The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; 7058; The Reasons for the Soviet Purge in Egypt by President Sadat

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ROBERT MacNEIL (voice-over): Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt, in American eyes a man of peace and statesmanship. Why is he suddenly arresting political opponents and expelling Soviet advisors?

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MacNEIL: Good evening. Some 1,500 Soviet technicians and advisors were ordered to leave Egypt today as President Sadat continued his purge of alleged domestic and foreign plotters. Today`s action was only the latest in two weeks of wholesale arrests and expulsions and reassignments involving hundreds of political and religious opponents. While the popular president was able to secure a massive public approval in a referendum last week. His drastic actions have raised many questions in the United States. In the words of a New York Times editorial, "Why does such a popular leader need to use a sledgehammer to confirm his authority?" Turmoil in Egypt is of great concern to the United States. Egypt is vital to hopes for a Middle East settlement, the only Arab nation technically at peace with Israel. Sadat is the only Arab leader able to make the historic reversal and accept Israel`s existence. Tonight, the reasons for the purge in Egypt. Jim Lehrer is off; Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in Washington. Charlayne?

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Robin, President Sadat charged the Soviets with plotting against Egypt by inciting Moslem/Christian strife. Then he continued his purge. Here is the breakdown. Ordered to leave the country within 48 hours were the Soviet ambassador and six unidentified diplomats. All contracts of Soviet advisors were canceled, also, and two Soviet journalists were expelled. The major targets of the crackdown, however, have been Islamic fundamentalists. Most of the 13 extremist groups dissolved were Muslims. A total of 40,000 independent mosques were nationalized by the appointment of government-approved Islamic leaders. Among the 1,536 persons placed under arrest were the head of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, and the leader of the student movement. On the other hand, state recognition of the Coptic Christian church was withdrawn, its leader. Pope Shenuda III, dismissed and exiled to a desert monastery. Among those detained were eight Coptic bishops, 13 priests, and 125 lay activists, as well as 55 secular dissidents and intellectuals. Some 67 Egyptian journalists and 64 professors were transferred to new jobs. Seven religious and political publications were banned. Others arrested included the vice-chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, which holds 12 opposition seats in the 390-member Parliament. Meanwhile, two foreign journalists have been expelled, also, one from ABC News, the other, the Cairo bureau chief of the French newspaper, Le Monde. For an explanation of these and other developments in Egypt, we go now to the Egyptian ambassador to the United States, Ashraf Ghorbal. Mr. Ambassador, starting first with the Soviets. Why did President Sadat throw the Soviets out?

Amb. ASHRAF GHORBAL: Well, let me say that we regret that the Soviets left us no other option but to do what has been done. And I think the government has shown, and is showing, that the Soviets have been implicated very much in inciting to violence, in trying to get Copts and Moslems -- extremists on both sides -- to stir up trouble against each other to the degree that killings would take place. It`s, again, the usual Soviet communist technique of turmoil in a country where communism can flourish and can take over.

HUNTER-GAULT: And there is evidence, specifically?

Amb. GHORBAL: There is evidence. One evidence in particular, there is a Doctor Risk (?) who was studying -- he was a Copt who was studying in the Soviet Union; he was approached by the Soviet authorities, and they enlisted him. He reported it to Egyptian intelligence; they told him [to] follow what the Soviets are trying to do. They held 11 meetings with him when he returned to Egypt. In these 11 meetings the teachings was how to stir up trouble among the Copts, what to use as weapons, when to use it. Now, I think that is an act. not by an embassy that is anxious to develop better relations, but to create a coup d`etat.

HUNTER-GAULT: What about the crackdown on the Moslem fundamentalists?

Amb. GHORBAL: Well, the same. We found that the Soviets were really touching base with both sides. It`s not taking one side against the other, but trying to see where the trouble is -- going to the extremist in the Moslem groups as well, and try to penetrate them by inciting them equally to violence. I recall that at one time, when we learned it later that Kosygin arrived in Egypt and he was passing by a mosque where there was the Friday prayers, and he told these people, "That is where you should start with your fomentation of trouble." Now, with that kind of an approach, and with extremists on both sides hitting at each other, to be fomented by a foreign power, to be fanned by a foreign power, is, I think, something that is unbecoming for a diplomatic mission.

