The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour

Funding for this program has been provided by this station and other public television stations and by grants from American Telephone & Telegraph Company and the Corpomerican doctor predicted in Moscow other deaths were still to come from the Chernobyl accident. And the search continues for eight mountain climbers in Oregon. We'll have the details in the news summary in a moment. Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in New York tonight. Charlayne?ZCHARLAYNE HUNTER GAULT:ZAfter the summary of today's news, we'll get details of American medical efforts in the Soviet Union. We go to the second of our three-part series on the effect of Chernobyl on nuclear power in this country. We ask the question, can it happen here? And finally, a documentary on one state's desperate attempts to save its malpractice coverage. News Summary

LEHRER: The House of Representatives passed a 1987 federal budget today, and as expected they chose the Democratic version. It calls for tax increases and defense spending cuts not wanted by President Reagan. The House rejected a Republican alternative before passing the Democratic bill by a vote of 245 to 179. The vote followed five hours of spirited debate largely focused on the defense differences. It ended this way.

Rep. ROBERT MICHEL, (R) Illinois: It's quite obvious that the Democratic strategy was to beat the hell out of the defense program in order to placate all the social welfare pleaders. And I'll be frank to say that I really feel what the majority has done on the defense figure is irresponsible.

Rep. WILLIAM GRAY, (D) Pennsylvania: Democrats want a strong defense. Many of them have voted that way. But let me tell you what the difference is. The difference between our budget and their budget is 2 on defense, over three years. They're going to do $865 billion of new defense spending; we're going to do 848. Now certainly no one in America in their right mind thinks that because of a $17 billion difference the Russians are coming up the Potomac.

LEHRER: Just before the final vote, President Reagan called the Democratic bill a "breach of faith with our common duty to protect this nation." There was also talk of money before a Senate committee today, specifically how much money it will take to modify the three remaining space shuttles for safe flight. NASA administrator James Fletcher put the figure at $676 million. And the Federal Aviation Administration responded today to a congressional study which said it was unable to do its job. The General Accounting Office report yesterday said the FAA could not assure airlines are obeying government safety regulations. An FAA spokesman said that was not so: "We can say with assurance airlines are meeting the federal air regulations." Charlayne?

HUNTER GAULT: American and Soviet doctors predicted there would be more deaths beyond the nine already killed in the world's worst nuclear accident. At a news conference in Moscow today, Dr. Robert Gale of the University of California said 299 hospitalized people were judged to have received substantial doses of radiation, but that figure could change when it becomes clearer whether doctors have correctly assessed the gravity of the cases. We have a report from Brian Hanrahan of the BBC.

BRIAN HANRAHAN, BBC [voice-over]: Mr. Gorbachev invited Dr. Gale to the Kremlin to thank him for his efforts. For 13 days Dr. Gale has been working with Soviet doctors trying to save the lives of those who got the most serious radiation doses. He said today some had been exposed to extraordinary high levels, more than 800 rads, and had become to some extent radioactive themselves.

Dr. ROBERT GALE, bone marrow specialist: Of these 35 individuals, 19 have received transplants. Some did not receive transplants because they did not, in our estimation, need transplants, and others were severely affected by other toxicities and could not benefit from transplantation. In our attempts to rescue these 35 individuals by one or other techniques, 28 as of this moment remain alive, and we anticipate that there may very well be additional fatalities. If we are very hard-pressed to deal with the victims, 300 victims of a nuclear reactor accident, I think it should be very evident how inadequate would be any response to a nuclear attack or thermo nuclear war.

HANRAHAN [voice-over]: Dr. Armand Hammer, the American businessman who helped fix up Dr. Gale's visit, is in Moscow, where today he opened an exhibition of paintings which he owns. He says the exhibition will go as planned to Kiev, and he announced that he will personally pay all the costs of the drugs and equipment brought in to help the radiation victims.

LEHRER: The Soviet Union put a medium-range nuclear arms proposal on the negotiating table in Geneva today. But U.S. officials in Washington said it appeared at first read to contain nothing new or startling. But White House spokesman Larry Speakes said the U.S. would analyze it carefully to see if it constitutes constructive movement. Other officials expressed delight over the fact the proposal was made in private rather than in public. It was the first time in the 14-month negotiations a Soviet proposal or counter-proposal was not announced first in Moscow.

HUNTER GAULT: As of late today, the search was still continuing in Oregon for six teenagers and two adults missing on Mount Hood [TEXT OMITTED FROM SOURCE] KIRSCH, KGW [voice-over]: It was late Monday night that a group of 13 got trapped in high winds and freezing temperatures. A day later, two of the climbers straggled out to safety.

MOLLY SCHULA, survivor: Got lost on our way down trying to use a compass, and we couldn't see, and we finally decided to stop because it was late and going to get dark.

KIRSCH [voice-over]: Wednesday the hunt for survivors accelerated. Aerial spotters combing the mountain were joined by nearly a hundred others on the ground. It was one of these crews that spotted the bodies of three teenagers. They may have fallen; they apparently died trying to hike out. The victims were airlifted to a local trauma ward, but efforts by cold-weather experts to revive the three would soon fail. Meanwhile, family and friends were gathering privately to wait out the search.

Rev. MALCOLM MANSON, Oregon: People are caring for each other. Sometimes there are people hugging each other and crying, and sometimes people just being quiet. It's a real tribute to the community spirit that has built up amongst these parents in the last few days.

KIRSCH [voice-over]: By Thursday, search crews still had found no new leads. The snow cave could not be found. The climbers were carrying neither sleeping bags nor extra food nor survival gear, and their snow cave might have collapsed.

