The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour

Intro ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening from Washington, leading the news today the Supreme Court upheld state death penalty laws, even if they appear racially biased. President Reagan's Arms Control Director accused Congress of meddling and threatening talks with the Soviets. Congressmen blasted the State Department for laxness in embassy security. We'll have details in our news summary in a moment. Charlayne Hunter Gault is in New York tonight. CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: After the news summary, here's the News Hour for tonight. The author of the administration's medium range missile plan takes on his critics. Then an update on the latest twist in the U. S. Embassy spy scandal. And finally, a debate over the effects of the Supreme Court's death penalty decision.News Summary HUNTER-GAULT: The Supreme Court today handed down a decision regarded as a crushing defeat for opponents of the death penalty. In a 5 4 decision, the court upheld Georgia's death penalty law, despite evidence that it had been applied in racially biased ways. The court says the statistics showing that killers of white victims drew death sentences far more frequently than killers of black victims do not establish that the Georgia system violates the constitutional equal protection guarantees. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis Powell said, ''Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system. '' Robin? MacNEIL: In Geneva, U. S. negotiators arrived for new arms control talks starting tomorrow. Maynard Glitman, who heads the U. S. team on medium range missiles, said he was prepared for serious, intensive, and expeditious negotiations that would not be bound by a timetable. In Washington, Kenneth Adelman, Director of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency, accused Congress of meddling in the talks, and threatening the outcome. Adelman spoke at a news conference.

KENNETH ADELMAN, Director, Arms Control Agency: I think one of the big threats hanging over the horizon of Arms Control is the action of the Congress on arms control agreements. If the Congress is going to proceed to tie the President's hand instead of strengthening his hand, it's going to hurt us in these negotiations. To me, it is ironic that the one area where Congress has left us alone, not restricted us, is the INF, the one area we've made the most progress over the years. HUNTER-GAULT: A marine guard arrested in the embassy security scandal was offered immunity from prosecution, but his lawyer said he immediately rejected the proposal. According to a report on National Public Radio, the Marine Corps needs the testimony of Corporal Arnold Bracy to help build an espionage case against Sergeant Lonetree. Both men were U. S. embassy guards in Moscow, and are charged with espionage after becoming sexually involved with Soviet women. Meanwhile, a State Department official told Congress that U. S. officials knew the Soviets were bugging the Moscow embassy as early as 1979. At the same hearing, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee criticized the handling of construction contracts for U. S. facilities in Moscow and elsewhere.

Rep. LAWRENCE SMITH (D) Florida: Is it true that some or all of these firms that built foreign missions, embassies or compounds for housing of American personnel overseas did not have security clearance? ROBERT LAMB, State Department: It was certainly true until the end of last calendar year, yessir. Rep. SMITH: So the Soviets, for instance, could have the blueprints for everything that was being built for the last 10 years by the United States overseas, is that right? Is that a possibility? Mr. LAMB: Yes, sir, that's a possibility. Rep SMITH: Then I'm going to tell you, for one Congressman, I think the State Department has acted with gross negligence, gross ineptitude, gross stupidity. You're playing with people's lives. I have never heard anything -- these admissions are disgraceful. HUNTER-GAULT: Poland said today a U. S. diplomat had left that country after being picked up in a clandestine meeting with an espionage contact. Cathy Pope with this news report.

CATHY POPE [voice over]: At a news conference, Polish government spokesman, Jerzy Urban, said Albert Mueller was caught redhanded while spying for the United States. Mueller worked as a second secretary in the embassy's political section. He's been in Warsaw since 1985, and was approaching the end of his tour of duty. The Polish authorities produced a video film, which they said shows Mueller passing over spy equipment, instructions and money to a Polish contact. Obviously shot at night, the video is of poor quality, and neither the alleged U. S. spy nor his contact is clear. The film also shows Mueller refusing comment when he was later questioned by police, and the alleged contents of the bag. Mueller is now in the U. S. , and despite the allegations, is expected to return to Poland. HUNTER-GAULT: In Washington, the State Department refused to comment on the spy allegation. But said the incident could damage U. S. . --Polish relations. MacNEIL: In Iran, an American engineer, Jon Pattis, has been sentenced to 10 years in prison on spy charges. Pattisworked at a telecommunications complex in southwestern Iran, and was arrested last June after an Iraqi air raid. On an appearance on Iranian television last October, he admitted passing information on the complex and its defense system to the American CIA. The House Select Committee investigating the Iran contra affair today voted to grant limited immunity to Admiral John Poindexter, former National Security Advisor. In following similar Senate action yesterday, the Committee thus secured the promise of testimony from a key figure who has so far remained silent. HUNTER-GAULT: In South Africa today, security forces fired on striking railway workers. The violence marked a major escalation in the six week old industrial dispute. Michael Buerk of the BBC reports.

