The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Uganda after Idi Amin

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. In Uganda, as Tanzanian and Ugandan soldiers continued today chasing the remnants of Idi Amin`s retreating army, the United States and other Western countries are moving rapidly to befriend the newly liberated country. The United States announced yesterday that it would normalize relations later this week; Canada recognized the new government today; and Britain did yesterday. All three had closed their embassies in recent years in protest against the murderous regime of President Amin. His whereabouts are still unknown. He`s left behind a bankrupt nation and gruesome evidence of his style of government.

Liberating troops today pushed further towards the Kenya border to cut off surviving members of his army. In Kampala, the capital, a provisional government headed by former university president Yusufu Lule is trying to pick up the pieces. While few nations shed any tears for the overthrow of Amin, many black African countries have remained silent. What many may be wondering is whether in this unstable continent the liberating invasion may become a precedent for others.

Tonight we look at the strange phenomenon of Idi Amin and what the manner of his going means for the future of Africa. Jim Lehrer is off tonight; Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in Washington. Charlayne?

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Robin, Idi Amin had been in power for the past eight years. Following the overthrow of Milton Obote, he had proclaimed himself president for life. The history of his devastating reign is summed up by Owen Paterson of Visnews.

OWEN PATERSON, Reporting: Even in 1967, as a brigadier in Dr. Milton Obote`s army, Idi Amin was riding a wave of popularity and promotion. He rose from the rank of corporal in the King`s African Rifles to commander- in-chief of the Ugandan Forces, making frequent visits abroad on behalf of his president.

In January 1971, Amin sought the help of his Malire Regiment to depose Dr. Obote. The coup was swift and effective.

IDI AMIN: I will (unintelligible) and truly exercise the functions of the head of government of the Republic of Uganda, so help me God.

PATERSON: By 1972, Idi Amin had gained a reputation as a strongman whose path should not be crossed. He expelled thousands of Asians from Uganda in what he described as a cleanup operation. His relationship with the Christian church in Uganda has not been a happy one. Two years ago, when church leaders were openly critical of his regime`s silencing methods, Archbishop Luwum was killed in uncertain circumstances which provoked worldwide alarm. And in neighboring countries such as Kenya, organized opposition was growing steadily. He has attempted to strengthen his military position through an uncertain alliance with Libya, but at the same time has told world press of his desire for a reconciliation with all countries.

President Amin has always denied Western allegations of human rights violations in Uganda, but in recent months more and more of his officials have escaped from Uganda with alarming stories of brutality and death. Idi Amin, through all this, has attempted to persuade his people that victory is in sight.

AMIN: I have my (unintelligible) given by God, this is a gift of God; and I am just doing, taking my decision in the interests of my people of Uganda.

HUNTER-GAULT: The beginning of the end of the Amin regime started last October, when Amin invaded neighboring Tanzania. In the ensuing months Tanzania retaliated. Finally, in a move unprecedented in modern African history but with the help of the Ugandans themselves, Tanzania captured the Ugandan capital of Kampala. Amin had fled and is now believed to have left the country. But behind him he left vivid, horrifying proof of the crimes that the outside world had suspected. At the State Research Bureau and at the military police barracks, nicknamed the "house of death", mutilated prisoners dead and dying lay crammed into underground cells and strewn around the grounds outside. Robin?

MacNEIL: During Amin`s eight-year reign, thousands of Ugandans went into exile in Tanzania and other countries. Last month some of them established the Ugandan National Liberation Front, which has formed the new government. One of the founders in Tanzania was Mr. Grace Ibinjira, former Uganda Minister of Justice and former ambassador to the United Nations. He`s currently a legal consultant to the United Nations Development Program. Mr. Ibinjira, to read all our press accounts, it looks as though Uganda has been liberated from a savage oppressor. Is that how you feel?

GRACE IBINJIRA: Absolutely, yes.

MacNEIL: What were your own personal dealings with him like?

IBINJIRA: Well, they go back to 1966. I should give you a little background, that in fact. I spent five years in a maximum security jail...

MacNEIL: Under the Obote regime.

IBINJIRA: Under the Obote regime, for having supported a motion in the parliament to remove Amin from the Uganda army, which is a matter of public record, on the fourth of February, 1966. But Obote wanted Amin to head the army because he had the necessary qualifications, he thought he was looking for. And dating back from that experience, they could not have been really very satisfactory, although we had some better moments -- for example, when I came here after the coup as his ambassador to the United Nations for a couple of years. But obviously Amin could never forget that we had crossed one another at a very critical time in our history, and I could not continue to serve him.