HUNTER GAULT: In other news, the President today retaliated against the European Economic Community by imposing trade restrictions on chocolate, apple and pear juice, beer and white wine. The move came in response to Common Market restrictions on U.S. farm imports to Spain and Portugal. Asked if this could trigger a trade war, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said it shouldn't, but that there was always a danger of a tit-for-tat in trade.

LEHRER: In Lebanon today, there was a telephone threat that Western hostages will pay the price if Syria is pressured to release them. The caller claimed to represent Islamic Jihad and said some of the hostages have already been liquidated. The call followed reports Syria is trying to help secure the release of the Western hostages. And in Washington, there was a most unusual press conference. A South Korean movie director and his actress wife said they were kidnapped by North Koreans eight years ago. They said their kidnapping was masterminded by the film-buff son of North Korea's president. The director spoke to reporters through a translator. He offered this explanation for the kidnapping.

SHIN SAN OK, Korean film director [through interpreter]: As the North Korean leadership made it very clear to us, that they wanted to abduct us to improve the quality of their film making. I reckon that they tried to improve their image through my production.

HUNTER GAULT: That completes our news summary. Still to come on the NewsHour, we'll get details of American medical efforts in the Soviet Union; the second in our three-part series on the effects of Chernobyl on nuclear power in America: we ask, can it happen here?; And a documentary report on West Virginia's desperate attempts to save its malpractice coverage. Marrow Transplants

LEHRER: We turn first tonight to the Chernobyl story and to medical efforts in the Soviet Union to help the survivors. Judy Woodruff has more on the story. Judy?

JUDY WOODRUFF: As we mentioned, Dr. Robert Gale, the head of the American team treating the radiation victims, met with Soviet leader Gorbachev today. Shortly afterwards, Dr. Gale talked by telephone with Dr. Mortimer Bortin, who is professor of medicine at the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee and scientific director of the International Bone Marrow Transplant Registry there. Dr. Bortin joins us now from public station WMVS in Milwaukee.

Dr. Bortin, what did Dr. Gale have to say about his meeting with Mr. Gorbachev?

Dr. MORTIMER BORTIN: Judy, first I would like to correct a statement that you made. I'm at the Medical College of Wisconsin, which is based in Milwaukee.

WOODRUFF: Thank you.

Dr. BORTIN: Dr. Gale indicated that his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, where he was accompanied by both Dr. Richard Champlin from UCLA and Yair Reisner from Israel, was one of warmth, that he thanked him personally, thanked each of them personally, for the efforts they have made.

WOODRUFF: Do you say "had made"? Their work isn't done, is it?

Dr. BORTIN: Their work is not done. The work that they are making.

WOODRUFF: Was that it? Was it just a meeting to say thank you?

Dr. BORTIN: Yes, it was a brief meeting.

WOODRUFF: Do you have any new information about how successful this mission has been now, beyond what we heard from the news conference today?

Dr. BORTIN: Well, Dr. Gale and Dr. Champlin both indicated to me when I spoke with them that they fully expected that some of the patients that they had transplanted would survive as a direct result of the bone marrow transplants that they performed.

WOODRUFF: Now, he said, if I remember correctly -- he said today 19 transplants have been performed.

Dr. BORTIN: That's correct.

WOODRUFF: So he's saying some of those -- how many? Does he know how many?

Dr. BORTIN: No, there's no way to predict in advance. It'll be several weeks to months before we know just how successful they were.

WOODRUFF: How many more transplants need to be performed?

Dr. BORTIN: That is uncertain. Dr. Gale, however, is flying home, flying to Los Angeles tomorrow. Dr. Champlin will probably follow on Saturday. And then they will be returning again in midweek, next week.

WOODRUFF: Now, why is that? Why are they coming home?

Dr. BORTIN: I'm really not sure. My impression, though, is that they are simply physically exhausted. It's been a very great strain, working under difficult circumstances, and attempting to do more than has ever been done before in the history of marrow transplantation. So I think they just need a few days' break before they return.

WOODRUFF: We know that there were -- at least he said that there were -- of the 299 hospitalized, there are 35 he identified as being most seriously affected. Seven of those died; there are 28 left. Did he give you any sense about how much more work -- I mean, whether they intend to go ahead with transplants on those, or whether more of the 299 who are outside that most-severe category may need this sort of procedure or not?

Dr. BORTIN: He did not really give me a clear indication of whether or not any of those patients will be transplanted. We know that at least some of them, though, are in the range where a transplant might help. So I would presume that they will be doing additional transplants.

WOODRUFF: As I understand it, according to what he said, some of the patients were so severely injured by the radiation exposure that they figured it would not be worthwhile to go ahead with the transplant. Is that correct?

Dr. BORTIN: That is correct. The dose range where a marrow transplant can be life-saving is relatively narrow. It's from 500 to 1,500 rem or rads. For patients who -- for individuals who get exposed to higher doses of radiation, then there's injury to the liver and to the central nervous system and to the intestine that is irreparable, and a bone marrow transplant simply will not restore function of those organs.

WOODRUFF: You said that they've been working under very intense conditions there. What did he say about the conditions? We know they've had to work frantically these last few days.

Dr. BORTIN: That's right. The only thing he indicated is that they're working very hard and very long hours, and they're doing the best that they can under those circumstances.

WOODRUFF: This is not an operation that's been performed, obviously, very much in the past. Is it really still at the experimental stage?

Dr. BORTIN: Well, bone marrow transplantation is being used. There have been 12,000 bone marrow transplants performed in humans since the mid-1950s, when they first started. Most transplants, however, are being done for people with leukemia or with severe aplastic anemias or with rare immunodeficiency diseases, disorders that could not be cured with any other approach. And marrow transplantation is not considered to be experimental for those conditions. For radiation victims, our experience is very limited, and I expect that this experience in Russia, however, will be very worthwhile from a learning standpoint so that we can apply the information gained in the future if it is needed.

