The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; 7030; Clean Air Act

[Tease]

JIM LEHRER [voice-over]: Auto pollution. Acid rain. Toxic air standards. Regulations and paperwork. They`re all part of the coming battle over the Clean Air Act, a battle the Reagan administration joined this week.

[Titles]

LEHRER: Good evening. The Reagan administration wants federal air pollution laws loosened a bit, not in a way that would slow down progress toward cleaner air in the country, only to make the pace of that progress more reasonable. That was the explanation given two days ago by Environmental Protection Agency head Anne Gorsuch, as she laid out nine guidelines -- guidelines the administration would like for Congress to follow this fall in revising the Clean Air Act. The changes range from a rollback of auto emissions standards to making it easier for industry to burn coal, plus an expanded research effort into the potential dangers of acid rain. Business and industry groups warmly applaud the administration`s approach and suggestions; environmentalists strongly attack them, claiming they would turn back the clock on cleansing the air we Americans breathe. Tonight, the argument over the Clean Air Act and the Reagan administration`s ideas on changing it. Robert MacNeil is off; Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in New York. Charlayne?

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Jim, although the administration`s guidelines fall short of a detailed legislative proposal, they contain quite a bit of meat for the Congress to chew on. For example, the guidelines call for a continued use of health risk standards rather than cost benefit analysis standards. They also call for a rollback on some of the automobile and truck emissions standards, an easing of federal enforcement, and a simpli- fication of various state pollution standards. Under the federal guidelines, deadlines for the submission of clean air plans would be pushed back and on acid rain -- which environmentalists charge spreads poison and contaminates lakes far from the actual pollution source -- research would be stepped up. Jim?

LEHRER: We`re going to look at these proposals, now, through the eyes of two men who had the major responsibility in different administrations for enforcing the Clean Air Act. Each is still involved in the air quality issue, but from very different perspectives. First, David Hawkins, assistant EPA administrator for air in the Carter administration, now a lobbyist for the Natural Resources Defense Council, and a staff member of the National Clear Air Coalition, a coalition of environmental groups opposed to overhauling the Clean Air Act. In general, what do you think of the Reagan administration`s guidelines, Mr. Hawkins?

DAVID HAWKINS: Well, Jim, these proposals, these guidelines -- the Gorsuch guidelines -- are a prescription for dirty air. They would weaken public health standards by protecting only against what the administration calls "real health risks" -- whatever they may be; they would eliminate the program that protects clean air areas outside our national park lands; they would double the automobile pollution levels for two of the three regulated pollutants. They would relax the power plant -- coal-fired power plant standards -- that we discussed on this program two years ago, and that would increase sulfur oxide emissions by three million tons a year in 1995, both in the east and the west part of the country. There would be severe environmental problems from that. And generally, they`d be just a prescription for dirty air; they would do nothing on controlling acid rain whatsoever.

LEHRER: Of course, Ms. Gorsuch says that all that this would do is slow the pace toward cleaning the air. You just don`t agree with that, right?

Mr. HAWKINS: They`ve given no specific whatsoever on how they would attack the problem of dirty-air areas. What they have given in terms of specifics are elimination of programs, relaxation of regulations; they haven`t come up with any specifics at all on how they would in fact keep moving in the same direction. I had hoped that we would have a chance to talk to the administration tonight about that, and get some specifics. Instead, we`re going to have to be guessing at it by talking to representatives of two past administrations.

LEHRER: Well, speaking of two past administrations, during your administration, business and industry argued vocally that the clean air standards in this country were crippling them from a cost standpoint; that they were unrealistic; they were too rigid, too tough, and they were counterproductive. Do you not believe that the time has come for some maybe balancing of the strong things that you did with some-- with things along the lines of what the administration is now suggesting?

Mr. HAWKINS: Well, the interesting thing about those arguments is that every study that`s been done contradicts them. Just two weeks ago, this administration EPA issued its report on the macroeconomics impacts of both the Air and Water Acts. What it showed was that there was a price rise associated with all federal environmental regulations of less than six tenths of 1 percent, and that-- all of that is not necessarily inflationary because they took no account whatsoever of the benefits. They also pointed out that these-- that there is something like 400,000 more jobs in the economy as a result of these pollution control regulations. So on the facts, you just can`t make the argument that pollution control is bad for the economy or bad for employment. The facts will not support the argument. In terms of public support, the Harris poll released a couple of months ago showed 86 to 12 -- 86 percent to 12 -- the American people surveyed rejected the idea of making the Clean Air Act weaker. People don`t want dirty air. We all pursue things like clean air and clean water in our daily lives, and we`d like the government to help us in that pursuit.

