The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour

Intro

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. These are the day's top headlines. The Reagan-Gorbachev summit ended without agreement on major issues, but with two more meetings planned. President Reagan is flying back and will address a joint session of Congress this evening. Personal spending by American consumers suffered the biggest monthly drop in 25 years. Hurricane Kate hit the Florida Panhandle, forcing thousands to evacuate. Details of these stories coming up. Jim Lehrer is in Geneva. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: After the news summary tonight comes all Reagan-Gorbachev summit, with extended excerpts from what the participants had to say about what they did, and then with analysis of that from Malcolm Toon in Geneva, William Hyland, Lawrence Eagleburger and Madeleine Albright in the United States. News Summary

LEHRER: Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said there was now a spirit of Geneva that makes the world "better, safer and quieter." President Reagan called it the " reside summit" that began the new start in U.S.-Soviet relations he wanted. But the two leaders as they left Geneva after three days of much private talk also made it clear serious, difficult problems remain.

[voice-over] At 10 a.m. they met at the International Conference Center in Geneva. They spoke briefly and animatedly to each other, and then formally to the assembled press.

Pres. MIKHAIL GORBACHEV [through interpreter]: The President and I have done a huge amount of work. We've gone into great detail. We've really done it in depth. And we've done it totally openly and friendly. We decided that we must help to decrease the threat of nuclear war. We must not allow the arms race to move off into space, and we must cut it down on earth. If we really want to succeed in something, then both sides are going to have to do an awful lot of work in the spirit of the joint commission which we -- the joint statement which we have put out.

Pres. RONALD REAGAN: We packed a lot into the last two days. I came to Geneva to seek a fresh start in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we have done this. General Secretary Gorbachev and I have held comprehensive discussions covering all elements of our relationship. I am convinced that we are heading in the right direction. In agreeing to accelerate the work of our nuclear arms negotiators, Mr. Gorbachev and I have addressed our common responsibility to strengthen peace. I believe that we have established a process for more intensive contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two days of talks should inject a certain momentum into our work on the issues between us, a momentum we can continue at the meeting that we have agreed on for next year. I leave Geneva today, and our fireside summit, determined to pursue every opportunity to build a safer world of peace and freedom. There's hard work ahead, but we're ready for it. General Secretary Gorbachev, we ask you to join us in getting the job done, as I'm sure you will. Thank you.

LEHRER [voice-over]: And then they watched Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze sign six bilateral agreements on opening matching consulates in New York and Kiev, resuming cultural and scientific exchanges, cooperating on fusion energy research, air safety in the northern Pacific, environmental cleanup, and in working to resume U.S.-Soviet air traffic. A joint written statement was also issued on what the summit had accomplished. It termed the meetings "frank" and "useful," said there was now a better understanding of the other side's view of things, but emphasized serious differences remain. The most serious is over arms control and its link to the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Mr. Gorbachev continued his vigorous attack on that at a news conference after the joint ceremony. He went from his news conference at the Soviet mission directly to the airport and home. An hour later President Reagan did the same, and suddenly the first U.S.-Soviet summit in nearly seven years was history.

[on camera] Mr. Reagan flew from Geneva to Brussels to talk to the leaders of the NATO countries before going on to Washington to address a joint session of Congress on national television. Robin?

MacNEIL: Almost at the very moment of Mr. Reagan's arrival at NATO headquarters, a bomb exploded 10 miles away in a building housing an American firm. It damaged the building but caused no injuries. Leaflets warning of the explosion carried the name of a terrorist group called the Fighting Communist Cells. After Mr. Reagan's meeting with the NATO leaders, they said they were very pleased with the results at Geneva. Meanwhile, Mr. Gorbachev was making a parallel report to the members of his Warsaw Pact alliance in Prague. Czech television showed pictures of the other six Warsaw Pact leaders assembled in Hradcany Castle and then greeting Gorbachev warmly as he arrived. Later, Tass, the Soviet news agency, said Gorbachev gave a detailed account of the meetings at Geneva and the other leaders voiced full support for the positions he took there. Tass said the leaders found the discussions in Geneva to have been useful.

In Washington, in a Congress awaiting Mr. Reagan's personal appearance before the joint session this evening, the first reactions to the summit outcome were mixed: lukewarm praise with some reservations. Here's a sample of speeches on the House floor.

Rep. EDWARD J. MARKEY, (D) Massachusetts: After two days of media blackout, Reagan and Gorbachev emerged from the summit with little to show for their efforts. Overall the world must regard the summit with polite applause but not a standing ovation.

Rep. TOM LANTOS, (D) California: We all breathe a bit more easily. Tensions have lessened somewhat, and a first step has now been taken toward more normal relations. In this nuclear age we must applaud even modest and partial improvements in the relationship between the Soviet Union and ourselves.

