The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour

MR. MacNeil: Good evening. Leading the news this Wednesday, the British Government said a powerful bomb destroyed the Pan Am jumbo jet over Scotland last week, a fuselage crack was found on another Eastern Airlines jet. Federal bank regulators announced two more major bailouts of failed savings & loans. We'll have the details in our News Summary in a moment. Jim.

MR. LEHRER: After the News Summary, we look at the Pan Am bomb confirmation with U.S. State Department Official Paul Bremer, plus Terrorism Expert Richard Shultz, Airport Security Consultant Arik Arad, Former FAA Official Billie Vincent and Richard Lally of the Air Transport Association. Then from Afghanistan comes a report about rebuilding after nine years of war and we close with a Roger Rosenblatt essay about the winner in us all. NEWS SUMMARY

MR. MacNeil: The British Government announced today that the Pan Am jumbo jet which crashed in Scotland a week ago was blown apart by a powerful bomb. The British Department of Transport said conclusive evidence of a high performance plastic explosive was found in wreckage from the crash which killed 270 people. We have a report by David Chater of Independent Television News.

DAVID CHATER: The Air Investigation Branch say there's no doubt Pan Am's Jumbo Jet Flight 103 was brought to the ground by an explosive device. The confirmation came as they continued to pull out wreckage from the houses shattered by the debris from the aircraft falling from 31,000 feet. The statement came from a press conference arranged late this afternoon.

MICK CHARLES, Department of Transport: It has been established that two parts of the metal luggage pallet's frame work show conclusive evidence of a detonating high explosive. The explosives' residues recovered from the debris have been positively identified and are consistent with the use of a high performance plastic explosive.

JOHN BOYD, Chief Constable, Lockerbie: Inquiries are ongoing throughout the world. These inquiries are wide ranging and amongst others involve the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the anti- terrorist branch of the metropolitan police.

DAVID CHATER: The wreckage trail on the ground has led investigators to the preliminary conclusion that explosion took place soon after the aircraft had crossed the Scottish border cruising at 31,000 feet. The nature of the device and what it was contained in, where it was placed on the aircraft has yet to be established.

MR. MacNeil: In Washington, FBI Director William Sessions told a news conference that the Bureau was looking at both terrorist and non-terrorist motives for the bomb.

WILLIAM SESSIONS, FBI Director: The sophisticated criminal mind is capable of thinking up anything a terrorist is capable of thinking up I would presume. As to the concentration of our resources on criminal as opposed to terrorism, I would not comment on the amount of resources, but we're looking at every single aspect, both criminal and terrorist inspired. I think even though there were early indications of persons who took credit for it, or groups who took credit for it, you have to simply presume that you don't know and you're pursuing all known avenues.

MR. MacNeil: The State Department said the U.S. was determined to find out who put the bomb on the plane. Spokeswoman Phyllis Oakley said that in the meantime security would be increased.

PHYLLIS OAKLEY, State Department: We understand the FAA intends to impose some additional counter measures to further tighten security which until we know how this bomb was introduced onto the plane will focus on passenger processing and cargo and baggage handling. The incident points up the need for the international community to adopt even more stringent air security measures. When the details of the Pan Am crash are known, we will discuss this issue with governments and with the appropriate international organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization.

MR. MacNeil: The first five bodies of Flight 103 victims to be released to relatives for burial were flown to New York today. Most of the bodies still await formal identification and the search continues for many still missing. Jim.

MR. LEHRER: In another airliner story, there were two developments today involving Boeing 727's. Eastern Airlines grounded a 727 after an inspection turned up a 3 inch crack in the fuselage. The inspections were ordered Monday after a 14 inch hole caused an Eastern plane to make an emergency landing. An Eastern spokesman said no cracks were found on any of its other 727's. And in Seattle, a Federal Aviation Administration manager said airlines will soon be asked to make repairs on more than 800 Boeing 727's. He said the directive would apply to planes which were constructed with an outdated bonding process. The technique makes them more susceptible to cracks than newer planes.

MR. MacNeil: Federal regulators today announced two more major bailouts of failed savings & loans institutions in Texas and California. The Home Loan Bank Board said it would provide $1.7 billion in federal aid in a deal to sell the American Savings & Loan Association of Stockton, California, to an investment group. In the Texas case, Bank Board Chairman Danny Wall said the government will provide much more aid over 10 years to assist another private investor group to take over five troubled savings and loans in Texas.

M. DANNY WALL, Federal Home Loan Bank Board: The private investment group will be investing $315 million in the institution. We estimate our, the maximum estimate of the cost of solution would be approximately $5 billion. The institutions are some that have been rather infamous in the state and some that have only recently become insolvent.

MR. MacNeil: The Texas bailout represents the second largest amount of money ever paid by the government to save an ailing thrift institution. In other economic news, the Commerce Department today said American businesses plan to increase their spending on new plant and equipment by nearly 6 percent in 1989. That's compared to nearly 11 percent increase this year. The estimate is based on a survey of businesses across the country. An economics test given to high school students in 42 states found that a majority of 11th and 12th graders don't know the meaning of some basic economic concepts. For example, only 34 percent of the students taking the multiple choice test were able to pick the right definition of profits, which is revenues minus costs.

