The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Theodore Sorensen

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Eight of the people selected by Jimmy Carter for top administration jobs breezed through necessary approval by their Senate committees today. That means Mr. Carter can, immediately after his inauguration on Thursday noon, formally appoint the people he wants to run the Treasury, HEW, HUD, Labor, Interior, and the Budget Departments with full Senate approval assured. Senate committees had previously approved Carter nominations to run Defense, State and-Agriculture. That leaves only three cabinet offices to be approved, with only one, that of Griffin Bell, for Attorney General, causing difficulty and that, too, is now regarded as assured. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: But the big story, Robin, is still about the one that didn`t make it. That`s Ted Sorensen, of course, nominated by Carter to be Director of Central Intelligence. Under fire from members of the Senate and others, Sorensen dramatically withdrew yesterday; and today many questions about what happened and why are still being asked. Tonight we plan to pose them to Mr. Sorensen himself. He`s with Robin in New York. Robin?

MacNEIL: Mr. Sorensen, can you give us any more details, a sort of chronology of what actually happened over the last day or so that led to your decision to withdraw and your actually with drawing before the Senate Intelligence Committee yesterday?

THEODORE C. SORENSEN: The chronology is basically this: one month ago today I was in Plains, Georgia and Governor Carter asked me if I would be his Director of Central Intelligence, a post that I did not seek and was not particularly anxious to accept because I knew the headaches that it involved. But I did not see how I could turn him down, and I accepted. After the other meetings in Sea Island, and the holidays, I came to Washington and spent the last two weeks going around and seeing all the Senators who were members of the Committee and other key members of the United States Senate, other key Congressmen who were involved. The meetings went exceedingly well; I encountered no serious opposition. One Senator refused to see me. All others saw me, we had friendly meetings; one or two indicated they might have reservations, all of the others indicated very strong support. There was some opposition from the far right wing -- they disagreed with my views on non-violence, on foreign policy, on civil liberties, on protecting the rights of Americans; but it was all confined, it seemed, to a very small group. Then, last Thursday evening, after I had been participating with the President-elect and the Vice President-elect and other members of the National Security team in an all-day briefing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Mondale received a call from Senator Inouye, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who told him that he thought the nomination was in trouble because the staff had that day distributed to Committee members the affidavits which I had filed in the cases of the New York Times and Daniel Ellsberg. And I had stated frankly in those affidavits the anomalies and inconsistencies which prevailed with respect to the handling of classified material. Mondale, Carter and I had a meeting in Blair House that evening. I said I thought those were ridiculous charges if anyone bothered to read what I had said in the affidavits and compare them with the actual facts, and that I certainly had no intention of withdrawing. Mondale agreed, Carter agreed. Indeed, Carter took a copy of the affidavit with him on the plane back to Georgia that evening, and called me that night and said, "There`s nothing whatsoever wrong with what you`ve said in this affidavit." He arranged for me to see Senator Inouye; I did. I explained the circumstances to Senator Inouye. He said, "I`m sure we can get it through all. right. I suggest you see as many of the other members of the Committee as you can.` Friday I went around to see other. members of the Committee. Some of them had scattered, Senator Goldwater still refused to see me, but for the most part those whom I saw were very friendly and they understood the facts when I explained it to them. And it was quite clear to me that this was not the real reason for any trouble. Nevertheless, the opposition continued to escalate, coming from a variety of sources for a variety of reasons; and there were a series of phone calls between Governor Carter and Senator Mondale and myself over the weekend, and finally, it was clear that there was so much opposition in the Senate that either I could be confirmed only with a divided margin that would handicap my effectiveness in the job--- because I want the Director of Central Intelligence to work closely with the Congress -- or I would be defeated, and that would be harmful to the new administration. So I made up my mind that it would be best for the administration and for the intelligence community if I withdrew, but I was not going to...

MacNEIL: You made up your mind on Sunday, you say.

SORENSEN: On Sunday. But I was determined not to withdraw while these personal charges were hanging over my head. If people wanted to reject me on grounds of philosophy, and policy and what they regarded as the necessary experience, they were entitled to do that; but I was determined not to be driven from the field on the basis of these scurrilous personal accusations.