Rep. WILLIAM BROOMFIELD, (R) Michigan: Both leaders today emphasized the positive results of the meeting while at the same time acknowledging that this meeting should be considered only a first step in this new phase of the Soviet-American relationship.

Rep. BILL RICHARDSON, (D) New Mexico: The world is safer today because of the summit, but it remains to be seen whether it will be safer tomorrow.

MacNEIL: There was mixed economic news today. The government reported that Americans' personal income rose 0.4 in October, the largest monthly increase since April. But consumer spending fell more sharply than at any time in the past 25 years. The 0.9 decline was attributed to falling sales of new cars. Meanwhile on Wall Street, the prospect of further declines in interest rates pushed the stock market to another historic high. The Dow Jones average of 30 industrial stocks rose 23 points to close at 1462.27.

Hurricane Kate came ashore near Panama City, Florida, this evening, packing winds of 100 miles an hour. More than 100,000 people were evacuated from the area. The National Hurricane Center said there was potential for heavy damage to several communities in the Florida panhandle.

In South Africa, at least six blacks were reported killed when police fired on a crowd of about 50,000 demonstrators near Pretoria. Here's a report from Chris Hardy of Visnews.

CHRIS HARDY, Visnews [voice-over]: Police helicopters hovered over the black township of Mamelodi near Pretoria, while on the ground, armored personnel carriers patrolled the streets. Up to six people died in angry protests against a weekend funeral ban and the government-sponsored local council. Police said they shot dead one black woman when a crowd attacked a police vehicle with stones. Many more were injured in this latest outbreak of protest in the black townships. This man died of his wounds.

MacNEIL: In Cape Town, the wife of Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress, said he's asked to see his lawyers tomorrow amid rumors that he may be released from prison. Winnie Mandela said she took the speculation seriously, but the government said there was no truth to it.

At Loma Linda, California, the doctor who transplanted a baboon's heart into an infant girl last year today performed a rare infant-to-infant heart transplant. The operation was performed on a newborn baby by Dr. Leonard Bailey. No further information was released.

In Stockholm, Leif Stenberg, the first person outside the U.S. to receive a permanent artificial heart, died today. The 53-year-old businessman, the fourth recipient of the Jarvik-7 heart, at first made a remarkable recovery, but suffered a stroke in September and gradually lost consciousness. That's our news summary. We devote the rest of the NewsHour to the windup of the Geneva summit. Coming up, extended excerpts from the American and Soviet news conferences, then analysis: in Geneva by Malcolm Toon, former ambassador to Moscow; in the U.S. by Lawrence Eagleburger, William Hyland and Madeleine Albright, all former senior foreign policy officials. Sizing Up Geneva

LEHRER: The achievements and glories, the failures and shortcomings of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit will be debated for days, for years, probably forever. We begin that examination process now with the official judgments. Secretary Shultz rendered it for the United States; General Secretary Gorbachev did so for the Soviet Union. Shultz spoke at a 15-minute-long press briefing before leaving Geneva with Mr. Reagan. Here is an excerpt.

GEORGE SHULTZ, Secretary of State: What is set out in the joint statement I think represents a first step in the sense that some concrete things were put down and moved along, as well as a process started -- that interaction. But I believe the most important thing that happened here is that these two individuals took this over completely; it was very much their meeting, and they spent a lot of time together. It got to be a problem for the schedulers, because every time they got together they went much longer than was thought. But that was really what we came here for and was very fruitful, and I think that length of time and the intensity and the frankness and the scope of what was talked about between the two by the fireside really went beyond anything I could have expected, although I felt myself that that kind of pattern was the desirable way to do it.

1st REPORTER: Mr. Secretary, what has this two days of summitry done to curb the nuclear arms race?

Sec. SHULTZ: It has not produced anything by way of a further agreement. It has produced perhaps some political impulse to the negotiators in Geneva which will undoubtedly be reflected in our own discussions in Washington as we consider the next round. Perhaps more important, it has contributed a relationship between these two leaders based on a lot of substantive discussion between them. So it was just the kind of get-acquainted that we wanted and I believe General Secretary Gorbachev wanted. That is, they got acquainted on the basis of wrestling with difficult substance, and it worked well.

The subject of strategic defense was discussed in considerable detail, and with great intensity on both sides. Insofar as the President is concerned, he feels as strongly as ever that the research program designed to find the answer "Is it possible to defend against ballistic missiles?" is essential. And he insists upon that -- there was no give on that at all.

2nd REPORTER: Mr. Secretary, did the President give the Soviet leader any assurances that we would not go beyond research in SDI at this point?

Sec. SHULTZ: The President's statements in our meetings were very parallel to statements you've heard him make many times. On the one hand, insisting that we must pursue the research and answer the question, and if the answer to the question is positive, then, as he has said many times, he believes that we should all sit down and share this technology so that we can move into a pattern of deterrence that has a greater defense component to it. And if you had been sitting in the meeting, you would have recognized very clearly the things the President said.