WOODRUFF: Is the operation risky for those people who've received doses of radiation, risky in any way?

Dr. BORTIN: Well, the bone marrow transplant itself is not risky at all. If you walked into the room of a patient receiving a bone marrow transplant, it would like he was receiving a blood transfusion. There'd be a bag of what would look like blood hanging up, and it would be running into his vein just as though it were a blood transfusion. The main risk from the marrow transplant is that the patient, having been irradiated, is critically vulnerable to infections for a period of time before and after the transplant. Then there are complications of the marrow transplant which could interfere with survival, such as graft-versus-Host disease. This is an immunological attack by the donor bone marrow cells against the patient.

WOODRUFF: That's when there's not a match, I gather.

Dr. BORTIN: That's even when there is a match. With bad matches, however, the intensity of the graft-versus-Host reaction is much increased.

WOODRUFF: One last -- yes, go ahead.

Dr. BORTIN: The other complication that I wanted to mention is interstitial pneumonitis. This is a mysterious kind of a pneumonia that occurs following bone marrow transplantation, and it takes weeks for both of these complications to appear. So at this point it's impossible to determine just what the level of success will be of these patients that were transplanted in Russia.

WOODRUFF: Dr. Gale mentioned that some of the patients had been -- were radioactive themselves. Is there any danger to the doctors, to the medical team that's performing this work?

Dr. BORTIN: I doubt that there is.

WOODRUFF: And any other comment that he made about what it has been like working under these conditions in recent days, and what his hopes are?

Dr. BORTIN: He indicated that he was working very closely with Russian scientists who were very competent. He also indicated that they had been most helpful, and the main problem was, however, that they had had relatively little experience in Russia in bone marrow transplantation.

WOODRUFF: Well, Dr. Mortimer Bortin, we thank you so much for being with us.

Dr. BORTIN: Thank you. Fallout from Chernobyl: Safe at Home?

HUNTER-GAULT: We go now to part two of our series on how the Chernobyl accident is affecting the nuclear power industry here and elsewhere. Elsewhere is where we start tonight, in Europe, with this report by Sheila MacVicar of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

SHEILA MacVICAR, CBC [voice-over]: Through most of Europe there is rising disaproval of nuclear power and growing fear of increased contamination by radiation. In Athens, two separate demonstrations, one violent, brought hundreds of thousands into the streets, even though Greece has no nuclear reactors. But the strongest anti-nuclear reaction has come from West Germany, a country with a powerful and politicized environmental movement. A poll released yesterday shows nearly 70 of Germans are now against nuclear power. Despite that, in the German parliament, Chancellor Helmut Kohl refused to consider any change in plans to build six more reactors by the end of the decade. But other European governments have responded to public pressure. The Netherlands, Finland, Italy and even communist Yugoslavia have either shelved or postponed nuclear expansion. In Britain there have also been protests, but small ones. The government of Margaret Thatcher says it is, for the time being, at least, committed to building four new nuclear plants. But opposition members say public support for the nuclear industry is dwindling.

ANTHONY WEDGWOOD-BENN, Member of Parliament: Any candidate who tried to be elected now on the basis of there was going to be a nuclear waste dump or a nuclear power station in his district would not be reelected.

MacVICAR: The major problem for the European nuclear industry seems to be a credibility gap, for incidents and accidents that took place months ago are only now being publicly reported. In a new spirit of openness inspired by criticism of the Soviet's handling of Chernobyl, Europeans are getting a steady stream of details, and reassurances from governments that want to try to maintain confidence in their nuclear programs.

LEHRER: In this country the Soviet disaster rekindled an argument over the safety of nuclear power that has never been far from the public surface. A collection of consumer, environmental and scientific groups want nuclear power phased out altogether. The U.S. utility industry and others counter by pointing to the safety record of nuclear power in the United States. There are 98 nuclear reactors operating in the U.S. Another 30 are under construction. Two others are on order. Only one of the 98, a Department of Energy facility in Hanford, Washington, have a graphite system like the one at Chernobyl, and five others -- four in South Carolina and one in the state of Washington -- do not have built-in containment systems. The safety argument concerning them and all the others has been given new life by the Chernobyl accident. We air it now with Mark Mills, president of Science Concepts, a leading energy consulting firm, and Lanny Sinkin, policy analyst and attorney with the Christic Institute, a Washington-based public interest law f how likely is it that something like Chernobyl could happen in this country?

MARK MILLS: An accident of the type that occurred at Chernobyl is not possible in the United States. That's not to say that an accident of some kind is not possible. Certainly accidents like the accident at Three Mile Island are technically possible, and in fact, over the long period one expects other accidents. But the design differences and the safety and operational differences in the Soviet reactor and the U.S. commercial and nuclear reactors are so profoundly different that one can safely say that that type of accident won't happen here.

LEHRER: Mr. Sinkin, in San Antonio, do you agree?

LANNY SINKIN: No, I don't agree. I trust that we won't have hundreds of people dying from radiation sickness in the United States before we admit that the nuclear industry has foisted upon the world essentially a defective product. We've had many, many accidents in the United States; they stand as warnings to us that it can happen here. Three Mile Island is just the worst visible accident. There have been dozens and dozens of others.

LEHRER: But have there been dozens and dozens of others that have led to people being killed or injured?

Mr. SINKIN: We haven't had anything of the seriousness of Chernobyl, and I say I hope we won't wait 'til we do before we reach a conclusion that nuclear power doesn't belong inour energy system.

LEHRER: So what causes you to believe that a Chernobyl accident is possible here?