MR. LEHRER: Breast cancer patients may live longer when given a synthetic hormone or chemotherapy drugs. A story released today in the New England Journal of Medicine said that conclusion was drawn from 61 separate studies of nearly 29,000 women. They said the results proved beyond a reasonable doubt a hormone and drugs lowered breast cancer death rates by up to one-quarter.

MR. MacNeil: Israel says its soldiers killed three Palestinian guerrillas trying to infiltrate Israel today about a hundred yards from the Israeli border in Lebanon. Israeli soldiers killed three other Palestinian guerrillas in the same area Monday. Meanwhile, there was more unrest in the occupied territories. It came as another general strike was called by Palestinians protesting Israeli rule. We have a report from David Simmons of Worldwide Television News.

DAVID SIMMONS: The streets of Rumala told the day's story throughout the occupied territories. In the commercial district, the only movement to be seen was the occasional Israeli patrol. The odd Palestinian ventured out, but for the most part the strike held. Behind the barricades though it was business as usual. Stones were hurled and tires burned. The uprising is now into its thirteenth month and with the latest death in Nablus the casualty list continues to rise. While Palestinians paralyzed the occupied territories with the general strike, the Israelis imposed curfews on four refugee camps in the Gaza Strip.

MR. MacNeil: Two young French girls who were supposed to have been released by a Palestinian guerrilla group holding them in Lebanon still have not turned up. Seven year old Marie Lore Batile and her six year old sister Virgini were captured aboard a yacht off the Gaza Strip coast last year with their mother and five Belgians. A spokesman for the Palestinian group holding them said on Monday that the girls had been freed and would be put on a plane to Paris, but that spokesman was not available for comment today on the girls' whereabouts.

MR. LEHRER: Finally in the news, the No. 2 man in the Central Intelligence Agency was chosen today to be the No. 2 man on the new National Security Council staff. Robert Gates was selected by President-elect Bush for the Deputy NCS position. Gates is a career CIA official. And that's it for the News Summary. Now it's on to the Pan Am bomb story, the building of Afghanistan and a Roger Rosenblatt essay. FOCUS - FLIGHT 103 - BOMB ABOARD

MR. MacNeil: Our major focus tonight is the announcement that Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed by a bomb when it disintegrated over Scotland a week ago, killing 270 people. We'll talk to State Department and airline industry officials and air security and terrorism experts. We start with the statements made today in Lockerbie, Scotland, by the Chief Constable John Boyd and Michael Charles, the British official in charge of the investigation.

MICK CHARLES, Department of Transport: A number of items of wreckage, passenger baggage and part of the frame work of a metal luggage pallet are being examined by Ministry of Defense scientists. More items have been collected by the air accidents investigation branch investigators from the accident area. Each of these will be subjected to lengthy chemical and metallurgical forensic examination, however, it has been established that two parts of the metal luggage pallet's frame work show conclusive evidence of a detonating high explosive. The explosives' residues recovered from the debris have been positively identified and are consistent with the use of a high performance plastic explosive. Other evidence collected by the Air Accident's Investigation Branch, in particular that from the flight data recorder, and the cockpit voice recorder, and from the wreckage trail on the ground has led to a preliminary conclusion that the explosion took place soon after the aircraft had crossed the Scottish border whilst it was in the cruise at 31,000 feet and that this led directly to its destruction. Much investigative work remains to be done to establish the nature of the explosive device, what it was contained in, its location in the aircraft, and the sequence of events immediately following its detonation.

SPOKESMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, the Chief Constable. Would you like make a statement?

JOHN BOYD, Chief Constable, Lockerbie: From what you've heard, you understand that this operation has developed into a criminal inquiry of international dimensions. I've always been aware that this probability existed and because of this I have ensured from the outset that the various elements comprising a criminal investigation, including other agencies both national and international have been involved and have kept fully informed. Inquiries are ongoing throughout the world. These inquiries are wide ranging and amongst others involved the Federal Bureau Investigation and the anti-terrorist branch of the metropolitan police. This is a mammoth inquiry and at this stage I'm satisfied that I am receiving all the necessary assistance and support.

MR. LEHRER: More now here in Washington from L. Paul Bremer, the State Department's top counter terrorism official. Mr. Ambassador, welcome. What is known about how that bomb got on the airplane?

L. PAUL BREMER, State Department: Well, that's one of the things we don't have an answer to yet. As we just heard, I think one of the things we've got to look at most closely now is to find out how that bomb got on the plane.

MR. LEHRER: But there's no indication at this point?

MR. BREMER: No, there isn't. But even without that information the FAA is taking steps right now to improve, upgrade the security for American carriers overseas. Obviously, we'll know better what kind of counter measures we need to take when we have a sense of how that bomb got on the plane.

MR. LEHRER: But just based on what is known, the residue, as the man said, the residue of the explosive, was found in the baggage pallet. Now that doesn't necessarily mean though it was in baggage, right? It could have been stashed in there in any other kind of way.

MR. BREMER: That's right. You have large baggage pallets that are placed in these planes and there can be a mix of baggage and cargo in those various pallets and we really need to do a lot more work on the ground with the evidence that is available in the debris to find out where exactly that bomb was and then we can trace back and find out how it was introduced onto the plane.

MR. LEHRER: Now, what about the nature of the explosion, how powerful a bomb was this?

MR. BREMER: Well, it's a little hard to say at this moment beyond what the British have announced which was it was obviously a high explosive bomb that went off.