3rd REPORTER: On the statement of agreeing not to seek -- not to achieve military superiority, how does that differ from the agreement made in Moscow in 1972 and 1973, of an almost identical kind, which the Soviets then almost immediately violated in Angola and other parts of the world?

Sec. SHULTZ: I think the military superiority refers to the respective forces. We have felt that theregional issues which you referred to are a very important component of this total picture, and as it has emerged in the course of this meeting, that notion that problems around the world and the distress that they produce is a major part of this problem. That emerged as something that is recognized on both sides, and there is set out here indications of an effort to get at it. And I think the notion that people arm themselves because of distrust, not the other way around, is very prominent here. So we have to start with these areas that create the tensions, and then of course working on arms control but wanting to see an interplay there.

LEHRER: Gorbachev spoke to the press for 90 minutes: one hour straightaway from notes, and then 30 minutes of questions from reporters. It was considered a most remarkable performance by all who saw it, and here's an extended excerpt from it.

Pres. GORBACHEV [through interpreter]: There were quite a number of private sessions held with President Reagan before the actual talks themselves. And this wasn't just a matter of arithmetic, how many hours it took. These were very frank talks; sometimes they were very lively. At one point actually they became very, very lively indeed. And [unintelligible], I think they were to a certain extent productive talks. Of course, a great deal more time was spent in these private sessions than planned. In fact, I would say they took up the main part of the time allotted to us over the two days. Now that we are saying goodbye, I was trying to think back just how many times we did meet -- I think it was some five or six different occasions we had to meet, and had an opportunity to spend at least a good hour talking to one another. And this enabled us to discuss a wide range of issues, looking at one another straight in the eye.

The talks proceeded in political language, in a very open way, in a very straightforward manner, and I think that was not only of great significance; I would say it was decisive. We said to the President that we were not striving for -- that we're not angling for superiority over the United States in security matters. I tried to put this across several times in our private sessions as well as in the plenary sessions, to express our deep conviction that less security on the part of the United States as compared with the Soviet Union would not suit our interests particularly, because this would lead to distrust and would spawn instability. But at the same time we assume that the Americans would operate in the same fashion, and as far as we're concerned, we said to the President and we said to all the members of that delegation, that for our part we would in no case allow the United States to gain superiority over us.

But of course it logically ensues that no one, neither the United States of America nor the Soviet Union, when considering matters as a matter of principle, should do anything to allow the arms race to extend into a new sphere, into outer space. And so if this is to occur, then the scale of military rivalry would be such, in other words, if it would open the door to an arms race in space, then it would have immeasurable consequences. And the arms race, I would say, to a certain extent will become irreversible, one can even go so far as to say that even now. Because it would be extremely difficult to monitor it, because at some point there would be the feeling conveyed that one might stand to lose out and one would frantically seek a way to accumulate and escalate more and more, and this would lead to further spirals thearms race -- not only in outer space but also on earth.

We explained to the American side that the Star Wars program will not only lead to a further arms race, but it will mean that all restraint will be blown to the winds. We've said again and again -- the American side was saying that it's a defensive system, this antirocket system with some space weapons. They kept saying how can you say after the Geneva meeting to your people that you refused the possibility of cutting down on offensive weapons?

Our answer to that is one I'll repeat to you now. We are prepared to engage in radical cutbacks in nuclear weapons provided that the door to unleashing an arms race in outer space be firmly slammed shut. We're thinking that after these talks, the American side will very carefully sift through everything that we have been able to say on this subject, and we see that the Americans aren't particularly happy with our way of reasoning. But frankly we fail to see their reasoning. They say that "If we're the first ones to come up with this solution, we'll share it with you." And I would appeal to the President to [unintelligible]. We've already said that we wouldn't wage a first strike, that we would not direct our weapons to the United States of America. So why are you already not only trying to maintain a certain stability for destruction under war to elsewhere. You're taking it even further in trying to spread the arms race into outer space. Don't you believe us when we say we won't wage a first strike?

If we were to talk about the technological superiority that would be required to carry off a Strategic Defense Initiative, well, all I can say is that it would certainly complicate matters for the Soviet Union, but they would come up with a response. And I said to the president, "Surely you realize that you're not talking to a simple folk. And if you as President are determined to stand by that idea, then you realize that I in my position will have to do something about it. We have now -- at present we have now reached a certain borderline in international affairs, and we must do our utmost to weigh every step.

There is still competition between us, but we have to try and keep a lid on this so that it not come into the level of the -- the sphere of military rivalry. We are quite well aware of the weaker and stronger points of the American society as well as those to be found in other developed countries. I'm well aware of the achievements they can claim, their potential, and actually we're all the more aware of our own potential, some of which is still untapped. In a word, we deplore competition with the United States or active rivalry with the United States.

