The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Henry Kissinger in Africa

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Has Henry Kissinger done it again -- pulled another important diplomatic rabbit out of the hat before an amazed world on the eve of a Presidential election? The Secretary of State today ended eleven days of shuttle diplomacy between blacks and whites in southern Africa. By all accounts he has apparently convinced the leader of the white minority in Rhodesia, Ian Smith, to consider a plan for handing power to the black majority. That is something Smith has flirted with but always rejected before. Smith met with his cabinet in Salisbury today, and is reported to have said, "We have to face reality." Reality, in part, is a growing guerrilla war abetted by five neighboring black nations. Kissinger has reported to their leaders and received general approval of his plan. And it looks as if Kissinger`s efforts have produced real optimism that the much-feared racial showdown in southern Africa can, at least in Rhodesia, be peacefully resolved. Tonight we consider what Mr. Kissinger has actually wrought, whether it will stick, whether the quick fix will last and what it all means here in the United States. We begin with a BBC report on the weekend`s talks in South Africa, shown Monday night in London. The reporter is Richard Lindley:

RICHARD LINDLEY: On the pleasant, rolling hills outside Pretoria stands the Voortrekker Monument, granite and marble. It was built to last forever, a memorial to the Afrikaners` own search for freedom and a warning of the perils of unsound treaties. Inside, the marble frieze records the peace negotiations between black and white 140 years ago and what the Afrikaners, on their Great Trek north, saw as the murderous treachery of the black man. As Dr. Kissinger made his own personal trek through southern Africa this last weekend it`s the granite determination of the white population never again to be deceived and betrayed in negotiation with the blacks that he`s had to struggle with. Before he left America Dr. Kissinger made it very plain that on this trip, at least, he was not going to involve himself in South Africa`s racial problems despite the riots in the black townships here that have cost 300 lives.

Though the day of Dr. Kissinger`s arrival started quietly, by lunchtime firebombs set alight buildings in the shopping center at Johannesburg. For the first time the race war came to Eloff Street, the heart of the white city. In the black townships there were protests against the Kissinger visit. When the police moved in shooting, at least six people died. There were no protests or demonstrations at Waterkloof Airport when Dr. Kissinger flew in; this is a military air base. Kissinger, whose passport number is 00-001, was preceded by three jammed transport planes to carry his staff, communications equipment and of course the bullet-proof Cadillac he traveled in. When the Lone Ranger rides out, he brings a sizable posse with him. Television is as much a novelty to South Africans as is Dr. Kissinger himself.

In a country so often ostracized by the outside world, Kissinger`s visit has even more importance. In Pretoria, cafe patrons watch the nightly news program in its English version:

NEWSCASTER: Good evening. The-American Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, has arrived in South Africa. Dr. Kissinger and his entourage were met at Waterkloof Air Force Base this afternoon by Foreign Affairs Minister Dr. Hilgard Muller, South African Ambassador to the U.S. Mr. Pik Botha and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mr. Brand Fourie. A guard of honor of black South African servicemen saluted Dr. Kissinger as he left the air force base accompanied by a fleet of 30 official cars.

BBC: Dr. Kissinger obviously thinks that Mr. Vorster, despite what he`s saying, ought to put pressure on Mr. Smith in Rhodesia. Now, do you think that`s going to happen?

CAFE PATRON: I don`t think so. I think, to a certain extent, South Africa has always followed a policy of non-interference and I don`t think -- just as we will not tell Samora Machel or Dr. Kaunda -- I don`t think we will tell Mr. Smith what to do.

BBC: Well, how can majority rule be achieved in Rhodesia -- do you even think that would be a good idea?

CAFE-PATRON: It looks like the only one. But on the same hand, I must admit if we accept majority rule in Rhodesia, why shouldn`t we have majority rule in South Africa, where ate have four million and 24 million respectively, black and white? So all I`m saying is that I think a formula will have to be worked out where the rights are protected -- the rights of everybody - and I think the same will apply in this country.