Mr. SINKIN: I think the history of the nuclear industry is the basis for my belief. You can look at the beginnings of it -- the experimental reactor in Idaho that had a partial meltdown; then the Fermi breeder reactor in Detroit that had a partial meltdown; the Browns Ferry fire in 1975 where you just lucked out that we didn't have a meltdown; the Three Mile Island accident, where we had a partial meltdown and were within an hour of having a full meltdown. All the signs and symptoms are there for anyone to read. We can continue on until we have the full meltdown if we want, and we'll pay the price for it.

LEHRER: Mr. Mills?

Mr. MILLS: Well, I think one has to first of all be very careful about definitions of what we mean by accidents. First of all, there are with nuclear power plants, they are complicated machines and they have problems all the time. One expects machines to break and we have a system where we categorize these incidents and they have to be reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And we can call them accidents if you like, but you can't have it both ways. You can't say that there have been hundreds or thousands of accidents over the last 20 years, calling these incidents "accidents," and then on the other hand saying, well, gee, the industry has just been lucky they haven't hurt anybody. It's obvious they haven't hurt anybody because the system essentially worked well. One can always do better, but they essentially worked well; they've prevented public harm. And when an accident of the magnitude of the one that occurred at Three Mile Island occurred -- and that accident was very large in every technical sense; it essentially destroyed the reactor's core, released tremendous amounts of radioactivity into the concrete and steel containment building -- very tiny, in fact minuscule, amounts of radioactivity escaped. Absent the containment building, an accident, Three Mile Island, would have been terrible, would have released tremendous amounts of radioactivity in the environment. But these containtment structures and systems are on all commercial reactors in the United States and are -- were part of the safety system, this layers of safety called defense and depth by the industry, from the first commercial nuclear reactor, long before there was an anti-nuclear movement and long before, in fact, there was any sense of like fear of commercial nuclear energy, at a time in the '50s when there was euphoria about power from the atom. The scientific and engineering community believed at that time that nuclear energy had to be held to higher standards. Not that it could not cause accidents and not that people could not be hurt, but that accidents could not occur which would have consequences even equal to other major industrial accidents. And as a consequence, from the first time that commercial nuclear power plants were built, they were built to very high standards of safety. Now, obviously, the accident at Three Mile Island showed that things could be better, and there have been tremendous, and I think unsung, improvements in the system, the management, and the operation and the actual equipment involved in nuclear energy in the United States.

LEHRER: Mr. Sinkin, what is it that bothers you? What is the major safety problem with nuclear power, then?

Mr. SINKIN: Well, I think it's important to realize that the Russian scientific community thought Chernobyl was safe. They didn't build a reactor that they thought was going to blow up and kill hundreds of people and irradiate the breadbasket of their country. They believed the chances of a meltdown were one in 10,000 years. It just happened to come in the third year of this reactor. At Three Mile Island there was radiation released, deliberately. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ordered the venting system on that containment building opened to release the radioactive gases inside. So you did have a radiation release, even though the containment building was not ruptured.

LEHRER: Do you agree with Mr. Mills that things have improved since Three Mile Island in this country?

Mr. SINKIN: Well, I don't think they have. I think the level of regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has deteriorated severely. My most recent experience was an allegation at the South Texas Nuclear Project that quality control inspectors were inadequately trained and were not following procedures. Region Four of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission sent a letter to Houston Lighting and Power saying, "Would you please investigate this event and tell us whether these allegations are true?" Five years ago the NRC would have sent their own inspector in to find out whether the allegations are true.

LEHRER: Well, let me go back, let me ask you again. I've tried a couple of times; let me try it a third time. What is it that concerns you the most about the nuclear reactors of the United States? What about them is unsafe, specifically?

Mr. SINKIN: Well, they started out by being unsafe. The minute you turn on a nuclear reactor you produce nuclear waste. That's dangerous for every generation coming after us. If you look at the history of operation of the United States nuclear power plants, you find incident after incident -- I call them accident after accident. They demonstrate it can happen here. I hope we're not going to wait until it does happen here to believe it.

LEHRER: But in other words, you can't tell me what makes them unsafe, is that right?

Mr. SINKIN: What makes them unsafe is a lack of adequate regulation, a lack of management systems --

LEHRER: But regulation to stop what? I mean, what is it that bothers you about a nuclear power plant?

Mr. SINKIN: Regulation to be sure that the plant is being built to the highest quality. Maybe that's the goal; that's not what's happening at nuclear reactors in the United States. Secondly, the administration systems that put a quality-first attitude into the entire workforce -- that's not happening. The regulatory, administrative and political system of this country has not responded to the scientific challenge presented by nuclear power. I think that is clear from the record of the nuclear industry.

LEHRER: Mr. Mills?

Mr. MILLS: Well, two important points. First, let me briefly address Chernobyl again in the context of the United States' nuclear power plants. The Soviet engineers believed that their system, I gather, had a low probability of accident. But the difference between the Soviet reactor and a commercial nuclear power plant in the United States is that while we certainly believe the same thing, we also believe that Murphy's law can reign and things can fail in any case, and that human errors can occur, and that is the reason for these massive three-to-four-foot thick reinforced concrete containment structures around nuclear power plants in the United States. They are designed specifically to take into account unanticipated errors, human errors and mechanical failures.

LEHRER: But Mr. Sinkin says it isn't working, that there's bad management and there's a lack of concern about safety and etcetera. You heard what he said.

Mr. MILLS: Well, I want first to draw the tremendous and distinct differences between Chernobyl and the U.S. reactors, because a failure of the reactor and the core and the release of radioactivity at Chernobyl meant that radioactivity goes directly into the atmosphere, and in the United States it stays contained largely, almost entirely. Now, as far as the United States is concerned, and the record since Three Mile Island -- I'll let the NRC address what they've done -- but let me observe briefly what the industry seems to have done, and I think they deserve a lot of credit for what they have done. And they have not publicized it, and I think in part because they're afraid it will look like a public relations effort. They have instituted something immediately following Three Mile Island called the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, which every nuclear utility is involved in and they have essentially mounted a massive self-regulating system to make sure that every member meets standards of excellence. They recognized, I believe, that they weren't good enough because of Three Mile Island and they've gotten better.