The tension -- this is what we said both to the President and to the American delegation -- conflicts and even whole regions and wars, the wars which take place in this or that region between this or that country, whichever part of the world it's in -- these are all based upon what happened in the past and upon the social and economic conditions in which these countries and regions are existing today. To imagine that all these contradictions are just a result of the rivalries between East and West would be not only wrong, but it would be very dangerous on the world stage. Some people do still blame Moscow for everything, but they shouldn't. It should not be allowed, especially at meetings like this one. So we agreed at first that we're not going to say stupid things to each other of this sort. Enough of that sort of stupid remark has been made before the meeting. We listened carefully to the American President's assurances that they don't want nuclear war, they don't want superiority. And we hope profoundly that their statements will be based on facts in the future. Our aim is to achieve something better, both in Soviet-American relations and in the world in general. And in this respect, I would say that the meeting created the possibility to move forward. This is our overall view of the meeting's significance and what was achieved at the Geneva meeting. And this means that I can leave this hospitable city of Geneva looking forward to the future optimistically. Good sense must prevail. See you soon.

LEHRER: Now to the observations of the unofficial world, and first the views of Malcolm Toon, the former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, who has been with us throughout the summit. He listened to virtually all publicly spoken words these last three days, including those of the morning Shultz and Gorbachev sum-ups.

Mr. Ambassador, Gorbachev said the world is better, safer and quieter because of this summit. Do you agree?

Amb. MALCOLM TOON: I think I agree with that, because I have always felt that one of the gaps, at least in the first term of Mr. Reagan, was that we didn't have a continuing dialogue with the Soviet Union. And I think one of the results, if not the only result, has been a commitment to continuing dialogue, and I think that's a good thing. On the other hand, as you probably know, Jim, I am never terribly excited about summitry as a way of doing serious diplomatic and political business. And I heard nothing or saw nothing during this week, during this -- not clambake, I shouldn't say that -- this exercise, which would stir my enthusiasm for negotiations at the top. We did get --

LEHRER: Not even in what Gorbachev said in his statement that we just heard?

Amb. TOON: No.

LEHRER: No?

Amb. TOON: No. We did get, as you indicated, a commitment apparently to a continuing dialogue, but there was no narrowing of the differences on the really serious substantive issues that divide us. But you know, what really disturbs me about summitry is the fact that you run the risk of misinterpretation or conflicting interpretations of what goes on in the private talks. And of course, as you know, in Geneva this week we have set a record, I think, for time in private conversation.

There's a curious historic relationship between summitry and major and tragic world developments. Just look at the record down through the years. You had World War II, close collaboration with the Soviet Union at the summit, and then the Cold War; and then finally of course the demise of Czechoslovakia, the only democratic state in Eastern Europe, and gradually the total enslavement of Eastern Europe. Then you had the summit in 1955, Eisenhower with his British and French colleagues. And after that, of course, you had the brutal crushing of the Hungarian freedom fighters in Hungary in 1956. Then you had the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit in Vienna in 1961, and after that the erection of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis. Then you had Glassboro, with Johnson, a sort of mini-summit operating with Kosygin, who was not the party chief but head of government. And after that you had the invasion of Czechoslovakia. And then you had the summits with Nixon and Brezhnev, and after that you had the Yom Kippur war, which almost resulted in a military confrontation between ourselves and the Soviets. And then finally you had the summit which I attended in 1979 in Vienna with Carter and Brezhnev. And after that you had the invasion of Afghanistan.

LEHRER: What are you telling me, sir?

Amb. TOON: Well, I don't know whether there's any direct connection between what goes on at a summit conference and what happens afterwards, but what I'm really saying is that I don't think you can really judge the value of this particular conference and its achievements, now or for the next months or in the next years, even.

LEHRER: What about -- there was -- one of the high-level administration officials who chose to remain anonymous who did a briefing later this afternoon, before the President left, after the formal statements, said that the human factor, the fact that these two men met for six hours, was much more important than any of the policy dimensions and any of the policy problems that you might have with this summit. You disagree with that?

Amb. TOON: Well, perhaps I'm overly cynical, but I don't think really the human factor plays any role.

LEHRER: The fact that these two men got together for six hours, no?

Amb. TOON: You're dealing with a Soviet apparatchik, and the fact that Mr. Reagan is a very charming man and is able to persuade -- convince people of his point of view, which is true when he's dealing with an American politician or perhaps Western European politicians, is not necessarily true when you're dealing with a man that has come up through the ranks, through the party ranks, as Gorbachev has. He's a tough, hard-bitten apparatchik, and he's not going to be influenced by Mr. Reagan's personality.

