The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour

INTRO

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. In the news today, the Supreme Court upheld a law making sodomy a crime. Soviet leader Gorbachev said the U.S. was sabotaging arms control by ignoring Soviet proposals. A California coroner said Cleveland Browns football player Don Rogers died from cocaine poisoning. We'll have the details of these stories in our news summary coming up. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: After the news summary, we look at the latest developments on arms control with administration official Edward Rowny, former negotiator John Mendelsohn and two former national security advisors, Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Then our series on the new immigrants ends with a story of a young man from South Africa. And the program ends with an A. C. Greene essay on the founding fathers.News Summary

MacNEIL: In a ruling with major implications for homosexuals, the Supreme Court today upheld a Georgia law making sodomy a crime. About half the states have laws making sodomy among consenting adults illegal, and the five to four decision was greeted by gay rights advocates as a major setback. Writing for the majority, Justice Byron White said, "The Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. The fact that homosexual conduct occurs in the privacy of the home does not affect the result." In his dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun said that the Georgia law also applies to heterosexuals, single or married, and added, "Depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our nation's history. I think the court today betrays those values." Spokesmen for gay rights organizations expressed fears of a witch hunt against homosexuals and predicted increased gay rights activism. Jim?

LEHRER: The Supreme Court also had some things to say on gerrymandering and voting rights. In a seven to two ruling, the court upheld the right to draw voting districts that favor one political party over the others -- otherwise known as gerrymandering. The majority said such partisan action is constitutionally acceptable as long as the one man, one vote principle is maintained. The case came from Indiana, where legislative district lines were rewritten to favor Republicans.

But in a separate decision, the court upheld the right of blacks to challenge redistricting plans under the 1982 Voting Rights Act. In a nine to nothing decision, the court struck down a North Carolina redistricting plan, because it reduced black voting power. The court found the plan hurt the chances of electing blacks to the state legislature.

MacNEIL: Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said today that the United States is sabotaging efforts at arms control by ignoring his proposals. Gorbachev was speaking in Warsaw at the Polish Communist Party Congress, where he praised the Jaruzelski regime for crushing the solidarity movement. He called it a struggle for the existence of socialism itself, and said it was a lesson for other east bloc countries. Turning to arms control, Gorbachev said, "American politicians generously spread declarations full of nice words about striving for peace and disarmament while they act in an absolutely different way. They try to justify sabotaging this highly important issue by inventions about violations by us of particular points in the agreements. The White House said that U.S. officials are drafting a comprehensive reply to recent Gorbachev proposals. They include an offer to modify previous proposals on nuclear missiles in Europe and a call for a special meeting to discuss the Reagan administration threat to abandon the SALT II treaty.

LEHRER: The Reagan administration is reassessing its policy toward South Africa. White House spokesman Larry Speaks today confirmed weekend speculation about such a review. He said the results will be given to President Reagan within the next several weeks. Weekend source stories said the reassessment includes better communication with anti-apartheid black leaders inside and outside South Africa. Speaks acknowledged the new look has been triggered by the increased violence in South Africa and the South African government's invoking of a state of emergency two weeks ago.

MacNEIL: The members of OPEC ended a six day meeting in Yugoslavia without agreement on a plan to limit their production as a way of reversing the slump in world oil prices.

For the second month in a row, new home sales fell in May. After a 5.7% decline in April, they were down 11.6% in May -- the biggest decline in two years. Even so, sales for the first five months of the year -- January through May -- were 20% ahead of last year, and the best for eight years.

On Wall Street, the Dow Jones Average broke new ground today. It briefly passed the 1900 mark for the first time in its history, then retreated to close at 1892.72 -- up 7.46 points for the day. Analysts attribute the market's continuing rise to a belief that the Federal reserve Board will soon lower the discount or basic interest rate.

LEHRER: First there was the Bias case -- the death from cocaine of all-American basketball star Len Bias. Now, eitht days later, there is the Rogers case -- the death from cocaine of professional football star Don Rogers. Officials in Sacraento, California held a news conference today on the case of Rogers, the 23-year-old Cleveland Browns defensive back who died Friday. County coroner Charles Simmons ruled the death was accidental, but said it was not yet clear just what happened.

CHARLES SIMMONS, Coroner: At this time, the investigation has not determined when or how the cocaine was ingested. With the exception of therapecutically administered drugs during life saving procedures, no other drugs, including alcohol, were discovered. We're having difficulty establishing when he might have taken the cocaine. There are two possibilities -- one, that there was a cumulative effect of, you know, ingestion over a period of time. Another answer could be that he did take it right before he collapsed. We just don't know.

LEHRER: On the Bias case today, the University of Maryland board of regents decided to launch two task force investigations -- one of drug use on its campus, the other of its athletic program to make sure athletes fulfill academic requirements.

MacNEIL: President Reagan paid tribute today to Senator John East, who committed suicide over the weekend at his home in Greenville, North Carolina. The conservative Republican died of carbon monoxide poisoning in his garage. Calling him a true patriot, President Reagan said in a statement, "He was a quiet and effective legislator who never wavered in his belief in principle and his determination to keep our country strong."

LEHRER: And that's it for the news summary tonight. Now a top level discussion of where the United States and Soviets are going on arms control; the story of Sydney Maree, an immigrant from South Africa; and an essay on the founding fathers by A.C. Greene. Disarming Proposals?