MICHAEL BUERK: Today the strikers gathered in a series of meetings to learn 16,000 of them had been sacked. Emotions boiled over into bloodshed and death. At Germiston on the East Rand, police with whips broke up a strike meeting being held at a union office in a shopping precinct. There were 120 men inside, desperately trying to get out. In the ensuing violence, one of the strikers was killed, and one seriously injured. Worse was to come two hours later at Doornfontein Station on the edge of Johannesburg City Center. There was a pitched battle between police and 50 strikers armed with axes and clubs. A senior police officer was beaten and stabbed, another seriously injured before the police opened fire. It is thought five of the strikers were killed. HUNTER-GAULT: Under South Africa's emergency decree, reports of violence in that country are subject to government censorship. There was also more violence today on the island nation of Sri Lanka. Government planes bombed the bases of two Tamil separatist groups at the Jaffna Peninsula in retaliation for yesterday's rush hour bombing of the main bus station in the country's capital, Colombo. Today's attacks added more than 100 to the nearly 400 killed in the past 6 days. That's our news summary. Still ahead on the News Hour, the administration's medium range missile man takes on his critics. The latest twist on embassy spying, and fallout from the death penalty decision. Taking on the Critics MacNEIL: Is it a good deal? That's the question being raised with new intensity as the United States and Soviet Union seem to be moving closer to an agreement on medium range and possibly short range missiles in Europe. On the table are the more than 300 American cruise and Pershing II missiles deployed in Western Europe, and the 500 plus Soviet SS 20 missiles in the Western and Asian edges of their country. Under the proposed deal, all these missiles with a range from 1100 to 3000 miles would be eliminated, except for 100 that the Soviets could keep in Soviet Asia and the 100 Americans could keep in the Continental United States. The Soviets have also offered to eliminate some 130 or more shorter range missiles, mainly in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, with a range of 300 to 600 miles. The U. S. has none in Europe. We take up the issues and arguments first with Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, who many in Washington consider to be the author of the so called zero option, the part of the proposal that calls for eliminating all medium range missiles in Europe. Are you the author of the zero option? RICHARD PERLE, Defense Department: No, certainly not. The author is the President of the United States Ronald Reagan. And he produced this policy, tabled it with the Soviet Union when thesetalks got underway in November of 1981. MacNEIL: But you have no quarrel with the policy? Mr. PERLE: No, indeed not, I support the policy fully, and supported it then. MacNEIL: A lot of people in Europe and in this country are acting as though this deal is already done. How nearly done is it? Mr. PERLE: Well, there's a great deal that remains to be completed. We don't have agreement yet on clarification. We still have to discuss the details of how the shorter range systems would be handled, and we are presently in consultation with our European allies with respect to that issue. And we would still like to see the elimination of the last 100 warheads on each side, the 100 that the Soviets would have in Asia and the 100 that we would have in the United States. So that remains to be -- MacNEIL: Shorter or medium range? Mr. PERLE: Medium range. MacNEIL: What do you say to Majority Leader Robert Byrd -- that is the Democratic Senate Majority Leader -- who said in his speech yesterday, warning the administration against racing into a deal he said was cosmetically attractive, but could harm the cohesion and steadfastness of the NATO Alliance? Mr. PERLE: Well, I think he's wrong about the danger to the cohesion and steadfastness of the alliance, and I think that will be demonstrated when the Alliance through its normal processes of consultation comes together behind an agreed Alliance decision. MacNEIL: You have no doubt they will come behind it? Mr. PERLE: I have no doubt they'll come together. What I think we need to work about for the future is the kind of interference by the Congress of the United States, and that would include the Senate of the United States, in ongoing negotiations in which the Congress aligns itself with the bargaining positions that the Soviets have on the table. And my gratuitous advice to the Majority Leader in the Senate would be if he wishes to see negotiations succeed, to avoid the pitfalls he's talking about, a little help and support from the Congress, rather than a persistent effort to tie the administration's hands and legislate along the lines that the Soviets would prefer would be a pretty good idea. MacNEIL: Is it possible that the Alliance could still block this deal through their anxiety about -- the anxiety of some members of the Alliance over the short range missile part of the deal particularly? Mr. PERLE: Well, I think the anxiety has to do with a concern that we may go too far in the long run and become perhaps even advertently part of a process that has as its final result the denuclearization of Western Europe. Western Europe and the United States together cannot provide an adequate defense of Alliance territory without a combination of nuclear and conventional forces. This has been true for many years, it will be true far into the future. And therefore it seems to me -- and I think it will become apparent to the Alliance as a whole -- that we are on the verge perhaps of successfully completing an area of nuclear arms control in Europe, that we mustn't make the mistake of negotiating in areas where there can be no fruitful negotiation of these very short range systems, aircraft and tactical systems, that are impossible to verify and that are vital to the security of the Alliance. So if we conclude the process successfully with medium range and short range missiles that are under discussion, and then concentrate on maintaining adequate conventional and nuclear forces within the permitted range limits that would result in this agreement, we can have a satisfactory defense posture, and one need not be concerned. MacNEIL: Well, suppose they don't believe that. Suppose enough of them -- the important ones -- West Germany, for example -- don't believe that and continue to insist on something else rather than abandoning short range missiles as well. That is, not having the United States bring in missiles to match the Soviet short range missiles. Could that block an agreement, or does the Alliance really have a choice in this matter? Mr. PERLE: Oh, yes, I think the Alliance does have a choice. And we have always managed in these matters to forge a consensus out of the consultation process, and I am confident that we will here as well. But I would say to our Allies, as Secretary Shultz said in consultations in Brussels last week, that we believe that it's important to draw a line. We're not going to head toward the denuclearization of