The Robert MacNeil Report; Anatomy of the Korean Incident

JIM LEHRER: Good evening. I`m Jim Lehrer in Washington; Robin is off tonight. Representatives of the United Nations Command on north Korea met again in Panmunjom today to firm up an agreement that would prevent further border incidents like the one two weeks ago, in which two American Army officers were beaten to death. Late reports today indicated that while agreement was near, there was always a possibility that negotiations would break down and it would all come to naught. Otherwise, fallout continued to flutter down here in Washington and elsewhere about the August 18 incident involving a tree in the neutral area between North and South Korea. A Congressional committee held a hearing yesterday to hear from State Department spokesmen and others about what happened and why, and to assess the American as well as North Korean actions before, during and after the incident.

And tonight we want to pursue some of the questions raised by this entire affair. First, with the assistance of some photographs taken by a U.S. Army man at a guard post a few hundred yards away, let`s review exactly what happened on that fateful day. The photos were made available to us by the Defense Department for their first showing on television. Here`s the scene: the North Korean guardhouse on one end of the bridge called the "bridge- of no return," the U.N. Command American guardhouse at the other end. This is the tree which caused the problem. A better shot of the tree, as the U.N. Command force of three officers, seven enlisted men and five Korean laborers begin their trimming work on the tree. The reason for trimming it was because it obscured the view from this U.N. Command guard post to one further south, from which these pictures were taken, by the way. Work has begun at this point. The North Koreans arrive now; after first saying it was alright to trim it, some twenty minutes later they ordered the work to be halted. As fate would have it, the Americans are in white hats, the North Koreans in the dark ones. According to witnesses a North Korean Army officer yelled, "Kill!" and thirty or so North Korean soldiers grabbed axe handles out of this truck and started hitting the Americans and their workers.

More fighting now. As you can see, some of the Americans are running for cover, although armed, choosing not to use their sidearms. Here you can see several of the North Koreans bearing in on one of the American officers and beating up on him. And suddenly, less than five minutes after it all began, it`s all over. Left behind, the body of one of the dead American officers; the other is in the bushes here by the tree. The final toll, two dead, and eight American and South Korean soldiers injured. And then we move to August 21, three days later.

Another American work force of 16, plus a 94-man security force, went back to the tree. And without incident or interference from the North Koreans, cut it down. That felling of the tree was part of an overall American response to the August 18 attack, which also included the deployment of aircraft and the Naval Task Force to the area, as well as putting our defense forces on a high-category alert. The North Koreans countered putting their defense forces on what was called a "war footing." Then care an expression of regret from the North Koreans, which was first rejected by the State Department as being unsatisfactory and then later accepted as being alright. And the incident apparently ended there, with new meetings at P`anmunjom, the threat of a new Korean war ending with it. But the questions have not ended. Don canard is a former Foreign Service officer who was stationed in Korea from 1959 to 1962. He also served as the State Department`s Director for Korean Affairs from 1970-74. Mr. Ranard is currently Director of the Center for International Policy, a Washington- based think tank. Mr. Ranard, what do you think about why this attack took place in the first place?

DON RANARD: I don`t have much difficulty accepting the facts as presented in the hearing yesterday. I think the attack took place largely for North Korean propaganda value in relation to the Non-aligned Conference and also to the upcoming U.N. General Assembly. I think there night possibly also have been a revenge motive in the sense that three North Koreans were killed sometime, I think, towards the end of June in an infiltration attempt.

LEHRER: No question, then, that it was premeditated -- that the -North Korean high command, wherever they may be and whoever they are, knew exactly what the soldiers were going to do, is that your feeling?

RANARD: I don`t have much doubt that the incident was premeditated; I`m not sure that murder in that degree was premeditated.

LEHRER: Do you think that they hope to get some P.R. value out of this?

RANARD: I don`t think there`s any question about that; they wanted mileage in-terms of the Non-aligned Conference and also in terms of the U.N. General Assembly, and I guess from their purposes they got it. They proved that there was a massive U.S. involvement in Korea.