MacNEIL: Our major focus tonight is arms control and whether the U.S. and Soviets are actually getting closer to striking a major deal. A lot has been happening, some of it hard to follow -- like the various statements about whether President Reagan has or has not scrapped the unratified Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1979. Besides that SALT controversy, there have been these developments: on June 11 the Soviets put a new bargaining offer on the table in Geneva. Their key proposal is reported to be to limit research on strategic defense by a 15 year extension of the 1972 ABM, or Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Soviets, in turn, offered a big cut in nuclear weapons -- a key goal of the administration -- and reportedly sweetened it with more flexible ideas on counting other weapon systems. On June 19 in Glassboro, New Jersey, President Reagan said, "It appears that the Soviets have begun to make a serious effort to reduce nuclear weapons." But Defense Secretary Weinberger said the Soviet SDI proposal is "just another method of defining strategic defense out of existence." Last Thursday, Mr. Reagan said, "If the Soviet Union is now genuinely seeking progress, we may have reached a turning point in our efforts to build a safer and more peaceful world."

To find out what's afoot, we have several perspectives, with two former national security advisors -- Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft -- and a former arms control negotiator, John Mendelsohn. First, we get a view from within the administration. Jim?

LEHRER: The administration's view comes from Retired Army General Edward Rowny. He was the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative at the SALT II talks until resigning in protest in 1979. In the Reagan administration, he headed the first strategic arms reduction talks, and he now serves as a special arms control advisor to President Reagan.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome. Today's developments first. Soviet leader Gorbachev said in that Poland speech that the United States is ignoring Soviet arms proposals, and as a result is sabotaging legitimate arms control talks.

Amb. EDWARD ROWNY, arms control adviser: Well Jim, we're not ignoring it at all. We're studying it, and we've already said that we welcome some positive developments there.

LEHRER: So what's he talking about there?

Amb. ROWNY: I really don't know.

LEHRER: Is it -- is it a bad thing that he said that, or is that just in the normal course of --

Amb. ROWNY: Well, that's in the normal course of things. The normal course of their rhetoric, you know, that they apparently feel that this has some impact among people who really don't follow or study it, but you have to look at what they say at the table and what they do, and that's where the real cutting edge is.

LEHRER: But he is right in that there has been no U.S. response to the Soviet proposal on June 11, is that correct?

Amb. ROWNY: There has not yet been a response officially. Now, we've asked questions, you know, of their proposals in Geneva, and we've made certain -- had some questions about it and discussed it, but no, there has not been a proposal yet, or counterproposal.

LEHRER: Why not? What's the hold up?

Amb. ROWNY: Well, it takes some time, you know. These proposals that were made can not be accepted the way they are. They do, however, make some positive moves, and when we find out exactly what they're saying and where they're going to go, then I think we can make some progress. Hopefully, we will make progress.

LEHRER: President Reagan, as Robin just quoted, said that it could be a turning point in this whole exercise.

Amb. ROWNY: It could. It's up to them. If they now -- you see, up 'til now, ever since the summit, they've stonewalled. Then after the fourth round there was no progress. It ended on a negative note, if you remember when I was here before. Now this time it ended on a rather more positive note. Therefore, this is good. It could be a turning point if you continue to turn and move in that direction.

LEHRER: Okay, what else do they need to do? They've made a proposal, they're waiting on our answer. Why is the next step up to them? I don't understand. Isn't it up to us to either accept or reject --

Amb. ROWNY: I'm sorry. Yes, we will reply to their proposal when we've studied it. But then, as I said, there's much more hard bargaining ahead. This is not the end of the road. It's the beginning of the road.

LEHRER: What's the most hopeful thing about this proposal?

Amb. ROWNY: Well here, you see, I can't, because of my official position, talk about what happens at these confidential negotiations. I can just talk in generalities and give you the overview, but because of the confidentiality and because we want to have these negotiations move forward and not discuss them in public, I'm not at liberty, nor do I think it's wise, to discuss them in detail.

LEHRER: But in general terms what Robin outlined is correct, is it not, Mr. Ambassador -- that the Soviets are willing to make some dramatic reductions in offensive weapons in exchange for some restraint on SDI?

Amb. ROWNY: in general, that's right.

LEHRER: And is that -- that is what makes you hopeful that something could come from this. Is that correct?

Amb. ROWNY: The fact that they're willing to talk about some of the positive aspects and talk about reductions, yes.

LEHRER: Are we all correct -- we meaning everyone who has a thought or says a word about this -- are we correct in saying, "Hey, look, these guys might be ready to make a deal." Is it that kind of thing? Or are we talking slow, slow progress.

Amb. ROWNY: I think we're talking slower than that.These are complex issues. It would take a lot of time to develop exactly what they mean, exactly how much they're coming towards us, and it will take some time. Of course, the pace, you know, could be stepped up by them. But even if the pace were very rapid, you shouldn't be euphoric about a deal in the next week or two or even month or two.

LEHRER: Okay. What about the additional element -- the Soviet proposal to meet in Geneva next month to talk about the U.S. decision on SALT II? White House spokesman Larry Speaks today said the U.S. hasn't decided what to do about that yet. Is that -- you agree with Mr. Speaks?

Amb. ROWNY: That's exactly right. We --

LEHRER: Once again, what's the problem? What's the hold up?