LEHRER: What did you think of his performance at this news conference today?

Amb. TOON: I thought this was a real tour de force, and this guy is very able, articulate, he's on top of all the issues. He didn't -- as far as I could tell, he didn't use very many notes. He answered the questions just like that, and he is a formidable competitor. As a matter of fact, as I have often said, I think he's bad news for us and generally for the West, because he's much smarter than any of his predecessors, much more adept at spotting weaknesses and frictions between ourselves and our allies, and much more skillful at exploiting those frictions. I think we've got to watch him carefully.

LEHRER: What about the bilateral agreements that were signed here? Do they add up to anything?

Amb. TOON: Well, they are useful and significant, but not the sort of thing, it seems to me, that requires the imprimatur of heads of powerful governments like the United States and the Soviet Union.

LEHRER: Meaning, they didn't have to come to Geneva to do it.

Amb. TOON: They didn't have to come to Geneva to do it. And as a matter of fact, I'm a little bit disturbed by some of these bilateral agreements. The one on cultural exchanges, for example, it seems to me should have had some reference in there to the need for free flow of information and ideas. It's always been in cultural exchange agreements, and that gives us a peg, you see, for complaining about jamming. As you know, the radios are still jammed. Also I think there should have been some reference somewhere, a much more powerful reference, to our concern about human rights. There is a slight reference in the joint statement, but not enough, it seems to me.

LEHRER: All right. Ambassador Toon, thank you very much.

Amb. TOON: Thank you.

LEHRER: Robin?

MacNEIL: For further analysis, we're joined now by three people who held senior foreign policy jobs in previous administrations. In Washington, Madeleine Albright, a National Security Council staffer in the Carter administration, foreign policy advisor to Geraldine Ferraro's presidential campaign. She teaches at Georgetown University, where she's a specialist in U.S.-Soviet relations. Lawrence Eagleburger was undersecretary of state until a year ago, when he retired, and is now president of Kissinger Associates in New York. In New York, William Hyland, a top national security official in the Nixon and Ford administrations, who was involved in two summits with Mr. Brezhnev. He's now editor of Foreign Affairs magazine.

Bill Hyland, should we, can we count this summit in any way a success?

WILLIAM HYLAND: I think for President Reagan it's clearly a success. It's the kind of summit that he said he wanted: a general discussion, not focusing only on SDI or arms control; some discussion of regional issues, some bilateral discussions and so forth. For the President I think he would have to say it was a success, and I would agree. For Gorbachev I think it was a setback. My impression is that this is the end of a six-month campaign against SDI which simply has not paid off. Now Gorbachev has agreed to come to the United States, and I can't see any concession that he's gotten. His strategy may be to play for the long haul and hope that support for SDI will erode. But for now I think the President wins this one quite easily.

MacNEIL: Ms. Albright, a success for Reagan, a setback for Gorbachev?

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT: Well, I do think it was a success for Reagan, especially given the agenda he set for himself, which wasthat it would be a get-acquainted summit. And that certainly worked, and the power of his personality was persuasive. I don't agree with Mr. Hyland quite so much that this was setback for Gorbachev, because after all he's going to be able to put the spin that he wants on it. And I think that the press conference that Gorbachev had was tour de force, as Ambassador Toon said, and it may have been four or five o'clock in the morning in the United States, but it was full morning or midday in Europe. And therefore Mr. Gorbachev was able to put his spin on the whole events, and in fact pointed out the differences and also talked about the fact that there was a sense of responsibility that he got out of it. So I think that given the fact that he is able to orchestrate his public opinion better in Moscow and did have the propaganada advantage of talking to the Europeans, it was not quite as much of a setback as I think Mr. Hyland might be saying.

MacNEIL: So some success for each of them, you're scoring it?

Ms. ALBRIGHT: Yes.

MacNEIL: And what about you, Mr. Eagleburger? How do you see it?

LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER: Well, I thought it was a success until I listened to Mac Toon, and now I'm waiting for World War III. I think -- basically I think it was a success for both sides. How long it lasts, what it means, I think we have to see yet. I think Bill Hyland has a point in the sense that Gorbachev came to Geneva really hard-line on SDI; he left without getting what he wanted. It's a Soviet mistake, I think, in negotiations consistently anyway that they take this very hard line and then when they don't get it, all of a sudden we are all surprised that they're prepared to accept less. And I think in terms of the future we need now to remember that though the Soviets keep telling us there will be no arms control agreement without movement on our part on SDI, we don't need to take that necessarily at face value. They've proved that what they make as preconditions don't always stick.

MacNEIL: In that connection, I was intrigued by what Secretary Shultz said in the bit we just ran, and I wonder what you think of it. He said that while they didn't have any agreement which would lessen the arms race, he said it will give some political impulse to the negotiators in Geneva, which will perhaps be reflected in our own discussions in WASHINGTON. What does that mean to you. Bill Hyland?