MR. LEHRER: What's high explosive? Define what that means.

MR. BREMER: It means it's an explosive, that it's not a low order explosive that you might get by using say black powder or something. It's a much more, higher explosive.

MR. LEHRER: It did more than just say blow a hole in the fuselage. I mean, it would do something terribly disruptive, is that right?

MR. BREMER: Well, I'm not an expert in aircraft structural design. It doesn't take an awful lot at the speeds that we're talking about here to cause very considerable damage, indeed, destruction of an aircraft, so the actual effect of that explosion may not have been that enormous. We don't know yet. I think this is one of the things we've really got to find out. How big was this bomb and of course, how did it get on the plane/

MR. LEHRER: Now they say it's plastic, it's a plastic explosion, and the story I read today something called symtex. Tell me about that. What is that?

MR. BREMER: Let me be precise. What the constable said was that the residues that they found are consistent with the kind of residues you would find with a plastic explosive. That indicates that it was a plastic explosive but again we're not 100 percent sure of that yet, so more tests will have to be done on the residues and the chemical residues. Symtex is one of the best known plastic explosives. It's an explosive made by Czechoslovakia. The word plastic explosive doesn't mean it's made out of plastic; it just means it can be molded. It's more like a clay, a claylike material, and it can be molded to various shapes. The problem with plastic explosives is it's -- there are really two problems -- first of all, it can be molded into various shapes, which makes it harder to detect, and secondly --

MR. LEHRER: You mean, you could take it and stick it in a shaving kit or anything?

MR. BREMER: In almost any shape. In almost any shape. We know of an example of a plastic explosive used in the bombing of a Korean airliner about a year ago that it was molded into the inside of a portable radio, for example. It could also be rolled flat and hidden in the lining of a suitcase. So the first problem is it is plastic, it can be molded. The second problem is that it does not give off, these plastic explosives do not give off the same kind of detectable chemicals that TNT or dynamite do, therefore, they are more difficult to detect with current detection technology.

MR. LEHRER: So you have to eyeball it, is that right?

MR. BREMER: Well, there's a lot of research going on and the FAA has drawn attention again today to the fact that they have developed a new detection system for plastic explosives which we are hoping to have introduced on an accelerated basis.

MR. LEHRER: But it wasn't being used in London or in Frankfurt?

MR. BREMER: It is not really in common usage yet and that's one of our problems.

MR. LEHRER: Okay, now the question about who might have done this in as segment that we ran in the News Summary, FBI Director Williams Sessions said, yes, terrorism is the most likely suspect, but there's also the possibility that some other criminal element may have done that. How would you weigh those?

MR. BREMER: Well, I think he's exactly right. I think we have to realize we're at the beginning of an investigation. We may have ended the first phase in the sense that we've now concluded that there was a bomb on the plane. It was not a question of structural failure. But that doesn't tell us who put it on and as the director pointed out, there are two hypotheses. One is terrorism and the other is an act of criminal sabotage by almost any kind of a group you could imagine.

MR. LEHRER: Like what? I mean -- the kind of person --

MR. BREMER: It could be conceivably a drug group, it could be - -

MR. LEHRER: What would be their motive for blowing up an airplane?

MR. BREMER: Well, we don't know. I mean, that's our problem.

MR. LEHRER: Well, there's got to be -- if you think it could be a drug group or you think it could be a criminal group, there must be a reason.

MR. BREMER: There could have been somebody on the plane they want to kill.

MR. LEHRER: -- one of the passengers --

MR. BREMER: It seems a rather drastic thing to do to kill 270 people to get 1. I think it is more likely that we're dealing with a terrorist act here, but I think at the outset of this investigation we need to go into it without preconceptions. We've got to say what do we know, what are the facts?

MR. LEHRER: But if it's a terrorism act, isn't it likely that we should have had a public, a really dramatic public claim of responsibility by now? Otherwise, what's the point?

MR. BREMER: Logically that's true, unfortunately in the terrorism business things are not always logical and we often have attacks, terrorist attacks, which are not formally claimed by any group and we find out who did it in the end by good hard investigation.

MR. LEHRER: But what's their motivation then, just because they don't like Americans or Pan Am and they just want to kill some people?

MR. BREMER: It's hard for me to put myself in the rather --

MR. LEHRER: I mean based on experience.

MR. BREMER: -- sick mind of a person who would kill 270 people.

MR. LEHRER: Sure.

MR. BREMER: Based on the past, a lot of the times these people are just doing it to terrorize people, to get some kind of a message across that it's not safe to be an American or to go to an airport. We remember the attacks two Christmases, three Christmases ago in 1985, the attack on Rome and Vienna Airports by the Abu Nidal Organization. Those were not claimed by Abu Nidal. They know we did it because people were caught.

MR. LEHRER: All right. Finally let me ask you this. The Helsinke investigation, the call that came to the U.S. Embassy 2 1/2 weeks or so before this warning of the probability of a bomb on a Pan Am flight from Frankfurt to New York, what's the status of that investigation?

MR. BREMER: Well, we have been cooperating with the Finnish police in their investigation. They concluded their investigation and announced yesterday that they have concluded it and decided that this phone call had no connection with the Pan Am incident.

MR. LEHRER: Do you feel that way too?