Amb. ROWNY: Again, they just made that proposal. We should study it and see what the pluses and minuses are. And then we will make -- the President will make a decision, and that will be followed up.

LEHRER: Are there some obvious minuses to that sort of thing -- sitting down and talking to him about this?

Amb. ROWNY: Well, the -- this is a question i don't want to go into too much detail, because it does have pluses and minuses. On the one hand, you know, you're ready to talk about anything -- which the FCC is entitled -- or in its charter talk about, which are largely the violations -- and if that's the subject, then that may influence the White House that way -- in that direction.

LEHRER: If you were involved in some peripheral way with covering events like that, would you go ahead and make hotel reservations in Geneva?

Amb. ROWNY: I would wait the short time until the President makes his decision, and then I think I'd have plenty of time.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Now we have a view from outside the administration. Jack Mendelsohn was a deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and was a member of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks delegation in 1982-83. He is now a deputy director of the Arms Control Association in Washington.

Mr. Mendelsohn, do you see the opportunity for major agreement in the new Soviet proposals?

JACK MENDELSOHN, Former arms negotiator: I think the Soviet proposal does a lot of very positive things. Whether there's an opportunity for a major agreement or not is still in play. First of all, it clears a lot of clutter out of the position that existed previously. It takes away the intermediate range systems, and it also says something which everybody knew had to come sooner or later, and that is that SDI research -- that which would be conducted inside laboratories --

MacNEIL: So just -- may I interrupt you for a moment so we're clear? You say it takes away the intermediate range systems. That means it's dealing only with intercontinental systems.

mr. MENDELSOHN: As far as I can understand --

MacNEIL: As far as missiles are concerned.

Mr. MENDELSOHN: Right. As far as I can understand from the reports that are in the newspapers, these intermediate range systems have been removed from the Soviet position. They are to be dealt with in another arena, but basically we're back to dealing with the intercontinental strategic systems. And the second bit of clutter that's been taken out is the obvious point that we would have to have gotten to in any case, and that is that SDI or strategic defense research in laboratories will be permitted with certain limitations. I think that's -- those are two very positive steps.

MacNEIL: So when Secretary Weinberger says this is just another attempt to define strategic defense out of existence, is that just a -- a sort of very partisan position, or is that a -- how do you react to that?

Mr. MENDELSOHN: Well, I don't think there's any question but that the Soviets are going to try to put as tight a clamp on SDI -- on U.S. SDI programs as possible. And I think it's quite right for the United States to maintain that laboratory research at a minimum should be permitted. And I think even the critics of the SDI program would admit that laboratory research on defense should go forward. So there there's going to be a little bit of tension, but I think basically that's a resolvable issue.

MacNEIL: But didn't Mr. Gorbachev hint a long time ago, as far back as last fall, that there was an interpretation on research which might be negotiable there?

Mr. MENDELSOHN: Absolutely right. And what they've done now is sort of carried this out at the table in Geneva. And all of this sort of hysteria about how the Soviets want to legislate this all out of existence, I think, was just that. It was hysteria. The Soviets have made it quite clear for some time that at the highest levels that they knew that research in the laboratories on strategic defenses was going to go forward.

MacNEIL: Well, is it to Mr. Reagan's and the administration's credit that by standing firm on SDI and other matters, they have brought the Soviets to this -- to this sort of apparent bargaining point?

Mr. MENDELSOHN: Well, that's an interesting and rather popular analysis. I think if you look at the Soviet proposal, what it actually shows you is that sticking by SDI has driven up the number of systems that the Soviets are prepared to live with. If I recollect correctly, the original Soviet proposal was to ban SDI and reduce weaponry by 50% to about 6,000 weapons. They're now saying, "We won't ban SDI. We'll permit certain limited aspects of research. But if that goes forward and you commit yourself to the ABM treaty, then you'll have to live with 8,000 weapons." So what SDI is doing, and this is where the real nub of the issue is -- the relationship between offenses and defenses and how much of each will be permitted -- as long as SDI goes along, the amount of reductions that we're going to be able to obtain in the negotiations will be reduced -- will be less.

MacNEIL: General Rowny said a moment ago the pace could be stepped up by them, meaning by Moscow. I mean, is the initiative in their court, so to speak, or could the pace be stepped up by the United States too?

Mr. MENDELSOHN: Well, this is a rather sweeping observation, but I think for the last half year or so, the Soviets have been throwing the ball into the U.S. court practically every week. There's been a -- just a series of proposals on various arms control measures and agreements across the board -- an incredibly active agenda which the Soviets have been dominating and controlling. And on this last one, I think now it's quite clear the Soviets have framed the issue very clearly -- very carefully. How much limitation on defenses is the United States prepared to accept? And if so, if they are prepared to accept these limitations, then the Soviet Union is prepared to accept some reductions. I agree with General Rowny that the proposal as put forward undoubtedly has aspects to it the United States can't live with. But the basic issue is still there. What kind of control on defenses will we agree to -- will the United States agree to? Will it bottle SDI? Will it put it back in the laboratory? And if so, then a certain level of reductions will be acceptable to the Soviet Union.

MacNEIL: Do you have the smell of a deal coming up? Would you, if you were a smart reporter, book hotel rooms in Geneva?

