The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Vance's China Visit

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Jim Lehrer is off tonight. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance returned to Washington over the weekend and reported to President Carter on his five-day visit to China. The President called Vance`s reports encouraging, but said that full diplomatic recognition of the People`s Republic was well into the future. That was another way of saying that in his exploratory talks with the new Chinese leaders Mr. Vance had not made any significant progress towards normalizing relations between the two countries.

The normalization process leading to formal diplomatic recognition has been stalled since about 1974, two years after President Nixon`s historic visit to Peking. The sticking point has been Taiwan, the island turned into an anti-communist fortress by Chiang Kai-shek with American help following his defeat by Mao Tse-tung in 1949. The Chinese want us to close down our diplomatic ties with Taiwan, end our mutual security treaty and withdraw our troops. The U.S. wants an assurance that if we leave Peking will not attack the Nationalist regime on Taiwan.

But neither side has been willing to compromise, despite the presence of new leaders in every corner of the Washington-PekingTaipei triangle. In Taiwan Chaing Kai-shek`s son, Chiang Ching kuo, has taken over the reins of government. And in China, following the death of Mao and Chou En-lai last year, power is shared by a triumvirate of men who are said to be hard- headed and pragmatic: Hua Kuo-feng, the Premier and Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party; Teng Hsiao-ping, Deputy Premier and Vice Chairman; and Yeh Chinn-ying, Minister of Defense.

Tonight we examine what it will take to normalize relations with Peking and whether it`s worth the price. First, an assessment of Cyrus Vance`s trip, with Professor Allen Whiting of the University of Michigan. Mr. Whiting was former deputy consul in Hong Kong and is the author of several books on Chinese foreign policy. He`s in the Detroit studio of Public Television Station WTVS. Mr. Whiting, was it, as Mr. Carter said, encouraging to find out that the new Chinese leadership is just as adamant as the old was on the preconditions for normalizing relations -- that is, to pull out of Taiwan?

ALLEN WHITING: I really don`t think that`s the aspect of the trip that they found encouraging. They knew they were going to get that answer before they went there. What they must have found encouraging was the Chinese willingness to listen to our discussion of our problems, politically and domestically, that will delay our movement toward that end.

MacNEIL: Do you think that was the purpose of the trip, in addition to just getting to see the new leadership face to face, to lay out afresh what our difficulties are in moving towards normalization?

WHITING: Yes. This was a dialogue that had been broken off for almost two years. It was important that Secretary Vance, who had met Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping two years ago, restate in his official capacity what the American public opinion is so that the Chinese can appreciate how little room we have to move and how much compromise there must be on both sides if there is going to be an ultimate settlement.

MacNEIL: What do you think the administration actually hoped to achieve, just to get a listening ear to those points, or something else?

WHITING: Well, the Chinese have been very suspicious of what the Carter administration policy would be. They had to have some credibility that when the President said normalization was his goal, that he intended to carry out the Shanghai Communique it wasn`t merely lip service to a past promise by President Nixon but it was a program that would be worked out over time.

MacNEIL: The Shanghai Communique which ended Mr. Nixon`s historic trip in 1972.

WHITING: That`s correct.

MacNEIL: I was wondering how you`d characterize the kind of reception, from the reports you`ve seen, that Mr. Vance got. Cold, warm, proper, or do you read any significance into the kind of reception he got?

WHITING: I think that`s why the administration says it was encouraged. The reception in Peking began rather cool; it gradually moved up to at least the necessary level with Teng Hsiao-ping. There was no certainty that Secretary Vance would see Premier Hua Kuo-feng, and when he finally did, that reception plus the publicity given it by Peking showed that there was a very definite warming of the reception all along the way.

MacNEIL: Some press reports I`ve seen say that Mr. Vance suggested or outlined several possible compromises on the Taiwan question. Is that exploration -- as the administration characterized it, in your book -- or is that negotiation?

WHITING: I think exploration is present your side without the other side coming back. There are going to have to be a number of these sessions, maybe at lower levels, maybe at the same level, and the only way each side can digest what the other has to say is to have it out in private, mull it over and then come back at another time.

MacNEIL: In your own view, is there a need to hurry normalization of relations with Peking?