LEHRER: Thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: Many businesses and industry have been opposed to the present Clean Air Act. For some insight into their reactions to the administration`s new guidelines, we go now to Roger Strelow, an attorney for the Business Roundtable, as well as industrial clients interested in revising the Act. Mr. Strelow was Mr. Hawkins`s counterpart at the EPA during the Ford administration. Mr. Strelow, you heard Mr. Hawkins say these principles are prescriptions for dirty air.

ROGER STRELOW: I don`t know what principles David must have been reading in order to draw that conclusion. For one thing, to put these recommendations into perspective, upon receiving the administration`s proposals, I did a quick comparison between them and the recommendations of a group that reported to the Congress in March of this year -- the National Commission on Air Quality -- which was appointed by the Carter administration, included one of Mr. Hawkins`s colleagues at the Natural Resources Defense Council, a group of 11 or 12 people that had only one industrial representative. And that group--- and I might add, included a number of members of Congress, including people like Senator Hart of Colorado, who is an acknowledged leader in the environmental arena in the Congress. This group grappled with various issues relating to the Clean Air Act, and came out with conclusions which almost, item-for-item, are very similar. There are shades of difference, I would say, but basically the same conclusions, And the conclusion is -- the one that I think environmentalists, with all due respect, simply don`t want to acknowledge -- and that is that you can make the Clean Air Act a much more efficient.

streamlined, and economically reasonable piece of legislation, without in any appreciable way sacrificing air quality goals. There is no one who is urging -- the administration certainly is not urging; I know of no one in industry who is urging -- that we ought to abandon the goal of cleaner air for the country. Everyone wants continued progress; it`s a matter of how far you have to go at the extreme edges of various policy issues in order to get truly clean air.

HUNTER-GAULT: So in general are you saying that business and industry supports the guidelines pretty much as they are?

Mr. STRELOW: Yes. I think stated in their general principles, the people in industry that I`ve had a chance to talk with, in the brief time since the administration proposals have been announced, would certainly support them. And contrary to David`s assertion about the public opinion, I`ve certainly found over the years that public opinion polls are a very sensitive thing in that the precise question you ask makes an enormous difference. There was a Newsweek poll just recently which came out on the heels of the poll that David cited. And when they asked questions touching on the theme that I just mentioned, namely -- would you prefer a Clean Air Act that would be much less of an imposition on the economy of the country, would waste far less of the nation`s resources in asking for fine shades of difference in terms of air quality that cost enormous amounts unrelated to those benefits? -- there was an equally strong reaction from the public polled that they did favor that kind of revision of the Clean Air Act.

HUNTER-GAULT: Are those things that you just outlined the principal problems that groups like the one you represent have with the present Clean Air Act?

Mr. STRELOW: Yes. I think that there are really two principal categories of problems, both of them acknowledged by the National Commission report as well as by the administration. The first is really a matter of procedural complexity in the Act -- unnecessary delays, confusion, duplication of activity between the federal government and the states, which have and must maintain a very active front-line role in enforcing clear air in this country. Many of these activities have very little to do with the actual substance or the policy of the Act, but they cause just enormous delays time after time. A report was issued just last week by the Business Roundtable, as a matter of fact, citing innumerable instances only the tip of the iceberg, as we pointed out -- of specific cases where, time after time, there have been permit delays and so on. These impose their own costs, and make industrial planning extremely difficult. The other category, which is obviously equally important, is that there is unfortunately a tendency to push a good thing to an extreme, that is, beyond a point of reasonableness. Everybody wants clean air. I`ve never talked to anybody who doesn`t. The question comes when you have achieved, let`s say, reduction of emissions of 90, 95 percent; is there a case to be made for requiring an additional 2-, 3-, 4-percent reduction in emissions when, as any economist will point out, and any person in business or elsewhere would know, when you get out to the extremes, to the edge of what technology will permit, the costs tend to rise sharply, far out of proportion to a minimal rise -- often a rise that is totally unmeasurable by monitoring equipment or anything else in the air-- in the air quality benefits.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right

Mr. STRELOW: And it`s that difference that industry is also very concerned about.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right. Jim?