Mr. MENDELSOHN: Well, that's a slightly different question than you asked a moment ago. I don't have the smell of a deal coming up yet. The administration has to bet itself together and agree that it is going to put some limits on SDI. I see no indication that that's likely. And that's where the real nub is. If, however, we hear that, well, it's reasonable to keep SDI in the labs for 10, 12, 15 years -- if you begin to hear that kind of talk, then I think you can make a long term reservation in Geneva.

MacNEIL: Think you. Jim?

LEHRER: A third opinion -- that of Brent Scowcroft, a retired air force general who served as President Ford's national security advisor. He also headed President Reagan's 1984 Commission on Strategic Forces, which made proposals for deploying the MX and Midget Man missiles. He is now the vice chairman of Kissinger Associates here in Washington.

General, do you think the U.S. should make such a deal -- SDI -- restraint on SDI of some kind in exchange for dramatic reductions in offensive weapons?

Gen. BRENT SCOWCROFT, former national security adviser: I think that I would be prepared to make such a deal, depending on what went on the other side of SDI. There's nothing I've seen on the table so far for which I would accept even a Soviet proposal for restrictions on SDI. That's a very important issue for the United States, and I wouldn't give it up simply for deep reductions.

LEHRER: What -- why not?

Gen. SCOWCROFT: Well, because I think -- you know, once we give it up, and if we agree to stay in research only for 10, 15 years, there will be enormous pressure on the hill not to fund it at the levels necessary, because there's no understanding it could be deployed. Then if we're going to do that, then we ought to get something that makes a strategic difference. And simply numbers are insufficient, in my judgement.

LEHRER: Well then what would be in your judgement? What would it take if you were negotiating, if you were running the show? What would it take for you to say, "Okay, we will do what you want or something similar to that, Mr. Gorbachev, on SDI." What -- if you will do what? What would the what be for you?

Gen. SCOWCROFT: The what for me would be very deep cuts in their MIRV missiles.

LEHRER: Like what?

Gen. SCOWCROFT: Like -- well, I don't want to negotiate with you now, but --

LEHRER: No. I'm not empowered to do so.

Gen. SCOWCROFT: Just for starters, getting rid of the SS-18s. I think that would be a minimum for some kind of serious restriction of SDI, which I consider the Soviet proposal to be.

LEHRER: All right. So -- but my next question is, you are very much up -- you stay up on what's going on. Is that kind of proposal likely to ever be accepted by the Soviets?

Gen. SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't know. I think it's more likely to be accepted than what -- than the clause in our present proposal, which is they take a unilateral 50% cut and throw away. They're never going to do that without some tradeoff. I don't know. I don't think we have probed what they're really prepared to pay for SDI. Because the administration has been unwilling to bargain. Now we see signs they may be. But I don't think we ought to underestimate the value of SDI.

LEHRER: Buy you think we should be willing to negotiate -- we should find out what the Soviets are really willing to give up.

Gen. SCOWCROFT: I certainly think we ought to be willing to negotiate. I think we ought to watch carefully what the price is likely to be.

LEHRER: Do you think that the administration has handled the SDI issue properly, or do you agree with Mr. Mendelsohn -- the end result of all of this is that it's actually escalated what the end result could be.

Gen. SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't fault the administration on SDI. I think it's early in the game. I think some of the -- some of the claims for SDI may be overblown. It obviously has gotten the Soviets' attention. I think it remains to be seen whether they really want an arms control agreement other than the impression of the United States on the defensive and Gorbachev being the good guy. I think we still have to probe that. But I think, you know, if in fact SDI will get us for the first time some serious change in the Soviet force posture, then I think it's worth it.

LEHRER: How do you explain Mr. Mendelsohn's point that it's -- it's been the Soviets who have really been in charge of the agenda on arms control these last several months -- they're the ones that have been coming up with proposals. It's the United States that hasn't -- hasn't seemed to counter, etc., etc. Is that -- first of all, do you agree with him, and how do you account for that if you do?

Gen. SCOWCROFT: Yes, I agree with him. And I think you can account fot it in one of two ways. There are a number of reasons you could argue that Gorbachev really needs a period of stability in U.S.-Soviet relations, so that he can turn his attention otherwise -- maybe even transfer some resources internally within the Soviet Union. But aside from that, and we don't know whether he really wants that, I think he clearly wants to appear the good guy and do whatever he can to keep the United States and Europe at odds. And the more he can press proposals on us and the more we appear unyielding, the more we look like the bad guys to the Europeans and he looks like the good guy. That in itself is progress for him.

LEHRER: There's another thesis, as you know, on this, General. Senator Gore and others have said on his program that it's -- that Rowny, Adelman and company -- those who are in charge of arms control really don't want -- don't believe in arms control, and there's a big struggle within the administration. That's the reason it takes so long to get an answer. That's the reason there's been no progress. You've watched it. Do you agree with that?

Gen. SCOWCROFT: I'd rather let Ed speak for the administration. I think there are a variety of views within the administration on arms control and on its utility. And I wouldn't rule out the possibility there are some who think that at the very least the day of arms control has passed.

LEHRER: Is that right? People --

Gen. SCOWCROFT: Some.

LEHRER: People in high positions?

Gen. SCOWCROFT: Obviously, there's a wide spectrum of views in the administration about how to deal with the Soviet Union on this issue.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

Mac NEIL: Next we have the views of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, and now a professor of government at Columbia University and counselor at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Brzezinski is the author of the Just released book, Gameplan, which is about U.S.-Soviet relations.