HUNTER-GAULT: Well, the crackdown also included the Egyptian journalists - - the 67 I was talking about a few minutes ago. Was their offense the same? I mean, being involved in this fomenting of --

Amb. GHORBAL: Yes. Well, you`d be astonished to read in the Christian Science Monitor Lutfi al-Kholi, a leading journalist in Egypt. I know him personally, a leftist; he`s known to be communist, yes. Lutfi al-Kholi told the Christian Science Monitor, published on the 2nd of September, that there is a new alliance taking place between the leaders of the West and the leaders of the left with the Waft Party on the right -- the left -- on the leftist parties, together with the leaders of the religious movements that are quite stirring up the trouble, the extremist groups on both the Coptic side and on the Islamic side to make a union of these for the purpose of three things: bring down Camp David, bring down the economic order in the country, which is now directed towards free enterprise; three, to bring down the government as it stands with its democratic institutions and openness, as it has been brought to Egypt by Sadat`s approach. Now, with that kind of an alliance, that the Soviets help foment, a strange bedfellows from both extreme right to extreme left, and helped by the Soviets in, by consequence, measures had to be taken with all those who joined in that unholy alliance to bring down the government.

HUNTER-GAULT: Excuse me, does that include the Coptic Christian leaders, and does that account for the dismissal of the Pope?

Amb. GHORBAL: No. The Coptic Christian leaders, unfortunately, those who have been accused by the government because of their actions, they have taken certain measures to incite their own side of the community, either on the Coptic side or on the Islamic side. It has been known that there are some extremists on both sides of the fence. What do you do? You try to tell them this is a community of 44 million Egyptians today that has lived the centuries over in harmony and peace together. Why is it all of a sudden that they rise up against each other? A small group here and a small group there. Well, unfortunately, it is known that Pope Shenuda has been accused of encouraging some extremist action among the Copts -- to feel that they are in a way besieged, that they are in a community that is anti-Coptic -- when it is not. Some on the Islamic side equally felt the same way -- that the Copts are asking for more than they -- than they need to have as members on equal footing with the rest of the community. And what do you do with the two extremes? You just tell them, "Behave yourselves. We are in one community. We are brothers and sisters in one community."

HUNTER-GAULT: But as far as --

Amb. GHORBAL: As Sadat said, he is the president of both Copts and Moslems. And I say I am the ambassador of both Copts and Moslems.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right. We`ll come back. Robin?

MacNEIL: We hear now from an American who has observed Egyptian politics for many years. He`s John Walerbury, who teaches politics and international affairs at Princeton. He lived in Egypt for seven years, has written a number of books about it, also including the forthcoming The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt. In your view, Mr. Water-bury, why is Sadat doing all this?

Prof. JOHN WATERBURY: Well, I think if we look at Egypt`s experience with liberal politics -- democratic politics that Sadat has tried to make the hallmark of his own incumbency -- it only dates back to 1976 and the first fairly free parliamentary elections. So it`s a new experiment; it`s five years old. It came on the heels of something like 15,17 years of authoritarian rule by Gamal Abdel Nasser. And I think Sadat has had a genuine interest in promoting a democratic mode of politics, but it has been highly controlled, and he has always had supporting legislation that affects relations between Christians and Muslims -- the so-called National Unity Law. There is a code of political morality, which is rather vague in its terms, which can contain, control how people actually participate. So I think Sadat has been very careful in trying to manage a free debate.

MacNEIL: Well, was the debate becoming unmanageable, really unmanageable to a degree that would threaten his incumbency?

Prof. WATERBURY: Well, I wouldn`t want to question his judgment on that. I doubt if it had become unmanageable, but I think there may have been an element of preemptive strike on his part. He did not want to allow the extremists that Ambassador Ghorbal referred to to get so much wind in their sails that they could become uncontrollable. I think he wanted to give a very severe and dramatic warning, and I would suspect particularly to the Muslims, that he was not going to allow them to, in some instances, I believe, arm themselves, in others, to more and more freely criticize his policies, particularly his policies towards Israel and the Camp David accords.

MacNEIL: What do you think his motives were? And apart from simply wanting to keep things manageable, what other motives -- immediate tactical motives -- does he have, do you think?

Prof. WATERBURY: Well, there has been a history of periodic conflict between Christians and Muslims. When he first came to power in 1972, there was already some fairly severe clashes which he was able to defuse through parliamentary investigation. There have been recrudescences of that since 1972. So this is not really a new situation. There has also been a long history, going back to the 1930s, of Muslim fundamentalism including armed groups that have taken a very vigorous position in political life in Egypt.

MacNEIL: How do you answer the question that I quoted The New York Times editorial writer as asking at the beginning of the program: why does such a popular leader need to use a sledgehammer to assert his authority?

