The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Spanish Prime Minister

[Tease]

JIM LEHRER [voice-over]: The new leader of Spain, Felipe Gonzalez, talks to us on his way to see President Reagan at the White House.

[Titles]

LEHRER: Good evening. The Spanish Prime Minister said today continued confrontation in Central America may lead to war, one that would involve the United States as well as the nations of that region. And he said the U.S. could help prevent such conflict by concentrating more on promoting peace, freedom and economic prosperity there rather than military security. Felipe Gonzalez, the 41-year-old Socialist leader, issued his warning in Washington where he today began his first official visit to the U.S. since his election six months ago, the first Socialist head of the Spanish government since the Franco era began, 50 years ago. In addition to being Prime Minister, he also holds the title of president of the government. President Gonzalez met at the White House with President Reagan for an hour and a half. Whether he delivered a critique of U.S. Central America policy directly to Mr. Reagan is not known because spokesmen afterward gave only a general view of what the two leaders discussed. But this morning before he went to the White House, President Gonzalez had much to say about Central America in an interview with Robert MacNeil and me. Here is that interview, edited only to cut out gaps caused by the translation to and from Spanish. The translator was Eduardo Mendoza, the official Spanish government translator for this presidential trip to the United States.

ROBERT MacNEIL: Mr. President, welcome. After your recent trip to Central America you said that United States policy there should be more positive and less negative. What did that mean?

FELIPE GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: I think the United States has a tremendous weight on Central and Latin America area and apart from security considerations, it should have also in mind reasons of freedom, peace and social justice and in a positive way.

MacNEIL: You also said during that trip that the U.S. policy was fundamentally harmful. What did that mean?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: I never said harmful. I said negative. It's amazing for me that the United States has not a vision for the year 2000 of what the development can be in the American continent. I think that the United States could do a lot to develop peace and social and economic development in the whole continent from the south to the north -- the whole continent. And this would be very, very important for the security of the whole world.

LEHRER: Does that mean, Mr. President, that the United States policy towards security and military matters is wrong?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: No. I don't think it's wrong. Wrong is too strong a word. For instance, to consider that the Panama Canal is a neuralgic point is not a wrong view of the matter. The point is that for these countries in the area the security reasons are not always positive for Central America. What they really want is to be able to live in peace, freedom and social justice.

LEHRER: Does it mean that the United States should not be providing military assistance to El Salvador, say?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: I think that there should be no military -- no foreign military assistance in any country, which means that there shouldn't be any Cuban assistance in Nicaragua, for instance. What is important is that these countries look for themselves their way to forge their destiny, especially in peace.

MacNEIL: What will happen if the United States policy continues in the direction it's going now in Central America? What will happen?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: Well, there is not a very clearcut U.S. policy in Central America, but let's say that if this first stage of confrontation goes on, if there is counterrevolutionary struggle in Nicaragua, if the civil confrontation goes on in El Salvador or there is a military confrontation between Nicaragua and Honduras, for example, what can happen? Well, it's very difficult to foresee, but it's possible that there is a generalized international confrontation in which the United States might -- and I underline "might" -- be absorbed.

MacNEIL: To put that more simply, you fear that if things go on as they are now it could lead to a general war in the area, with the United States involved?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: The first half is correct. There might be a generalized conflict in the area. The second part, intervention of the United States, comes from the theory of security that the United States is upholding. This area being basic for its security, they should intervene.

MacNEIL: I'm not clear what you think, Mr. President, that the United States should do now. What do you think it should do?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: Well, what should be done is to foster any initiative for peace, and at the present time there is only one initiative for peace, namely the Contadora group. This group, this Contadora group, has two advantages. First of all, it's at the level of government and three governments, Colombia, Mexico and Panama, who should be trusted by the United States. And, secondly, it gives the conflict a regional dimension, which is better than giving it the dimension of confrontation East and West.

LEHRER: Mr. President, as you know, the United States says that it is Cuba, who with the help of the Soviet Union on one side and using Nicaragua on the other, that is hellbent on making war and strife in Central America, not the United States. Is that just wrong when they claim that?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: I think that Cuba should stay out of Central America; however, we should not oversimplify matters. For instance, when Sandino was fighting -- the guerrilla -- Communist Cuba did not exist yet, and so happened with Faribundo Marti. I think that the causes of this conflict are much deeper than the mere presence of Cuba. It's impossible to oversimplify the problem. For instance, before Fidel's Cuba there was Somoza's dictatorship in Nicaragua.

