The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Interview with General Alexander Haig

ROBERT MacNEIL: Tonight General Alexander Haig gives his first interview since his decision to resign as NATO Supreme Commander.

Good evening. Twelve days ago General Alexander Haig suddenly announced his resignation as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, effective at the end of June. By thus giving six months` notice the General prompted speculation that he was planning an assault on the Republican presidential nomination next year -- or at least making himself available for it. He has denied having any such plan now, but has not ruled out the possibility later. Whether he goes into active politics or not, General Haig`s retirement will free him to speak out in coming debates which will help shape the issues for 1980:the strategic arms treaty with the Russians, the size of the defense budget, and the military strength of the West in the face of growing Soviet power. Tonight, a conversation with General Haig. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, Alexander Haig is best known as the White House Chief of Staff during the final days of the Richard Nixon presidency, but there`s a lot more to his biography. A West Point graduate, he served as an aide to General Douglas MacArthur during the occupation of Japan. Then he was a Pentagon policy officer during the Kennedy administration, a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense under President Johnson. After a nine-month tour in Vietnam, Haig was selected by Henry Kissinger to join the National Security Council staff at the Nixon White House. In 1972 Haig was jumped over 240 other Army officers to be appointed a fourstar general.In May 1973, after the forced resignation of H.R. Haldeman, Haig came back to the White House as Chief of Staff. In December 1974, President Ford named Haig Commander of Allied Forces in Europe. The General is with Robin in New York now. Robin?

MacNEIL: General Haig, welcome. Why did you resign so early, six months before the date?

Gen. ALEXANDER HAIG: Well, I think it`s a very normal notification period; there are considerable details to be worked out in a transition of this kind, including coordination with the member governments of the Alliance.

MacNEIL: Is it normal to do it in public that early?

HAIG: Well, I recognize that this seems to be interpreted with some surprise, but I had informed President Carter and Secretary Brown almost a year ago of my intentions to do this. They asked me to stay on a year from last June, and that`s precisely what I`m doing. This is merely a confirmation of the original arrangements.

MacNEIL: Let me ask you the question that a lot of people are asking: are you running for the Republican presidential nomination?

HAIG: Not at all, and in no way.

MacNEIL: Might you run for it?

HAIG: No, I don`t foresee it at all. I have discounted or precluded any "never" statements, because I don`t think that`s an appropriate thing to do, but I have no plans whatsoever at this time to enter politics, in any way.

MacNEIL: In other words, it`s not totally beyond question or reasonable speculation that it could become a possibility.

HAIG: Well, I would say the speculation that has followed by announcement far exceeds the realities of future potentials.

MacNEIL: I see. And you say you have no plans to enter any kind of politics; would that include the speculation that you might run for Senator Schweiker`s seat in Pennsylvania?

HAIG: Absolutely; absolutely. Yes.

MacNEIL: Is it possible you might change your mind? Do you leave it open to yourself to change your mind?

HAIG: I always leave it open, but I doubt it very seriously at this juncture.

MacNEIL: Has any Republican figure or group actually approached you and...

HAIG: Oh, I`ve had a few approaches from here and there, but I haven`t been overwhelmed by the din.

MaCNEIL: (Laughs.) They`re not beating down the door, you mean?

HAIG: Not exactly, no.

MacNEIL:. Is it true, as reported, that when you saw Mr. Nixon in Paris during his European trip in November that he urged you to get into politics?

HAIG: Well, I make it a habit of not revealing the context of discussions of that kind, but I wouldn`t suggest an affirmative response, either.

MacNEIL: Would it be fair to say that you`re testing the water at the moment?

HAIG: No, not at all.

MacNEIL: Then why did you meet with that group of Republican figures in Massachusetts in the middle of December?

HAIG: Well, if I did, I was what you call sandbagged, because all I did in that time was to attend a cocktail party I`d been invited to before a formal lecture to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

MacNEIL: Have you had a lot of job offers since you announced your resignation on January third?