MR. BREMER: Yes, we do.

MR. LEHRER: So it's just an incredible coincidence?

MR. BREMER: It is a remarkable coincidence. It turns out the person who made the phone call has, there's been a history of these kinds of hoax calls over the last year and we are satisfied with the Fins that it has no relationship to this attack.

MR. LEHRER: A second finally, any rethinking now of U.S. policy about bringing the public in, on warning about calls like that?

MR. BREMER: Well, we've looked at that question over the last week and have decided that for the time being the policy is the right one and that is to try to get the people on the ground who can counter a security threat to take measures. That's the most important thing to do.

MR. LEHRER: And that didn't even happen in this case, did it?

MR. BREMER: Well, it did happen. Ironically, the phone call in Helsinke did lead to an upgrading of security. Apparently it's not enough and we've got to figure out now what more needs to be done to prevent this thing from happening in the future.

MR. LEHRER: Mr. Ambassador, thank you. Robin.

MR. MacNeil: We turn now to four experts on airport security and terrorism. Arik Arad is the General Manager of International Consulting on Targeted Security or ICTS. His firm designs security systems for several U.S. major airlines and does consulting work at both Frankfurt and London airports. He was formerly Security Director for Israel's LL Airline in Canada. Richard Lally is the top airline security official at the Air Transport Association which represents most major U.S. airlines. Billie Vincent was the head of aviation security for the Federal Aviation Administration from 1982 to '86. He now heads an aviation consulting firm in Arlington, Virginia. Richard Shultz is an expert on terrorism who teaches international politics at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy at Tufts University. He joins us from public station WGBH in Boston. Mr. Arad, the fact that the amount of explosive necessary to do this job could get on that plane through either London or Frankfurt airports, what does it say about the adequacy of the security in those two places?

ARIK ARAD, Airport Security Consultant: That it's not sufficient and in order to satisfy passengers and airlines, I think one ought to concentrate on the passengers, themselves, interview each passenger getting on the aircraft before boarding and get the feel to how to categorize the passenger and to what type of security treatment one should receive before, prior to boarding the aircraft.

MR. MacNeil: Very similar to what LL has been doing for years. Am I not right, they interview -- in fact, I've been through it - - they interview each passenger in the presence of his own checked baggage and go through the checked baggage.

MR. ARAD: That's exactly the concept. We focus, we, ICTS, and LL is focusing on the passenger rather than on the suitcase. If we will be able to determine what type of passenger we are facing, we shall also be capable of checking his luggage properly.

MR. MacNeil: What are the ways in which the necessary amount of explosive to do this kind of damage could have gotten on that plane? What are the ways it could happen?

MR. ARAD: Well, it could penetrate through the passenger, himself, on his body, in his hand baggage, in his luggage, cargo, and could be helped by inside employees working at the airport.

MR. MacNeil: Mr. Vincent, what does the now confirmed presence of that amount of explosive on this flight say to you about the precautions that the airlines have been taking?

BILLIE VINCENT, Airport Security Consultant: Well, Bob, unfortunately, we've known about this threat since August of 1982. Pan Am was the victim of the first bomb using sophisticated technology. That was August 11, 1982. Two weeks later we found another bomb on a Pan American airplane. It's also believed that the people who did those bombed TWA 840 Flight out of Rome to Athens on April 2, 1986. In addition to that, we have known about a number of suitcases, very powerful suitcases, with the same technology as those bombs I've just mentioned since 1982. We know enough about the threat to have done something to stop it. I agree with Mr. Arad. It's necessary for the U.S. Government to require a system something on the order of the LL system. It's not necessary at this point to wait to know what happened to Pan American flight on December 21 to start that action. But we must do something not halfway measures anymore. We must put the system in all over internationally for U.S. aviation.

MR. MacNeil: When you -- what were you saying?

MR. ARAD: I said I completely agree with Billie.

MR. MacNeil: What is that going to mean -- what would that mean in terms of the convenience of passengers getting on these planes?

MR. VINCENT: It would have two major impacts. One, the passengers internationally would have to show up earlier than what they do now, perhaps twice as early for a parting flight. But perhaps more important than that, because I think most of the passengers would welcome that security, the knowledge to know that they are secure in flying on U.S. aviation outside of the U.S., but the economic impact is horrendous. And this is the point where the U.S. Government has to not only decide that that system has to be implemented but they must take some of the responsibilityfor financing that system, because I think it is, it's expecting too much for U.S. carriers in the competitive environment that they're in to try to shoulder all that cost themselves.

MR. MacNeil: But you're saying that U.S. carriers, in particular Pan Am, had known about the threat, have had it proved to them, and for what reason have they not bothered to take these measures?

MR. VINCENT: I think they would have to answer that but my impression in all of the meetings I ever had with U.S. aviation most were quick to reject something that costs a great deal of money. They also wanted to know very specifically what the threat was. The threat is there and has been there from one technology from the 15 May Organization, a gentleman named Abu Ibram, since 1982. I think the U.S. Government shoulders responsibility there as well, they must resolve that the problem's going to be solved and the U.S. aviation is going to be protected.

MR. MacNeil: Mr. Lally, how do you on behalf of the airline industry respond to what you've just heard?