LINDLEY: For Mr. Vorster, the South African Prime

Minister, this is a proud moment. For 30 years no important American official has visited his country. Now a generally hostile world has recognized that it needs South Africa`s help if the whole of southern Africa is not to degenerate into a racial war -- a war from which Marxism might be the only winner, as it was in Angola and Mozambique. The first item on the agenda was Namibia, the huge territory still administered by South Africa in defiance of United Nations resolutions. Mr. Vorster has agreed to multiracial government and independence there by 1978. The vital question now is how significant a role in the country`s political life he`s prepared to allow the nationalist organizations as opposed to tribal groups. How, though, intractable a problem is Rhodesia? While Dr. Kissinger hag adopted the British plan for majority rule within two years, white Rhodesians continue to reject any such rapid handover. Mr. Vorster has it in his power to bring Mr. Smith down by cutting off fuel supplies and refusing to transport Rhodesia`s exports. But on the eve of the Kissinger visit here he made his public position on that possibility very plain:

BALTHAZAR J. VORSTER: And I stated that all over the world where I went, I`m not prepared to prescribe to any of my neighbors what their policy should be. South Africa, ladies and gentlemen, gave no orders to Rhodesia; the Rhodesians are a proud people -- they won`t accept orders from South Africa or anybody else, for that matter....

LINDLEY: In private, as in public, Dr. Kissinger had maintained that he would only meet Mr. Smith if progress was guaranteed. Then suddenly Mr. Smith was in Pretoria under the American ambassador`s residence to meet the Secretary of State. All day Sunday Dr. Kissinger spelled out his plans, agreed to by the British and by the African front-line presidents:

HENRY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, the Rhodesian delegation and me have met for about four hours. I presented to the Rhodes an delegation the joint United States-British views on the subject of the political and economic future of Rhodesia. I presented also in detail the views--of the presidents of black Africa as to the essentials of a settlement in Rhodesia.

LINDLEY: The elements of the deal would be: first, massive foreign aid -- financial incentives to whites to stay on in the new Rhodesia, plus insurance payments if they were forced out. Second, an end to the guerrilla war. The black presidents would see to it that the Rhodesian nationalists ceased fire. In return, Mr. Smith would at last have to agree to the British demand for majority rule within two years. Mr. Smith listened, asked questions, and is now back in Salisbury to consult his cabinet. Dr. Kissinger has gone to report progress so far to the African presidents.

(In studio.)

Dr. Kissinger`s determination to achieve what his aides call the "quick fix" -- to get outline agreement to his proposals within the week -- has perhaps jolted Mr. Smith into facing up to the realities of the situation. But if. he does now abandon the policies he has pursued for eleven years and accepts the inevitability of early majority rule, will white Rhodesians go along with him? Tonight we`ve asked a leading member of the Rhodesia Party to fly down from Salisbury to this Johannesburg studio. Mr. McNally, you`re just back from a 36-day stint with the Rhodesian Army fighting the very men that Dr. Kissinger now expects Mr. Smith to hand over to. Are white Rhodesians going to accept that?

NICK McNALLY: Well, I think that the first problem is this question of a transfer of power. I think that the western world is inclined to think that it is simply a transfer of power, but it`s much more than that that`s involved. We`ve got problems of the restructuring of society; we can`t simply transfer power without creating a new educational structure, a new land structure; and all these things have got to be built up.

And then the second problem that arises is that we`ve got to find a group to hand over to. It`s all very simple to talk about transferring power, but there is major conflict between the black nationalist groups.

LINDLEY: Are white Rhodesians ready to accept, now, that they must do a deal if they are to survive as a group in the Rhodesia of the future?

McNALLY: I don`t think they are. I`ve been out in the bush for the last 35, 36 days and the general feeling among the people there that I met in the army is, we`ve got to win the terrorist war first, then let`s talk settlement. I think this is a rather back-to-front way of looking at things, but I think that one`s got to face it; that is what white Rhodesians generally think.

LINDLEY: Your part of the Rhodesia Party, with perhaps 20 percent of the white vote, put forward proposals very similar to Dr. Kissinger`s two years ago. Now, Mr. Smith ignored them then; why should he accept them now?