HAIG: Well, not enough that I feel encouraged about the subject, but it wouldn`t be appropriate for me to indulge in job selections or discussions at this time.

MacNEIL: Could I ask you this: would going into business be something you might consider doing?

HAIG: Well, I could consider such a thing, yes.

MacNEIL: After all these years of public service a soldier`s pay, compared to what a businessman can make, is not a lot of money. Is making more money an important thing to you?

HAIG: No, it is not, frankly, and had it been I suppose I would have picked another branch of service and career, because as you know the military service is not a remunerative endeavor.

MacNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: General, back to politics for a few more minutes, if I can. Are you in fact a Republican?

HAIG: In fact, I would say not necessarily, no. I`ve been generally an Independent. I`ve served administrations on both sides -- President Kennedy, President Johnson, and as you know, President Nixon, President Ford, now President Carter -- and in almost each of those instances at fairly close range.

LEHRER: Well, as you know, all the speculation that Robin just went through with you all had to do with Republican nominations of various kinds. You didn`t get that started? Are you surprised by that?

HAIG:No, I`m not at all surprised. I read the press, like you do (laughing), and I`m aware of all the speculation.

LEHRER: Right; I mean the fact that it all centers around Republican politics. Nobody has suggested that you might run as a Democrat for anything.

HAIG: Well, I suppose my past associations -- my work in the White House at the time of the Nixon administration and the Ford administrations -- would associate me clearly with the Republican Party, I understand that.

LEHRER: But you don`t consider yourself a Republican, is that correct?

HAIG: Well, I don`t consider myself as having been a partisan over my years of military service, and I`ve avoided such handles. Now, with respect to my own philosophic convictions, that`s a matter I`ll keep to myself today.

LEHRER: You took the words right out of my mouth. I was just going to ask you whether or not your own personal political philosophy follows in line closer with the Republican Party than it does the Democratic Party.

HAIG: Well, you`ve got me into one of those "When did you stop beating your wife" questions, and the more I attempt to answer it the more I`m drawn into a subject that I don`t think would be appropriate today.

LEHRER: You have thus far steadfastly refused to discuss the Watergate affair, those final days in the Nixon administration across the board. Why is that? Why do you decline to discuss that period, sir?

HAIG: Well, I initially felt it in a visceral sense, that the kissand-tell syndrome was not something that I felt I wanted to indulge in. Since that time I have developed an intellectual conviction that it`s been the right course to pursue, and I intend to follow it.

LEHRER: An intellectual conviction. What do you mean by that, sir?

HAIG: I think additional controversy at this juncture in the American history on the events, from who`s ever perspective they may be revealed, will not be received with the kind of objectivity that I would hope; historic analysis, which I would hope someday perhaps to contribute to, would be hard to come by.

LEHRER: Did you happen to read Pat Buchanan`s newspaper column a few days ago? As you know, Pat Buchanan was a former aide to President Nixon also. He wrote a column which was headed by words to this effect: Don`t do it, Al -- meaning run for the presidency of the United States. Did you read his column?

HAIG: I heard of it, yes.

LEHRER: What do you think about the point that he made, that you`re a neat guy and all of that, from his perspective, but just the fact of your candidacy might reopen Watergate and people would be asking what did Al Haig know and when did he know it.Does that concern you?

HAIG:No, it doesn`t concern me because the contingency that would make it a matter of concern, in line with the Buchanan thesis, is not one that I anticipate.

LEHRER: You mean running for political office.

HAIG: That`s correct.

LEHRER: Does that concern that the Watergate thing might have to come up again, if you in fact ran for office,in any way play a part in your decision at this point not to run?

HAIG: No, not in any way at all. You know, it`s an interesting fact, during the period that I served in the White House, I think I appeared before three grand juries, two Senate investigating committees, a court of law, and I can assure you that every step of my performance was analyzed, criticized and observed from a standpoint of either embarrassing, incorrect or perhaps even illegal activity, and I don`t know that anyone has ever come up with an assertion that would stand.