Mr. Brzezinski, do you see a big compromise arms control deal in the works?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, former national security adviser: Well, it's in the works in the sense that negotiations are going on. I'm rather skeptical as to the likelihood of a very major deal developing in the near future or perhaps even at all.

MacNEIL: Would you like to explain why you're skeptical?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all, it seems to me we have to go beyond what we have been discussing. We are focusing this discussion on numerical reductions. That's difficult enough to achieve. And I think Brent Scowcroft was quite right in pointing out that it's not just a matter of numbers. It's also a question of what you reduce. And if certain systems are not reduced, you could end up with more instability rather than less. But beyond numbers, there is the issue of modernization. What inhibitions do you impose on the introduction of new systems, on the improvement of existing systems?That's a terribly sticky issue, as SALT II has shown. Beyond that, there's the issue of verification. How do you verify what has been agreed -- either regarding reductions or inhibitions of modernization. And we need much more verification in any START agreement than we have had in SALT I or II. Beyond that, there's a large issue of Soviet strategic secrecy -- the fact that the Soviets are doing things which are very troublesome to us regarding which we do not know much, because their entire strategic program is conducted in secrecy. And that includes even a Soviet defense -- strategic defense program. And finally, there is a question of strategic defense. What are we prepared to trade? What do we need for stability into the '90s? I don't think we're nearly near resolving any of these issues. Perhaps the first, but not the next four.

MacNEIL: Not near resolving them because they aren't analyzed correctly or because the administration is so divided or because there's a preponderance of people who don't believe in arms control? Why not nearly?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI: There is some division in the administration, but that's not unusual. I suspect there's some division on the Soviet side too. I think the issues are terribly complex. They're very difficult to deal with. And for the time being, also, it seems to me, they're complicated by general political disagreements which induce greater suspicions, inhibitions towards reaching compromises. After all, it's very difficult to deal with a strategic arms issue alone, ignoring such problems as Afghanistan or Central America or the overall climate of relations. All of these things contribute to what is going to be, I think, a very protracted process which at best will yield only partial, limited, interim agreements, and probably not a comprehensive agreement.

MacNEIL: If you were advising on policy now, would you be advising in favor of selling some delay in Strategic Defense Initiative or prolonging the laboratory research period for some specific Soviet reductions? You heard the earlier discussion.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI: I would only be willing to make a compromise of the SDI if the reductions on the Soviet side were not only massive but highly focused on potential first strike systems -- both those that exist or might in the future be deployed. And only if such an agreement were accompanied by a truly effective, probably intrusive, verification system. And even then, I would like to reserve the right for the United States and for the Soviet Union to explore the possibility of some limited strategic defense for both sides in the 1990s and beyond, because in my judgement we would both benefit, and our reciprocal stability would be enhanced if both sides had some limited strategic defense reinforcing the survivability of the strategic systems.

MacNEIL: What do you feel about the administration's handling both of the SDI issue so far in its hard-lining on that, and of its way of responding to the various Soviet proposals?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI: I think the public responses have occasionally been confusing. I'm not in favor of generating the impression that a breakthrough has been achieved, because I think that is likely to yield disappointment and play against the administration.

MacNEIL: Do you think administration rhetoric in the last few days has suggested that?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI: Yes. I think there were some statements by the President which suggested we were about to get some major development. And I personally am skeptical that we will. And I know from personal experience, having been involved in SALT II, that it doesn't help our negotiating posture to build up public expectations.

MacNEIL: What about the question of convening a special meeting of this control commission on the question of whether the United State is going to stop observing the SALT treaty? Should the U.S. accept that and go to it and discuss it?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI: Yes. I would go to it, and I would discuss Soviet nonobservance of certain elements of SALT II. Part of the problem is, of course, that the Soviets have very selectively interpreted SALT II -- in some cases, in my judgement, have violated it directly. And I think that issue has to be discussed. Because at the heart of the observance of SALT II is the question of reciprocity. And agreement like this is only viable if both sides observe it. If one interprets it very selectively, then it's hardly viable agreement.

macNEIL: Can I ask you very briefly in the end, something of your impressions of this. Do you think that the way Gorbachev is behaving that he really wants some kind of agreement?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI: Until recently I would have said no. Because until recently he was essentially grandstanding, making theatrical plays. I think the last few weeks, the fact that he has taken this proposal to Geneva, that he has spelled it out there, that he has put it on the negotiating table, indicates that he is perhaps beginning to exploit -- explore the possibility of an agreement. But, as I said earlier, we are still a long way from the terminal point, and some very, very tough bargaining is ahead of us.

MacNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Back to you first, Ambassador Rowny. Do you -- what is your perception now where Gorbachev is on the desire scale? Does he want to deal?

Amb. ROWNY: I think that he wants to continue the process, certainly. I think that, as General Scowcroft said, he's playing to the public -- particularly among our allies. He wants to split us. And he has to appear, in his view, as the good guy. So I think he wants to continue the process. Whether or not he wants a deal or wants to get a deal which is equitable still remains to be seen.

LEHRER: What would he have to do to demonstrate to you that he wants a deal?

Amb. ROWNY: Well, I think he'd have to continue to lay out what he's already hinted at and show that he's reasonable. He'd have to show that he really is interested in reductions which lead to a balance and one which is verifiable. I think that all would lead towards an agreement.