Western Europe -- it's not in our security interest to do that. But having drawn that line, we have to stand by it. And I think that will give us a successful land coherent defense -- MacNEIL: Before we move on, to come back to the question we opened on, in your mind, is this a good deal? Mr. PERLE: I believe it is a good deal. I think it entails elimination of something on the order of 1300 or 1400 Soviet long range intermediate nuclear warheads, and another several hundred shorter range -- and the United States would be giving up a little over 300 intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe. We never had missiles of that range prior to 1983. The Soviets have had them for more than 20 years. I'd like to see those Soviet missiles withdrawn, and I think it's a reasonable price for us to pay for us to withdraw ours in response. MacNEIL: Mr. Perle, we'll come back. Charlayne? HUNTER-GAULT: Now for three critics of the proposed arms deal, William Hyland is the editor of Foreign Affairs Quarterly and was Deputy National Security Advisor in the Ford administration. William Jackson was Executive Director of an Arms Control Agency panel, and a senate aide. He is now an associate professor at the Fulbright Institute at the University of Arkansas. He joins us from a studio in Tulsa. Seymour Weiss is a former State Department official and is now a foreign policy consultant. Starting with you first Bill Hyland, is this a good deal? WILLIAM HYLAND, Foreign Affairs Magazine: No, I don't think so. I'm not sure it's a horrible deal, but it's certainly a bad deal for the United States. HUNTER-GAULT: Why? What's your major objection? Mr. HYLAND: My major objection to begin with is that it's unequal. As you mentioned earlier in the program, the Russians retain 100 warheads in Asia, targeted against Japan presumably, which is insulting to Japan. We take our missiles back to the United States. So they have 100 to zero. That is the real bargain that is being negotiated, and I think that's not a good outcome for the United States. As Mr. Perle indicated, there is this concern over a trend in Europe towards denuclearization. I think this proposal pushes the United States in that direction, though technically we'll still have nuclear weapons. It reverses a trend we've had for over 30 years of having some missiles in Europe targeted against the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. So for the first time that will not be the case. And finally, I don't think it can stand alone. We cannot take our missiles out of Europe and expect the Soviets to take their missiles out of Europe, but do nothing about the other missiles -- the intercontinental missiles. After all, we have denounced the Salt II Treaty. Presumably the Russians agreed to build ICBMs. If they were to build new ICBMs while this agreement was in the process of being implemented, it would make a mockery out of arms control altogether. So it seems to me the United States ought to stand back and make a new proposal which would allow us to keep some weapons on our side, short and medium range, and relink the whole process to the strategic weapons, and even to the Star Wars SDI. HUNTER-GAULT: By some, do you have any figure in mind? Mr. HYLAND: I don't think the figure is critical. One hundred, two hundred, something in the nature of that range. After all, there was a deal proposed by Paul Nitze some years ago that I think was quite a bit better than this outcome that we're talking about now. HUNTER-GAULT: All right. Stay there, we'll come back. Mr. Jackson, do you think this is a good deal? WILLIAM JACKSON, Fulbright Institute: No, I do not think it's a good deal in a vacuum, as Bill Hyland put it. I must say -- I have a great deal of respect for Mr. Perle's mind -- in fact, I think he's a giant among pygmies in this administration. So much respect that I cannot believe some of the argument that he believes, some of the arguments that he is making. I mean, consider this ironic spectacle, of these avid anti communists, Ronald Reagan and Richard Perle, arguing that we should go down this slippery slope of denuclearizing Europe. What's going on here? Are the Soviets giving us something for nothing? My major concern, however, is what is the strategy of this administrtion? Mr. Perle spoke of a coherent defense strategy. That's nonsense. The Reagan administration has simply blown it when it comes to any overall defense or arms control strategy or plan, to advance the national interest of the United States. It simply -- HUNTER-GAULT: In what way? Mr. JACKSON: Well, because it's simply too late to cut a strategic arms deal and the European deal is a last effort by a weakened administration. Generally, what's happening is that the administration's strategic and nuclear weapons arms control proposals are promoting European unilateralism, and American isolationism, which together promote a Soviet policy of anti American detente in Europe. HUNTER-GAULT: Can you just pursue that point a minute. Can you give it to me another way? The implications of that being what? Mr. JACKSON: Well, the implications of anti American detente as being pursued by the Soviets is that they would wean Western Europe closer to them and away from us. In order to get trade and technology benefits and in order to denuclearize the NATO countries. What if the Soviets had said yes to Mr. Perle's proposal? He was -- speaking of authors, he authored that 100% strategic missiles cut proposal at Reykjavik and advised Mr. Reagan that it was feasible for us to cut strategic ballistic missiles 100% in 10 years. What if the Soviets had said yes to that? We would have thrown in the continental deterrence out the window. So what is our strategy? I ask Mr. Perle. What has the one trillion dollars bought us in defense spending -- only whopping deficits. It has not driven the Soviets to the table -- they're driving us to the table right now. They're driving us to the table. We're not driving them to the table on our terms. To the contrary, Gorbachev is not about to come to Washington to give away his landbased ICBMs, while saying, ''Okay, you Americans go ahead and jump out of the ABM Treaty and pursue Star Wars. '' So I wonder why are we leading -- just why are we leading with this INF agreement? What is it that makes [unintelligible] forces in Europe so important to lead with as opposed to strategic forces? I suspect the real reason is that the [unintelligible] forces agreement in Europe is the least line of resistance within the administration, and between us and the Soviets, while we put the [unintelligible] on the Europeans for taking it in the groin if you will. HUNTER-GAULT: Let me just pursue this with Mr. Weiss. Do you think that this is a ploy of the Soviets? SEYMOUR WEISS, former State Department official: Well, before I answer that question, let me say that I was introduced as one of three critics of Mr. Perle. And quite to the contrary, I am rather an admirer of Mr. Perle, even though I happen to disagree with him on this particular proposal, and indeed even with regard to this proposal, however, I think in fairness it should be said that while some of his critics -- I suspect Mr. Jackson may well have been