RICHARD LALLY, Air Transport Association: I think it's a fact that the U.S. airlines, particularly at high risk foreign locations, which includes the Heathrow and Frankfurt airports, have been applying truly extraordinary security measures for the past three years. In effect, it's been a full court press, ranging from the aircraft structure, itself, to every person and every thing that has access to it or goes on to it, nevertheless, apparently what happened at Pan Am 103 happened. And I think as Amb. Bremer said we need to wait for some facts. There are a number of options that could have resulted in that incident. But I think the thing it really points out is that maybe we're facing a different ball game. Maybe this demonstrates that international terrorism is different from the preventive measures we have enjoyed and that have been successful since 1973. Now I guess I think that there's room for a new examination of the role of government and that the role of government ought to be expanded from the one of regulation to one of active participation in the defensive mechanism. The government, FAA particularly, is staffed with experts. And I think those experts ought to be assigned to locations where the problem is. And that is at these high risk locations. In addition, as Ambassador Bremer pointed out, we have, FAA is to be commended for the breakthrough in achieving for the first time the ability to detect all explosives in the quantities that threaten the integrity of aircraft. That should be accelerated and that equipment brought on line as soon as possible.

MR. MacNeil: I'll come back to that. First let me go back to Mr. Arad. Do you believe -- you're very familiar with the security situation at Frankfurt and London airports -- you've consulted on that. Have they taken what Mr. Lally calls truly exceptional measures these last few years?

MR. ARAD: I'm afraid I did not see it at all. I'm afraid that we still faced under waged security personnel working in both airports, outside, subcontractor security firms, untrained security personnel, and I've always given this example. Each airline would pay flight attendant a terrific salary, whereas, a security guard gets maybe a fifth of what she gets, and the only bad thing she can do is drop and spill some coffee over a passenger, whereas, a security guard at the X-ray machine or at any other post can actually determine whether an aircraft will be bombed or not.

MR. MacNeil: Mr. Lally.

MR. LALLY: I think that's a distortion. You know, flight attendants are paid not to serve coffee. Flight attendants are integral safety instruments of flight and they're paid primarily for their safety services, not their marketing or their food service.

MR. MacNeil: But what about their pay relative to the security staff's pay and training?

MR. LALLY: Well, apparently, I think it's a fact that their pay is higher. But I don't think that the pay is the major thing. I think we could take a Ph.D. out of MIT, pay him $100,000 a year, and he probably wouldn't do as good or any better a job than the people that are on those X-ray scopes today. There's more to it than pay and the airlines are working hard at that. As I said before, I think the name of the game has changed. We're talking about acts of terrorism which in themselves are intended to achieve political objectives. They're intended to influence governments. The airlines are a convenient and uniquely vulnerable instrument and they become the surrogate targets, so if governments are the ultimate target, then I think it's time for government to move to the fore and get in and participate in the defensive exercise.

MR. MacNeil: Mr. Bremer, Amb. Bremer, you're still with us. How do you respond to two calls we've heard for a much more active government role in this?

MR. BREMER: I think --

MR. MacNeil: I know you're not the FAA but how do you respond?

MR. BREMER: No, but I think it's important to recall that there's been a very active government role. That is to say the FAA does have inspectors on the ground at most of the major places served by American carriers overseas, including both Frankfurt and London by the way. They have had a very active program, particularly in the last two years, of running periodic inspections of airports which are served by American carriers. In fact, they're required by law to do that. And they do it regularly. The problem is -- and they have put into effect additional security measures including some of the ones which Mr. Arad has spoken of. For example, I served for three years as our Ambassador to the Netherlands. And I know that there the American airliners introduced a program of examining every single bag that was put on their airlines. That is to say they opened them up and actually looked at them. It was inconvenient for passengers, but nonetheless, it certainly added a certain degree of security, and that was in response to the FAA's requirements.

MR. MacNeil: But that isn't done at Frankfurt and London.

MR. BREMER: No, it is not at present done. They do do the kind of positive baggage check which Mr. Arad mentioned, that is to say I flew out of London just 10 days ago. They do ask you if this is your bag and if you packed it and ask you a series of questions along the lines of what Mr. Arad has suggested. Now as I said at the top of the show, something obviously is wrong, however, because a bomb was able to get on this plane, and I think we've got to find out how it got on. I was glad to see him refer to the possibility that it might have come on in the cargo, or it might have come on through some efforts by the ground crew, the cleaning crew or the catering crew, and we're looking at all of those possibilities now.

MR. MacNeil: Let's move on to this and start with Mr. Shultz in Boston. Mr. Shultz, how can the information that will be gleaned from the wreckage, and we've heard of some of it today, how can that be used to trace who might have done this?

RICHARD SHULTZ, Tufts University: Well, it can in part because certain groups have used certain types of devices in terrorist operations before, however, I don't think that simply treating this as a problem for the FAA or a problem of analyzing what occurred in the explosion is enough. A number of your guests have said that governments have to get involved in this activity and I think that the answer is that certain aspects of government have to be involved and that means a much more active role for your intelligence organization which in the past our intelligence capabilities in dealing with sophisticated groups who've conducted terrorist operations has not been very good either in the collection area or in the area of taking actions against them and I --

MR. MacNeil: You mean to say there has not been a full court press by all U.S. intelligence agencies in the wake of the TWA and the Rome airport and, where some Americans died, and the Achille Lauro, and the Abu Nidal incidents, that there hasn't been a major priority given to that?