LEHRER: What's your reading, Mr. Mendelsohn, of what Gorbachev is up to so far?

Mr. MENDELSOHN: I think the Soviets have been interested in a deal for some time. Whether or not it's been as a result of SDI is very hard to tell. But I really do think they have a lot of internal issues that they would like to deal with rather than dealing with an upward spiral in the arms race. I think they need a foreign policy success, if you will, and that an agreement with the United States would certainly be considered that. I think they also realize the futility of allocating resources to the SDI or to the defensive, offensive arms spiral. They would like to work out something. It's been very difficult, because they have deep concerns about the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the United States has appeared unwilling to satisfy those concerns in any way. That's what's been holding up progress.

LEHRER: General Scowcroft, back to you on the issue of the summit. It's been -- the suggestion is that Gorbachev is using the summit as a way to get an arms deal. That -- this is an oversimplification -- that on the one hand, you have Gorbachev who very much wants an arms control deal, on the other hand you have President Reagan who very much wants a summit. And somewhere in there they're going to work this thing out. Is that your reading of it?

Gen. SCOWCROFT: I think so. I think both sides have been maneuvering ever since the last summit, and Gorbachev is trying to pin us down on preconditions for a summit which would make it, in his terms, a success. And I think our notion is that really when we had the early idea for a summit earlier this summer, it was introduce Gorbachev to the United States kind of summit. And I think the two sides are still jockeying on it.

LEHRER: Mr. Brzezinski, what's your view of why President Reagan apparently -- why is a summit so important to him, and why is arms control apparently so important to Gorbachev?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I frankly don't agree that the summit is so important to the President. I think the President did quite well in Geneva. He deflected Gorbachev's effort to make it into an arms control summit. He made it into a get acquainted summit.And now Gorbachev has been made to appear as if we have to pay him for a summit, which I think relieves the pressure on the President to have a summit. As far as Gorbachev is concerned, I think he would like an arms control agreement if he can have one on his own terms -- so that the technological competition slows down, so that the Soviet Union retains certain options that it's had over the last few years. And I think our task is to nail down an agreement that is really watertight and airtight and stabilizes the relationship in all of its dimensions, including those which currently the Soviets have preferred to exploit.

LEHRER: Has the subject of the summit come up in Geneva, General Rowny? I mean, when the negotiators are sitting there, is that the kind of thing that comes up? "Hey, look, our guy wants a summit, and, you know." Is that part of the discussion?

Amb. ROWNY: No, that's not part of the discussion across the table. This is left for the higher masters. But let me just reinforce what Dr. Brzezinski said. Last summer the Soviets wanted an arms control summit -- arms control, period. The President said, "Look, there's a lot more to foreign policy -- East-West relations." And if we were to get an agreement somehow, but didn't improve relations, then the treaty would come apart. Now, the Soviets insisted that it be an arms control summit. It was not. It was on a broader scale. And the Soviets promised to talk about all four issues -- the bilateral issues, the multilateral issues, human rights and arms control. Now, once again, they're trying to make this an arms control summit -- arms control only.

LEHRER: It's working too, isn't it?

Amb. ROWNY: Well, you can see that so long as we continue to talk about this, and of course that's my business, but somebody else ought to be talking, and I will also say that there's a lot more to East-West relations and a lot more to foreign policy than arms control.

LEHRER: Speaking of your business, you heard what General Scowcroft said. He said the same thing that others have said -- that there are people in your business, in the administration, who really don't believe in arms control.

Amb. ROWNY: Well, I'm not one of them. I believe in arms control.

LEHRER: But how do you deal in that kind of -- how do you deal in that kind of atmosphere where you've got people who are supposedly involved in arms control who don't really want it?

Amb. ROWNY: Well, I think -- I don't know, you know, that people take it to that extreme. I know that people, as we do, you know, when we negotiate with the Soviets, find it extremely difficult to negotiate with the Soviets, as we've talked about before. Their culture is different, their goals are different. And all this is done here amongst us and our press and our people and our legislature -- not in the Soviet Union.

LEHRER: Mr. Mendelsohn, looking at it from the outside now, do you think that people who want arms control agreement are on top right now within the administration?

Mr. MENDELSOHN: Well, it certainly doesn't look that way to me. I mean, you had an example just about three weeks ago at the end of May when the administration announced that it was going to repudiate the SALT II agreement. I think it's hard to argue that the people who are in favor of arms control won out on that decision. I think you'd have to say that most of the administration convinced the President, or the President himself was convinced, that we ought to junk what existing arms control there was.

LEHRER: Is this unusual, gentlemen, for an administration to be divided on arms control like this? Mr. Brzezinski?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI: Don't look at me. No, it's not unusual. No, that's inherent in the nature of things. We are a democracy. We are a pluralistic society. There are many different institutions helping to shape policy. And last but not least, even in the Soviet Union, in a much more regimented society, I would bet you my last ruble that there are many, many fundamental differences at work too.

LEHRER: Okay. Thank you gentlemen, all four, for being with us tonight. The New Immigrants

MacNEIL: Next tonight, we conclude our series on the new American immigrants. Kwame Holman profiles a world class athlete who came to America for opportunity. His name is Sydney Maree.