MacNEIL: How do you explain what we have been calling in the Western world the atrocities committed?

IBINJIRA: Well, you know, it`s like how would we explain the atrocities of Hitler? Amin is an abnormal human being; I cannot give the medical or psychological reasons why he did it, but it is a matter of public record, sad, tragical record, the he has done what he`s supposed to have done.

MacNEIL: Why is there so little cheering in black Africa at his overthrow?

IBINJIRA: Well, I wouldn`t begin with that premise, that there is little cheering, if by that you mean that there has been no unanimous, swift recognition of the new government. If you look back at the governments that have come by coup d`etats in Africa, which are many, it has been a sort of general pattern; people come slowly. In fact, it`s unusual for a government to get the recognition that ours has got of so many leading countries within a very few days of its formation.

MacNEIL: Well, let me ask the question, backing up a little bit, why did so many African nations appear to tolerate Amin for so long?

IBINJIRA: I had always believed that the basic reason was because they approved of what he was doing. Africa is passing through a very difficult period, partly because of historical reasons, partly because of the weaknesses of the states themselves; and therefore it stands out as a matter of reason -- you may disagree with it, certainly -- that some may say those who live in glass houses should not throw stones. If they attacked Amin to the extent that, for example, the West wanted, it might have been creating a precedent that was very difficult in public; although in private many, many did express outrage, but that was futile.

MacNEIL: The United States imposed a total embargo on trade with Uganda. Did that contribute to what`s happened recently?

IBINJIRA: Oh, yes, I think it did, although I would say better late than never: we would have preferred the embargo to have come much earlier. But certainly it was a very constructive step, and our people appreciated it very much.

MacNEIL: Are you at all worried about the Tanzanian interference -invasion, in fact -- of Uganda as a precedent in Africa?

IBINJIRA: No. I know that there is going to be a debate as a result of this Tanzanian action. Some people, for their own selfish motives, may try to invoke it as a precedent to carry out aggressive wars; but I be lieve that in this complex world, to take our own situation as an example, each particular case has to be treated on its own merit. You have to view the Uganda case on the basis of what was happening. I think to accuse President Nyerere of having...

MacNEIL: The President of Tanzania.

IBINJIRA: The President of Tanzania -- of having committed an international outrage, one has to remember that, a) Amin invaded Tanzania first, annexed 700 square miles, publicly declared it as part of an administrative merit of the Republic of Uganda. And considering the notoriety of Amin as a reliable person, I believe that President Nyerere had a rational basis not to trust that, having pushed Amin beyond his borders, Amin would be content not to invade again with even greater ferocity. In addition to that, I think he had the right of world pursuit when you consider the humanitarian aspect in this matter of the Ugandans. I think this faces the whole world; I don`t believe that this Amin phenomenon should be relegated to the African bush. It is a matter that faces the whole of mankind, and the question is, would the world have preferred to uphold the sanctity of a frontier drawn. between Tanzania and Uganda in the bush rather than the efforts in order to salvage millions of people where half a million people had been butchered under the cover of the sanctity of or inviolability of borders?

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. We`ll come back. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: Now to another man who also knew Idi Amin, from a somewhat different perspective. He is Robert Keeley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Mr. Keeley served as deputy chief of the U.S. Mission in Uganda from July 1971 to November 1973, when the United States, citing fears for its personnel, closed the offices there. Mr. Keeley, the United States initially supported Idi Amin. How did they see him at first?

ROBERT KEELEY: Well, his assumption of power was greeted with great enthusiasm by the Ugandan people. He released a great many political prisoners who had been imprisoned by the previous president, including Mr. Ibinjira. He took a conciliatory attitude toward some of the tribal groups which had been oppressed under the previous regime, and he seemed to be friendly to the West. So I would say that was correct that we greeted his assumption of power with some enthusiasm ourselves initially. It was only when the killings began, and particularly the expulsion of the Asian - population, that we realized what he was really like.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right; we`ll get to that in a moment. In your dealings with him, did you find him reasonable, as you might expect a head of state to be, or did you find that he was in private true to the public image of him?