LEHRER: First, Mr. Hawkins, is Mr. Strelow right when he says that you environmentalists will not accept a conclusion that the Clean Air Act can be revised and made more efficient without sacrificing the goal of clean air?

Mr. HAWKINS: As a matter of fact, the only action that this Congress has taken on the Clean Air Act is proof that Mr. Strelow is wrong. The environmental organizations joined with the steel industry -- hardly a bedfellow of ours -- and we supported a change to the Clean Air Act which was moderate because it gave the steel industry more time to accomplish its objectives. The point that the environmentalists are making is that, if you will preserve the basic objectives of the Clean Air Act, you will find that the environmental organizations and the public at large will be more than willing to discuss moderate changes that will, nevertheless, pursue those objectives. The difference is that industry is using the argument of uncertainty and delay and technical complexity as an opportunity to under- mine the basic programs. And just to--

LEHRER: Well, wait a minute. You`re not denying Mr. Strelow`s point, that there is procedural complexity in the enforcement of the Clean Air Act, are you?

Mr. HAWKINS: Exactly right. We`re not denying that, but the prescription -- the remedy -- that`s being proposed by the business organizations is to eliminate the program. Let`s look at this clean air protection program. It is a complicated program, but it`s purpose is clear: it`s to say there should be some limit in the amount of additional pollution we will allow into parts of the country that have clean air. It is a complicated program but that is the central purpose of it. The proposal of the business community is to eliminate the program altogether.

Mr. STRELOW: That`s simply not true, by the way. The business community has never recommended elimination of the so-called prevention of significant deterioration program that protects clean areas of the country. All of us, whether we`re businessmen, lawyers, whatever else, enjoy the scenic vistas in the west and so on. What has happened, though, is that a program that was originally brought into the law principally to protect our national parks and wilderness areas, was expanded beyond that to require totally arbitrary restrictions on emission increases in other areas all across the country, with no demonstrated scientific or other basis. And in fact, studies` -- speaking of studies -- have shown consistently that the technology requirements -- the fundamental requirement in the Act that the industry certainly agrees with, that new facilities ought to use the best pollution control technology -- that requirement has achieved virtually the same results, case after case, as you have by imposing these arbitrary restrictions that`s all that industry is asking to be reduced, at far less cost, far less procedural complexity. But at some point in the future, those arbitrary increments of allowable air quality are going to be used up.

LEHRER: Let`s be very specific here for a moment, gentlemen. You mentioned a moment ago, Mr. Hawkins, the real health risk term. Now, the real health risk-- the administration and the guideline says they are committed to that as being a factor. No cost benefit analysis, only real health risk. Now, Mr. Hawkins says he doesn`t know what that means. Do you know what-- how do you interpret what the administration is saying?

Mr. STRELOW: Well, first of all, I would be suspicious of anyone who said they wanted to protect against unreal health risks, so I don`t find that term real to be as sinister as David apparently does. The administration, I think, is pointing to a type of analysis that the agency has used -- the Environmental Protection Agency has used -- for years. Indeed, David was part of the development of that process. It`s called risk assessment -- to try to really figure out -- at various levels of pollution that might be in the atmosphere under different types of standards -- what type of actual, real health risk is posed to the population at large, to various particular segments of the population -- including some who are more susceptible to pollution problems than others. And it`s simply an attempt to identify as precisely as possible what the risks are before you decide the level at which you`re going to set the standard.

LEHRER: What`s wrong with that, Mr. Hawkins?

Mr. HAWKINS: To us this is a code phrase that can mean anything that the administration decides it wants it to mean. Real health risks will mean anything, including what the Business Roundtable is advocating, which is changing the definition of "adverse health effects," so that it protects only against something called "more than temporary personal discomfort." In other words, you can go outside, breathe the air, your eyes can burn, you can cough, you can become congested, you can have a headache; but as long as you can struggle in here and do your job, the federal government cannot touch or try to improve that air. We think that`s unacceptable. That is not an acceptable quality of air, and the federal government ought to be involved in making the air cleaner than that.

LEHRER: Thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: All right. Moving for a moment to vehicle standards, the plan calls for cutting back auto pollution limits to half the 1981 requirements for saving some $1 billion. Mr. Strelow, what do you say to that?