LEHRER: They've gotten better. Are you saying they're good enough now?

Mr. MILLS: I think that nuclear power plants in the United States are very safe, but that doesn't mean you can't make them safer, and there really are two important issues. One is, how do we make them safer yet? And everybody would agree that's a good thing to do. And the second issue is, is the level of risk presented by nuclear power in the Western world out of line with the kinds of risks we face from other industrial activities? Tremendous numbers of studies have been done on nuclear risks, and all the experts come down to the same type of conclusion that I have when I've examined this: that the risks from nuclear power exist and they're real, but they're not greater than the kind of risks we face from other energy sources and technologies.

LEHRER: Do you agree, Mr. Sinkin?

Mr. SINKIN: Of course I don't agree. They're using computer models and coming up with probability risk assessments of the chances of an accident. The Russians did not believe this accident could happen.

LEHRER: But what about the --

Mr. SINKIN: And it did happen.

LEHRER: What about here in the United States? How would you -- where would you put nuclear power on the list of risks vis-a-vis other industrial possibilities?

Mr. SINKIN: Well, I think the risk of a major nuclear accident is high. We see all of the signs and symptoms. They're there for anyone that cares to look. Containment buildings are only as good as they are sealed. The Palisades nuclear power plant in Michigan operated for 18 months with its containment building unsealed. If there had been an accident at Palisades during that 18 months, it would have been a teakettle with radiation coming out the open vent. We have thousands, literally thousands of instances over the last 20 years when containment buildings, which have penetrations through them for pipes and electrical cables, doors, hatches, vents, where those penetrations have been open and the containments have operated with an open system in them. That means that at any time if there had been an accident in any of those reactors, there would have been direct flow of radiation to the environment.

LEHRER: All right, gentlemen, thank you; don't go away. Charlayne?

HUNTER GAULT: As we've been hearing just a little bit, a major part of the nuclear safety debate involves the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the government agency that oversees the nuclear power industry. Critics claim that the agency is licensing unsafe plants. The commission says that isn't so. We start that specific debate with Ellyn Weiss, general counsel of the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientists, and Victor Stello, executive director of operations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Ms. Weiss, starting with you, what's your overall assessment of the kind of job the NRC has done in promoting safety in the nuclear industry?

ELLYN WEISS: I think that in the past few years the NRC has backslid substantially from what was an initial improvement in its attention to safety after TMI, and that it's now in a position where rather than acting as the strict watchdog that I think everyone would agree is needed, it's acting more as a lapdog.

HUNTER GAULT: In what way specifically?

Ms. WEISS: Well, 1985 was not a good year for the nuclear industry. There were an unpredictable number of events, two accidents that were serious near-misses. If you wish to, we can discuss them in some detail later.

HUNTER GAULT: Well, just mention where.

Ms. WEISS: One at Davis Besse in Ohio near Toledo in June of '85 and one at Rancho Seco near Sacramento, California, the day after Christmas in 1985.

HUNTER GAULT: And what did the NRC have to do with that?

Ms. WEISS: Well, both of those plants are near twins of TMI-2. If any plant in this country should now be safe, it is the Babcock & Wilcox twins of Three Mile Island. Yet those accidents showed in disturbing respects a remarkable degree of similarity to TMI-2, demonstrating that the root causes have never been addressed.

HUNTER GAULT: And those were causes that the NRC, you're saying, should have been on top of?

Ms. WEISS: Oh, NRC is certainly aware of the safety problems in these plants. They were drawn to their attention with identification of specific safety improvements by the presidential commission, by NRC's own internal investigations. There's no mystery what needs to be done to make Babcock & Wilcox's plant safe. It is a failure of will to require it to be done.

HUNTER GAULT: Mr. Stello, lapdog and not a watchdog, a failure of will. Is that how you expect -- how you see what's happening over there at your agency?

VICTOR STELLO: No, not at all. I think if you look at the record since TMI and you look at the many studies that have been done that indicate the kinds of things that are needed to improve the safety of our operating plants, those literally hundreds of kinds of issues that arose out of those studies have been implemented in the industry. And those costs and range of issues are indeed very, very significant.

HUNTER GAULT: But what about the specific problems that Ms. Weiss just raised?

Mr. STELLO: Well, I'll get to those in a minute. I wanted to give you a summary of the activities that came out of the TMI study, required many, many fixes. Many of them have been done and many more are still under way. We are committed to safety; we are not complacent. We are prepared to do what's necessary. In the two facilities that have been mentioned, we have looked at those and concluded that the B&W plants do indeed need a reassessment, and I sent a letter to the owners' groups of the B&W plants and asked them if they were willing to look at this issue; they, the industry, have the responsibility for safety first and foremost. They have accepted the challenge to go back and do this reassessment. That reassessment is under way, and the changes that are dictated and are needed as a result of that reassessment will be made.

HUNTER GAULT: And so are you saying in effect that there are no -- that the NRC, in addition to the two you've just mentioned, are not licensing unsafe plants?

Mr. STELLO: We would never license an unsafe plant. If we did not believe the plant were safe, it would not be licensed. If the plant is operating and we conclude it is not safe, we shut it down until we are satisfied that those things that are wrong with it are fixed so that it can be operated safely.

HUNTER GAULT: Ms. Weiss?