McNALLY: I think there are some reasons why he should accept them now. The situation has got a lot tougher in Rhodesia; Mr. Smith himself has carefully cleared his position with his own party at the congress last week -- he`s got a carte blanche to go ahead and do what he likes -- and he has, for the first time, invited western intervention, whereas in the past, as you remember, he used to say that the west should get off his back. So there are hopeful signs, I think, that Mr. Smith is facing up to the real problem that we`ve got today..

MacNEIL: Twice before, Mr. Smith seemed willing to reach agreement with the Africa National Council, the most prominent of the various black factions in Rhodesia. On the other occasions, the British were the brokers between Smith and the blacks.

Now Kissinger is playing that role; and the only black Rhodesian organization he has talked with on this trip is the Africa National Council. Callistus Ndlovu is the North American representative for the Council. Dr. Ndlovu is currently a professor of history and Director of African Studies at Hofstra University in Long Island, New York. Mr. Ndlovu, to put to you the question that was just put in Johannesburg to a representative of white Rhodesia, albeit an opposition representative, why should Mr. Smith behave differently this time?

CALLISTUS NDLOVU: Well, I do.-not know if I agree with the analysis of the gentleman. We are very skeptical of what is going on just now. You probably remember that Mr. Nkomo said the Kissinger plan is a lot of ambiguities; and some of these ambiguities actually impinge upon the most fundamental parts of what we believe should be the right solution.

MacNEIL: Can I just tell our audience that Mr. Joshua Nkomo is the leader of the Africa National Council in Rhodesia, and he said today, according to the wire services, there were very serious flaws in the Kissinger plan. What do you think those flaws are?

NDLOVU: First of all, the plan involves a cease-fire, which -- from what I understand -- should take place as the negotiations begin. I think the audience will remember that last year Mr. Smith at the same time was very anxious to have negotiations. And if you look back you`ll see that the reason why he was anxious was because he wanted to have a cease-fire to avoid the rainy season which, of course, would give the guerrillas an advantage over him. We feel that the condition that there should be a cease-fire is probably one of the complications that might make it very difficult for anybody to accept the arrangement.

MacNEIL: What are the other flaws?

NDLOVU: The other flaw would be the basic concept of Mr. Kissinger`s understanding of what a Zimbabwean government should be like. The Africa National Council does not accept, for instance, the idea of multi-racial quarters in a government. You see, we have seen historically that in Lebanon, in Ireland, in Cyprus -- where these multi-racial or multi-ethnic quarters have been built into the constitution -- they`ve never worked. It`s a question of postponing a crisis which develops later. In fact, this represents what I consider to be guarantees of privilege within the constitutional structure. And I think as long as the people who are involved think that you can establish a government in which ethnic groups will be represented proportionally, then they are creating, obviously, a racial situation. You see, the Africa National Council is a non-racial organization to which any person, irrespective of his race, color or creed can belong. So as you see, we are not going to accept a situation which creates problems for our children, and we will resist any arrangement which creates guarantees of privilege.

MacNEIL: Good; we`ll come back. So, two serious flaws from the point of view of at least your group of black Africans in Rhodesia. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Dr. Chester Crocker teaches at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service here in Washington, and is Director of African Studies at Georgetown Center for Strategic and Inter national Studies. Dr. Crocker is a former member of Henry Kissinger`s National Security Council staff. His book, Southern Africa: Choices for the West, will be published this fall. Dr. Crocker, as was note by t e BBC reporter, this has been going on for eleven years. What new element do you believe Kissinger was able to bring to this whole affair at this point?

CHESTER CROCKER: It`s a very important question. I think Kissinger is on record as saying that he does not touch crises until they are hot -- at least, he has been quoted as saying that in reference to the Middle East. I think this is the major aspect of it. He sees now, in the events of the past 18 months, including Angola, some-movement in the power relations among the states of southern Africa. And this, he figures, offers an opportunity for American diplomacy. That, to me, is one major element. The second element, certainly, has to do with the dying days of an administration and the final months of his own record, which has not been particularly stellar in the African field, as he himself has recently recognized.

LEHRER: So he saw an opportunity caused by the potential outbreak of war, is that right, and he stepped into it and just hopes for the best? He must have had more than just hope going for him when he went over there.