amongst them -- were beating the drums, arguing that it was impossible for this administration to negotiate an agreement that involved such major reductions on the Soviet side, Mr. Perle and the rest of the administration insisted that nothing short of that would satisfy the need. In my own case, however, I do not judge the value of an agreement in terms of whether it would be better than one that the soft liners would have negotiated. I take it as axiomatic that Mr. Perle is likely to negotiate a tougher agreement than most of his critics. HUNTER-GAULT: Well then, what is your major problem with it? Mr. WEISS: There are three. First of all, I think there is a very serious question about the verifiability of this agreement, and in fairness it strikes me as somewhat incredible that an administration that has made as much of an issue of Soviet violations as this administration has would sign an agreement that may not be verifiable. Secondly, I think that the strategic premises on which it is based -- HUNTER-GAULT: Excuse me, but didn't Mr. Perle just say a few moments ago that this was one of the loose ends? Mr. WEISS: Indeed, and I was delighted to hear him say this. You may recall that when I was on this program -- I think it must have been about a year ago before Reykjavik -- we were discussing the prospects then of an INF agreement, and I warned at the time, don't count those particular chickens before they're hatched. I think it's worth repeating that now, even though I'm more inclined to think an agreement is likely. But, yes, it could flounder on the verification issue. HUNTER-GAULT: But is that your principal concern? Mr. WEISS: No, it is not. I have two others. One is that I think it's based on faulty strategic premises. This is an issue which has been debated between people like Kissinger and Schlesinger. We can go into that further if you wish. HUNTER-GAULT: Well, just briefly what do you mean faulty strategic premises? Mr. WEISS: Well, in essence, NATO's security has been based on the assumption that it was simply impossible for the Western Alliance to develop the conventional capability to offset the Soviet Union and its allies. This is not, by the way, for lack of resources, it's simply the asymmetry between the two societies -- the totalitarian state is prepared to provide the wherewithal, democratic states in time of peace generally are not. As a result, it has been NATO strategic policy to ultimately rely on a nuclear respond. I think it's going to be very difficult for them to have an effective nuclear deterrent if these long range systems are totally brought out of the inventory. My third point of objection is that I think it is likely to have adverse political consequences, and in some respects that may be the most serious objection of all that I have. HUNTER-GAULT: In the United States or in Europe, or -- Mr. WEISS: In both. You hit it precisely on the nose. Despite what Mr. Perle has said, I think it is patently obvious that this has already been a disruptive issue within the Alliance. Now, it is true, as he says, that in the last analysis it's usually the case that we can hammer out a consensus within the Alliance. But I don't think we ought to kid ourselves. It is extraordinarily difficult for the Allies when faced with a position by the principal power and guarantor of the security of the Alliance for them to resist it. Now I have to be honest with you and tell you that my sympathy is muted, because the Allies generally have been pushing us toward making agreements, including toward this one. But the fact of the matter is that having an Alliance that is in discord does not serve our security interests. In fact, it's been a principal objective of Soviet policy for the last 30 or 40 years to sow precisely such discord. On the domestic scene, my concern is underlined by a visitor and expert that you had on this program about a week ago, who asserted with practically unvarnished glee that -- at least this is how I understood his position -- and it was not so much the specifics of the agreement that interested him, but that this would herald the dawning of a new era of detente. And it was obvious that he was enthusiastic over that prospect. I am not. I am concerned about it. I think our previous experience with detente suggested that it was very bad for the United States. I think it would be extraordinarily difficult with a new arms control agreement, a summit to follow that, thousands of members of the press fawning over every word of Mr. Gorbachev, the President and Mr. Gorbachev clinking champagne glasses. When the President then goes up to the Hill and asks for that increase in the defense budget, he will pay a very difficult price getting it. I don't think he can. HUNTER-GAULT: All right. Thank you Mr. Weiss. Stay where you are. MacNEIL: Secretary Perle, let's start with that. Is this -- you signed this deal --There's a summit meeting here in Washington, Mr. Reagan's administration goes out with a glow of success. Isn't that going to foster a feeling of detente, which will make it much harder to support defense budgets in this country? Mr. PERLE: Well, that has certainly happened before. And it happened most evidently in the administration of which Bill Hyland was a part. I don't think it will happen in this administration, because I believe that President Reagan's understanding of how to deal with the Soviet Union is far more realistic. We're under no illusions that the Soviets are laying down their arms and that this is peace in our time. It is one agreement. It's one agreement that I believe serves our security interests, and we would be foolish indeed to become extravagant in the claims for that agreement or for the things that follow from it. We are still dealing with a very tough totalitarian society, and we're going to have to recognize that in our continuing relationship with -- MacNEIL: Bill Hyland in New York, do you share the anxiety of Mr. Weiss that this could foster a false sense of detente and run to the dangers that he talks about? Mr. HYLAND: No, I don't think so. I don't think Ronald Reagan, as Mr. Perle said, I don't think the Reagan administration is likely to get involved in that. Even though there's been some eurphoric, strange comments from Congressman Wright saying this is the greatest opportunity since the Bolshevik Revolution. Actually, arms control has been a way of getting more out of the Congress. Secretary of Defense Laird was quite successful after 1972 in getting the Trident submarine and the B 1 bomber, and some of the MX missiles approved by the Congress, arguing that we have to keep our strategic posture in the light of this agreement. I don't think that's the principal problem. I think the problem is that this agreement on its own merit and standing alone really doesn't do much for the United States. MacNEIL: So are you satisfied on that score, Mr. Weiss? Mr. WEISS: No, not at all. Although I have the highest regard for President Reagan, I don't think he is any tougher than Mr. Nixon was on the issue, and yet it was Mr. Nixon's presidency that we're talking about at the height of detente. So, no, I'm not -- MacNEIL: Let me ask you this. Is it a good reason for saying