KWAME HOLMAN [voice-over]: Cork, Ireland, August, 1985, the mile race for world class runners. The winner that day was a 29-year-old American named Sydney Maree. For the last four years, Maree has run all over the world and has won consistently. Known as the fastest American at the middle distances, Maree holds two U.S. records and has set a world record in the 1500 meter run. Because of that success, Maree is able to make his living from running. It has earned him a comfortable home in the affluent area outside Philadelphia known as the Main Line and enabled him to support his mother and three brothers. But reaching this point has not been easy for Maree.The family he helps support lives in South Africa, where Sydney Maree was born and raised.

SYDNEY MAREE: I came to this country without anything. I understood that if I worked hard enough, anything was possible and everything was available to me. And I was in a much more fortunate position by having been in a position where everything was denied me by law, because I was black.

HOLMAN [voice-over]: He did not escape that environment until he was 19, but it was an escape he planned for years.

Mr. MAREE: I wanted a way out. I could not see myself going through the same conditions that my grandparents and my parents went through.I tried to utilize all the different forms of talents that I had to try to exploit those and see how far I could go.And I just decided then that I would choose a sport where I would have total control. I felt very free as a runner. I could just go out in the back yard and just go for miles and just run myself into the ground, because there was -- nobody could tell me how fast I was allowed to run or how far I could run. I had total control over that particular part of my life.

HOLMAN [voice-over]: Maree's coach of the last two years, Tom Donnelly, says Maree always pushed himself to his limit.

TOM DONNELLY: Then he'd go out and sneak out at night sometimes. Sneak out in the sense that, you know, I don't think his coach wanted him to do any more, but he would go out anyway and run. So he must have been doing even in high school a lot of days like over 20 miles a day. And just knowing the way that he runs, he doesn't run slow. He's trying to prove something, you know, not just to himself. And I don't think just to the running community, but probably to the whole world. You know, something about what he is, not just as a runner but as a person.

[to MAREE] If it's like that thing in '82, don't, you know, start slowing down over like at 1,000 meters. If the guy's really struggling, just go by him. Don't screw around.

HOLMAN [voice-over]: Today when Maree and coach Tom Donnelly prepare for a race, they don't have to worry about resources. Maree's contract with Puma shoes accounts for only part of the more then $100,000 a year he earns from running. Still, his South African past has held him back. Until his naturalization as an American, Maree was forbidden from taking part in international competitions because he was from South Africa. The fact that he is black did not free him from that restriction.

Mr. MAREE: I was now being punished twice by the international community. I was being punished in South Africa by not being given my basic human rights for being black. And internationally I was being punished for being South African, because I was not allowed to compete anyway. And to me it was -- it had no -- there was really no justified reason why if the international community had all these sanctions on South Africa trying to help the black people why I was put in the same boat as the rest of the white South Africans who had all the privileges as citizens of South Africa.

HOLMAN [voice-over]: Ironically, it was the South African government that helped Sydney Maree get out.In 1977 he was sent on a goodwill tour of the United States. When Villanova University offered him a scholarship, he decided to stay and began trying to adjust to life on an American college campus that was 95% white.

Mr. MAREE: I had been conditioned that the white man was so much more superior than I was and I was so much more inferior as a black person. And I needed time to have to study white people to see what white people were like, to see if they really had the same aspirations that I had and to see if they thrive or actually struggled for success and were constantly trying to better themselves as human beings like I was. And really it was -- I had to go through a whole studying process, which is really why I was not available at all social functions all the time.

HOLMAN [voice-over]: Former Villanova track star Don Page says he and others misunderstood that reaction.

DON PAGE: I think we betrayed him by pushing him aside and letting him go off in his own little corner studying by himself, training by himself, and not having as many friends as he should have in college. We were wrong, because we didn't understand truly what Sydney went through in South Africa. We didn't know what it was like for the blacks in South Africa.

Mr. MAREE: I had the questions like, "Aw, you must be kidding. You mean you guys there can't take the same buses? You mean you still can not use the same bathroom facilities? You mean you can not live where you want to?" I said -- really, I was just really, I have to say, disappointed by how naive the people that I met on campus were about the whole South African situation.

HOLMAN [voice-over]: These days, Maree seems more at home in American society. In 1984 he was naturalized as an American citizen. And his alma mater regularly remembers his achievements, as at this banquet where he was invited to sit alongside a former president to present an award to a young athlete. Maree says he feels both privileged and a great sense of responsibility about being an American citizen.

Mr. MAREE: It's only after you have had your rights taken away from you by forces beyond your control that you truly understand what it means to have that opportunity to go and vote, to have that opportunity to express yourself, to have the chance to stand equal to anybody in the world as a part of the human species, to be respected for what you are and to be dealt with very fairly in life. And that's why the law of the country, of the state, have to be so much more against any form of evil and really promote all groups equally and treat them all fairly. Because the country -- this country is made, really, out of immigrants. It's built by immigrants.

HOLMAN [voice-over]: Maree, his wife and three children enjoy a typically American lifestyle. He hopes that his two-month-old son, Sydney, one day will be a soccer player.But his wife Lisa says Maree still is not completely at ease in his new homeland -- that he so fears being disillusioned by American racism that he refuses to go to church.

LISA MAREE: He's very religious person, but he just made the statement one day, "I would really hate to walk into a church in America and know that I'm on my knees praying beside somebody that hates me because of the color of my skin." So -- he says, "Not in God's house." So I think perhaps that's just one barrier that he needs to overcome.