MR. SHULTZ: A full court press isn't something you can turn on tomorrow. A full court press means that you have the capabilities to press. That means good human collection capabilities. That means information on groups and their activities, and it means the ability to pre-empt possibly or to react in retaliation. And you don't build those up overnight. Now it's true that in the wake of those operations, the central intelligence agency was improving its counter terrorist capabilities. But again, this isn't something that you're going to develop for tomorrow --

MR. MacNeil: Do other nations have more sophisticated gathering of information on these groups?

MR. SHULTZ: They do and some of the Europeans have proved quite effective in capturing terrorists who've been involved in operations and putting them on trial and of course the Israelis have also. But our human intelligence capabilities as we look to the 1990's need to be refocused in ways that will lead to serious changes in the collection capabilities of the central intelligence agency.

MR. MacNeil: As the administration person here, Amb. Bremer, how do you respond to that?

MR. BREMER: Well, I certainly agree that we have to pay a lot of attention. I'm sorry to hear that Mr. Shultz doesn't think we have. I think there has been a major upgrading in our capabilities in the last five years in this field, and in fact, I would point to the fact that in most previous major terrorist incidents we have in the end been able to identify the group responsible and in many cases the people responsible, and they have been brought to justice. And that's our objective in this case. I'm frankly confident that in the end we'll do the same here.

MR. MacNeil: Are you --

MR. SHULTZ: There's a difference between identifying groups that have carried out acts and being able to say, yes, they're the ones that did it, and we haven't always brought them to justice. But it's another thing to be able to know about these groups in advance and I agree with, Paul, I agree with you that we've made advances, but as I look at our human collection and at our covert action capabilities for the years ahead I personally think that there's room for improvement. I'm not saying that we haven't made improvements, but we can do much more. And as you know, developing these kinds of capabilities is not something that you can do overnight.

MR. MacNeil: Mr. Shultz, speculate from what is known so far on the behavior of certain groups in the past and their pattern of behavior and possible motivations now -- and everybody is doing this today. Where would people looking for likely perpetrators be led to look by the available evidence? What's the typical profile?

MR. SHULTZ: Let's look at the evidence. We know that a high explosive probably with a pretty sophisticated detonating device was put on the plane. We know that even though there was a warning it turned out to be a hoax, but the airports, Frankfurt, went on a high security alert. Nevertheless, a penetration took place. Now this tells you probably that a fairly sophisticated organization was involved. If you're high, if you have a high state of alert and you're expecting something and it happens, it's not a group that is unsophisticated. So given that, then you ask the question what are the political circumstances that might motivate this. And I'm drawn to looking at the recent developments in the Middle East. Even though Yasser Arafat has stated that he rejects terrorism and recognizes Israel, there are many groups, factions within the Palestinian movement that don't accept that at all. There are also states that don't accept that. And there have been states in the past that when the peace process has moved forward, they've used the terrorism instrument to try to disrupt the peace process --

MR. MacNeil: How many such groups or states possess not only the motive but the sophistication to carry out what you've described?

MR. SHULTZ: I think we're talking probably, it would be my estimation, of a handful.

MR. MacNeil: Name the handful.

MR. SHULTZ: Well probably Abu Nidal would be one; George Habash would be another; the general command of the popular front would be another. But then you know you have to realize that there may be groups that they themselves don't have the intelligence, or the information on the airport and how to penetrate them, so it can be provided to them by a state organization. So there are a variety of possibilities in trying to unravel what took place.

MR. MacNeil: Amb. Bremer, does that line of speculation see plausible to you?

MR. BREMER: It does, I think as far as it goes. The trouble is we've got to get more facts in our hands before we can really follow in a coherent fashion one of these leads. We should look at motives as Mr. Shultz suggests. We should look at capabilities and I would think also we should look at past performance, in other words, what groups have had a history of conducting this kind of attack before. But none of those in themselves is a conclusive evidence or decision that that group carried it out. We've got to be very careful and move with the evidence, not ahead of it.

MR. MacNeil: Mr. Vincent, what is your comment on the need to improve the intelligent side of this equation?

MR. VINCENT: That's always a nice thing to do but the facts are again we know about a very sophisticated explosive device very likely to have been used in this case that would go through any current security system in all except one or two airports in Europe, U.S. and other aviation right now, except for systems like LL. That explosive device can be carried in the breast pocket. I could be carrying one now like the one that was put on a Pan American plane --

MR. MacNeil: You could carry enough in your breast pocket to do that kind of damage?

MR. VINCENT: No, I didn't say that. I could be carrying one now that is approximately 12 inches long, less than 1/4 inches thick, 4 inches wide. That same device, except in a suitcase size, in all the lining of the suitcase, that virtually even experts have difficulty in identifying it has shown up in suitcases several times since 1982. It has a sophisticated electronic timer. It has a barometric switch. Again, we don't need to know any more about who did this at this point to do something about preventing the next one. That's what needs to be done now while these other things are being done.

MR. MacNeil: And I think we've heard from several people what they suggest. Well, I'd like to thank you all, Amb. Bremer, Mr. Shultz, Mr. Arad, Mr. Vincent, and Mr. Lally, for joining us. FOCUS - AFGHAN AID

MR. LEHRER: Next, Afghanistan. It was nine years ago this week that the Soviet Union sent its troops there. It is less than nine weeks now until they're due to all be gone. The question is what kind of place and future are left behind. Western nations and the Soviet Union have pledged nearly $2 billion to a United Nations program to help 7 million refugees return home and restore their homes, villages and cities. Special Correspondent Edward Girardet reports on the problems ahead.