CROCKER: Well, there was, of course, the implicit threat of further Cuban or Soviet support or intervention, along the pattern of Angola, which I`m sure he figured would be an element in the thinking of the white governments of both South Africa and Rhodesia. That element was certainly there.

LEHRER: I realize that you were not there and nobody who is talking was there when Ian Smith met with Henry Kissinger, but it`s not hard to visualize, is it, particularly for you, what Kissinger was able to tell Smith? Was he almost in a position where he could say, "Smith, look, friend, this is the way it`s going to be; you`re either going to go peacefully or you`re going to have war and everybody`s going to die," and then couple that with an offer of money -- is that really basically what he had to offer?

CROCKER: That is certainly what we`re being led to believe, and there have been press reports today to suggest it. He laid it on the line in no uncertain terms to Smith when they met in South Africa. On the other hand, I think his information base must surely be good enough for him to realize that white Rhodesians do not feel things are that bleak that they must, in effect, turn over power to the African majority on the terms set down by the Africa National Council within two years. Most white Rhodesians don`t believe their situation is that desperate.

LEHRER: From your perspective, are you optimistic -- more optimistic than Mr. Ndlovu was about whether this thing is going to stick together or not?

CROCKER: I wouldn`t bet a single penny on the outcome; we`ll know by Friday, I think, and to guess at this point would be a little far-fetched. I do think the timing of the negotiations has enough elements in it which suggest` American domestic political priorities that I`m not all that optimistic, and I think southern Africans read it that way, too --both black and white.

LEHRER: Thank you, Doctor. Mrs. Goler Butcher, a Washington attorney, is a member of Jimmy Carter`s foreign policy task force; she`s co-chairman of the Democratic Party`s study group on Africa and worked on the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Africa. Mrs. Butcher also spent several years working as an attorney on African affairs at the State Department. Mrs. Butcher, what is your view, are you: ready to sing the praises of Henry Kissinger tonight?

GOLER BUTCHER: No, I am not. I think that this whole scenario has to be received with the gravest reservations and that the American people must begin to ask the hard questions surrounding it.

LEHRER: Such as?

BUTCHER: What is the price that we must pay; what is the cost to the United States?

LEHRER: Are you saying that no attempt should have been made by Kissinger to avert war, which is really the basis for what he went over there?

BUTCHER: I`m not saying that no attempt should be made; but I`m saying that the attempt that should be made must be one that is built on a certain type of foundation. This foundation is one which involves an externally imposed solution. The people of the countries are not being consulted. Maybe a leader here or there, the front-line presidents, and so forth -- the people of the countries are not being consulted as to what they want.

LEHRER: People of what, you mean the people of Rhodesia...?

BUTCHER: Peoples of Zimbabwe, and the people of Namibia. We know also that this solution is being worked out ignoring the basic problem of southern Africa, which is South Africa. The people in South Africa, I understand, see Kissinger as coming as their savior.

LEHRER: You mean, the white people of South Africa?

BUTCHER: Yes. And so do the blacks, I believe, see him coming as the savior of the whites. Now, whether or not this perception is, in fact, true, its being there is difficult; and I think that we`ve got to ask what price are we paying Vorster, and what is the cost to the United States?

LEHRER: You mean in terms of money, or in terms of prestige, in terms of morality, or what?

BUTCHER: Prestige is an unfortunate concomitant of this, but that`s not what I`m concentrating on now. Money -- I think in the end it may be the smallest element. The real question is, what is the involvement of the United States government here? Who is going to guarantee this? Are we going to be the guarantors? There was a report in the Dublin Sunday press that insofar as Namibia is concerned, that one aspect of the plan is to have a Namibian army created, equipped, financed and supported by the U.S. government, that there would be U.S. military advisors stationed there, and that to as large an extent as possible this black Namibian army would have black American personnel serving with them. Whether or not that is true, these are the questions that must be asked. Are we going to guarantee the borders of South Africa? Are we going to give up the external arms embargo? Are we going to use American forces and American power and American strength to support a solution whether or not the people throughout the country want it? Because the real thing here is that this is a liberation movement, a grass-roots, indigenous movement throughout Zimbabwe, and that we cannot impose it.