Mr. MAREE: Maybe there's a reason why I've been so hesitant. And maybe those are the reasons -- that I'm afraid if I ever felt dealt with in a very unfair way, I would -- I could not live with myself.

HOLMAN [voice-over]: Despite his concerns about racism, Maree insists that he is a sportsman, not a politician. He has been criticized by those who want him to condemn the government of his homeland.

Mr. MAREE: I feel as if I have been critical enough of the South African government. I have just maybe not been violent -- critically violent -- which I do not feel is necessary. To me it's very important to maintain a position where i can go back and forth into South Africa and be respected for what I am. And then more and more white South Africans will understand that the only reason I'm different is only because I was given a fair chance -- an opportunity.

HOLMAN [voice-over]: Friends say Maree is more confident and settled now than ever before. They predict he could break two world records this summer and that he'll bring the same diligence to law school when he stops competing on the track. Two weeks ago, at the familiar Villanova track, around the corner from his home, Maree got a good start on the racing season, winning a three minute, fifty second mile -- one of the fastest of the summer. For Sydney Maree, it's a matter of keeping his success in perspective.

Mr. MAREE: I do not forget my future and my past -- my past being South Africa, my past being those masses of the underprivileged that are left behind. I can not really sit here and be bathing in these luxuries, because I never had them in the past, and I could wake up tomorrow and it could all be gone. Finding America

LEHRER: This is the week of the Fourth of July, and we will be observing it with a series of essays on finding America. First up is Texas writer A.C. Greene to tell us about how he found the founding fathers.

A.C. GREENE: One summer evening in the middle of World War II, I found myself wandering the streets of Philadelphia -- a little lost, and more than a little lonesome. I had arrived in town only a few days before -- a sailor from Texas who had never been any further east than Chicago.

It was my first liberty in the city of brotherly love. I left the naval station alone without a plan or a phone number to my name and rode the Broad Street subway to Center Square where city hall towered over downtown, with William Penn at its tiptop, hands outstretched, blessing his city. I passed some wonderfully attractive restaurants with red roses on snowy tables, but when I looked at the menu posted in the window, the prices took away my hunger. My navy salary was $64 a month. I settled for a bowl of clam chowder at the Redding Terminal Oyster Bar.

Emerging at dusk, I walked down Market Street feeling even more lonesome -- the least important sailor in the U.S. Navy. Turning into a side street and walking a few more blocks, I realized I had no idea where I was. The sidewalks were empty. I stopped and looked around, glancing at the doorway of the red brick building where I had halted. A plaque was mounted there, and the words brought me to tears as a read them."The Birthplace of the United States of America." Looking upward, following the lines of the familiar spire, I recognized this was Independence Hall, where the Declaration of Independence was signed July 4, 1776. It happened here. That diverse group of heroes gathered on this very spot to make that final, awesome decision. Thomas Jefferson, who wrote the document; Benjamin Franklin, age 70; John Adams, who would one day be president of the United States; Francis Hopkinson, author and songwriter; Benjamin Rush, physician. They touched these bricks that morning, taking those decisive steps, turning their back on the safety of concession. Cautiously, with a sort of metaphysical expectation, I placed my foot in that stone footprint. I put my foot in the Fourth of July.

Suddenly, the bold sentences thundered through me with new and immediate power. "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, and among these rights are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." It was, it is the most compelling document in American history, paramount in its importance. Because without it, the other documents and amendments remain locked in the hearts and minds of those who conceived them.

These men who put their names to that declaration put their lives on the line -- the firing line or the lines to the gallows. If the colonies lost the revolution, there was no place for them to hide, no shelter from the wrath of King George, no Bill of Rights to call on for protection. Their names were on this treasonable paper. There was no denial.

I could hear voices.John Hancock, president of Congress and first in line, penning that now familiar signature and exclaiming, we are told, "King George will have no trouble reading that." None of them acknowledging the fear that must have lurked beneath the consciousness of them all. They were not just signing a petition; they were demanding the noose.

And yet there was surely an even stronger fear lurking: would it work? Even if the battles and political struggles were successful, what terrible creature might they be loosing on mankind? What price independence at a time in history when it had never before been defined? Even the taste for human freedom was uncertain. They were weiting the original recipe. That to secure these rights governments were instituted among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

And there I was that darkening evening in Philadelphia, waiting to be sent into a war which, in a sense, was being fought because of what they did here on that long before July 4 -- a war from which I had no assurance of returning. A war that would cost me years of time and the death of friends and take me where I, like millions of others, would ask, "What am I doing here?"

But where might I have been had they hesitated, had they divided and lacked resolve? With all the flaws and failings of the creature they created, where would the world be? Would I have chosen otherwise? Of course not. No, all these thoughts didn't find me that one night. Over the years I have believed, then changed my mind; have taken stands, then deserted them; have raged and wondered and prayed.But no matter what I've discovered about my country or myself, I've not forgot that evening more than 40 years ago when I put my foot in the Fourth of July.

MacNEIL: Once again, the main stories of the day. The Supreme Court upheld a law making sodomy a crime. Soviet leader Gorbachev said the U.S. was sabotaging arms control by ignoring Soviet proposals. A California coroner said Cleveland Browns football player Don Rogers died from cocaine poisoning. Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night, Robin. We'll see you tomorrow night. I'm Jim Lehrer. Thank you and good night.