WHITING: If by "hurry" you mean now, in the next six months to a year, no. But on the other hand, this isn`t something that can be pushed off to the second term of this administration or into the mid 1980`s or the 1990`s or the year 2000. The Chinese will have differing estimates of our intentions and differing capabilities on their own side to push that Taiwan issue as time goes on. So time is not necessarily on our side.

MacNEIL: You mean that the position of Taiwan becomes more vulnerable the longer we wait?

WHITING: Not only does it become more vulnerable, but the Chinese willingness to compromise with us on Taiwan may change. Right now they are offering us what they call the Japanese formula. They`re saying after we break the diplomatic and military ties we can continue our trade, our investment, our travel. Those are the vital lifelines for Taiwan`s economic survival. Ten years from now that may not be their price.

MacNEIL: How much is Taiwan itself the real obstacle to normalization?

WHITING: Taiwan is the obstacle in the domestic politics of both countries, not in itself. Taiwan isn`t going to fall into the Chinese Communists` lap when we leave the island militarily. It`s got a very good defense system and there`s quite an obstacle before they can attack it. But it`s the domestic politics in Peking which constrains the Chinese leadership`s ability to compromise, just as it is in our country.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. We`ll come back to Detroit. Not everyone thinks that we should hurry normalization along by compromising on Taiwan. That view is very strong in Congress, and with us in our Wash ington studio is Representative Clement Zablocki, a Wisconsin Democrat and chairman of the House International Relations Committee. Congressman Zablocki visited China in 1974. Congressman, did you think that Mr. Vance`s visit was timely and necessary?

Rep. CLEMENT ZABLOCKI: It may have been timely if this administration was going to follow through on exploring as to what really was behind the statement of Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien when he gave the interview to Admiral Zumwalt, when he had reiterated not only the conditions that Peking sets for full normalization but made it quite clear that if necessary, force would be used to liberate the sacred territory of Taiwan by Peking. It was somewhat untimely as far as our domestic international relations because this administration has so many problems now under consideration: the Panama Canal treaty, the Middle East problem, the Greek-Turkey problem, the South African-Rhodesian problem. It`s spread too thin, and I think in this respect it was not timely for the Secretary to go to Peking when he really did not have any assurances who he would meet. And it was merely, as I understand, exploratory although earlier this year some substantive offers were supposedly to be offered to the Peking government.

MacNEIL: I see. Now what, put very simply, Congressman, is your position on the severing of our connection with Taiwan as a price for normalizing relations with Peking?

ZABLOCKI: I think this would be unthinkable to sever diplomatic relations for the expediency of getting full diplomatic relations with Peking. Peking needs us more than we need them. Behind this entire so-called U.S. policy at the present time that some of the advisors even call that skinning the cat by letting the animal still live. Now, have you ever seen a skinned cat live? I think this is inhumane even to think of severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan, with whom we have excellent trade, and there is nothing we will gain by diplomatic relations with Peking.

MacNEIL: Is there something we would lose, Congressman, by delaying some arrangement with Peking?

ZABLOCKI: I don`t think we`d lose anything. We would lose our credibility if we severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan now. I believe that even the leaders in Peking would have less respect for us. Because one thing they say, their word is good. And if our word is not good with an ally now -- Taiwan -- they will have less confidence in whatever agreement or arrangement we make. Time is on our hands as well. We can wait.

MacNEIL: How common is your view in the Congress today? Are you in a majority, do you think?

ZABLOCKI: I think we`re in a majority as the people in the United States. The most recent polls have indicated that although there is a desire and support for normalization with Peking there is opposition to severing diplomatic relations with a trusted ally.

MacNEIL: Are you and members of Congress who feel like you in favor, however, of some compromise between these absolutist positions?

ZABLOCKI: Of course there must always be room for compromise. I`m sure that it is not our intention to ad infinitum have military troops anywhere in the world -- certainly not in Taiwan. We have less than 2,000 troops in Taiwan at the present time. There`s no threat to the Peking government, the People`s Republic of China, from Taiwan, and certainly the People`s Republic of China could not by force take over Taiwan. And I don`t believe it`s necessary now to take such drastic steps.