LEHRER: All right, thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Yes; General, in the press conference January third in which you announced your resignation, you said that NATO was making good progress in meeting the Soviet challenge in terms of conventional weapons but that the new challenge -- the new dilemma, as you put it -- was to modernize nuclear weapons systems in the European theatre. If we have a need to do that, to modernize nuclear weapons systems, does that mean this is not a good time to be negotiating and signing a SALT treaty which would limit our options?

HAIG: Not necessarily. I think the point that I would underline is that if we hope in SALT-III to achieve breakthroughs and restraints on ...

MacNEIL: That`s the one beyond the one they`re negotiating now.

HAIG: That`s correct. If we hope to achieve breakthroughs on the ongoing Soviet buildup in the theatre nuclear area -- and I`m talking about SS-20, Backfire bombers and a host of shorter-range systems that they are deploying today -- then clearly the incentive for breakthroughs must be based on compensatory or corresponding buildups on our side. If we go into those negotiations with an empty hand, there`s hardly an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate limits on their own systems.

MacNEIL: Does that mean we have to develop new systems whether we negotiate this SALT agreement or not? Is that what that means?

HAIG: Well, there`s no real question about that. This SALT-II agreement will deal essentially but not exclusively with central strategic systems, systems which are intercontinental in character. Now, there are some limitations in the protocol of SALT-II which will involve the ranges of Cruise missiles, and in that sense this is a matter of concern to our European allies in the context of the limits of that protocol and the ability that they will have in the intervening period to prepare systems which will counter ongoing Soviet improvements.

MacNEIL: Are our European allies, the people you talk to in NATO all the time, worried about the terms of the SALT treaty as they know them so far?

HAIG: I don`t know that I would characterize it by any particular adjective or adverb. I`d say that in general our European allies strongly support our efforts to achieve a breakthrough in SALT, and they will inevitably support SALT-II, at least in the initial discussion of it. They are concerned about this protocol I mentioned; they are concerned about their ability to enjoy the transfer of American technology as they perceive their own modernization needs; and finally, they`re concerned about whatever commitments we should make in SALT-II for the agenda for SALT-III.

MacNEIL: Do they feel adequately consulted so far on what we`re negotiating in SALT-II?

HAIG: Well, it would be presumptuous of me to answer for them.

MacNEIL: Do you feel adequately consulted?

HAIG: I think they have felt, initially, some concern here. In the past twelve months or so the American effort to consult before negotiating and to report following the negotiating sessions in Vienna has been very detailed and thorough. I`ve made the point, however, that it`s important that our allies can sense that there is as much flexibility in the development of American negotiating positions in the process of consultations as we have apparently been able to exercise in the process of negotiating.

MacNEIL: You mean not just telling them what we`re going to do but asking them...

HAIG: Yes. Having more than an informative arrangement. MacNEIL: And it is not, so far?

HAIG:I think the process, when we deal with central strategic systems, is quite naturally...

MacNEIL: Our business.

HAIG: ...more bilateral. Now, as we get into theatre systems, of course, we`re dealing with vital interests of our European allies.

MacNEIL: You also, in a -- to be frank, I can`t remember where you said this, but you said recently that we shouldn`t, in looking -- I guess it was in the January third press conference -- we shouldn`t, in looking for new systems, put all our eggs in the basket; you said look for a get rich-quick solution like exclusive reliance on Cruise. What made you say that? Did you see things going that way?

HAIG: Well, I think there has been, on both sides of the Atlantic, a great deal of enthusiasm for the Cruise solution, the air breathing solution. And the point I`ve made is that in purely deterrence as well as in war-fighting terms an air breathing system is not an equivalent match for a ballistic system, by a host of criteria but the most important being flight time; from time of launch to time of arrival on target a Cruise is air breathing, it takes hours rather than minutes to arrive at a target, and in a ballistic system in takes minutes.

MacNEIL: Are you one of those who still believes that the neutron bomb should be not only developed but deployed -- as an alternative...