Prof. WATERBURY: Well, I think Sadat, like any other popular leader, may be popular in certain areas and questioned in others. Ronald Reagan is obviously a very popular president in some ways, but there are doubts about some of his policies. And I think Sadat is vulnerable on two issues: he`s vulnerable on Camp David and some kind of just settlement for the Palestinians; he`s vulnerable on the functioning of the Egyptian economy, which looks quite good now, but with high rates of inflation tends to hurt the poorest elements of Egyptian society. And on those two issues there is not unanimity in Egypt as to how well he`s performing.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Now an expert on the Soviet influence in Egypt. Al Rubinstein is the author of Red Star on the Nile, which traces that influence up to 1977. He`s a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, and he joins us tonight at public television station WHYY in Philadelphia. Professor Rubinstein, why do you think Mr. Sadat has also turned against the Soviets?

Prof. AL RUBINSTEIN: By including the Soviets in his crackdown, Sadat has in a sense nationalized the opposition to the regime, and I think he has helped make more credible the crackdown on the domestic opposition.

MacNEIL: I don`t quite follow that. Can you explain that to me?

Prof. RUBINSTEIN: The Russians are not popular in Egypt, and the Egyptians know that as far as President Sadat is concerned, the Soviet Union has pursued an anti-Egyptian policy, certainly since the end of the October `73 war.

MacNEIL: May I just put a note of background in there? It was just before that time that Sadat had expelled some 20,000 Soviet military personnel who had enjoyed the hospitality of President Nasser before him. Is that correct?

Prof. RUBINSTEIN: Yes, that`s correct. In July, 1972 Sadat requested the Soviets to pull out their 20,000 troops and military advisors. This did not in any way mean a break in relations; it did not in any way jeopardize the arms relationship that the Soviet Union and Egypt had at that time. It gave Sadat increased flexibility, and it permitted him to both open his diplomacy to improve relations with the Saudis, and at the same time to satisfy the Egyptian military, which was most unhappy with the way they were being treated by their Soviet advisors.

MacNEIL: How serious an influence in Egypt are the civilians who have been left there, and who have now been asked to leave?

Prof. RUBINSTEIN: Insignificant. I think that most of them have been working on economic projects that date back to the middle of the 1970s. The Soviets have had very little access to the core of Egyptian political life. They`ve had very little ability to penetrate Egyptian institutions.

MacNEIL: So would the charges now, that they have been plotting to incite religious disorder, would those be credible in your eyes?

Prof. RUBINSTEIN: It`s very difficult to second-guess President Sadat. I would tend not to believe that that was the number-one reason for the crackdown. I would tend to believe that the Soviet element has been introduced so that President Sadat can offer that the national interest demands this crackdown in which the Soviets are included with adventurers from the left and reactionaries from the right. But I don`t think that the Soviets represent a serious threat to Sadat`s political stability.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: Now for some further reaction we go again to the Egyptian ambassador to the United Stales, Ashraf Ghorbal. Mr. Ambassador, what do you say to Mr. Waterbury`s point that this was a preemptive strike on president Sadat`s part, really to serve as a dramatic warning that there shouldn`t be any interference with the Camp David process?

Amb. GHORBAL: Well, I think lots of people have been saying that Sadat has been overpatient with the strife that was taking between Copts and Moslems -- extremists on both sides. Bombs have been planted: people have been killed. Equally with what we have seen as action from the Soviet representatives in Egypt or those who were remaining as working there. Now, the Soviet system is the Soviet system wherever it is. It doesn`t become the more benevolent in one, and abhorrent in another. The technique has been all over. And it is well-known that they are very upset about what Sadat did since 1972. As we heard, when we see the Soviet strategy of trying to build around Egypt, and to put in Ethiopia 20,000 soldiers; in Libya, 7,000 soldiers; in Angola, other 30,000 between Cubans. Soviets, East Germans, and what not. With 70,000 ready to move at any time, don`t tell me that if the Soviets are instigating a move militarily, that the Soviets are going to hesitate in moving in a coup d`etat form if they find that there are extremists on both sides of the fence in the Moslem community and in the Coptic community, and among the political opposition in the country.

HUNTER-GAULT: You moved to Mr. Rubinstein`s point, to refute it. I gather, that this Soviet expulsion -- his point was that the Soviet expulsion helped to make credible this crackdown in the rest of the population. You`re refuting that.

Amb. GHORBAL: Definitely.

HUNTER-GAULT: Well, what about Mr. Waterbury`s point, though, that this "sledgehammer approach" really has to do with the vulnerability that President Sadat feels about Camp David?