Mr. HYLAND: Well, it's a little mysterious. But I guess what he's saying is that the discussion have opened up perhaps some new avenues, or at least small avenues, that have to now be explored. It's not quite the confrontation in concrete that it was at the outset, where we were saying absolutely no give on SDI, and they were saying you must close it off. Perhaps there has been some discussion that both sides want to reflect on, and maybe there will be a little movement.

MacNEIL: How do you read that, Mr. Eagleburger?

Sec. EAGLEBURGER: Well, I think you have to assume that both sides in these negotiations still have room to manueuver. I think we need to remember that the negotiations prior to this summit had not really had time to get into detail on the issues that these arms control negotiations have to deal with. So I have to assume both sides have some room for maneuver, and I have to assume that the secretary was in effect saying in part, yes, we have to think about what the Soviets have told us, we may have to make some changes, they will have to make some changes. And let's not forget that we apparently have ourselves another summit in the middle of next year, or sometime next year.

MacNEIL: June, in Washington, I believe it's to be.

Sec. EAGLEBURGER: And that's going to mean that there's going to be a certain time pressure on the negotiations because I have to assume that neither side wants to go into another summit without some movement on arms control.

MacNEIL: Yeah. Ms. Albright, earlier in the fall, Mr. Gorbachev hinted in interviews with Time and in discussions with American senators that some kind of research in so-called Star Wars might be acceptable to him, which suggested there might be a way, a formula, which could be accepted. Does that seem to have been closed down by the disagreement in Geneva? What do you make of all this?

Ms. ALBRIGHT: I think it's very hard to tell. I think Mr. Gorbachev did leave himself some room there also. One might have a feeling that he was floating a trial balloon originally when he had that interview to see how it would really play within his own circles, so it's hard to tell how much maneuver room he has. But I don't think that his particular way that he phrased it during the press conference in any way cuts that down. I do think that he is still in the position where he, as Mr. Eagleburger has said, has kind of locked himself in being opposed to Star Wars, and somehow has to get himself out of that position. On the other hand, as I said earlier, he is able to present it the way that he wants to, to his audience.

MacNEIL: How do you all account for the fact that with so slittle agreement and so much very hard talk, both of these leaders have come away in one way and another sounding optimistic? Mr. Reagan was quoted as saying on his way to Brussels, quoted by Larry Speakes as saying that he feels hope for the future, that he feels there was some achievement, a sense of achievement. You've heard what Mr. Gorbachev felt. Mr. Eaglebruger, how do you account for their relative optimism and their relative, you know, lack of product?

Sec. EAGLEBURGER: Well, I have to assume that neither one would admit there was a failure even if there were, and I don't mean that seriously in the sense I think they both probably do feel there hasbeen some movement. If in nothing else, they both now know the other a little bit better and they have a little bit better feel for each other, and I have to assume they come away from that believing that they -- you know, there is some possibility for some movement. I don't think any of us should be surprised that nothing more was accomplished at this summit than was in fact accomplished. I think going into it we already knew this would be the outcome.

MacNEIL: So is your reading of it, Mr. Hyland, that although no agreement was reached, their optimism reflects some opportunity -- in other words, there are things -- the reason they've set up another summit is that they found there are things they could possibly begin to negotiate on. Is that a fair reading?

Mr. HYLAND: I think that's ture, and I think both sides want to say, for their own purposes, that this was a success and they're looking forward to the next summit. Gorbachev has to go before his party congress in February. He will want to say, "I've met President Reagan, I can deal with him. There are serious differences, but it's not hopeless." And that's what he needs internally at this juncture, I think.

MacNEIL: What's your reading on that point, Ms. Albright?

Ms. ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that there is an importance to having these summits, which points out the argument that I might have the Ambassador Toon, as creating a sort of pressure to keep the momentum going on arms control, and that perhaps this is the way that having the summit in June will put some pressure on the bureaucracy on both sides to come up with some responses so that the leaders will not be embarrassed in another summit. Because quite accurately, I think, you can have one get-acquainted summit, but you can't have two or three. And therefore the next time there has to be some product. And I think that having regular annual summits is a positive step, not a negative one, because in fact it does create this decision-making mechanism that I think is important.

MacNEIL: What about Ambassador Toon's other point, that considering the way Mr. Reagan steered the agenda, or attempted to with his speech to the United Nations, did human rights and regional issues get as much airing as the United States seemed to want going in?

Ms. ALBRIGHT: Well, I think --

MacNEIL: Judging by what's come out, I mean.