KEELEY: Well, I`m afraid I`d have to say I found. him quite unreasonable, but most of the encounters we had were rather confrontational, where he was using me as a foil to make a point against the United States.

HUNTER-GAULT: For example?

KEELEY: Well, he used to broadcast our sessions on the TV, but there was no equal time or fairness doctrine in his TV system. The TV program in the evening would show what he was saying to me but it would never show what I said to him; I was always on the receiving end.

HUNTER-GAULT: You mean the normal meetings that you would have as a U.S. official with the head of state.

KEELEY: Right; that`s right. He used them as propaganda, in effect.

HUNTER-GAULT: Were you as an American living in Uganda ever afraid there for yourself?

KEELEY: No, I wouldn`t say I was ever personally afraid, primarily because the targets of his wrath were almost entirely Ugandans. As a foreigner and a diplomat, I felt reasonably safe. Although I will say that we took certain security precautions, particularly after the murder of our ambassador and deputy chief of mission in Khartoum in March of `73. Amin praised that action as a good gesture, and at that point we decided that maybe we`d better take further precautions.

HUNTER-GAULT: When you were there, did you have any inkling or see any signs of atrocities that were going on there?

KEELEY: Oh, certainly. I had a number of my personal friends who were murdered -- the chief justice, the head of the bank, the vice chancellor of the university, the editor of the Catholic newspaper; these were all people I knew personally who would just suddenly disappear overnight and you`d never see them again.

HUNTER-GAULT: Did this have anything to do with the U.S. getting out?

KEELEY: Well, it certainly had something to do with it, but there was a general deterioration in our relations over a period of time. There was a series of nasty, insulting messages that Amin sent to President Nixon, which were of course not well received in Washington. There was the fact that two Americans were killed by his military forces and it took us nearly two years to get them to acknowledge responsibility for that. There was the killing of the Ugandans; a Peace Corps volunteer was killed -- somewhat accidentally, but that ended our Peace Corps program; and our aid personnel found it impossible to carry out their programs because many of their Ugandan counterparts were being murdered, or threatened in such a fashion that they had to leave the country.

HUNTER-GAULT: Well, the United States waited until last year to impose a total mandatory trade embargo. Why did it take so long?

KEELEY: Well, I suppose as a government we do not generally favor trade embargoes because of the interference with normal trade. Also, I think there`s a feeling that such embargoes are not terribly effective.

HUNTER-GAULT: Were they in this case?

KEELEY: I think they certainly helped but mainly in the psychological sense, because Uganda was able to sell its coffee despite our embargo; but I think it was a good thing to have done and it probably contributed in some measure to the end result.

HUNTER-GAULT: So in a word, the United States feels it can take some of the credit for bringing the Amin regime down.

KEELEY: I don`t think we`re inclined to take any credit, I think we did the right thing. We closed our embassy and got out; we imposed a trade embargo, we severed all relations with Amin, and so I think we have a good record to stand on today.

HUNTER-GAULT: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Not everyone who knew Uganda saw Idi Amin all negatively. One person who liked him is Carlos Russell, professor of African Studies at Brooklyn College in New York. Dr. Russell is past editor of the Brooklyn edition of the Amsterdam News and has made several trips to Uganda, most recently last October.

You saw President Amin on your last trip.

CARLOS RUSSELL: Yes, I did.

MacNEIL: How did he seem to you then?

RUSSELL: (Pause.) Idi Amin I found to be very composed. We spent approximately six, seven hours; he had just finished getting a massage, and we spoke in the Nile mansion with his son, and it was a very relaxed, cordial conversation.

MacNEIL: When you were on this program two years ago, you described Amin then as "a very .folksy, down-to-earth, pleasant, humorous fellow. "Do you still have that view of him?

RUSSELL: Yes, but I want to say this, that 1 am not here to apologize for Idi Amin. As I said two years ago, what I attempt to do is to try to place the discussion on Uganda, from my perspective, in what I consider to be the larger perspective; and I hope we can do some of that this evening.

MacNEIL: Sure. Well, you also said, just to come back to one point for a moment, you said at that time the atrocity stories we were reporting were based on hearsay and not proof. Do you still believe that?