Mr. STRELOW: Well, it`s-- one can characterize a particular proposal in different ways. The fact is that by the 1980 standards, an aggregate 90 percent reduction in emissions from the uncontrolled vehicle emission levels that we used to experience only a short decade ago have been achieved. They`ve been achieved at a certain cost that each of us pays every time we buy an automobile. What the 1981 standards, if left in their present form, would involve, is getting a slight additional reduction in emissions -- going from a 90- to roughly a 95-percent reduction in aggregate emissions -- but at a cost that is virtually four times the cost that it took to get that first 90 percent. And that`s a classic example of the type of thing we`re talking about. Shouldn`t we as a society want to be reasonably sure that before we pay an enormous amount for a slight increment in additional pollution control, that that is really going to make a difference -- and a significant difference -- in terms of the air that we breathe? That`s--

HUNTER-GAULT: Mr. Hawkins. Excuse me. Mr. Hawkins, do you-- what do you say to that?

Mr. HAWKINS: The automobile standards is a very good example of a symbolic gesture for deregulation that really is not going to help and-- the industry that it`s supposed to be helping, and will hurt the environment. The Office of Management and Budget did an analysis of the cost of all pollution control for the automobile industry. It works out, if you take away the cost of the-- of the fuel economy regulations -- which the manufacturers are saying they need to do anyway to meet the market -- you`re talking about less than 3.5 percent of their capital needs for the next five years. Relaxing these standards, doubling these standards, is not going to save the American automobile industry. Indeed, some analysts have indicated that because the Japanese technology is more advanced than ours, relaxing these standards may actually allow the Japanese auto manufacturers to save more money on their sale price of their cars, and actually increase the competition against domestic production.

HUNTER-GAULT: Mr. --

Mr. HAWKINS: It is going to hurt-- excuse me. It is going to hurt. One of the things that the administration is calling for is extending the deadlines to meet the health-based air quality standards. At the same time, they`re talking about relaxing one of the major sources that those-- that those areas cannot now meet. You can`t really have it both ways. You can`t argue that there`s such a severe problem that we need an additional time. And the current deadlines, by the way, are 1987. You can`t argue that there`s such a severe problem that we need additional time, and then relax the controls on the major sources of those pollutants.

HUNTER-GAULT: What about the administration plan to drop inspection and maintenance of those programs, on the grounds that they`re just worthless, Mr. Hawkins?

Mr. HAWKINS: The inspection and maintenance program is a good example of how government can help each of us do what we would like to do, but know that it would be a futile gesture unless all of our neighbors do it as well. When I buy a new car, as Mr. Strelow just pointed out, I make an investment in clear air. But if that car isn`t kept clean, that investment just dribbles away, and I don`t keep getting a dividend for it. Even if I keep my car clean, if my neighbor doesn`t keep his car clean, that investment still dribbles away. I keep my car clean, and I feel moral, but the air is dirty. The inspection programs are in place in several communities around this country. They are working; they are tested; and they are getting public support. They are cost effective, and it`s just silly and bad politics and bad policy for the administration to be talking about abandoning them.

HUNTER-GAULT: Silly, Mr. Strelow?

Mr. STRELOW: Well, I think this is a good example of trying to learn from experience rather than simply taking a position, and in a bull-headed way, sticking to it regardless of the consequences. When I was at the agency, we spent a lot of time and attention on inspection and maintenance. I personally took a lot of flack from individual communities -- local government leaders -- for trying to push the concept. We were constantly reassessing the very skimpy data that we had to start with in implementing a program that we were implementing in the first place because of some rather arbitrary statutory requirements. We found from experience that we simply weren`t getting the benefits from this program that had been promised for it, or that we hoped to get. We certainly hoped it would work. I became convinced, long before I left the agency and began initiating some programs, some of which Mr. Hawkins continued when he was there, to try to put more emphasis on making sure that the automobiles are designed in such a way initially that they will continue lo meet standards when they`re in use, not just on the-- on the assembly line, and that they would do that without regard to maintenance. Because I think all of us who have had experience with having cars maintained realize that there is a lot of variability in the quality of maintenance you get. A lot of mechanics, perhaps through good intentions, may do things that will actually harm pollution control systems in the automobiles.

HUNTER-GAULT: So basically you agree that the enforcement thing here is worthless?

Mr. STRELOW: No. I wouldn`t say it`s worthless, but I would say, given the fact that it is a marginal question of just how valuable this program is, given the fact that a lot of the public resist it vehemently, and perhaps understandably -- they feel that they may be subject to rip-offs in having to go through such a system. Why not let local government officials, state officials, make the decision in particular areas like New Jersey, where they`ve had a program for years, and they`ve been happy with it, fine. Let them use that option. In communities where they`re not happy with it, why try to force it down their throats? We need a better choice.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right, fine. Jim?