LEHRER: Robin wants to pursue that right now. Robin?

MacNEIL: Yes. Zimbabwe, of course, being the African name for what we call Rhodesia. Mr. Ndlovu, do you agree that the people of Rhodesia are not being consulted in this process?

NDLOVU: I think that is accurate, yes.

MacNEIL: I mean Mr. Nkomo, your leader, was consulted on behalf of that group.

NDLOVU: Mr. Nkomo was consulted after Mr. Kissinger had met with Mr. Vorster and with Mr. Smith.I think it is accurate to say that they were not consulted in the first place; s0 that even if Mr. Nkomo is consulted, I think what really is at issue here is whether what is being done is being done in the interest of the African people, or it is being done...

MacNEIL: According to the American political priorities, as Mr. Crocker put it.

NDLOVU: Yes.

MacNEIL: What do you think is the case?

NDLOVU: I think that probably the United States is motivated by the desire to protect its interests in southern Africa, and that if they don`t do that now they probably are going to lose everything.

MacNEIL: But even if that were true, could it not turn out to be a favorable solution for Rhodesia if it turns out to be progress towards majority rule?

NDLOVU: You see, from our own point of view, we would not lose an opportunity to get the country free, but I think we have to put these things in their proper perspective and see exactly what they mean. 1-don`t personally think that the people that are really behind the policy consider African opinion very crucial, except that if they can get some people to back it up then probably they would surround the Africans with this situation and force them to accept whatever has been agreed. The fact that a lot of emphasis is being placed upon what neighboring countries feel, more than what Africans feel themselves, is quite an important one. I`m not saying here that the neighboring countries should not be consulted, but I think that it is quite obvious that what they say is probably weightier than what the Africans, themselves in Zimbabwe and Namibia might think.

So to that extent I would say that Goler is correct that the consultation has not been what it should be.

MacNEIL: Mr. Crocker, what do you think the price could be to the United States, following on Mrs. Butcher`s comments?

CROCKER: I think she`s posed some very important issues. But as I read the situation in southern Africa the real question is whether or not the United States knows what its interests are in the area, and secondly whether or not there`s any way to communicate rapidly enough with the American people what those interests are, in fact. As I look at the situation, the American interest in southern Africa is one of obtaining peaceful accomodations. I do not think the American people or the American Congress are going to support violent solutions or bloody victories. I don`t think our political system works that way; nor do I believe the American electorate will vote that way -- in an unambiguous way -- if you actually ask their opinion. One of the most difficult problems in all of America`s efforts to develop a southern African policy is that no American politician has ever dared throw this issue to the American people, and few would dare predict what would happen if they did.

LEHRER: Let me try to ask you in the minute we have left -each one of you two -- what effect do you think this is going to have on the November elections? Mrs. Butcher?

BUTCHER: I don`t see how this could have an effect on the November elections if the people of America are thinking, and if they recall that we went through the magic of a peace-at-hand syndrome before and if they have real, long-term U.S. interest in mind.

LEHRER: What do you think, Dr. Crocker?

CROCKER: I`m inclined to agree there won`t be a dramatic impact. If there`s a sudden collapse, Carter might play it up in a certain way; if there`s a rabbit-out-of-the-hat, as you put it earlier, there might be a very modular gain for the administration. But I don`t think many voters in this country understand what`s at stake, and I`m not sure they`re prepared to pay out the dollars...

LEHRER: Ford took his lumps during the primaries for an African policy. with conservatives, and the question here is if he brings something off successfully, whither it will have an effect on black voters, and you don`t think it will.

BUTCHER: You mean if he brings off magic successfully, will he have effect? The real issue is that a great power must act circumspectly and with reality and support its interests or it goes down the road to ruin.

LEHRER: And our reality is we`re out of time. Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Yes, and we should know more definitively what Mr. Smith is really thinking when he speaks to the Rhodesian people this Friday. We`11 be back tomorrow evening. I`m Robert MacNeil; good night.