RUSSELL: Well, as I said then also, when we were there we saw no such atrocities, and as to the aspect that I did not expect to see it if it was occurring, I also said at that time that the Geneva convention had not found any reason to sanction Idi Amin around the atrocities, and that is still true today, Now, I also attempted to place the question of atrocities in a larger perspective, if you remember. I said then that while I abhor killing I think that much of what occurs grows out of the context of a historical. reality where Uganda itself as we perceive it is not a cohesive country as a whole, it`s a composite of many nation-states, if you want to call it that, who have a history of struggling and wherein anyone who asscribes for leadership tends to use his national ethnic group as the primary source for power. In fact, that position has been supported by Mr. Ibinjira in his book, The....

IBINJIRA: Forging of an African Nation.

RUSSELL: Forcing of an African Nation, in which he makes that point, and in discussing t e road to independence he argues very clearly that that was a road that was rocky and thorny because of the internal contradictions within the country as a whole.

MacNEIL: You also said then that you saw Amin as a pawn in the conflict between capitalism and socialism for supremacy in Africa. Do you still...

RUSSELL: I still do that. In fact, in a larger context. In fact, when you showed the first clip this evening, the reporter there said that Amin had a coup, but he forgot -- purposely, perhaps -- to suggest that that coup was arranged with support of the United States, France and Israel as a whole, that the greeting which -- Bob Skeet is his name, I think -- when he said that we viewed it with approval, I think, is indicative that what occurred was that because Obote, Kaunda and Nyerere were progressive socialists, Amin was viewed as a person who those forces felt they could control. Obote at that time appeared to be the weakest of the link, so they moved to get rid of him and they then thrusted Uganda with Amin. In fact, as you heard, Mr. Ibinjira was in jail under Obote; Amin freed him and made him ambassador. So I`m saying -- you said that, sir.

IBINJIRA: Of course, but...

MacNEIL: Well, just a moment...

RUSSELL: You did say that earlier in the program, so all I`m suggesting is, I`m not saying right or wrong, I`m trying to place it in a historical context which essentially was true.

MacNEIL: How do you feel about Amin`s overthrow now? Is he a victim, or someone who deserved it?

RUSSELL: That`s a harder question. First and foremost, when I place it in the larger context of the strategy of geopolitics of the United States in which Uganda is viewed as -- as usually the pawn, Amin allowed by his in cursion into Tanzania the club which ultimately overthrew him.

MacNEIL: He gave an excuse.

RUSSELL: Gave an excuse. And that was what was necessary. Because if we look at it in a broader sense we will see that when in Cambodia, for instance -- Kampuchea -- when the same atrocities that we are talking about, if we accept atrocities as a given...

MacNEIL: When Vietnam invaded and overthrew the Pol Pot regime.

RUSSELL: Yes, exactly. There was a large outcry but no one wanted Vietnam to go straight in and overthrow the government. In this case it was a different thing because it is in the interests of the United States. Now, the best example I can give of that is the rapid recognition on the part of Britain and now Canada; I would give in the same day the new president, Lule, Bakirenda Lule, was sworn in -- I think the fellow flew in from Britain. So again, it`s an attempt to take over. Now, my concern is not so much the deposement of Amin per se, but what will come now, that African countries stop becoming pawns of that geopolitical struggle.

MacNEIL; Okay, thank you. Let`s pursue some of those points. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: Mr. Ibinjira, do you agree with Dr. Russell`s assessment about Amin being a pawn in a conflict between capitalist and socialist systems?

IBINJIRA: Oh, I think that -- I don`t agree. I`m agreeable to the view that these international forces try to take advantage wherever they can find it around the globe, but I think that...

HUNTER-GAUL T: What forces are those?

IBINJIRA: Well, capitalism and socialism. But I think that our context you have to understand. I think it`s crucial that Amin, completely without any external involvement, would still have overthrown Obote. The Israelis, the French, or the West, as you call it -- if they were involved, it was a purely catalytic role. Obote had established a very debilitating dictatorship in the country. To give you an example, at the time of his (unintelligible), fifty percent of the Independence cabinet was in jail - eight out of sixteen ministers. I was arrested in the middle of a cabinet meeting, handcuffed, beaten, with several other of my colleagues.

HUNTER-GAULT: So what you`re saying is that Mr. Amin would have done what he did wihtout those forces at work.

IBINJIRA: Exactly.

HUNTER-GAULT: Dr. Russell, can you just respond to that?