EDWARD GIRARDET: In the early years of the occupation, the little humanitarian assistance that actually reached the people inside arrived by age old caravan routes crossing high mountain passes to the North and bleak deserts to the South. These convoys travel clandescently, relying on horses, mules and camels, or trekking by foot for weeks, even months on end. Today the situation is changing as more areas come under resistance control. Until recently, operating destroyed field clinics amid destroyed villages was left to the few courageous doctors inside Afghanistan. We talked to Juliette Fournot.

DR. JULIETTE FOURNOT, Medicine Sans Frontieres: We had no proper base. At that time, we were really trying to have a very very low profile in Pakistan. We were sneaking through the border, organizing hospitals inside. We, it seemed much dangerous than it is now because at that time the Mujahadeen had no air protection against the bombers and helicopters and in 1981, four of our hospitals had been bombed and completely destroyed.

EDWARD GIRARDET: From their bases in Pushala, barely a dozen of these many voluntary agencies have consistently provided cross border humanitarian aid. Most government support was directed toward the resistance or refugees who had escaped the fighting to Pakistan. It was only halfway through the war that the international community began giving these operations higher priority. The United Nations in New York recently launched Operation Salam, which in the wake of the April 1988 peace accords provides for the reconstruction of war ravaged Afghanistan. While response from the West has been cautious, the Soviet Union paradoxically has pledged the equivalent of $600 million. To oversee this massive $2 billion recovery program, the UN Secretary General appointed a special coordinator, Saterdin Agakan, whose envoys are already crossing to the war zones to prepare the relief effort.

SPOKESMAN: But all the aid to be provided is of a strictly humanitarian nature, no matter to what area or along what route it is directed.

EDWARD GIRARDET: In Pakistan, this refugee camp was once little more than a sea of tents pitched on an Arab plane. But the years have passed, the trees have grown and it has adopted a disconcerting air of permanence. Despite 10 years of war, few of Pakistan's 3 million refugees have returned home. A few have tried, but have since come back. To most Afghans, the war is far from over. When I first visited Pushala shortly before the invasion, it was still a romantic frontier outpost. Today, Pushala serves as a resupply and logistical center for Afghan resistance groups operating out of Pakistan; with some 78 organizations and over 1500 relief workers and more coming, the bizarres are thriving. But the influx of foreign aid as well as heroin and arms trafficking has created uncontrolled growth and widespread corruption. Although many believe a large scale UN program is needed, some such as Hedayet Amin Arsala, an Afghan former world bank official, warn of the risks.

HEDAYET AMIN ARSALA, Economist: I feel the United Nations can play a role, particularly in terms of facilitating a political solution for Afghanistan, obviously it cannot create that, it cannot impose any solution, but can facilitate it. That's one thing. But secondly, of course, it can also help us in the future and when it comes to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, to the repatriation of the refugees. But mind you when I say that they can play a role, it has to be done very carefully, cautiously, and it has to be done taking into account our circumstances.

EDWARD GIRARDET: At border posts now controlled by the Mujahadeen, there is already considerable traffic with arms and other supplies crossing to and fro. Realistically, while the fighting continues, eight agencies will be obliged to deal primarily with the resistance if they hope to reach the majority of Afghans. This is an unprecedented step for the UN, which as in other areas of conflict is more used to dealing with recognized governments. The war has dragged on more than a decade, keeping many farmers from their fields. The key to recovery lies in the rehabilitation of these devastated farm lands. With over 80 percent of the population traditionally engaged in agriculture, this is an enormous task for a country where once lush fields now barren and littered with mines can barely support grazing livestock. As irrigated areas untouched by the war test, the Afghans have a potential to feed themselves. But relief officials say this might take years. A too rapid return could prove catastrophic, warns Anders Fange of the Swedish Committee.

ANDERS FANGE, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan: Well, I say that once there's peace, if all the refugees will go on back at once, or say if there's a hurried re-patriation of the refugees, then we will face a new chapter of the Afghan tragedy because the land can't carry them. The land can't support them. With an agricultural production down to approximately 1/3 of it was before the war, famine will start and people will be start coming out of the war again.

EDWARD GIRARDET: Back in Pakistan, Afghans working with aid organizations are seeking innovative ways to help returnees with the reconstruction of the thousands of villages destroyed in the bombing. One possible solution to prevent the devastation of Afghanistan's dwindling forest is the manufacture of essential concrete products ranging from roof beams to domes. In operations such as this run by a shelter now, refugees are learning new skills says Afghan construction foreman Faraz.

FARAZ, Foreman, Shelter Now: The thing which I learn here in Pakistan is much useful what I learn in about 15 or 16 years in Afghanistan -- you practically have not seen anything. Now I'm working here in the city, but I know if I go to Afghanistan, I can just run this kind of thing myself, you know, and produce the domes and everything with myself.