LEHRER: Do you think this was a P.R. coup for the North Koreans?

RANARD: No, but I think the North Koreans grandstand to a different audience; that is to say, the North Koreans are grandstanding not to the U.K. or the French or any of the Western European nations -- they`re grandstanding in front of the iron-aligned people and I don`t think there`s much doubt that they have proved a point, that the United States is that heavily involved on the Korean peninsula.

LEHRER: You know, it was brought out also at this hearing yesterday that we did have some warning that -the Koreans might resist any kind of attempt to tamper with that tree or chop it down. Do you think that we went in there with the idea that there was going to be trouble, or did we go in there prepared enough? :hat do you think of our actions to begin with?

RANARD: You know, it`s awfully hard, Jim, to second-guess other people who have to make decisions, but I don`t think there`s any doubt but what we were apprehensive. After all, on the sixth they had been told to stop trimming the tree. We now look back and talk about the major statement the North Koreans made on August 5 -- August 5 and august 6 are sufficiently in advance of August 18 to know that the North Koreans can be provocative and they can be ugly.

LEHRER. : But you don`t believe that the United States went in there to trim that tree in order to provoke an incident?

RANARD: I`d hate to believe that, and I don`t now. I have a lot of questions about what happened, but I`d hate to believe that the United States did that for that purpose.

LEHRER: Alright, sir. Thank you. Representative John Murphy is a Democrat from New York who has taken a special interest in Korean affairs during his seven terms in the House; last October Murphy and several other Congressmen who were also veterans of the Korean ;Tar went on a fact-finding tour of Korea. When he returned he issued a report warning that the North Koreans were stepping up activities against the South, and after the August 18 murders Congressman Murphy introduced three resolutions calling for prompt action in Congress and the United Nations.

Congressman, do you think this was a premeditated murder on the part of the North Koreans?

JOHN MURPHY: I think there`s no question. As we saw at the outset of the program, which wasn`t made clear, the lieutenant of the North Korean Armed Forces that was leading the details was the same gentleman who almost killed Major Henderson in the attack a few months ago on him, in the same demilitarized zone -- kicked him in the throat and broke his voice box, permanently injuring him.

LEHRER: The same man who supposedly yelled "Kill!" is the same man who attacked Major Henderson.

MURPHY: The same one ... and of course has been involved in the other incidents, which were all premeditated. I think if we put in perspective the North Koreans and go down to the Srilanka Conference that was taking place at this time...

LEHRER: This was the Ton-aligned nations, that`s right.

MURPHY: Right, of the Non-aligned nations, who proved then weren`t very non-aligned after the conclusion of that conference. We saw that Kim I1 Sung, the premier of North Korea, did not go; the vice-premier went. His opening statements were that 400,000 Americans were in South Korea, which is ten times the number of American troops, trying to further overstate tine case of American involvement there -- we`ve reduced our forces down to what we feel is a balanced force to keep stability in the peninsula. But that doesn`t show up is the reason Kim Il Sung did not go to Sri Lanka, and that`s the problems that are existing in North Korea today: North Korea is bankrupt, it`s defaulted on its loans to both the Soviet Union and Japan. In June it had a very serious freeze that has caused a crop failure, and they have to go into international areas now to buy grain and other foodstuffs. We found that Kim Il Sung tried to create the heir-apparent to his dynasty, named one son as the next premier, and the second son took great umbrage at this, as did many senior-ranking military officers, and there are serious problems in North Korea.

LEHRER : So he needed some.

MURPHY: There`s nothing like this international incident to create a threat to the country to try to take people`s minds off the problems of the country at the time.

LEHRER: What about the American response, the alert, the putting in of the airplanes, the movement-of the convoy -- particularly the Midway -- in those waters... do you think that was adequate, do you think it was justified?