MacNEIL: That was why you went before the Committee and read your statement yesterday, and then announced your withdrawal at the end. Just before you made that statement you had a conversation with Governor Carter on the phone -- a few minutes before, I believe.

SORENSEN: Yes.

MacNEIL: Did you know before that call whether in fact you would carry out your intention to withdraw?

SORENSEN: Oh, yes.

MacNEIL: You did. Did you not, in fact, anticipate that Mr. Carter might have repeated his expressions of confidence and urged you to go in to fight?

SORENSEN: No, by Sunday night, at the time I wrote out the optional last paragraph, he and I had already jointly reached the conclusion that the fight would not be worth it.

MacNEIL: Then why did you carry in to the Committee and then read a statement which said in part, `I do not intend to be intimidated by those who wish to strike at me, or through me Governor Carter, by personal attacks. I prize both my country and my honor too greatly to desert this post under that kind of cloud." Didn`t you in the end desert the post under that kind of cloud?

SORENSEN: My hope was to clear that cloud by the preceding nine tenths of my statement and to persuade the Committee. And I am naive enough to believe that the statements made by the members of the Committee after I had withdrawn indicated that the personal accusations had been removed.

MacNEIL: Would you agree that your statement had the air of having been prepared for another occasion, where the last page, where you announced your withdrawal, would have been left off?

SORENSEN: No, I wouldn`t agree with that. It was a statement that was prepared to clear my name, period; and I tried to do that.

MacNEIL: So Mr. Carter, in. effect, did not -- by refusing at that very last-minute conversation to again say, "Go in and fight, Ted" -- he did not pull the rug out from under you at the very last minute.

SORENSEN: He did not pull the rug out from my withdrawal or from my nomination.

MacNEIL: I mean from your nomination. In other words, did you not anticipate that at that last moment, with this statement in your hands, it could have gone either way, and Mr. Carter could have said, "Go in and fight there, Ted. I`m behind you"?

SORENSEN: Well, I suppose it was possible, theoretically, but as I say, on Sunday he and I had really reached the joint conclusion that once my name was cleared it was not appropriate, from his point of view, for me to continue the fight. Or from the intelligence community`s point of view.

MacNEIL: At the risk of repeating myself, your statement, "I do not intend to be intimidated by those who wish to strike at me..." -- your withdrawal is not being intimidated by those people?

SORENSEN: No, it`s not. I would hope that I separated rather clearly -- and the Wall Street Journal editorial this morning indicates that perhaps I separated it successfully -- the two kinds of questions being raised: the personal, malicious attacks which were totally groundless; and the legitimate questions which the Wall Street Journal itself had, and which it separated, saying that the personal attacks were groundless and irrelevant. I understand people who think that there ought to be an insider running the intelligence community; I understand those who say that someone who has my particular beliefs about covert operations should not be running the intelligence community. I disagree with them, but they`re entitled to that point of view. And having cleared the personal attacks out of the way I recognized that the real opposition was based on my beliefs.

MacNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Yes. I understand that some of you folks watching may have seen the beginning of another program and did not see the first minute or so of this program. If you`ve tuned in now, you obviously see we are interviewing Theodore Sorensen, the man who was nominated by President-elect Carter to be Director of Central Intelligence and then dramatically withdrew yesterday. Mr. Sorensen, to pick up on something you just told Robin, did I understand you correctly, that in your conversation with Mr. Carter Sunday he told you that he thought it would be appropriate if you went ahead and withdrew?

SORENSEN: No, he didn`t put it that way, Jim. He said that the final assessment was that the votes against me were so numerous that confirmation would come only over a divided Senate, which he and I agreed would handicap my effectiveness, and I might very well be rejected, and that there was no possibility that that substantial opposition could be reduced. He said, "If you want to stay in and fight I will fight with you to the last vote." And I said, "I want to consider what my options are.".

LEHRER: I see. But was there any doubt in your mind what he wanted you to do -- what he preferred that you do?

SORENSEN: I think it`s clear that he did not want a Director of Central Intelligence who was effectively handicapped, nor did he want a defeat at the outset of his administration; and he and I agreed it was going to be one result or the other.

LEHRER: I see, Do you agree with those who are now saying that you could have been confirmed for just about any other job except this CIA job?