MacNEIL: Thank you. For a third view on this, with me in New York is Robert Payne,perhaps best known for his biographies of major ` twentieth century figures, including Lenin, Hitler, Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Payne was a university professor in China throughout World War II. He returned there for the first time last year, and that visit is the subject of his newest book, A Rage for China, to be published this fall by Holt, Reinhart and Winston. Mr. Payne, do you detect any change of emphasis in the new Chinese leader as compared with Mao and Chou in terms of their desire to improve relations with us?

ROBERT PAYNE: Of the leaders I know nothing, because I never met them, and very few people have met them. But it seemed to me among the people in universities, one or two of whom I did meet, and in the foreign languages press, there was a very real belief that a thaw was coming up, that the thing would become much more manageable, that there was a very real desire for relations with America. The real stumbling block, of course, was Taiwan and this was the hitching point. Everything revolved about that.

MacNEIL: What would it benefit us, the United States, to have full diplomatic relations with Peking? What would we achieve or get that we don`t have now with them?

PAYNE: Could I go back a little bit and talk in terms of world strategy? It seems to me that Russia`s on the warpath. Russia is determined to conquer as much of the world as it can, and we need allies rather desperately. We need Western Europe, we need Japan, we need India and we need China. And we don`t need the sixteen million peoples of Taipei anything as much as we need the 800 million people of China. So it seems to me that on balance we should not hesitate, that our whole game should be to try and make this alliance work and make it a real alliance. And I think we`ll find the Chinese will work with us on that. They want arms; they particularly want American arms. They want training; they want American training.

They want American books. There`s everything that we`ve got to supply them which they haven`t got now.

MacNEIL: You`re talking about the People`s Republic as a fullfledged ally in the tradition sense, not as a sort of marriage of convenience for the moment.

PAYNE: A marriage of convenience which might eventually become a real marriage, and which looks as though it very well will because we`ve got a traditional feeling for the Chinese and I think they`ve got a traditional feeling for us. I think this thing is enormously important, that we should work towards an alliance with the Chinese.

MacNEIL: And to come back to my question, what would that benefit us, that alliance?

PAYNE: 800 million men. That`s a large number. We need them against the Russians.-

MacNEIL: And if the price for that were the present Chinese three conditions, that we sever diplomatic relations and abrogate our defense treaty and pull out our troops, you would be prepared to accept that price for this.

PAYNE: I think the price is very small. We`re talking about Taiwan as though it`s a legitimate state; I don`t think it is. It`s a place of refuge where Chiang Kai-shek went to in 1949. It`s never had anything but police dictatorship all the way through. It`s nothing we should be fiddling around with at all. It`s a very dangerous thing to have on our consciences -- it`s like Vietnam, it`s all those terrible things that we`ve done; we`ve chosen the wrong people all the time. We`ve played with the Pakistanis against the Bangladeshes, we`ve played with the Vietnamese, to our horror; we play with Taipei, also to our horror. We made these terrible mistakes time after time, and I think it`s time we stopped making mistakes and joined up with the Chinese.

MacNEIL: How could we ally ourselves with a regime and a social structure that was so very different from ours in the West?

PAYNE: I think it`s going to change very rapidly. It seems to me that after Mao died it`s no longer going to be this total puritanical regime which we`ve had. There`s every sign that this is going to change within a year.

MacNEIL: Change how?

PAYNE: When I was there -- this is December, November and things seem to have got better since -- they talked very much about the thaw. The Mao`s magisterial opinions no longer count very much. Something new is emerging. And you know, in 1911 they had the revolution and since then they`ve had about fifteen revolutions. And it seems to me that after Mao`s death we might have the real revolution at last, so many years later. Things might start happening, because they`re not enforced from above. This time it may come from the ground.

MacNEIL: Back to the question on normalizing relations with Peking and if necessary, to that abandoning, which is the...

PAYNE: It`s not really abandoning.

MacNEIL: It`s the emotive word in this country that would be used -- Taiwan. What is the degree of urgency to that, in your view?

PAYNE: I think it`s tremendously urgent.

MacNEIL: More urgent than Professor Whiting put it?

PAYNE: Oh, much. I think it`s urgent because they`re now at the beginning of their long climb upwards, trying to find the state that really is manageable, which will work without Mao`s dictatorial statements all the time which everybody had to obey. I think the thing is fluid, and when the thing is fluid is the time to act. If we wait until it hardens it`ll be too late.