MURPHY: I think it was a very smart response. Other methods were recommended, incidentally, and those were troop movements in the peninsula itself near the demilitarized zone, which I would not have recommended because it could have led to an escalation. I think our response by Navy and Navy air puts it in perspective because those areas are areas that North Korea cannot compete with us -- on the sea or Navy air. The fact that we moved a squadron from the United States in a matter of hours, and from Midway in a matter of hours, also further emphasizes the ability of the United States to respond on a large scale quickly in strategic areas. I think it was a proper response -- there`s a four-to-one imbalance in air in that theatre now in favor of North Korea, and this merely corrected that imbalance at the time.

LEHRER: Alright, sir, thank you. Jerome Alan Cohen is Director of. Last Asian Legal Studies and Associate Dean of the Harvard Law School. He has written numerous books and articles and advised Jimmy Carter on East Asian affairs. Dr. Cohen visited Korea early this summer. Dr. Cohen, what do you think of the American response to the incident on August 18?

JEROME ALAN COHEN : Well, it was certainly better than our response in the case of the Mayaguez. I don`t think we can second-guess the kind of mobilization of forces that has been described here. What I do criticize, I think, is that it took over two weeks until the factual background that led to this incident was brought up by our government. in other words, long after our own perceptions and that of the rest of the world are formed, we learned yesterday that on August the sixth the North Koreans had warned us not to do this. I`m not saying we weren`t within our rights to go ahead -- each side really was playing chicken here; it eras a war of nerves that we felt rightfully we ought to assume the risk in. But I think: we should have been given that background long before, because we didn`t do this on August 18 without our own premeditation and planning with the South Koreans. I think. when we talk about premeditation I agree with both previous speakers about the reasons the North would have for creating an incident -- it`s clear they wanted to do it for the reasons stated.

LEHRER: How would they have known that the United States had chosen August 18 to go trim that tree?

COHEN: They were prepared for when we would do it, obviously. But the South also, I think, didn`t find this provocation of the North unwelcome. I think the North has problems, internally and externally; South Korea, despite its phenomenal economic development, also has some very serious problems, particularly political problems. You see, President Park Chung Hee was well aware that he was about to sentence the 18 leading citizens who called for a restoration of democracy in Korea, and who called for Park to resign, to long prison terms. This incident came in very handy by appearing to justify, and even overshadow, this sentencing, not only at home but also abroad -- particularly in the United States where he is under very severe criticism. And I must say that Congressman Murphy`s plea for prompt action from the Congress has already brought a response from the House International Relations Committee, where the full committee unanimously voted yesterday not only to condemn the North for these killings but also to condemn the Park government of South Korea for sentencing 18 distinguished citizens to prison simply because they called for a restoration of democracy. And I might say the committee took the very unusual step of respectfully urging the government of the Republic of Korea, that is, South Pores, to remit their sentences. This shows you that each side has its own problems and its own reasons to welcome this kind of provocation.

LEHRER: Let`s open this up now. How do you feel about what the House International Relations Committee did yesterday, is that what you had in mind with your resolutions, or are -you strictly anti-North? What`s your feeling about the South and the points that Dr. Cohen just raised?

MURPHY: I think Dr. Cohen raises some points, but I think they have to be put in their proper context. The resolution I introduced was a condemnation of North Korea for killing two United States Army officers who also were United Nations officers in the demilitarized zone, which was clearly an international incident because of where it took place, and it was certainly in violation of the `53 treaty signed by both sides - really a cease-fire signed by both sides. And 140 members of the Congress co-signed that resolution. Now when the resolution got to the committee the committee tacked on the language to recommend the commutation of the sentences of the18 people who had created an incident on Easter Day back in the spring in violation of South Korean law -- mainly a decree that`s an emergency decree number 9 -- a clear violation of the law; but the fact that we take an international instance and condemn that act, then we take the instance and join it of an act that was wholly within a country and which, in effect, could be considered by most people an intrusion into the internal affairs of another country. I think, strictly speaking, both resolutions should have been separated and they both should stand on their own merits.