SORENSEN: (Laughing.) I noticed that once they had disposed of the body, the mourners were willing to say, "Oh, he would have been wonderful in any other job.".

LEHRER: Do you believe that?

SORENSEN: Whether I would be wonderful in any other job? I`m not sure I`m the right one to ask.

LEHRER: No; do you believe that you would have had no problems had you been nominated for another cabinet-level job?

SORENSEN: I don`t believe I would have had no problems. You have to consider the various sources of opposition against me. As one old Washington hand put it to me this morning, a lot of dirty little rivers came together to cause the flood that forced me out. Some of those dirty little rivers would have been there had I been nominated for any position in the administration, but they were particularly virulent and effective because of the mystique with which Intelligence is still regarded on Capitol Hill.

LEHRER: Did you and Mr. Carter, or you and Mr. Mondale, or you and anybody else of a high position within the coming Carter administration discuss or in any way realize your vulnerabilities in the Senate? Did this catch you by surprise, or did you know you were going to have problems a month ago today in Plains when you decided to take this job?

SORENSEN: No, I had no idea that I would have any problems Of this kind.

LEHRER: You didn`t know that there were any of these things that could end up being the dirty rivers that they became?

SORENSEN: No; I assumed that there would be some individuals in the intelligence community or formerly in the intelligence community, and in the military establishment and formerly in the military establishment who would take a very different view. But I certainly had no idea that they would be successful in hiding behind these groundless personal accusations.

LEHRER: You know, everybody has had their say and will continue to have their say on this thing; another thing that`s being said today is that Carter and his people blew up because they did not talk to the members of this Senate Intelligence Committee before he made the decision to nominate you. Do you know whether he did in fact talk to the members of the Committee, and if he didn`t, why he didn`t?

SORENSEN: I have no idea.

LEHRER: Did you talk to any of them between the time you were nominated and until the all the problems came up over the last couple of days?

SORENSEN: Oh, of course. I went around and saw each one of them personally except for the one Senator who was unwilling to see me, and I had very good talks with all of them -- very friendly talks.

LEHRER: Did any of them tell you, "Hey, Sorensen, I`ve got dirty river problems with you," or anything? Did anybody give you any hint that this thing was going to blow up this way?

SORENSEN: Two Republicans indicated that they had not yet made up their minds to support me, but would have very open minds on the matter; and they asked me about my record as a registrant of the draft as a non-combatant. And I think that was the only question they raised. One Democratic Senator raised questions about how much I knew regarding the so-called "assassination plots" in the White House. And as I say, one Senator refused to see me. But all the other Senators -- Democrats and Republicans -- were very favorable, very friendly.

LEHRER: Did the Carter people handle the appointment, or the nomination, well in a strictly pragmatic political standpoint? Once the soundings did come back -- and eventually they did come back - the problem that the Inouye call .... What happened after the Inouye call, after Inouye called Mondale and said, "Sorensen`s in trouble," what then did the Carter team do to offset that trouble, if anything?

SORENSEN: It began with Carter himself calling Inouye that very night and telling them that Sorensen had done nothing wrong and that he was standing by the nomination.. Mondale also spent the good part of the weekend talking with members of the Committee. I am certain that the transition staff for legislative liaison was doing its best as well.

LEHRER.- Are you satisfied that the Carter folks did everything they could for you and they didn`t just leave-you -- what is it -- twisting in the wind, as the saying goes, from a prior experience?

SORENSEN: I`m satisfied. You know, if fault is to be placed, some of it must be placed on me; I was apparently a more controversial figure than I thought I was.

LEHRER: And that really surprised you. I mean, you really did not expect any of this to really come out the way it did. Remember a month ago tonight, during the press conference -- remember, I was looking over the transcript of that press conference; you were asked some pretty tough questions even then by the reporters, that touched on your experience, that touched on the non-combatant status thing. Didn`t that raise a little red flag: "Hey, wait a minute. What are these guys doing to me?" No red flags then?

SORENSEN: I supposed it raised a red flag in the sense that I realized I had to get around and see the members of that Committee and answer any questions they might have, explain the facts to them. And I did.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MRCNEIL: Let`s come back to the differences of philosophy -you and some members of the Intelligence Committee you`ve talked about. Are you claiming, in effect, that the intelligence community is strong enough politically and with enough tame Senators to veto the choice of a new President?

