his speech wrote the most golden pages in American history for Poland. And Polish nation will never forget it. But. if you are looking on that not only from the moral point of view, but from political point of view, you must be a little more realistic. Policy, in my feeling, is what you really can do and what will be effective. First of all, I`m not convinced that punishing the Soviet Union at that moment is. from practical point of view, totally correct. Because that means that you give the Soviet Union the right to speak about Poland. You give -- you are saying to the Soviet Union that this is a Polish province. I would like to emphasize another point: to punish only the Polish government, and very strongly, and to keep for the Soviet Union at the exact time when they`ll not be directly involved. Because Poland, we must emphasize -- and we know that Poland is not inde-pendent, but we must emphasize that Poland is independent, and we want strongly that Poland will be independent. It`s very important. And this is why I`m not sure that the punishing of the Soviet Union is effective.

MacNEIL: I`m afraid our time is up. Mr. Checinski. thank you very much for joining us this evening. May we wish you and Poland a happy new year. Happy New Year. Jim.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin. Same to you.

MacNEIL: And Happy New Year to you. We will be back tomorrow night. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.