Ms. ALBRIGHT: I would say, judging by what's come out, no. But I think it's very hard to say what went on in private discussions. I do think that human rights often is reserved for private discussions, and that may be the most appropriate, and it's very hard to tell. I found it interesting in Mr. Gorbachev's press statement that he did in fact talk about regional conflicts and tried to make clear that not every regional conflict was the fault of the Soviet Union. So I think he probably was responding to something that had taken place during the various negotiations. But I would say that given Mr. Reagan's desire to discuss that publicity in that way, he was not able to bring that about.

MacNEIL: Well, Mr. Eagleburger, given the Soviet desire to concentrate on arms control, could you score some success for Mr. Gorbachev in having kept the predominant part of the discussion on that?

Sec. EAGLEBURGER: Well, I don't know that we are certain yet that that's where the predominance of the discussion lay. But I think it's clear there was a lot of discussion about arms control, and it's also fairly clear that it was fairly sharp on occasion. I am inclined to believe on the basis of what we've seen so far that the regional issues probably in fact did get a good bit of airing. The human rights issues, we may know more tonight when the President reports to the Congress, because I assume he'll talk about that subject. I would suspect, however, on the basis of what we've seen so far, that while the balance may have been to a degree more on the side of arms control, that the regional issues probably got a fair amount of attention. So, you know, again, this is the sort of question that makes me think we're looking at a boxing match and who scored points. I think it's very hard to make a judgment on who won on that one.

MacNEIL: Yeah, because we didn't see the blows land, you mean.

Sec. EAGLEBURGER: That's right.

MacNEIL: And finally, Ambassador Toon said all these cultural agreements that were signed, you didn't need the impetus of presidental or first secretary presence to do that. How do you react to that?

Mr. HYLAND: Well, I agree with the ambassador. You don't need it, but once there is a summit, there is a certain advantage to using the occasion to say here are two countries that are trying to have a somewhat more normal relation. What's in the agreement is subject to analysis. I don't see any major harm. In fact, it's interesting that one of the first agreements reached in 1972 was a joint effort to develop an artificial heart. And now that looks like a very laudable project. At the time, that too was said, well -- people said, well, you really don't need these kind of things. So I think this may be one part of the summit that is actually beneficial.

MacNEIL: Ambassador Toon, in Geneva, you've been listening to this. I think each of our guests here is a little more -- has a more positive view of some success and positive outcome of the summit than you do. What are your comments, having been listening to this?

Amb. TOON: Well, apparently, Robin, I do find myself in a position of one against three, but I'm not unaccustomed to that -- that doesn't bother me at all. I think frankly it's wrong to try to decide who won and who lost. You never win or lose in a negotiation with the Soviets. I mean, all you can do is come out even. I think Mr. Reagan got what he was after, and that is a commitment to a continuing dialogue, and I think that's good. I think Mr. Gorbachev got what he came after, too -- not all that he came after; he wanted, of course, to collapse SDI. But he knew -- he's a realist, he's a pragmatist -- he knew he couldn't do that. But what he got was a reaffirmation of the January formula at the summit, as he put it himself in his press conference. Now, that means to me --

MacNEIL: What do you means by the January --

Amb. TOON: -- that while we have a commitment to an ongoing dialogue, we also have a commitment to a stalemate at Geneva unless there is some adjustment of the SDI position on the part of either side.

MacNEIL: Yeah, how do you read that?

Mr. HYLAND: I think I agree that the test is to come. The second summit, the June summit, if it comes off, will be crucial, because I agree with earlier comments, you cannot have two chit-chat summits, get acquainted; now we come down to the real issue, which is what happens on the armament issues. This may be a second chance for Gorbachev. But I would come back to my original position. Given the fury of the Soviet assult on SDI -- remember the Time interview, where he said war was -- the war danger was increasing. This is not much of an outcome for Gorbachev. His strategy almost now has to be to outwit the Reagan administration and to keep a moderate atmosphere and see if two years from now perhaps he can get something.

MacNEIL: You don't agree with that, Ambassador Toon -- not much of an outcome for Gorbachev? Because you're looking at it in the effect of his public relations impact in Europe and that sort of thing?

Amb. TOON: Well, I think what you want to do, Robin, and everybody back there ought to do, is read very carefully the text of Mr. Gorbachev's press conference. This I think is a clue to his thinking, and I think that if you read it carefully you will find that he's absolutely adamant on SDI, and there's just not going to be any movement at Geneva until there's some sort of adjustment to meet his position. Now, meanwhile, I think what he's doing in his press conference and generally in the positions that he's taken at this summit is addressing Western European public opinion, where, as you know, there is not a great adminiration for SDI -- as a matter of fact, there's serious disenchatment with it. And that's what he's trying to do, and that's what he's going to do from now on,and I think frankly he's going to have some success, unfortunatley -- primarily because he's much more skillful than any of his predecessors in spotting weaknesses and exploiting them.

MacNEIL: Do you agree with that, Mr. Eagleburger?