LEHRER: On to another area, quickly. On reaching various clean air targets, the administration wants to roll back some deadlines -- some regional deadlines. Like, for Los Angeles, they had a 1982 deadline to get the air down to a certain level; now they want to move that back to 1987. Any problem with that for you, Mr. Hawkins?

Mr. HAWKINS: The environmental organizations have recognized that some areas -- and Los Angeles is one of them -- will need some extensions of time. And we-- as we did with the steel amendment, we will support moderate extensions of time that give the public some way of checking the performance of their taxpayers` officials. These people are paid by the taxpayers to deliver clean air, and they need to have some deadlines against which to measure their performance. But the idea of some extensions is something that we would support.

LEHRER: That`s the kind of flexibility, of course, you would support, too?

Mr. STRELOW: I think we finally found something that we agree upon.

LEHRER: Hey, hey. Well, we got two or three minutes left. Let`s see if we can find another one. The cost benefit. Now, you have-- on several of your answers, Mr. Strelow, you`ve talked about the cost. In other words, the 90 percent -- the 10 percent. Now, the administration specifically rejected cost benefit analysis in its guidelines. Are you-- do I read you correct? Did you think they`re wrong?

Mr. STRELOW: No. They rejected it in only one very specific area, and that is in the process of deciding what the level of the health-based or so- called primary air quality standards should be. They did not urge that cost benefit analysis be used. The Business Roundtable, for example, one industry organization that I am familiar with, similarly did not recommend the use of cost benefit analysis for that very important function.

LEHRER: That`s the most important, isn`t it?

Mr. STRELOW: Yes. I mean, it`s certainly a cornerstone of the Act. Now, we have recommended that the administrator be authorized to protect against unreasonable or significant health risks, and that in some way the economy and impacts on the economy be considered. We can`t legislate in any area -- - whether it`s clean air or anything else -- in a vacuum, with our eyes blinded to impacts that it has on other aspects of our life. We support cost benefit analysis, and I believe the administration does, in other types of decisions made under the Act. The primary standard-- this now relates to the deadlines question. Many people feel that an acceptable way to deal with economics in relation to the primary health standards is indeed to have the very kind of reasonable -- not wide open -- but reasonable flexibility in deciding how soon a particular community or area is going to be required to meet those standards. Because I don`t think the public will accept the notion of drastic, totally unacceptable measures that would shut down a community -- as would have been threatened in Los Angeles years ago -- for the sake of attainment a few years sooner.

LEHRER: I see. Mr. Hawkings, speaking of enforcement, the EPA`s main enforcement tool now is to just withhold funds from a state that is failing to enforce federal air standards. The administration says in its guidelines that they want to-- or Ms. Gorsuch actually said in the press conference, that they want to find a better way. Is there a better way?

Mr. HAWKINS: Well, there are actually many more enforcement tools that the federal government has. It can go into court directly against individual sources of pollution. It has the power to restrict the permitting of new sources of pollution in areas which are not meeting the standards. But basically all of these techniques are designed to make sure that the federal government has powers to do the job of cleaning up the air if a specific state fails to do that job in the first instance. This is not a federal versus state issue. It is a question of making sure that some level of government is prepared and is responsive to the public, and will take action when it is needed.

LEHRER: What do you think of that?

Mr. STRELOW: Well, I certainly support and I believe the industrial community supports an effective, aggressive enforcement program at the Environmental Protection Agency. There`s no question about that. One of the principal concerns, however, that industry has had as a result of the 1977 amendments is a rather perverse provision under which, if a particular community as a whole -- a whole area of a slate, perhaps -- is experiencing difficulty meeting the standards, then new facilities that might otherwise be constructed in that community -- regardless of what they may do to clean up their own emissions -- may be barred from construction simply because the total regulatory program in that community isn`t adequate to meet standards, perhaps having nothing to do with the type of facility or industry that is attempting to build and develop jobs.

LEHRER: We have to leave it there, gentlemen. Sounds like to me the Congress will have an interesting time in the fall. Good night, Charlayne.

HUNTER-GAULT: Good night, Jim

LEHRER: Thanks to you all, and have a nice weekend. We`ll see you on Monday. I`m Jim Lehrer. Thank you and good night.