no and not making this deal that it might induce a feeling of detente which would have adverse consequences on the defense budget? Mr. WEISS: No. As a matter of fact, if I didn't make it clear, let me make it clear now. I think that the first two reservations that I mentioned, namely with regard to verifiability and what I consider to be the questionable strategic underpinning of the agreement -- if those were beyond reproach, I would probably reassess my judgment about the political consequences. See, these are connected. For example, it is my judgment that it is the inadequacy of the strategic logic that has caused parts of the problem with our Allies. And therefore has created the adverse political consequences [unintelligible]. MacNEIL: Mr. Perle, all three of our other guests have in one way or another questioned the strategic logic of signing an intermediate range deal and not linking it with, or replacing it with, or addressing yourselves to the long range strategic weapons and linking that with SDI. Now, why -- let's put the question simply first -- why is the administration willing to do this deal first, and not to address the much larger question? Mr. PERLE: Well, we have addressed the much larger question, and we'd be delighted to conclude an agreement along the lines of the American proposals with respect to strategic weapons and for that matter strategic defenses. We've proposed 50% reductions in those forces, and in principal the Soviets say they agree with that. But we don't know of any way to conclude a treaty with ourselves, and -- MacNEIL: Well, Mr. Hyland says that you should stand back from this, rethink, and link it to the strategic weapons and SDI. Mr. PERLE: We thought about it a long time before we proposed it. What we are doing is eliminating 300 missiles on the American side and the Soviets are going to eliminate close to 2,000 on their side. Now, by any standard, I think that's a good deal if we can get an appropriate verification regime and Ambassador Weiss is quite right in saying we've got to nail that down. And if we and our allies together are confident that with the forces that we're permitted to retain we can have an adequate, integrated conventional and nuclear posture. We will have over 4,000 nuclear weapons in Europe after this agreement is complete. So we're not about to abandon a nuclear capability in Europe. MacNEIL: Let's go back to Bill Hyland. The administration did try and get a strategic deal, and the Russians have so far turned it down, Mr. Hyland. Mr. HYLAND: Well, I assume Mr. Perle of all people is not arguing that since the Russians say no we should take whatever the Russians say yes to. I still maintain that the best position for the United States is to link the intermediate range weapons with the strategic weapons, and to stand on that position. If Gorbachev says no, then so be it. It would be difficult for the President not to have an agreement, but I think he would come out of this with a much better agreement. After all, everyone I think agrees that President Reagan has an historic opportunity. He is in almost a unique bargaining position with the Soviet Union. I fear that he's settling for much less than he could achieve. Mr. JACKSON: Can I get into this? MacNEIL: Yes, Mr. Jackson. Mr. JACKSON: First of all, I find it -- again, I think Mr. Perle is a realist. I find it extremely unusual that President Reagan will be described as more of a realist than Presidents Nixon and Ford, and Carter for that matter. President Nixon gave the advice that the ultimate bargaining chip had to be SDI. And that's something that we're not prepared to deal with. Therefore, there's no movement on strategic arms. We take the easy way out of cutting a theater nuclear forces deal with the Soviets. Mr. Perle has often -- Richard has often talked about how democracies can't do two things well at the same time. He and I talked about this years ago. They cannot both arm up and negotiate the arms control deals at the same time. Think what a bind, Mr. Perle, you're putting the Germans in right now. If we said yes to zero option, we said yes, yes to double zero option, and who knows, there may be a triple zero option involved in tactical neutral weapons. What tremendous pressure it puts upon that democracy, that government, against its public to go ahead and get all nuclear weapons out of German. So I don't see the advancement of the interest of the United States in combination with its allies here. As Bill Hyland pointed out, why not do these things together? What's the problem? The problem is in Washington between Mr. Perle and the White House and Mr. Shultz. MacNEIL: Let me try and rephrase the question, very simply, as I think Mr. Jackson is putting it. And that is, you can't make a deal on strategic weapons because you won't compromise on SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, therefore you're settling for the easy way out with the medium range deal. Mr. PERLE: No, no, not at all. We have on the table a perfectly sensible proposal to deal with strategic forces. We're going to be as persistent with respect to that proposal as we've been with respect to the zero option which was proposed by Ronald Reagan. As I listen to this conversation, people talk about our accepting zero -- it's our proposal, the Soviets accepted. And I'm listening to people when we first proposed it in 1981, almost without exception, took the view that we were demanding too much from the Soviets, they would never agree, we were deliberately putting forward a proposal that was so ambitious that there would be no successful negotiation. It's a little bit ironic that now that we've succeeded -- now that we've demonstrated that the Soviets will, if you're patient and persistent, and if you're tough at the negotiating table, come around to American position. And now we find people who never believed we could do it saying that we ought to at this stage of the game insist that the Soviets make concessions in other areas as a condition for an agreement that's in our interest. The trouble with Bill Jackson's logic and Bill Hyland's, is that this is not a gift to the Soviet Union. This agreement is in our interest and they're making the larger sacrifice, we're not. And they're not about to make further concessions in order to get an agreement that's in our interest. But I hope that they would agree that we should remain very firm and very determined in refusing to abandon the Strategic Defense Initiative, which in my view is the thing that keeps the Soviets at the negotiating table and gives us the best hope we have for a success with respect to strategic weapons, which we hope to reduce by half. MacNEIL: Mr. Weiss, briefly? Mr. WEISS: Yes, briefly. Let me say I really disassociate myself from the views that Bill Hyland and Bill Jackson offered on the need to couple this agreement with either SDI or strategic -- in fact, I find it rather ironic, because it sort of implies that if we have a bad agreement here, somehow or other it will be improved -- perhaps by agreeing to other bad agreements in other areas. When I said I thought it had a strategic fallacy, I think it is internally fallacious. In particular I do not