SORENSEN: No, nor would I want to make any general characterization of the intelligence community as a whole. I think there was opposition from a few individuals in that community and a few individuals who had retired from that community, as well as from the defense establishment; but the intelligence community as a whole I was much impressed with. Those at the managerial level, those at the office of director support level worked with me very closely during these last two weeks; they found no difficulty with my views or my qualifications.

MacNEIL: Well, isn`t that even worse? You`re saying, then, that a few individuals, present or former, in the intelligence and defense communities are powerful enough politically to gainsay the wishes of a new President.

SORENSEN: No, that was only one of the streams to which I referred. It is true that those individuals have contacts in the Congress and contacts in the press, and they made the most of those contacts. But perhaps with a less controversial, less vulnerable individual all their pressures would have gone for naught.

MacNEIL: You said in your statement, "I was chosen by the President-elect as someone sufficiently in his personal trust to bring him the hard, unvarnished facts and to reject any unproper ones, whatever their source."

SORENSEN: Any unproper orders.

MacNEIL: Any unproper orders -- sorry. Are you saying that the intelligence establishment, or that part of it you`re referring to, can insist on someone who will present only varnished or improper facts to the President?

SORENSEN: I think there are several different qualifications that we ought to keep separate here. Bringing unvarnished facts to the President is extremely important. But there have been those, not necessarily in the CIA, who would try to impair the integrity of the intelligence process, who suspect the CIA, believe it or not, of being soft on the Soviet menace.

MacNEIL: Military intelligence, for example.

SORENSEN: Military intelligence, for instance.

MacNEIL: And they come to the President with a gloss on the facts -- varnishing them.

SORENSEN: They want the facts to support their budget and their weapons systems. There have been others, not all inside -- not necessarily inside - - the military intelligence, who want to see the estimates and analyses brought to the President by the Director of Central Intelligence altered so as to fit their policy concepts; I would not have done that. The other side of that coin that I mentioned was with respect to orders that are given by the President or by someone else in the White House; that means largely orders with respect to covert operations, or highly sensitive collection activities. I made it clear in my opening press conference that as a lawyer who is sensitive to civil liberties, as someone who had lectured and written extensively about the necessity to have our intelligence agencies accountable-to-the Congress and public, that I might take a somewhat different view. And there are those who feel that in the harsh world in which we live that kind of moral approach was naive.

MacNEIL: I wonder if it doesn`t boil down to this: that you`re saying, in effect, that despite all the anxieties that have been expressed in public by the Senate Committee that investigated them and other bodies that have looked into the CIA and the revelations of the last few years, that the intelligence community is out of the President`s control in that it can, or part of it can in effect dictate the kind of man, and therefore the kind of agency, the new President will have.

SORENSEN: No, once again you`re considerably exaggerating what I said. The intelligence community is not out of control. On the contrary, I think the safeguards which have been built in are working. Perhaps more reforms would be required, more can be done in the way of bringing it into the last quarter of the twentieth century. But to say that because a few individuals expressed opposition to me therefore they are out of control, is going way too far. Those individuals have a perfect right to express their views to their friends in the press and in the Congress.

MacNEIL: So you`re satisfied that if Mr. Carter -- presumably because he wanted someone of your beliefs about the intelligence community in there -- appoints somebody else who believes in limiting covert activities to extraordinary circumstances, as you say, involving national interests of the country; the other qualifications -- someone who brings in unvarnished facts, who has the power to reject improper orders, whatever their source, and so on -- an outsider, perhaps, not an insider -- someone who has all those qualifications, and presumably the kind of man Mr. Carter wants, that if he finds somebody else like that.he won`t get rejected, too? -

SORENSEN: He won`t get rejected...

MacNEIL: Because of those things, I mean.

SORENSEN: I think there will be pressure against him, also, because of those things -- there`s no doubt about it.

MacNEIL: So you`re saying that these basic elements of philosophy, the kind of philosophy the new President wants to impart to the intelligence community are unacceptable to a group that is sufficiently powerful to keep that sort of person out.