Ms. WEISS: I think Mr. Stello illustrated my point. NRC told all owners of Babock & Wilcox plants after the TMI accident that it was necessary for them to install a highly reliable source of backup cooling water. It is seven years since the TMI accident. Davis Bessie never installed it. The president of Toledo Edison says he never got around to it because the NRC never really told him to do it. Now we have an accident that is in many respects like TMI, and the response of the NRC is to send another letter to the owners' group of the Babcock & Wilcox reactors. In Mr. Stello's words, "We're asking them if they were willing to reassess the safety of their own plants." Those are not the actions of an arm's-length regulator.

HUNTER GAULT: Mr. Stello?

Mr. STELLO: I think it is very, very important for the industry, who also have at risk the facilities they operate, even if they are not a risk to the health and safety of the public -- if they break, the public is not well served when these plants don't operate well. They have a concern -- their concern and our concern for safety. What we did is sat back and worked out an action plant that we thought was necessary to reassess the safety of those plants, and we told them we wanted them to take our plant and theirs and combine them, and come up with the right kinds of fixes that would be the best fixes to solve the problem once and for all in the B&W plants.

HUNTER GAULT: Ms. Weiss, why do you think, if what you're saying is the case, the NRC would allow unsafe plants to be licensed or continue to operate?

Ms. WEISS: I think fundamentally it's the same attitude that the presidential commission, the Kemeny commission, after TMI found. There is a pervasive complacency at the NRC that it won't happen here, or at least it won't happen here until we get around to fixing these few problems.

HUNTER GAULT: But up to now we certainly haven't had the kind of disaster that had happened at Chernobyl.

Ms. WEISS: That's right. But we've had enough precursors, and 1985 was a particularly bad year for precursors, that if the attitude of complacency continues, and that is, if we don't just get down to it and say, "Fix these plants up, put this pump in," then that's exactly the attitude that will ensure that we do have a Chernobyl in the United States. And that's what the Union of Concerned Scientists would like to prevent.

HUNTER GAULT: Is that really possible here, Mr. Stello?

Mr. STELLO: No. The accident that happened in the Soviet Union could not happen in one of our commercial reactors, for a variety of reasons. The reactor is of a significant different design than the type used in the United States. I believe the major points that one needs to keep in mind is it's a very large graphite-moderated reactor with 1,700 pressure tubes that go up and through the reactor. Our engineers who have studied, to the best of our ability to do so, have concluded that the entire core of that reactor is outside of the containment building. The ability to produce enormous quantities of explosive gases that could damage both the reactor and its confinement or containment building is obviously orders of magnitude greater than we have in the reactors in the United States. We have since TMI -- TMI, as you recall, there was an explosion in that containment. We have learned that lesson and gone back and fixed our reactors up so that kind of an accident could not happen here.

HUNTER GAULT: All right. So basically your position is that the NRC is doing all it can to maintain the safety of the nuclear industry at this time?

Mr. STELLO: I would add one more point, the point that was made with respect to the Kemeny commission attitude. Attitude is important. The industry itself had to learn, and it has. It has come up with an Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations who go out and inspect and make sure those plants strive for the excellence that is needed to achieve the kinds of safety that we in the NRC believe is necessary, as well as to cause the rest of the industry to aggressively pursue solutions to problems whenever they see them. I think that's a healthy attitude and the kind that the Kemeny commission was talking about.

HUNTER GAULT: All right. Very briefly, Ms. Weiss, I assume you don't agree with that.

Ms. WEISS: Well, if I -- I really feel as if I need to correct what I think are some misleading statements. If the question that you're asking is, "Could there be an accident in the United States which released a disastrous amount of radioactivity?" the answer to that question is certainly yes. The differences in plumbing between the Soviet reactors and our reactor means that it would not happen in the same way, and it may be -- I hope that it is -- of lower probability. But to maintain that it can't happen here is simply untrue. It can.

HUNTER GAULT: All right. We want to move this discussion along. Jim?

LEHRER: Yeah. Mr. Mills and Mr. Sinkin, first to you, Mr. Mills. How would you assess the job the NRC is doing?

Mr. MILLS: From where I sit and look at things as somewhat of an outsider, I think the NRC has gotten a lot tougher. It's got more well-organized internally. It has, in my opinion, a much higher credibility following Three Mile Island than it had during the time of the accident, when there were fears of misinformation and misunderstanding. I think the industry -- I agree with Mr. Stello. The industry has done an immensely aggressive job of improving its own management operations, because if for no other reason, if you even discount their concern for public health and safety, they have a tremendous investment in these power plants. Three Mile Island caused no public health harm, but it destroyed a billion-dollar power plant. A company simply can't afford those kinds of mistakes.

LEHRER: Mr. Sinkin, how would you assess the job the NRC is doing?

Mr. SINKIN: Well, I think the NRC has abandoned its essential responsibility to protect the public health and safety in favor of protecting the domestic nuclear industry. Here in Texas we have two projects, the South Texas Nuclear Project, where the architect, engineer and constructor for nine years on that project was simply incompetent; they were finally driven off the project by whistle-blowers and people bringing attention of the media to the project. At Comanche Peak you had a complete breakdown of the quality control system and a totally inadequate design for pipe supports and cable trays. The NRC had been looking at that plant for years, but somehow couldn't see it. We think that at least in this region of the country the NRC has been a miserable failure.

LEHRER: Mr. Stello?

Mr. STELLO: I think the NRC has learned its lesson associated with TMI. I think we're doing a far better job today. I think the nuclear plants in this country are safer than they were before TMI, and I think that the entire Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its employees fully believe and understand their responsibility to assure that they fulfill its fundamental mission, which is to protect the health and safety of the public.

LEHRER: Ms. Weiss, what do you and other critics, like Mr. Sinkin -- what do you think the motivation of Mr. Stello and the other employees of the NRC would be not to maintain or try to maintain safety in the nuclear power industry?