think that the so called short range systems that will be left will be an effective deterrent. MacNEIL: Well, gentlemen, obviously this is something that we could go on with, and we will certainly come back to. I would like to thank you, Mr. Jackson in Tulsa, Mr. Hyland in New York, Mr. Weiss, Mr. Perle in Washington. Charlayne? Embassy Breach HUNTER-GAULT: Another national security question is continuing to raise hackles in Washington -- the issue of the security. The State Department is under Congressional fire for not maintaining adequate security precautions at its embassies abroad. And the Marines may be running into problems prosecuting at least one of the Moscow guards accused of espionage. We'll hear more about that in a moment from legal affairs correspondent Nina Totenberg. But first, an excerpt from today's Congressional hearings at which the State Department's top officer for embassy security was asked about conditions in the current embassy building and what measures were being taken to prevent bugging devices from being put into the new building. Rep LAWRENCE SMITH, (D) Florida: What provisions were made within the terms of that contract -- whatever leeway we had -- to make sure that the people who were working on the building were at least secure as far as security can be. ROBERT LAMB, State Department: I think from my perceptions, looking at those agreements, all the way back to 1969, that security was not considered seriously enough in the construction from the earliest stages, that security factors took a backseat to costs and to construction and policy considerations, and that was the case, I think, for at least a decade, Mr. Smith. Rep. CONNIE MACK, (R) Florida: Was there any reason to believe that there was security breaches with the supervisory personnel in Moscow? Should they have known? Why didn't they know that these things were taking place. I guess the reaction that most of us could have is that the supervisory personnel were just way too lax, weren't watching close enough what was going on, and it was a problem that they allowed to take place. Mr. LAMB: I think that the supervisory people know that the embassy was being bugged. We were in fact -- the construction people contributed information to us about the bugs that were coming in. I think if we were surprised by the sophistication of the Russian attack. I think they were even more surprised by the sophistication and thoroughness of the countermeasures that we had produced. They did not put those things in that building for us to find them. Rep. OLYMPIA SNOWE, (R) Maine: Two things: What was your assessment of what took place and what existed at that embassy? Two, what did the State Department know about fraternization problems at the Moscow Embassy and how widespread do you think it is and was? Mr. LAMB: I cannot right now recall visiting an embassy anywhere in the world that had a worse physical plan than that embassy in Moscow. And when people work in those kinds of conditions, it is a very difficult security environment, a sloppy, dirty embassy, poorly maintained -- makes it very difficult to protect the national security information that is in that building. On the question of non fraternization, we have found less than 10 marines and maybe less than half a dozen that knew about the fraternization that was going on between -- that's alleged to have gone on between some of these marines and the Soviets. MacNEIL: We turn now to a different aspect of the embassy spy case. The report that Marine prosecutors are having trouble mounting their case. Joining us now is the reporter who broke today's story, Nina Totenberg, the legal affairs correspondent for National Public Radio. What is the problem the Marine prosecutors are running into? NINA TOTENBERG, National Public Radio: Well, the problem as I understand it is that usually in espionage cases you need the testimony of accomplices -- or if you're in a lot of luck, an informant. Because there isn't physical evidence of espionage if you don't have the cooperation of the foreign power that's been trying to spy on you. When you find out after the fact that somebody compromised your intelligence and you need to prove it, so you go to the smaller fish, and you say tell us what the bigger fish did. Well, the difficulty is that they thought they had two small fish -- Corporal Bracy and Corporal Williams, who would testify against Sergeant Lonetree, and who would say, ''We helped him let Russian agents into the Moscow Embassy. '' But now both of those Marines, the corporals, have recanted their testimony and said they were coerced into making those statements. And under a well established rule of law, you cannot use a recanted statement in a trial against a second party -- in this case, Lonetree. It is not admissible evidence. They cannot use those against him. Lonetree himself has never admitted letting anybody into the embassy of the Russians. So they're for the moment scrapping to try and find evidence to prove that he did what they think he did. MacNEIL: Are you saying that they do not have a case against Sergeant Lonetree if they do not have the testimony of one of these two other men? Ms. TOTENBERG: Well, let's put it this way, the defense lawyers say that they do not know of a case. And under the rules of law, the defense is supposed to be informed of witnesses and evidence that is currently impending against their client. MacNEIL: You reported today that they had offered -- at least Corporal Bracy -- immunity from prosecution himself if he testified against Sergeant Lonetree, and he refused, as I understand. Ms. TOTENBERG: Last night Bracy's lawyer, who is the Associate General Counsel of the NAACP, Mr. Charles Carter, told me when he interviewed Bracy last week, Bracy told him that he had been offered immunity, that he refused the request, or the offer of immunity, because he had done nothing wrong so there was nothing to be immunized for, and there was nothing to rat on anybody for -- in other words. MacNEIL: Marine spokesmen and other people in the administration have gone very far out on a limb -- if that's the right image -- in saying what these men have done at the embassy. Would they have committed themselves in these allegations -- or statement of fact sometimes, or charges -- if they did not have more evidence than you're suggesting? Ms. TOTENBERG: Well, there's no doubt that governor prosecutors believed that Lonetree let Russian agents into the Moscow Embassy. But what they believe and what they can prove may be two different things. Now I have not had access to the prosecutors themselves. I can tell you, though, that there is grave concern in other parts of the government. In the Justice Department and in the White House. But the Marines may have blown the case in the way they originally investigated it. And there is a lot of bureaucratic infighting here between the military and other parts of the government, the State Department, the Justice Department, White House, everybody. And so everything has to be taken with a grain of salt. MacNEIL: The Marine Corps is not commenting on it. Ms. TOTENBERG: And the Marine Corps is not commenting, at least for the record, on this. So we have