MacNEIL: Let`s go back to Detroit and Professor Whiting. Professor, what`s your reaction to Mr. Payne`s formulation?

WHITING: Well, I don`t think the difference is that great between us. I think that there has to be evidence of movement in this normalization process, I think the evidence was undoubtedly given by the statements that Secretary Vance made. And I would expect this to be consummated by 1979, the thirtieth anniversary of the People`s Republic -- well within the tenure of this administration.

MacNEIL: Congressman Zablocki?

ZABLOCKI: I`m concerned that Mr. Payne said that it is necessary that it be done now because the situation is fluid. Let me state that it appears that those who are advising an immediate full diplomatic relationship with Peking and severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan do it on the basis that there may be a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Now I think just the opposite will happen. I think that we will have some real problems in SALT-II if we move rapidly in this direction of full diplomatic relationship. But more important is the -- in my opinion -- the moral commitment that we have. What is our word worth, not only in the Far East but elsewhere in the world, if we, for expediency, break a commitment? I think to manipulate overtly the Sino-Soviet relationship is unwise.

MacNEIL: Congressman, let`s take up your first point first and then come back to the moral commitment. Professor Whiting, what do you think of the dangers of a Chinese rapprochement with Russia if we do not move rapidly towards normalizing relations with Peking?

WHITING: I think that`s the obvious option for the Chinese to consider. They will after all conclude that we will not move at all on Taiwan, that we will remain intervening in a civil war, that we`ll remain supporting a rival government which claims its objective is to take over the mainland. They will conclude that they have no alternative but force. To use force against Taiwan will require a detente with the Soviet Union to patch up the border dispute, have a drawdown of the Soviet threat from that side so that they can turn to the Taiwan Strait. Just as in 1969 they chose detente with Richard Nixon when they faced a threat from the north and northwest of the Soviet side. So I think that we there would have a detente with Moscow under the worst conditions: no territorial problems between the Chinese and the Russians, whereas we remain intervening in a civil war and keeping them from acquiring Taiwan.

MacNEIL: Intervening in a civil war, meaning that Peking regards Taiwan and the mainland as all one country, divided at the moment by an old civil war.

WHITING: And the people on Taiwan -- it is a civil war, and China is all one country, divided temporarily by the exigencies of fate.

MacNEIL: I don`t know whether you have views on this, but do you think there is a danger of Peking making friends with Moscow again if we do not normalize relations with them?

PAYNE: I think it would be very difficult. The Chinese have got tremendous quarrels with the Russians, particularly on land. There are hundreds of millions of acres of land which are in dispute, and I don`t think that will be solved in another five years. That is not the urgency I`m thinking of. I`m thinking of the urgency of massing our forces to hold off a Russian attack.

MaCNEIL: Let`s go back to the Congressman`s other point, the nature of the moral commitment that we have. We have a treaty with them and we now have also trade and economic ties which have increased, perhaps ironically, since the Nixon overtures to China. Congressman, what kind of compromise could possibly preserve that moral commitment and not destroy or abandon that moral commitment? For instance, would it be a compromise if we got the sort of reassurance, a verbal reassurance from Peking, that they would not use force against Taiwan? Would that get us out of the moral commitment?

ZABLOCKI: It certainly would not. We have a mutual security commitment as well as some fifty-nine executive agreements with Tai wan. I think that what must be borne in mind is that we are still laboring, as we have over the past twenty-seven, eight years, that there is a one China. There were two governments. We are now beginning to deal with one we did not have diplomatic relationships. There`s no reason, in my opinion, that we could not have diplomatic relations with both. After all, we have diplomatic relations with Singapore. Singapore is a Chinese nation. We have relations with Hong Kong. And I`m sure that as far as the people in Taiwan, if there were a plebiscite, if they had a choice as to what government they would want, they would not vote to be united with the mainland.

Speaking of Mr. Payne`s statement about a police state in Taiwan, there`s more human rights, there`s self-dignity, independence; they have freedoms that do not exist in the mainland. And if we would force them into this system that they would not wish to choose, I think this is really a moral commitment that we should not permit to be broken.

MacNEIL: Professor Whiting in Detroit, could you go through what you think are the possible forms of compromise? The Congressman has just mentioned one, that there be two Chinas, rather as there are two Germanys, both recognized by us. Where is the most fruitful area for compromise, in your view?