Ms. WEISS: Well, I think there are a couple of institutional factors that are involved. Probably the most daunting is that there are 100 reactors licensed to operate in this country and 20 under construction. And to concede that there is a safety problem at any one plant involves implicitly conceding or at least raising the issue that there are safety problems at many plants. That is a powerful institutional disincentive.

LEHRER: To the NRC.

Ms. WEISS: That's right, to strictly enforce rules.

LEHRER: Mr. Stello?

Mr. STELLO: I think it's just totally wrong. There are a number of plants that are now not operating in this country, notably you could start with the TVA plants. All of those are shut down.

LEHRER: That's the Tennessee Valley Authority.

Mr. STELLO: Tennessee Valley Authority. We're not satisfied with the management of that organization and their ability to run those plants safely. And until we're satisfied that they in fact have corrected their management problems and any hardware problems in those facilities, they will not operate. The two that were mentioned earlier, Rancho Seco and Davis Besse, they are not yet operating because we're not satisfied. She could have added San Onofre, another plant that we're not going to allow to operate until we are satisfied that the problems are corrected. When they are, we will agree to allow them to operate and not before.

LEHRER: Ms. Weiss?

Ms. WEISS: I think the proper question, the question one should ask about the TVA plants, is, how did it happen to be that five plants were constructed, completely constructed before we discovered that there were 2,000 welds whose quality could not be verified? It is a shame that the TVA plants are shut down now, but it's a symptom of a terrible breakdown of a system.

LEHRER: Well, what I'm trying to get at is, are Mr. Stello and his colleagues at NRC evilOo: people, incompetent people, have they sold out to the industry? What's the charge?

Ms. WEISS: Well, I think there is some element of reflexive pro-industry bias that's not limited to the NRC. To some degree it's reflected, certainly where health, safety and environmental issues are concerned, across the spectrum of this administration's current nominees.

LEHRER: In a word, Mr. Stello?

Mr. STELLO: I just don't think that's correct. If you look at the record, the safety record in this industry, you're not going to find another industry with the safety record that the nuclear industry has. I think in large measure that's a result of the dedication of the NRC to assure that these plants in fact are built and operated safely.

LEHRER: All right. Mr. Stello, thank you; Mr. Mills, Ms. Weiss, and Mr. Sinkin in San Antonio, thank you all very much. Coverage Cancelled

HUNTER GAULT: Next we focus on some of the fallout from the skyrocketing cost of malpractice insurance. Nowhere is that problem more acute than in West Virginia, where the governor has called a special session of the legislature today in an effort to do something about their crisis. If a solution can't be found soon, thousands of West Virginia residents will find themselves without health care. Correspondent Elizabeth Brackett picks up the story from there.

ELIZABETH BRACKETT [voice-over]: For 57-year-old Robert Anderson, West Virginia's malpractice crisis is not a matter of economics or politics. It is a matter of life and death. Anderson needs this kidney dialysis machine four hours a day, three days a week.

ROBERT ANDERSON, dialysis patient: I don't want to die right now; I want to live long as I can. And if I -- they take me off the machine, then I can't get service nowhere else. I'm just a dead duck, that's all it is.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: John Rankin is also scared.

JOHN RANKIN, dialysis patient: The dialysis treatment keeps me alive, and if I'm not on this machine a prescribed time, it's dangerous.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: But the Renal Dialysis Clinic, where Anderson and Rankin get their treatments, may be forced to shut its doors in two weeks. And it is not just this clinic. Every community health care clinic in West Virginia may close down. Nearly all of the state's doctors may stop practicing. Why? Five major insurance companies have cancelled their malpractice policies in West Virginia as of May 31st. Seven thousand six hundred practitioners in the health care field have received cancellation notices. Most doctors say they will not practice without coverage.

Dr. ROBERT PULLIAM: I won't practice, and that's effective of 12:01 midnight on May the 30th, and I believe that the seven other doctors in this practice will take exactly the same point of view. We will not practice bare. Not at all.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: The crisis developed when the West Virginia legislature tackled the problem of escalating premiums for malpractice insurance. It proposed new legislation calling for reform in the legal system and the insurance industry. The bill put a cap on jury awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages while requiring insurance companies to reveal detailed financial information before raising rates or cancelling policies. But the insurance companies say the new law is so tough, they can no longer afford to do business in West Virginia.

FRANK PATALANO, CNA Insurance: This legislation is something that we haven't encountered. The decision by CNA was unprecedented. We've never cancelled a business like this before. The law basically eliminated our ability to make basic decisions about our business. It eliminated our ability to choose our customers, to decide who we would insure and who we wouldn't. It put some very severe restrictions on our ability to get the rates that we think we need to cover the losses that are emerging in West Virginia. And it required us to divulge confidential information which we believe was not in the best interests of our insureds, of claimants in our company.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: A special session of the legislature was called today to try to reach a compromise in the crisis. Though an angry Governor Arch Moore, who signed the legislation six weeks ago, says the insurance companies never would have pulled out of a bigger, wealthier state.

Gov. ARCH MOORE, (R) West Virginia: I think they looked at West Virginia and I think they said to themselves, "Look, this isn't a large market. We probably write more insurance in Washington, D.C., on a given day than we would in the whole state of West Virginia. Let's just make our stand here. Let's just brace our back, let's just simply say that we're going to establish a message that we want carried throughout this country."

BRACKETT [voice-over]: While the politicians and the insurance companies squabble, West Virginia residents become more and more concerned. Becky Cole is five months pregnant. Doctors at this private clinic delivered her last baby; she expects them to deliver this one, but she is worried.

BECKY COLE: Dr. Dell, what's going to happen, you know, if this doesn't get settled? What am I going to do? Do you have any idea?