RANARD: I`m indebted to Congressman Murphy because I think he`s opened this up to the proper context. I think that the greatest significance of what happened on the DMZ is not in terms of the mechanics of the armistice agreement. But rather more broadly speaking I think it has helped remind us of the extent to which the United States is tied in on security arrangements with an oppressive government. I disagree with Congressman 1slurphy in terms of some of the actual facts -- the so-called "four-to- one" air imbalance; it really isn`t that, and I also disagree with him as concerns some of the points he makes about this so-called emergency law and the incident of 18 people getting together and the leading Catholic cathedral making a statement that probably would have made Thomas Jefferson look like a leftist. The essential element here, though, is that the United States is involved on security purposes and a security arrangement with a government that is repressive. And it seems to me that the tragedy of our policy here is that in the instance of the United States trying to maintain a commitment, American people just don`t feel that this particular government has anything in common with us.

LEHRER: Do you agree with that, Congressman? First of all, let`s delineate what the extent of our commitment is. There are 41,000 American troops...

RANARD: The commitment is the treaty; it has nothing to do with the size of forces. The commitment is the security treaty of 1954.

LEHRER: Congressman, you`re on.

MURPHY: I think the issue is one of perspective again. Park was elected President of South Korea on two occasions; we know what the government of the North is -- the most repressive regime in the world; we know that Park did cause a change in the constitution which caused many politicians within Korea to feel that he was being repressive. His reason, of course, was the national security and tine integrity of South Korea and retaining that. And of course I think not just this incident, but 47 other Americans have been killed in the DMZ in various other instances, and 1,000 South Koreans, including personal assaults through that zone on Park himself when a 32-man hit squad infiltrated through the zone right to the front door of the Blue House. How the question is. . .

LEHRER: What`s the Blue House?

MURPHY: The Blue House is the White House -- in Korea it`s called the Blue House. That points out a very simple fact: 22 miles from the capitol city is a 600-man army ready to take that capitol city. Now, does that justify extraordinary measures in that country and that country`s leadership to proclaim an emergency decree?

LEHRER: You believe it does?

MURPHY:I think it does.

LEHRER: Dr. Cohen.

COHEN : Could I say that this old shibboleth about "We don`t interfere in internal affairs" is really nonsense, as our behavior toward Chile, Cuba and many other countries has demonstrated. The administration no longer even invokes it any more because it`s a charade. We have, as taxpayers, been responsible for over 12 billion dollars in military and economic aid to this government in South Korea. We have a treaty that guarantees that my children and yours may have to die to defend that government; we have 700 nuclear weapons in addition to 41,000 troops there. We, in other words, have a great practical and moral obligation toward the South and we are responsible in that sense for what takes place there in a dray that we don`t remotely have toward North Korea. We don`t even have any contact, not to mention even diplomatic relations with North Korea, and Kim Il Sung`s abuses I abhor but I am not responsible for. And we do share, and we have really borne many risks for, the responsibility for this South Korean government.

LEHRER: Didn`t this whole incident of August 18 raise, really -- I would disagree with you, Mr. Ranard, in terms of what the ultimate question is -- the ultimate question is whether or not the United States is willing -- would have been willing -- to go to War if it had escalated to that point.

MURPHY: Not only the United States didn`t want to go to war over this incident; neither did China or Russia. And they made it clear to Kim that he was not going to be backed up and they said "You`d better apologize." And this is the first instance in the entire time that Kin has been leading North Korea that he ever apologized for anything, regardless of the outrageous acts; and the Pueblo, and the shooting down of the U-121 were far more outrageous than this incident.

COHEN: `We maybe able to turn a vice into a virtue as a result of `this incident, because, as the Congressman points out, this has led not only to a chastened response, as the State Department said yesterday, but also to the beginnings of some negotiations. I think this incident highlights the lack of communication we`ve had with North Korea. They are a very dangerous, isolated, paranoid, inflexible people, far different from the North Vietnamese. I think this requires a special attention and caution in dealing with them, and I think the next administration should make every attempt possible, despite all tine difficulties that they will put before us, to obtain some kinds of reliable channels of communication with then.