LEHRER: The United States says, though, that if Cuba and Nicaragua would quit shipping arms into El Salvador to the leftist guerrillas that that peace would come much quicker, and how should -- why should the United States be asked to stop arming one side as long as Cuba and Nicaragua are arming the other?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: I never said, and I will never say, that one side should stop arming one side and not the other. Both should stay out of the conflict. Everybody should be out of this conflict, and not only that, but peace is the only -- is the sine quo non for democracy and justice in the region.

MacNEIL: In a speech last night President Reagan said -- he was talking in the southern part of the United States. He said that what he called a Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan axis would take over Central America if the United States doesn't send more arms assistance to its friendly governments. What is your opinion on that statement?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: To deny relation between Cuba and the USSR and Nicaragua would be preposterous. Now, the question is why, when Nicaragua wants to buy armsfor its own defense the United States or Western Europe, why everything is done to prevent it. Why is Nicaragua forced to buy arms from the USSR? This is one question. Why and in what measure is any more diversified relationship is imputed to Nicaragua because Nicaragua wants to have economic or wide relationship with the United States and the rest of the world.

MacNEIL: So you do not agree that there is a Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan axis trying to take over Central America?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: I don't think -- I don't think that this axis that we speak on does want to take over Central America. I don't think that, no matter what we say, Western Europe is going to take over Poland, for instance. It's obvious that no matter what we say we are never going to take over Poland, for example.

LEHRER: Do you support the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the way they're running things down there now?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: I don't agree with some of the mistakes they've made. What I do support and I always supported was the original project. It was a national, pluralistic project of a mixed economy and, of course, a progressive project. What should be done is to help this project to be done.

LEHRER: Some would suggest it may be too late.

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: I don't think it's too late. It will be too late if the conflict generalizes in the region. Otherwise we can see an electoral -- a democratic confrontation, a return to a peaceful and democratic process. I think you're going to understand me better if I tell you that the most important thing is democracy and pluralism in any country in Central America, because I have lived 33 out of my 41 years in a dictatorship.

LEHRER: Mr. President, all that you have told us this morning about Central America, do you intend to tell President Reagan when you see him today?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: Of course I intend and I hope to be able to tell him all these things, and why not telling him when he could just watch it on TV?

MacNEIL: I don't understand that. Does that mean the President can read it in the press and see it on TV so you won't tell him, or what?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: What I -- probably we can go even deeper in the question with President Reagan.I think relations between Spain and United States should be not only good but useful, and maybe we should touch upon certain things that are better not made public on TV. I don't like the American public to think that I only come here to talk about Central America and the Central American question.

MacNEIL: Well, that brings up another subject I was going to raise anyway, and that is the question of Spanish membership of NATO. The government that preceeded you agreed that Spain would join NATO. You were personally opposed to that when you were campaigning, but you agreed to hold a referendum for the Spanish people to decide. Why are you delaying that referendum?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: First of all, I could have done something easier, to reverse the decision of the former government. But I decided to consult the people and do it slowly for two reasons. First, I think that the Spanish citizen should receive a full explanation of what it means to participate in Europe, not only militarily but also from political, economical and social point of view. And secondly, the international situation, including the ongoing Geneva talks, is so delicate that I don't think it would be good, a referendum now, because it could somehow affect the East-West relationship. And to consult the people does not imply that we do not want to participate in the collective defense of the West.

MacNEIL: Does that mean that if there were a referendum now the Spanish people, as opinion polls show, would vote against membership of NATO, and that would somehow upset the East-West delicate situation you talk of?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: Would the Spanish people vote no? Probably yes, they would vote against NATO. Would this alter the relation -- the East-West relationship? Probably no. No, because there is also a bilateral relation with the United States on security matters.

LEHRER: Mr. President, when you talk about the complications that such a vote might cause, are you referring specifically to the missile issue, the cruise missiles and the Pershing missiles that are supposed to go into Europe in December?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: I think that it would affect the course of the negotiations about missiles that are taking place now in Geneva, and the East-West relationship is delicate because it could affect the destiny, the final destiny of these negotiations in the Geneva talks as well as the conference on peace and security that's taking place now in Madrid.