EDWARD GIRARDET: On our most recent trips into several frontier regions of Eastern Afghanistan, we found inhabitants already rebuilding vital structures. Much of this work is being done by hand using local materials, in this case, constructing a tea house. Any recovery program will have to take into account the fierce independence of Afghans. What the UN should avoid is to dictate what is needed says Douglas Saltmarsh.

DOUGLAS SALTMARSH: The problem comes when you start talking to families, you start talking to an old man, for example. Two of his sons might have been killed in the Jehad. There are many instances of terrible troubles. Almost every family has got a tale to tell where someone has been killed and there is going to be a problem inasmuch that there is not going to be the same number in terms of labor force. They are going to need assistance, but I think the assistance must be given in a sensitive way and it must be given in a way that the local bodies feel is appropriate to their needs.

EDWARD GIRARDET: The Mujahadeen have progressed from primitive to more sophisticated technology for building roads, bomb shelters or communications systems. With the help of Western and other donors, they can begin to rebuild their home land, but as Afghan guerrilla and former mining engineer Muhammed Jan points out, the transition will prove difficult for young Afghans who only know how to make war.

MUHAMMED JAN, Engineer: I think it is not easy. It is difficult because the Jehad always weapons and fight and this kind of problem and after liberation when it's end of the war and when Afghanistan is free, without this in there, I don't know how to find some job; it is not easy.

EDWARD GIRARDET: The war has created a whole generation who either never went to school or had their studies interrupted. Classes have been established in refugee camps and inside Afghanistan, but the Mujahadeen and aid groups have generally failed to take the opportunity of pushing broader education and now must build a new Islamic system.

HEDAYET AMIN ARSALA, Economist: In 1978, '79, the ratio of school aged children, I mean, primary school age children that went to school or could go to school was about 30 percent, and that by international standards is basically very low. So now that same ratio has gone down to about less than 15 percent, mainly concentrated in Kabul and some urban areas. So within these 10 years I'm quite sure that we would have raised that to about 60, 70 percent because education plans were quite extensive and quite ambitious, not unrealistic, but they were quite extensive, so that's where we've lost. That's an opportunity we lost.

EDWARD GIRARDET: For all the zeal and dedication of Afghans and foreign aid workers and the use of high technology to coordinate the international recovery effort, the task ahead remains daunting. It could prove to be the largest such operation since the martial plan at the end of World War II. While Afghans pride themselves as being masters of their own destiny, much will depend on whether they can resolve their differences and show the same determination in peace as they have in war. ESSAY - PURE GOLD

MR. MacNeil: Finally tonight, our regular essayist Roger Rosenblatt has some thoughts on the winner in all of us.

ROGER ROSENBLATT: What would you look like if you were shown in slow motion, I mean, like the athletes on television, so powerful and agile doing what they do best that the human eye can appreciate their excellence only when the camera slows down their operations, the tight end in football snatching a pass from the air, the baseball slugger who knocks one into the seats, the diver, the miraculous high diver, first presenting himself to the air of his concentration, then stepping forward with the prideful grace of a toreador, springing up as if to fly but doing his real stuff on the way down, caught, studied by the slow watching admiring camera lens, and the world. But you, you in your stale air, glass walled office, or imprisoned behind your desk at the automobile dealership, or serving tables in a restaurant or arguing a case before a judge, or pushing clothes on a rack down the street, you, policing, selling, taxi driving, publishing, doctoring, grocering, what would you look like in slow motion? Would millions of viewers want to watch you do what you do best in time stopped exquisite detail? Fat chance. Body versus mind, I suppose that's it. The mind moves much faster than the body, so much faster that one would have to slow it down to one billionth of its normal speed to catch how the machine goes about its business. Even if that were possible, there would be nothing pretty in the picture. I think, therefore I am. But who would you prefer to study in the process of doing his job, the college professor, the banker, or Mat Biondi, the American Olympic swimmer, plowing through the water like a Jules Vernes submarine, slowly now, slower still, until you gape in wonder at exactly how he does it. Muscle, form, intent. Of course, that's exactly how you do it too. The problem you recently solved, how on earth did you manage to accomplish such a victory? Well, there was all that training and long, relentless workouts. You had to sacrifice a lot of personal pleasures preparing to solve that problem, and there were injuries along the way. Don't forget the pain you played through, the pitiless setbacks. But you had the will, the drive, the end was worth it, was it not? A problem solved. Invisible to the naked eye, yet beauty in the execution. Who but so disciplined an athlete could have won so great a triumph? Nonetheless, you sit there watching the game of the week, amazed at the athletes' jet propelled bodies, amazed by their records, as if nothing like that could ever be done by anyone you know. Nonsense. You do a dozen such feats every day. Look. Your event is coming up. The ministerial sermon speak, the secretarial letter type, the doorman door hold, the idea. No camera crew in sight, but still that rush of surprise and gratification as the result of the event is clear now and it is you alone, absolutely you, mounting the platform no one sees, wearing the laurel no one lowers on your exhausted, conquering head, gold. Pure gold. RECAP

MR. LEHRER: Again the major story of this Wednesday, British officials said there was now sure evidence that a bomb exploded aboard the Pan Am flight last week over Scotland, a White House spokesman said Pres. Reagan has ordered all available sources be used to determine how the bomb got aboard the London to New York flight in which 270 people, 259 on the plane, 11 on the ground. Good night, Robin.

MR. MacNeil: Good night, Jim. That's the Newshour tonight and we'll be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.