to take everything with a grain of salt, as I've said. But it does look to me as a person who covers the courts like they've got problem. They may surmount the problem, they may actually get one of these other people to talk, or somebody else to talk, they may find some other evidence, they may make a deal for a lesser offense for Lonetree, because they may decide that what they needed is a damage assessment. After all, in the Walker spy ring case -- MacNEIL: A damage assessment -- in other words, get him to please guilty to a lesser charge, dereliction of duty or something, and then get him to say everything that he did so they know what the extent of it is. And he hasn't done that so far? So far as you know? Ms. TOTENBERG: No, no. And his lawyers say ''we're going to fight it to the end, the worse thing he did was fraternize with a Russian woman and not report it. '' And when I asked his lawyer last night, I said, ''Well, he admitted giving the Russians a [unintelligible] bag of material,'' his lawyer, William Kuntsler said, ''I don't believe that. The statements that he gave to his interrogators have been proven inaccurate in so many ways that we can't be sure --'' MacNEIL: Why are high powered lawyers often -- like William Kuntsler -- often associated with civil rights cases -- why are they and the Chief Counsel for the NAACP involving themselves in this case? Ms. TOTENBERG: Well, as for Mr. Kuntsler, I really don't know. The gentleman from the NAACP, Mr. Carter, told me that the NAACP had entered the case at the request of Corporal Bracy's mother and father. That they had gone down there to interview him to see what they could find, because they were not going to represent him if they thought he was guilty of espionage. And they concluded that he had been just railroaded and scared to death and that they would represent him. And so this week, they agreed to represent him. MacNEIL: Nina Totenberg, thank you. We'll have you back when we know more. Ms. TOTENBERG: Okay. I hope we know more. Landmark Decision HUNTER-GAULT: For our final focus segment tonight, we look at today's Supreme Court decision on the death penalty. Judy Woodruff has more. JUDY WOODRUFF: Today's ruling in a case from Georgia reaffirms the constitutionality of the death penalty. The decision also goes beyond that and rejects what many observers see as the last in a series of broadbased assaults on capital punishment. Unlike previous challenges, where discrimination was alleged on the basis of the race of the defendants, today's case looked at the race of the victims. It was brought by a black man being held in a Georgia prison, who was convicted of murdering a white man. The argument he brought was that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it is more likely to be applied when victims are white than when they are black. Much of his case was based on statistics. There are almost 1900 inmates on deathrow in the 37 states that have a death penalty. According to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 72% of their victims were white, while only 14% were black. Here to talk with us about the ramifications of today's decision are Daniel Popeo, General Counsel for the Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative law center, and William Robinson, Director of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under the Law, a nonprofit public interest organization. Both filed Friend of the Court briefs in today's case. Mr. Robinson, let me begin with you. In brief, how do you view what the court did today? How would you sum it up? WILLIAM ROBINSON, death penalty critic: I'd sum it up briefly as a very substantial disappointment for those of us who oppose racial discrimination in application of the death penalty. WOODRUFF: Why do you say that? Mr. ROBINSON: Well, I say that because here the court was presented with really overwhelming evidence of the racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty. The statistics were overwhelming that the death penalty in Georgia is applied where the victim is white and where the defendant is black. The court then had an opportunity, which unfortunately it let slip by, to bring greater racial equality into the death penalty, and that's a disappointment to me. WOODRUFF: Was it a disappointment to you, Mr. Popeo? DANIEL POPEO, death penalty advocate: No, not exactly. First of all, the court and several courts below affirmed the decision that said there was no clear and convincing evidence that there was an intentional discrimination against Mr. McCluskey. I think we need to start out -- WOODRUFF: Mr. McCluskey is the inmate? Mr. POPEO: Yes. We need to start out by understanding very simply that McCluskey is a black man who murdered a police officer. And there's not question about his guilt. What we're talking about here is whether or not he should get off because he murdered a white policeman as opposed to a black policeman. And the bottom line here is that a murder victim is a murder victim, whether he's white or black. Mr. ROBINSON: Well, that's not so. The statistics here show very clearly that a murder victim who is black yields no death penalty. Mr. POPEO: That's not true. That's not true. Mr. ROBINSON: To a disproportionate extent that is precisely true, and that's what this case was all about. WOODRUFF: That if victims that those who kill, or are alleged to kill, are white victims -- are more likely to receive the death penalty? Mr. ROBINSON: That is correct. Mr. POPEO: We need to clarify something here. We're not talking about intentional discrimination against a black defendant. We're talking about discrimination because it happens to be a victim orientation where the murder victim is white. That's ridiculous. A white murder victim doesn't choose a black murderer. A murderer chooses the victim. The victim isn't present during the trial, and the victim is nowhere to be found, so if there can be any type of discrimination, based on the victim -- Mr. ROBINSON: All of that begs the question. You see, the application of the death penalty in Georgia is being applied only on those cases. No only -- but to a dramatically disproportionate extent. In cases where the victim is white. It's not a fair system where the death penalty wouldn't matter whether you're black or white as a victim or as a defendant. WOODRUFF: Justice Powell -- let me just make this point -- Justice Powell wrote for the majority today, and I quote: ''Apparent disparities are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system. '' What do you think he meant by that? Mr. ROBINSON: Well, it's clear what he meant by that. He meant by that that as long as in any individual case the factors involving discretion as to that individual are present, then the court is willing to tolerate disparities in the system as a whole -- which evidence wide ranging disparities on the basis of race. WOODRUFF: Is that how you see it? Mr. POPEO: No. First of all, there was a black juror who found Mr. McCluskey guilty of murder. Is he a racist? I think the bottom line is what they're saying is the system works, and the study, the Balder study, which -- WOODRUFF: This is the statistic -- which was part of the study, which was