LEHRER: Mr. President, in the other area, Spain has for six years now been trying to become a member of the European Common Market. What's the problem there?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: No, it's not another thing, although it's a different problem. For six years we've been trying to carry out a foreign policy for Spain that would make Spain what it really is, a European and a Western country. But we have economic hurdles in our way. When we lived under dictatorship we thought that this was the problem, that this was what impeded our entry in the European Common Market, and that when this dictatorship would end everything would be easier. This is not the case. For instance, with the United States we thought that the trade relationship would be better, and it is not. In fact, the deficit of our balance of payment has increased. Maybe this is the price we have to pay for a democracy.

MacNEIL: Are you suggesting the United States found it easier to deal with a dictatorship -- Franco's dictatorship than with a Spanish democracy?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: No, I don't think it was easier, and I'm sure it was not as pleasant as it is to deal with us. But, in any case, it is a very, very important subject for us. I'm going to tell you something very important about the relationship between Spain and the United States. I am the president of a democratic-socialist government in Spain. Spain never knew the effort to fight against nazism and fascism that other countries in Europe knew, and also the benefits of the Marshall plan.We arrived to democratic freedom 30 years later, and now we expect from the United States a clear contribution to democracy, not only with words, but also with a material contribution to our efforts.

MacNEIL: What contributions?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: In many areas. For instance, in 1975 still with the old regime the trade balance was in better condition with the United States than it's now in 1983. Our fishermen have more difficulty to fish in American waters than the fishermen of other countries. Our steelworkers, our shoemakers, our olive exporters have more difficulties in the United States than those of other countries.

LEHRER: What's the cause of all of this, Mr. President?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: I think the cause is economic crisis and the trend towards protectionism. I don't think there is a deliberate attitude. But this explanation is not enough for the fishermen, for the men who before exported shoes and now cannot, and the only thing he sees is that things were better before. This is very serious when we are trying to carry out a global project of integration of Spain in the Western world.

LEHRER: Do you think, Mr. President -- or do you harbor any suspicion that this may have been caused by the fact that you're a Socialist?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: Not at all. Not at all.Among other things, we have been in power only for six months, and the problem goes way back. Of course Spain from the American point of view has many things to criticize, as we also have the right to criticize things in the United States. But the fact is that Spain is the only country in southern Europe that has a majority government. A majority government that's socialist and democratic and with a small percentage of communist participation and a percentage of opposition.

MacNEIL: Come back to the European Economic Community, the Common Market. Some suggest that you are holding the NATO card in order to further and to help your entrance to the Common Market.

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: This would have been, in any case, an intelligent and clever policy for former governments, but I want to tell you something that's said in my country. To the Spaniards of democratic Spain everybody has asked to have the bad things but never the good things, and this is impossible to translate, the actual saying. We are the only country in Europe that still has a colony from an allied country, from Great Britain.

MacNEIL: Well, that brings up another point that's been suggested, that you are also holding the NATO question in suspense so as to get a better resolution from Britain of that colony, Gibraltar, which you want returned to Spain.

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: Sincerely, absolutely sincerely not. The right of -- sovereign right of Spain over its land is not a piece of money that can be exchanged against our entry in NATO. But you understand me perfectly well.If in a year or two years we ask the Spanish people about the participation in security and meanwhile it has received a fair and equal treatment and it has recovered its territorial integrity, their answer will be absolutely different.

MacNEIL: In other words, if you get Gilbraltar back in the meantime the Spanish people would be a lot more willing to vote yes for NATO membership with Britain than if you don't get it back?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: Well, it's all a very important contradiction that has been overcome. It's inconceivable that a Spanish admiral can be under the orders of a British admiral in Spanish land. And of course, it will never be well under the present government.

LEHRER: Finally, a personal question, Mr. President. You spent all your life in opposition to the government. Now you're on the inside and you're running the government. Have you had any kind of adjustment problems?

Pres. GONZALEZ [through interpreter]: From a personal point of view, no, but from the intellectual point of view, the problem and the readjustment of taking the ideas one had when in the opposition into the government and into the everyday practice, that's very stubborn and very hard to deal with.

MacNEIL: Well, Mr. President, thank you very much for joining us tonight. That is the end of our time. That is all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.