IBINJIRA: About three or four weeks ago, on a program, Channel 7, "Like It Is," our U.N. Ambassador, Andrew Young, was interviewed, and on that program one of the things that he did say -- and you can get the tape -- was that the coup which placed Amin in power was supported by the countries that I named. And while I understand what you say and I agree with you -- of course I`ve read your book and I`ve read a number of things that have happened in Uganda regarding the kind of suffering that you went through; there`s no way of arguing against that. But I am suggesting, sir, that it is perhaps idealistic to assume that -- you have no proof that Amin would have done that at that time if he did not get the sanction; in the same way that I think to suggest that the present government would be in power if Tanzania had not led the invasion. Eventually you may have been able to overthrow Amin, but that happened because Tanzania was able to give you the necessary support. And what confuses me about that relationship is that President Nyerere, in my view, is the old man of Africa with the great vision, and yet still he can transgress one of the principles of the OAU; and if he says because his border was taken, was invaded, then so has Zambia recently, by Rhodesia, and there is no army going from Zambia into Rhodesia. Mozambique has been bombed; there is no army going there. So again I`m saying, it seems to me that this part has a pattern, and incidentally, if you remember, it occurred shortly after President Nyerere came to the United States, met in Washington, and not much has been said about that meeting.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right; thank you, Dr. Russell. Robin?

MacNEIL: Let`s ask Mr. Keeley about that meeting. Was the United States fomenting this, Mr. Keeley?

KEELEY: Certainly not. We didn`t foment this, and tae didn`t foment the original coup by which Amin came to power. The fact that we welcomed the outcome does not prove that we were in on the instigation of it. I can only speak for our government; I was not in Uganda at the time, but I was following Ugandan affairs, and it`s simply not true that we were behind Amin`s coup. That was a pre-emptive coup by General Amin, who felt threatened by Obote and took advantage of Obote`s absence to replace him with himself.

IBINJIRA: May I -- I`d like to correct some misinformation from Dr. -- in the first place, nobody has flown from England to swear in the new president. The new president has been sworn in by the chief justice, Justice Wambuzi, who was a judge of the court of appeal for Eastern Africa and who was living in Nairobi...

RUSSELL: Kenya came. The reason I said that...

IBINJIRA: He was in exile.

RUSSELL: ...was because of the wig, the powdered wig, and the whole thing...

IBINJIRA: Oh, he was...

RUSSELL: You are correct on that.

MacNEIL: Let me...

RUSSELL: But I wanted to respond to the point that...

MacNEIL: Could you do that briefly, because we`re coming to the end and I want to ask another question.

RUSSELL: Sure. You see, the impression is that -- first of all, I do not expect Mr. Skeet to own up to the fact that the United States did that. That wouldn`t be -- all I would suggest to you is that...

MacNEIL: Mr. Keeley.

RUSSELL: Keeley, I`m sorry. Last week, in the new government in Grenada, in the last issue of the Daily Challenge, there`s a copy of a telegram in which the United States says to Mr. Bishop, Maurice Bishop, the new premier, that they would not look with favor on any relationship between Grenada and Cuba. Now, I`m saying very clearly and very outright that it is well within the strategy of the United States to go against those who are not its friends. And I understand that policy.

MacNEIL: Can I ask you, Mr. Keeley, in conclusion, you heard Mr. Ibinjira say that he wasn`t concerned that the precedent established by Tanzania`s invasion was going to be disturbing for the rest of Africa. There`s been a lot of comment in this country to the effect that it might be, since the OAU rules, as Dr. Russell`s just mentioned, of the sanctity of the borders, has been breached this time. Is that a concern of the American government?

KEELEY: I don`t think the Tanzanian intention was to change the borders of Uganda. The intention of the Tanzanians was to respond to an invasion of their territory by Amin`s forces and the annexation of a certain portion of their territory; they retaliated and engaged in hot pursuit and chased those forces over the border into Uganda. That certainly could be a precedent, but it isn`t unprecedented. I don`t think the situation is comparable to Cambodia and Vietnam in that sense...

MacNEIL: I think, Mr. Keeley, I hate to interrupt you, but we have run out of time this evening. I`m sorry to stop it there. Thank you very much for joining us this evening. Goodnight, Charlayne.

HUNTER-GAULT: Good night, Robin.

MaCNEIL: Dr. Russell, Mr. Ibinjira. That`s all for tonight. We`ll be back tomorrow night.I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.