presented on behalf of the man who brought this case -- Mr. POPEO: Exactly. What they're saying is that the Balder study was statistically flawed. In other words, there were 33 missing variables in each case that was reviewed, and if you added -- WOODRUFF: What does that mean? Mr. POPEO: There are 240 variables of mitigating and aggravating factors -- there are in excess of 240 different variables with mitigating and aggravating factors that are all discretionary that need -- WOODRUFF: That affected these different cases. This was a study that a professor did of cases -- Mr. ROBINSON: Excuse me -- the court did not criticize the study as being flawed. The court engaged in the assumption that the study was not flawed and then held that it was insufficient to establish racial discrimination. Mr. POPEO: The court found that there was no intentional discrimination in the case of Mr. McCluskey based on that study. The study was inadequate to prove his case. And you'd have to prove that intentional discrimination. WOODRUFF: Let me ask you this -- do you deny the findings of that study, which were that killers of white victims were more likely to receive the death penalty than -- Mr. POPEO: Sure, sure. You know, there's no place in a criminal courtroom for an upholsterer or statistician for some type of demographic parity here. We're talking about criminal law where there has to be prosecutorial discretion, judicial discretion, and a jury has to do its job based on the individual merits of each criminal case. Mr. ROBINSON: And in addition, when you sum it all up, should not be able to look at the system as a whole and conclude that the system is being applied or operated in a racially discriminatory and arbitrary manner. And that is the only conclusion that you can reach here. The upholding of the court was that because the individual can't prove discrimination in his case, that the statistics are irrelevant. WOODRUFF: Let's move on. What's the impact of this decision, Mr. Robinson? Mr. ROBINSON: In most respects, relatively slight. There are approximately 12 to 15 defendants on death row who are immediately subject to the McCluskey ruling. There are some approximately 65 or thereabouts -- I haven't got a precise count yet -- who have the McCluskey issue as one of their claims. WOODRUFF: What's going to happen to these people? Are they likely -- Mr. ROBINSON: The 65 will press forward with other claims, the 14 to 15 -- if they don't find other claims, they will be executed. WOODRUFF: So you're saying that some people will immediately suffer as a -- Mr. ROBINSON: Not immediately. In six to nine months, their cases will either go forward and they'll be executed, or they'll have to come up with some other claims. WOODRUFF: What do you think the impact of the ruling will be? Mr. POPEO: I'm hopeful that due process does not mean endless process and that we start to have justice being done. Bottom line is you've got 1700 plus people on death row who have already executed their victims, have shown no mercy, regardless of whether they're black or white, and it is an insult to look at this from a racial perspective. It's an insult to black judges, black jurors, black policemen, and black murder victims. And the jury of blacks in this country favor the death penalty. And they favor it because they are victimized, and the law has to work for them as much as it works for anyone else. Mr. ROBINSON: The majority of blacks do favor the death penalty, but when they favor the death penalty, they favor a fair death penalty. So, for example if you look at the death p -- WOODRUFF: Are you basing that on public opinion polls? Mr. ROBINSON: Yes. But if you look at homicides in Georgia, 62% of them are against blacks. If you look at black/white homicides, 10% of them are black. On the other hand, if you look at death row, 80% of the people on death row are blacks for killing a white. The blacks support a fair and nonracial death penalty. WOODRUFF: We can't resolve that one right now. What do you think the longer term implications of this are? Mr. POPEO: Either one, I would hope that novel theories and ridiculous approaches to block the enforcement of the law are over. And I hope that each case is judged on its own merits. And you know, 55% of all whites are more likely to be executed, according to the Department of Justice, on death row, because they are white. And he has not mentioned the Department of Justice surveyor statistics, which really are flawless and really should be a guiding study in this case. Mr. ROBINSON: What will happen? People will continue to exhaust their due process rights. Judge Godbold of the 11th circuit has noted that over 50% of the cases going before his court are reversed because of serious constitutional error. I expect that that will continue. And as long as those statistics do continue, it's irresponsible to suggest that due process is going on endlessly. When 50% of the cases are being reversed, then there is a great need for due process. WOODRUFF: When we hear or read that this is one of the last of the broadbased attempts at this point -- to challenge the death penalty -- is that accurate? Mr. ROBINSON: In no way. If you go all the way back to the early 1960s, you'll see over time challenge after challenge to racial discrimination in death sentencing. You'll see those consistent challenges to which courts have been responsive -- they've made reference to -- because it is present. It will take us a little while to come up with the next one -- hopefully it will be the compelling one, but if not, sooner or later we civil rights lawyers and our abolitionist friends will come up with a compelling argument. WOODRUFF: What do you think happens now, Mr. Popeo? Mr. POPEO: Well, I happen to think that the law is going to start being enforced more fervently, and I happen to think that it has nothing to do with race. And the bottom line is there are a lot of black victims out there who want to see the law work for them. And this isn't a racial question at all. As a matter of fact, when you are white and you are convicted of murder, you have a 33% more likelihood of being sentenced to death because you are white. And I am not here saying that the death penalty should be reversed for whites. You know, it's ridiculous, because you're going to have a white murder defendant saying, ''Hey, we've got a white murder victim there, and the surveys work for white murder victims, not for defendants, and therefore it should pertain to me, too. '' Enough is enough about ridiculous legal theories to block law from working. WOODRUFF: It's hard to get agreement, even on statistics here. Gentlemen, we thank you both for being with us. Daniel Popeo, William Robinson, thank you both. HUNTER-GAULT: Once again, the tops stories on this Wednesday. The Supreme Court upheld state death penalty laws, even if they appear racially biased. President Reagan's arms control director accused Congress of meddling, and threatening to disrupt talks with the Soviets. And Congressmen blasted the State Department for laxness in embassy security. Good night, Robin. MacNEIL: Good night, Charlayne. That's the News Hour tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.