SORENSEN: No, once again, that group by itself could not possibly have kept me out. But I think they were able, for a variety of reasons, to join forces with other groups -- other groups who would have been opposed to me because they`re from the far right -- in almost any job; other groups who would have been opposed to me or to Governor Carter because of their political differences; other groups who tried to strike at -- believe it or not -- the late President Kennedy through me; and because also they were able to succeed in all of this, because they were able to raise this smokescreen of these personal charges. And hopefully, the new nominee will not be as vulnerable on that kind of ridiculous personal charge. What it comes down to in the end is that a great many Senators, just to be very frank about it, who were for me and who even shared that philosophy we`re talking about did not want to be caught in that kind of controversial give- and-take. They were being put on the spot. The President wanted them to vote for me, their own convictions told them that they should vote for me; but they had all of these pressures against me. Senators don`t like to be put on a spot. The way to get off the spot was for me to withdraw my name, and they brought pressure for me to withdraw my name.

MacNEIL: Jim?

LEHRER: Mr. Sorensen, your anger came over loud and clear yesterday as you were sitting at that hearing room table, not only in your words but in the demeanor -- I was watching it on television -- and as each one of those Senators patted you on the head before they sent you out of the room. You had a real beady eye all the way...

SORENSEN: Jim, I wouldn`t call it anger. In some cases it was simply contempt.

LEHRER: Contempt -- all right. How deep is that contempt and bitterness, is my question.

SORENSEN: Oh, no; I`m not bitter at all. I`ve been involved in the political world for a long time, and I understand why Senators do not want to be put on a spot, I know why they want controversies to go away. If they do not have to take positions on controversial issues where their constituents divide, the longer they can stay in public office, which is the main name of the game.

LEHRER: Have you had it, or would you consider another job if you were offered one in the Carter administration?

SORENSEN: Not at this time.

LEHRER: What about any administration?

SORENSEN: (Laughing.)

LEHRER: What scars do-you bear from this experience, twenty four hours later, as you`ve had time to think about it? Where are you right now?

SORENSEN: It isn`t such a great honor, as the fellow said, being ridden out of town on a rail. He would have preferred to walk. I`m very happy to be home, among friends who are real friends, among people who say what they mean and mean what they say. I`m glad to be here and have some more time to spend with my family and my law partners. This is not the end of the world for me; I was doing very well before I was placed in that difficult position, and I`m sure I`m going to enjoy life a lot more out of it.

LEHRER: Speaking of your friends, some of them suggested today -- in fact, Mary McGrory, a columnist in the Washington Star -- did you read her column today?

SORENSEN: No.

LEHRER: Well, you ought to; it`s very, pro-Sorensen. She makes the point that in the case of the nomination of Griffin Bell, President-elect Carter is willing to take the heat from the left wing; but in your nomination he was unwilling to take the heat from the right wing. Is that a fair and accurate analysis of what happened?

SORENSEN: I suppose there`s a certain accuracy in that comparison. The reasons, however, may not be quite that simple. I think that Governor Carter felt that the votes were there for Griffin Bell, that the Republicans were not going to oppose him, and that most of the Democrats would go along; so that there would be a fairly small vote against him and the nomination would be confirmed. I think he found in my case that the Republicans would be opposed to me and that some of the same liberal Democrats who are opposing Griffin Bell might be the only ones who are in my corner, and that`s what would cause the divisiveness that both he and I worried about

LEHRER: In other words, a simple pragmatic political decision based on head count.

SORENSEN: That`s what it came down to, I`m sorry to say.

LEHRER: Finally, are you concerned about some of the personal things that came out in this, above and beyond the things that you went through in your statement yesterday? Hedrick Smith, for instance, of the New York Times, suggested that all the other reasons aside, that another thing you had going against you was a personality problem. You`ve heard them all -- that you`re arrogant and aloof, and all of that. What did that do for your peace of mind and your experience in being nominated for Director of Central Intelligence?

SORENSEN: It was interesting that the Senator who was quoted as saying that I was arrogant did not even give me the courtesy of a personal visit. He also told a friend of mine who went to see him that -- he engaged in that same refrain; oh, I`d be great for almost any other office, but not Central Intelligence. Others will have to judge whether I`m arrogant and aloof. Obviously, I try not to be; I hope I`m not.

MacNEIL: Thank you very much, Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, Jim. Jim Lehrer and I will be back tomorrow night. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.