HAIG: You know, the NATO military authorities have made their position on this very clear -- and I share that position -- and that was that this would be a desirable modernization step. At the same time we`ve also made quite clear that it`s essentially a political decision. Now, I think you know the current state of affairs is that President Carter has put the Soviet Union on notice that he will make a decision based on his assessment of their compensatory restraint in their nuclear and conventional arms buildup. Now, in the meantime he is going ahead with the production of the components, less the nuclear aspects. So I`m generally comfortable with that posture. But at some point a decision will have to be made.

MacNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: General, let`s move further east for a moment. Are there any indications so far that the Soviets are making any moves to take advantage of the instability in Iran?

HAIG: I`ll leave that to the official spokesmen of the Department of State, and I think they have addressed the issue; and best we leave it that way.

LEHRER: Of course your deputy is on a special military mission, is he not, to Iran right now?

HAIG: That`s correct.

LEHRER: Have you talked to him?

HAIG: Yes, I have talked to him. I keep close tabs on his assessments and his activities.

LEHRER: Can you give us any clues as to what his assessment is right now, what`s going to happen? We know the latest word, of course, is that the Shah is supposed to leave; what`s going to happen when the Shah leaves, based on the General`s assessment, your deputy`s assessment?

HAIG: Well, frankly, this is a highly dynamic situation and an extremely sensitive one, and I don`t think it serves any useful purpose for me, a man in uniform, to indulge in public speculation on it.

LEHRER: Yeah. Well, let`s talk about the military thing for a moment. Is there any indication, based on your sources, that the army in Iran is on the verge of staging a coup, or do you think they will go along with the political solution? What can you tell us about that? That`s been of great concern over here, as you know.

HAIG: I think the Department of State spokesman was asked that very question either yesterday or today and responded to it.

LEHRER: And you don`t wish to add anything to that.

HAIG: I wouldn`t want to elaborate.

LEHRER: The administration has said -- these spokesmen that you`ve mentioned a couple of times now -- have said continually throughout this crisis in Iran that the United States was virtually powerless to do anything other than what it has done, which is to continually -- with words, at least -- vow its support of the Shah. Do you agree that that`s really all the United States could do in this situation?

HAIG: I would refrain from offering a value judgment on what has been done or what might have been done. The simple facts are that at this juncture it is an extremely sensitive area of the world, and public contributions by me are not going to alleviate that situation.

LEHRER: Well, let me try one more time.(Laughing.)

HAIG: (Laughs.)

LEHRER: There have been people saying the United States should do more. We`ve been hearing that over here; I don`t know if you`ve been hearing that in Europe, but here in the United States we`ve been hear ing that: the United States should do more, the United States should do more. Can you think of anything -- from a military standpoint, not from a political standpoint -- that the United States could have done to try to alleviate the situation over there?

HAIG: Well, I suppose there are a number of things that might have been done, from a purely military point of view. Whether they would have been prudent and the correct things to have done is another question.

LEHRER: Can you give us an example?

HAIG: There are any number of examples, and your imagination there is as good as mine. I just don`t think it serves any useful purpose for me to discuss contingencies or to offer value judgments on a highly sensitive political policy issue.

LEHRER: All right. Moving on to the next step; assuming the Shah leaves as he`s supposed to leave tomorrow and we have a new government of some kind in Iran, looking at it strictly from a military, strictly from a strategic standpoint, what is the danger of Iran`s instability to our strategic position or to the West`s strategic position in that part of the world?

HAIG: I think I share the view of all American officials that Iran has been of vital interest to the United States and indeed to the Western world at large. There`s nothing in recent events that is going to change that basic assessment.

LEHRER: Could it in any way endanger our position in that part of the world if the instability in Iran continues, or if the Soviet Union should somehow get its hooks in there? In other words, how important is it?

HAIG: There can be no question about that. Soviet interventionism would be a grievous matter. The loss of the current pro-Western orientation of Iran would be a serious setback for Western interests. Iran has always been in the vital sphere of Western interests since the days when President Truman was confronted with the troubles in Azerbaijan at the end of World War II. Nothing`s changed.