LEHRER: Mr. Ranard .

RANARD: Jim, the one thing I wanted to get across is that I`m not in disagreement with Congressman Murphy; we`ve been on opposite sides of an issue for some tine, but I`m not in disagreement with him in terms of our view of t1orth-Korea. Let`s make that quite clear -- I think those of us who had some opportunity to follow North Korean practices and actions know that they are mean, they`re ugly, they can be provocative, and as was demonstrated the other day they can be brutal. But that is not alone why our forces are on the Korean peninsula, it seems to me. It was editorialized the other day -- I think it was in the Times -when they talked about the Achilles heel; in other words, we know why we`re there, we`re against the worth Koreans, but we`re also there, it seems to me, because we stand for certain positive values, tend these values relate to democratic institutions, they relate to human rights, they relate to human dignities; and the fact that in South Korea you have a government which has just arrested and put in jail a 76-year-old ex-President and has kidnapped the other fellow who almost won the election, I find these things hard to rationalize in terms of American security relationships.

MURPHY: Let`s go back a few years to 1950, where all of this started. The Korean War was not a war to save South Korea. The Korean War was a decision on the part of the United States and of course a large number of countries in the United Nations to stop communism. We not only had to draw the line in Korea in the `50s, we also had to draw the line in Berlin. Now, we maybe seeing -- and I think Mr. Cohen has pointed this out -- a change in the Korean situation from one of being an intrusion in the West by the communist world to being one of strictly a Korean question not related to the intrusion of the West by the communist world. We go to Angola: that was a pure intrusion; we saw that as a strategic intrusion. We saw the question of the Middle East: a solid intrusion of the Western world, but we may now be seeing -and we`ll have to watch and observe -- whether or not the Korean question turns into one of a local problem.

LEHRER: That`s the way it looks like it`s going, does it not? Russia and China would not come to the aid of North Korea in this incident.

COHEN: Our hope is that we can gradually get the great powers to withdraw from their interest in Korea and let the Koreans work these problems out for themselves.

LEHRER: Including the withdrawal of the ignited States, you mean.

COHEN: Absolutely, if Peking and Moscow will also do the same. We all have treaties with our respective partners. But let me just correct the Congressman in one respect. In April of 1950, just before the Korean War, Secretary of State Dean Atchison had to remind President Syngman Rhee, himself a dictator, that American support for the Republic of South Korea was predicated on the assumption that we were these to promote the growth of democratic institutions; and if that isn`t what was going to take place in South Korea then the American public wanted to take a second look at our support.

LEHRER : Is it time to reconsider and rethink our commitment to South Korea in this light, Congressman?

MURPHY: I think we`ve evaluated South Korea on a periodic basis. I think that the United States force there has been reduced from 600,000 men in the eighth army down to 41,000. President Park has stated that until he has equalized his force with his problem of the North, at such time as he does, the United States forces won`t be necessary on the peninsula.

LEHRER: Let me ask you this, though: as long as the United States forces remain there and the danger of these kinds of incidents getting out of hand, aren`t we always on the brink of having to go to war, as long as we`re there with that commitment and our troops being there?

MURPHY: If we walk away from the positions that we`ve felt are strategically, important to America, and on this peninsula Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union and China all meet, and that`s what makes it such a critical piece of terrain -- if we walk away from the places we`ve said are our strategic interest one b-T one. I think that we`re not going to have a free world except for a period of time here in the United States.

RANARD: I don`t want to talk about the free world when I talk about South Korea, but what I do want to say is I do think the United States has a security involvement on the Korean peninsula. In essence (that is to say, to help avoid war, to bring peace and so forth) I don`t think that the United States can possibly support that in terms of the repressive government in the South; it just won`t work. And that is where the increasing criticism is coming in terms of the newspapers, in terms of your churches, and so forth.

LEHRER: I must end it there. Robin will be back tomorrow night; I`m Jim Lehrer. Until tomorrow night, thank you and good night.