WHITING: A compromise has to have some prospect of being accepted by both sides. And I see no prospect at all of Peking accepting two Chinas, accepting any formula which dissolves the sovereign claim that they have to Taiwan. Now in 1955-57 Chou En-lai said repeatedly that they would seek the peaceful liberation of Taiwan to the extent possible. They would prefer to take Taiwan peacefully, obviously.

And the arguments for delay have been very persuasive all along. Taiwan has been enriched by American aid; Taiwan`s world market position is better than that of Peking`s in a number of commodities. They can argue in Peking as long as they think there is a possibility it can happen peacefully. Why not wait? After Chiang Ching-kuo dies there won`t be a leadership. Maybe there`ll be a recession, maybe Taiwan will have unemployment. Why take the very costly and risky step of crossing that hundred miles of Taiwan Strait, attacking 300,000 well trained troops on a hard-death fence of beach when the future holds that prospect? So long as we are there, however, there is no such prospect, and I think that the formulas they`ve used before they will reintroduce again.

MacNEIL: What about the formula of Taiwan possibly becoming an independent nation, which would presumably solve some of our difficulties?

WHITING: That`s a possibility that could happen at some distant time in the future but not under our auspices. It would be seen as a frank steal of Chinese territory. The Chinese Nationalists rule Taiwan; they`re not going to have a plebiscite to ask the Taiwanese do they really want to be independent rather than be ruled by the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Ching-kuo. There`s not much question if that plebiscite were held the Taiwanese would say yes, we`d rather be ruled by ourselves than by you. That`s why the Nationalists will not have any such plebiscite. The U.N. can`t intervene; there`s no way that it has any jurisdiction over Taiwan.

MacNEIL: Back to you, Congressman. What kind of a compromise do you think the Congress in the United States would buy that it would feel did not destroy the moral commitment?

ZABLOCKI: A compromise that would permit the Taiwanese to have self- determination, self-government and have the continued security from any attack from the mainland. We certainly cannot follow the so-called Japan formula; Japan had no mutual security agreement or treaties with Taiwan. I don`t believe we can expect Congress to support anything short that will prevent the sixteen million people from being cast or handed over to the Communist government of Peking. There are some that would say this would be the Yalta of the future.

MacNEIL: Mr. Payne, I presume you`re not interested in compromises because you just think we should move ahead and pull out of Taiwan as the necessary price.

PAYNE: It`s the necessary price above everything, because it seems to me that when we talk about moral commitments it`s the same thing as talking about the moral commitment to Vietnam, when we had so many moral commitments and they`re all valueless. The idea is to go ahead and try and save the world by having this alliance. It`s terribly important.

MacNEIL: Mr. Whiting, on public opinion in this country -- you said it`s a political problem in this country, as it is for the leaders in Peking -- I`ve seen surveys, one done by the Potomac Associates in Washington that suggests that the public is very ambivalent about this. It wants to normalize relations with Peking but does not want to abandon or withdraw from Taiwan. Is that the way you read that, and how is that going to be overcome?

WHITING: I think there`s one other ambivalence we should point out to in that poll and others which Congressman Zablocki did not notice. It`s true, a majority of the American people want to keep a treaty, but no poll shows a majority of the American people willing to fight the Chinese Communists to defend the Chinese Nationalists. Now the credibility of a treaty takes public support. As long as Peking can read the polls as easily as we, it can easily conclude at some time that that treaty is a paper tiger. I would hate to face the dilemma of committing our troops to fight in that Chinese civil war or withdrawing while the treaty is operational. So the ambivalence does extend across several aspects of the problem.

MacNEIL: Congressman?

ZABLOCKI: If we really break our commitment and our treaty to Taiwan we then really become the paper tiger and Peking, as I alluded earlier, will have less respect for us because we indeed are the paper tiger they charge us to be because we do not stand by an ally that we have had a commitment with. Now time will very likely take care of all of this but my concern is that we should not go hurriedly into this, as some advocate.

MacNEIL: Congressman, time has just taken care of us, I`m afraid, for this evening. Thank you very much indeed in Washington. Thank you, Professor Whiting in Detroit, and thank you, Mr. Payne, here.

That`s all for tonight. We`ll be back tomorrow night and other news permitting our story will be: measuring human rights in Latin America. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.