Sec. EAGLEBURGER: Well, I certainly agree with the point that the ambassador's made with regard to his trying to exploit differences. I don't think there's any question about that; I think we can predict now that he will be doing everything he can and indeed in the United States as well as Western Europe to try to get the opponents of SDI ginned up to put a lot of pressure on the President, arguing that if we don't change our position, we're going to go to into another summit without an arms control agreement. The only place where I would -- I'm not even arguing with Mac, but where I would at least -- what I think we need to think some more is, you know, he can be adamant. The Soviets have been adamant before, but I do think we need to remember that they have also backed off. I think there clearly have to be some adjustments on both sides on arms control, and I think its is also clear that SDI is a very tough issue for both sides. Whether the Soviets will stay with this hard position, I'm not sure, although I am sure they will do everything they can now to get public opinion in this country and in Europe ginned up to put pressure on the administration.

MacNEIL: Let's look at Mr. Gorbachev's performance. Ms. Albright, what do you think about Ambassador Toon's comment that he's a bad man for the West; that he's so effective, that he's dangerous?

Ms. ALBRIGHT: Well, I would agree with that completely, because I think that we have been kind of had by his public reltions approach and the fact that he's attractive and that he wears Western-cut clothes. What we forget about is his career and the fact that he has made it through a very tough bureaucratic structure, and has made it to the top. And one doesn't get that way just by accident or by being nice. And it's essential that we remember that we are dealing with a man that is a true Bolshevik, and that his inspiration is that he wants to develop the Soviet Union and will use whatever methods he has to be able to achieve that. I also think that we have talked a lot about this new generation, and I think that the new generation in a lot of ways may be more dangerous than the old generation, because they don't remember the alliance that we had during the war and generally kind of had a sense of the losses that came from the Second World War. And we are going to be dealing with very intelligent technocrats, and we ought to remember that, rather than thinking that we're dealing with some kind of a new breed of pragmatist.

MacNEIL: What's your comment on that?

Mr. HYLAND: Well, I guess I'm not quite as high on Gorbachev as others. I think he's very capable, but we've only seen him in action at one or two major events. He hasn't been in office a year. Maybe five years from now we should -- we would make a judgment. After all, Brezhnev and Kosygin in the late 60's, early 70's were a pretty formidable team.

MacNEIL: But to pick up on Ms. Albright's point, the arrival of technocrats who don't share the nostalgia of the older generation for ancient alliances and things, does that also mean less idelogical people? And might that not be an encouraging sign for the West?

Mr. HYLAND: Not necessarily. I mean, it could be that we're dealing with someone who will not appreciate all of the nuances and the geopolitics that some of the predecessors have, and many actually turn out to be more dangerous. There is a certain Khrushchevian overtone to the excerpt that we saw -- I didn't see the whole conference. But there was a certain reminiscence of Khrushchev in Gorbachev. I'm not so sure he is as much of a technician as we're giving him credit. He sounded very much like a regular party apparatchik in some of his answers.

MacNEIL: Mr. Eaglerburger, what's your view on how good or bad this new man is for the West?

Sec. EAGLEBURGER: I was fascinated watching the press conference here; I watched it earlier. I'm very ambivalent about the gentleman. I am inclined to believe for one thing he may be far more an ideologue than we think he is. Secondly, I think we need to remember that here is a man with virtually no experience of the world outside the Soviet Union other than a couple of trips to London and Paris, and he doesn't know us -- maybe he knows us a little bit better now. I am inclined to think he is a far less sophisticated fellow in terms of understanding the world than we give him credit for, though I agree with Mac Toon, he is a very good public relations type, he knows how to deal with these issues. And I think it is also clear he's going to work to try to extend the differences between us and the Western Europeans. But in general I am worried about him, and I think he may be more an ideologue than we think, and you could see little bits and pieces of it and edges in what he said in that press conference.

MacNEIL: Well, ambassador Toon, you have three people who agree with you on that point, and on that we have to leave it. I'd like to thank you in Geneva for staying with us; and in Washington. Ms. Albright, Mr. Eagleburger; in New York, Bill Hyland, thank you.

Finally, tonight's Lurie cartoon -- another perspective on the outcome of the Geneva summit.

[Ranon Lurie cartoon -- U.S. and Soviet peace doves kiss in outer space, converge, and get stuck together without being able to separate]

zMacNEIL: Once again, the top stories of the day. The Reagan-Gorbachev summit ended without agreement on major issues, but with two more meetings planned. President Reagan is flying back and will address a joint session of Congress this evening. Hurricane Kate hit the Florida panhandle forcing thousands to evacuate. And personal spending by American consumers suffered the biggest drop in 25 years.

Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: And good night to you, Robin, from Geneva. We'll see you tomorrow night. I'm Jim Lehrer. Thank you and good night.