LEHRER: All right; thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: General, you`ve been working in NATO to, as it were, remobilize Western European allied will to meet the Soviet challenge. How much is that will now dependent on the U.S. keeping its promise to raise defense expenditure by three percent above inflation factors for the next five years?

HAIG: It`s a vitally important decision for the United States. After all, the United States has this year, through two summit-level meetings launched with the vision and courage of President Carter, generated a consensus among our European allies to increase their level of spending. I can assure you, the burdens our Western European allies carry today in the socioeconomic sector are every bit as heavy as our own, and in some instances far heavier. And were we to fail, for whatever reason, to meet the sacred obligations arrived at at this summit in our own capital this past May, it would cause an unraveling in the European contributions, in my view, that would be far more serious than the decrements that the United States may have manipulated itself.

MacNEIL: You say for whatever reasons. Would those reasons include such budget tightness, just reasons of trying to squeeze the budget down, that they weren`t quite able in Washington to meet the three percent?

Would that not be understood, it would still cause this unraveling that you said...

HAIG: Well, it would not be understood, and I`ll explain why. Over a number of years, American defense analysts have held our European allies to a very rigid criteria in defense increases or decrements. And they know all the tricks in the NATO family. So were the United States to indulge in hanky- panky or sliderule contributions, it will surface and the consequences I`ve outlined would be realized.

MacNEIL: What would the consequences be?

HAIG: I think a grievous setback to the progress which has been so promising that`s been made this past year.

MacNEIL: Does the three percent, in your understanding, mean three percent applied only to our expenditures for NATO, or three percent across the board in our defense expenditure?

HAIG: There`s no question in my mind that the agreement arrived at visualizes a three-percent across-the-board increase in defense spending by the member governments.

MacNEIL: You say that it would cause grievous harm to the progress that we`ve made. Would it literally cause the other governments, which have their own budgetary struggles and their own politics to take care of, would it cause the British and the West Germans and the others to say, "Oh, to hell with it. We`ll cut ours down, too"?

HAIG: Well, I think I`d have to leave the answer to that question to the political officials who would have to make the determination. However, I would emphasize that in their discussions with me senior members of our allied governments have suggested that they will be unable to hold the line with their respective parliaments should the United States reneg.

MacNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: General, both former President Nixon and Henry Kissinger have recently diagnosed America`s problems as primarily being a lack of will. How would you diagnose America`s number one problems right now?

HAIG: Jim, I`ve never been concerned about a lack of Western will per se. I have been concerned about confusion in the West, confusion with respect to the threat with which we are faced, and perhaps confusion with respect to the priorities that we must adopt to meet that threat. I think in the past, history has been very clear: that democratic systems are frequently misjudged in the area of will, and that when the line is crossed in a democratic state, why, the reaction is sometimes far more violent than a potential aggressor would have anticipated, and two wars in this century confirm that.

LEHRER: What would you offer then as your diagnosis, if you don`t see that as the number one problem, or do we have any problems?

HAIG: If I say "confusion," then I think a greater clarity of thought, a greater clarity of expression, a greater clarity of understanding of the nature of the challenges and threats.

LEHRER: Whose job is it to alleviate the confusion, General?

HAIG: Well, this is a partnership proposition with those of us who are charged with national security affairs. I have felt that both our political and our military leadership must express their concern when such concern is justified. I am also very leery of over dramatising threat expositions on the part of uniformed people. But you know, by any measure of criteria today, Soviet defense spending, Soviet defense capabilities, and in some respects Soviet global activities are not consistent with purely defensive motives.

LEHRE R: It doesn`t sound like you`re confused, then, about what the problem is.

HAIG: I don`t think anybody has a monopoly on wisdom in these areas, but I do think the amount of time that I spend viewing the facts would confirm my judgments.

LEHRER: All right. Thank you, General. Robin?

MacNEIL: Thanks, Jim. Good night.

LEHRER: Good night, Robin.

MacNEIL: That`s all the time we have for this evening. Thank you very much for joining us. That`s all for tonight. We`ll be back tomorrow night. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.