Amb. GHORBAL: Well, you know, Camp David is, as he said, it`s the only fact of life that exists. It is there. It breathes, it moves, it is being implemented. First part of it we are seeing the end of the implementation in six months or so, in April 25, the rest of the Israeli soldiers will be out of Sinai totally. It is there, the rest of Camp David. We are going to have the coming round of talks on the 23rd and 24th with you participating. Now that Begin has had his elections, now that you have finished with your elections, we are all ready to hear from the new Israeli cabinet formed again by Begin, but of a different composition, that they have new theories, new ideas. So we`re not vulnerable about Camp David at all. We feel that it is there, or here. Definitely if Menachim Begin repeats his old argument, we`ll tell him it`s a broken old record; come up with something new, and he will have to come up with something new. And what we have seen from actions by the new government in trying to lessen the tension in the West Bank, and to try to build up some confidence among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, all right, if it is the beginning of a new trend and a new policy, we encourage it.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right. Robin?

MacNEIL: Mr. Waterbury, should the United States be concerned, watching the events of the past two weeks, that Sadat, on whom so much hope rests, is now a very shaky figure there? Is this a sign of real weakness?

Prof. WATERBURY: Well, I answer that with trepidation. My instincts tell me no. It`s always a precarious business, I think, trying to maintain control in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries, and Sadat has great skills at it. I think he has been under grave risk before. I don`t want to minimize the kinds of challenges to him, and much is involved, it seems to me in the peace process. But if, you know -- maybe I`m putting words in your mouth -- if you`re suggesting, is this a kind of pre-Iranian situation where various factions may get totally out of control and shake the regime, I do not believe so, and I think President Sadat has moved when he did so that there isn`t even any possibility of that.

MacNEIL: Professor Rubinstein, do you agree with that? Is. by this, Sadat showing his technical mastery of the situation, or is he revealing weakness?

Prof. RUBINSTEIN: I agree completely with Professor Waterbury. I think that all evidence indicates that the military and the secret police, and probably the general population is very much pro-Sadat, and he has shown himself to be a master of Egyptian political infighting for the last 10 or II years. This may be the most serious challenge that he has faced; we don`t really know yet. But I have full confidence that Mr. Sadat is very firmly in the saddle.

MacNEIL: Ambassador Ghorbal, when Prime Minister Begin was here, he said that there appeared to be a wave of Khometnism in Egypt. Do you see the Moslem fundamentalism there in that same spirit, and is your president`s reaction to it the beginning of a sort of Shah-like reaction to it in Iran? Is there a parallel?

Amb. GHORBAL: No, there is no parallel because Sadat is not the Shah. The Shah had completely separated himself from the rest of the population in Iran. Sadat does not. Sadat is very much immersed with his people. We are very inured in Egypt to the true image of Islam. That is what we practice. Khomeini`s Islam is not the Islam that we all know in the -- in the Arab world, in the world that believes in the true image of Islam. But definitely some people among the extremist Moslem groups believe that if it happened in Iran, why can`t it happen elsewhere? And don`t forget that 44 million Egyptians we have in Egypt, half of them are of the age of 15. So if these are going to be subject to the teachings in the mosques of some of these people who belong to the extremist groups in Islam, then we are opening the minds of these young generations to a Khomeinism. And we will not allow that.

MacNEIL: I`d like to ask another question in the couple of minutes we have remaining, starting with you, Professor Waterbury. Does this mean that the only way Mr. Sadat can now stay in control of the situation in his own country is to abandon his progress towards democratic institutions and freedoms that the ambassador referred to earlier?

Prof. WATERBURY: Oh. I think that`s too much of a dichotomous choice. I think he can restore a controlled liberal system if things move well on the peace from. He went through a period like this again in the early `70s where he suspended a number of people who were accused of leftist plotting. They were removed from their jobs, and just prior to the October war were all reinstated. I am thinking that this would be what he would like to do in Egypt now -- not now. but perhaps in the spring, if all goes well with Israel. But he will always, I think, maintain at best a very controlled liberal system, one that does not really challenge him too severely.

MacNEIL: Is this not something of a denial, Mr. Ambassador, of the religious freedoms you were talking about a moment -- sorry, not religious, democratic freedoms you mentioned earlier?

Amb. GHORBAL: Well, no. We are very anxious to have the democratic process, democratic freedoms, the biggest proof that we have political parties; we have political opposition in our country. They have their papers. Their papers have been attacking the government; they have been speaking their minds about Camp David, and nobody touched them over the years. The mere fact that then they would go to the extreme point of allying themselves to bring about a coup d`etat using the Soviet attempts and plots in the country, that is another thing.

MacNEIL: We have to --

Amb. GHORBAL: That is not a democratic process.

MacNEIL: Sorry to interrupt you there, but we have to end it there. Professor Rubinstein, thank you for joining us in Philadelphia this evening.

Prof. RUBINSTEIN: Thank you

MacNEIL: Mr. Ambassador in Washington. Professor Waterbury here. Good night. Charlayne.

HUNTER-GAULT: Good night, Jim. Robin, sorry!

MacNEIL: That`s all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.