Dr. DELL: Well, if the malpractice coverage is gone in early June, we won't have any choice but to stop practicing, at least until the legislature gets it fixed. But we will not be here to answer phones, the doors will be locked, we will not be in the hospital, we will not do surgery, we will not deliver babies.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: Dr. J.C. Huffman got his cancellation notice last month, too. But this doctor, who has delivered 7,000 babies in this West Virginia town that has a total population of 8,000, says he will not shut his doors.

Dr. J.C. HUFFMAN: I'm going to continue to see sick people and patients that I know are sick. I'm not going to refuse to see somebody who's sick.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: Dr. Huffman says he has not questioned the insurance companies in the past, but now he has begun to wonder if their rate increases have been needed, and if they are really losing money in West Virginia, like they say they are.

Dr. HUFFMAN: My gut tells me that insurance people are making money.

Mr. PATALANO: In the medical malpractice we expect to lose $24 million between 1981 and 1985. That's a lot of money.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: But attorney Monty Preiser, whose law firm recovered close to $6 million for clients in medical malpractice suits last year, says when insurance companies figure profit and loss, they don't count the interest earned on huge reserves set aside to pay future malpractice claims.

MONTY PREISER, attorney: Let them have the money in the reserve. Nobody complains about that. Just don't lie to us and say we're losing money when they're really not, because you have to include investment income, all investment income, in determining whether a company is making or losing a profit.

Mr. PATALANO: We do credit investment income that is earned on the premium collected in West Virginia, unlike the many accusations that are likely to occur. If we bring in, for example, and credit all the investment income that we could possibly make on the premium that we collect in West Virginia, those losses would be at the $15 million level.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: Despite those heavy losses, Patalano says CNA was willing to stay in West Virginia until the last-minute proposal of the unacceptable bill.

[on camera] Six minutes before midnight on the last day of the session, the legislators passed the bill. The governor signed the bill. Two weeks later the cancellation notices began to arrive. Now the crisis has spread beyond doctors. Architects, veterinarians, even lawyers have been told their malpractice insurance will be cancelled.

[voice-over] The mass cancellations prompted the attorney general of West Virginia to charge the insurance companies with collusion and violation of antitrust laws. He went to court and won an injunction against the insurance companies. Attorney General Charlie Brown says the decision means policies will not be cancelled on the 31st.

CHARLIE BROWN, Attorney General: We've stopped the panic in West Virginia, or I think we've stopped the panic. The panic would be to -- if all these facilities were to start closing immediately and we had to rewrite our legislation in that situation, and we had to see people perhaps actually die by not being able to get emergency health care.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: But the insurance companies have made no move to rescind the cancellations. Instead they will challenge the injunction in court next week.

Mr. PATALANO: Because we think the allegations are baseless. And secondly because we think -- well, we haven't -- we obviously with a temporary restraining order we have not yet had an opportunity to make our case. And I think when we do that it will be disolved.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: While the confusion continues at the state capitol, the health care facilities in the state try and decide what to tell the patients who depend on them for care. The staff at this clinic met to discuss who would be hit hardest if the clinic shuts down.

DAVE MILBURN, Mercy County Clinic: The main ones that come to mind are the cardiac and medical emergencies, the ones that -- the heart attack and the code type situation that without the ambulance service, the patient has no chance of survival.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: The best hope for a solution lies with the legislature. Compromise legislation knocking out portions of the bill the insurance companies object to was proposed in the special session called today. But the governor says he will not capitulate to the insurance companies. Instead, he has his own insurance plan.

Gov. MOORE: I think the state of West Virginia is going to have to go in the insurance business. And this is slightly repugnant to the manner in which I have handled most of my public responsibilities. But I think we can do it, and I think we can answer both the insurance question and the tort reform question.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: But the doctors we spoke to were not pleased with the governor's plan to enroll them in a mandatory state malpractice plan.

Dr. PULLIAM: My reaction to that is that everything government touches is a disaster. And I think you just have to look at that. It creates a bureaucracy that costs money and the benefits do not get to the people that they want to do. And I'm absolutely opposed to the state getting in the insurance business.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: It's not just the governor who has a new plan. Even the malpractice attorneys have offered to go into the insurance business.

Mr. PREISER: We have created an insurance company and applied for our license, and hope to form the Preiser & Wilson Insurance Corporation that will insure professionals in this state and give the legislators a choice to say to these -- to the blackmailing industry, "Take your ball, go home. You know, you didn't get what you want. Be the child. Get out of here. We've got another option now."

Dr. HUFFMAN: It's not that I don't trust lawyers in general, but I just don't believe that this is the route to go, that the legal profession should take over the insurance industry.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: Those who depend on West Virginia health care may have the clearest idea of the bottom-line reason for the crisis.

Mr. RANKIN: Well, I think the whole thing is based -- is centered around greed. Greed of the insurance companies, greed of the attorneys, and putting the person that needs this in jeopardy.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: So John Rankin and thousands like him continue to worry, wait and hope that some reasonable plan will be put into effect so no one will pull the plug on their life support systems on the last day of May.

LEHRER: The Lurie cartoon of the day is about Mikhail Gorbachev's nuclear problems.

[Ranon Lurie cartoon -- Gorbachev: "Well, comrades, we've learned our lesson, and got a brand new leash, as dragon-like nuclear plant is revealed."]

LEHRER: Again, the major stories of this Thursday. The House of Representatives did the expected. It passed a Democratic version of the 1987 federal budget. The vote was 245 to 179. The bill raises more taxes and cuts more in defense than President Reagan wants, and set up some hard bargaining ahead between the House, the Senate and the White House. And NASA it said will take $676 million to modify the three remaining space shuttles for safe flight.

Good night, Charlayne.

HUNTER-GAULT: Good night, Jim. That's our NewsHour for tonight. We'll be back tomorrow. I'm Charlayne Hunter-Gault. Good night.