Interview with the Prime Minister of Israel Menahem Begin; The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Begin

JIM LEHRER: Tonight, Menahem Begin talks with Robert MacNeil about what`s gone wrong and why in the push for peace in the Middle East. Good evening. Israeli Prime Minister Begin today criticized what the Egyptians have been saying about him and his people, and then countered with some comments of his own about Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, accusing Sadat of making some irrational statements and questioning the Egyptians` real motives for suddenly pulling out of the peace talks last week. Begin`s remarks came in a conversation with Robert MacNeil, in the quiet setting of the Prime Minister`s private office in Jerusalem. It was the first interview Begin has granted since the talks were suspended. It was filmed this morning, and then transmitted back here by satellite.

(Earlier today.)

ROBERT MacNEIL: Mr. Prime Minister, you told the Knesset last night you would not resume negotiations with Egypt until the Egyptian press stopped its campaign of vilification. Can you give me some examples of that vilification?

MENAHEM BEGIN: I said that we hoped that the Egyptian press will not repeat words of vilification against the Jewish people and the state of Israel and its government, and I really have such a hope. So the assumption, we believe that next week we shall be able to send our delegation to Egypt to participate in renewed talks within the framework of the military committee. Of course, if that vilification is repeated then we shall have to draw the conclusion you spoke of. But let us hope for the best- Now about vilification itself. First of all, suddenly during the negotiations to conclude peace treaties in a friendly atmosphere between President Sadat and myself and the delegations in both committees--the military which sits in Cairo, the political which came to Jerusalem --I am called in the Egyptian directed press "Shylock." For three centuries this word Shylock is a catchword for all the anti-Semites, including the Nazis, who used it for two decades; the Jew is a Shylock, et cetera. And now I have become a Shylock in the Egyptian press.

MacNEIL: How do you explain that you had suddenly become a Shylock?

BEGIN: This is an outburst, unwarranted, unjustified. I was only three weeks ago the hero of peace in the Egyptian press. When I came to Ismailia there was a placard: welcome to me, the hero of peace. And suddenly somebody pushed a button, because it`s a directed, a controlled, press, and said, "Attack." So they went out on the attack in the press and used that particular word. That`s not enough. There was another article in which they vilified the Jewish people, saying that to conduct negotiations with the Jews means to conduct negotiations with the "speculators of all generations. "This is Nazi language, so we`re right in Der Sturmer, in the thirties. And of course I could give more quotations; on television we don`t have enough time for all those anti-Semitic quotations. That was the fact. I would like to tell you, the

Jewish people were humiliated by its enemies for centuries. No more. We have now a Jewish state, we fought for our own liberation; nobody gave us our liberty, we had to conquer it at sacrifices of the best of our men; we sustain our own independence. We of course want peace, we want negotiations, peace treaties, but nobody in our time of our national redemption can again vilify our people, the Jewish people, call them names, try to humiliate them and then say, "Nothing happened, come to Cairo, let us negotiate." That is impossible, that would be hypocrisy, and therefore we said, "If you continue your vilification, we shall not come to Cairo. If you stop it, we shall send our delegation."

MacNEIL: You said you might send the military negotiators back to Cairo next week. Is there any chance of the political committee resuming its negotiations soon?

BEGIN: We won`t renew both committees. For the time being, the situation is that President Sadat suddenly, out of the blue, recalled the Egyptian delegation from the political committee, and it is up to the two parties to reconvene that committee, in which both the Egyptians and the Israelis are represented. So if there is such an agreement, the political committee will also be revived; but that depends on the other side. Meantime, we are willing to send our delegation to the military committee, because we want the negotiations to go on -- provided we see during the week there are no more Shylocks in the Egyptian press.

MacNEIL: You say somebody pushed the button. Is it Mr. Sadat who pushed the button that started this campaign?

BEGIN: I can`t say, and I hope not. But it doesn`t change the situation. Surely it`s a directed press, there is a propaganda ministry. I suppose that either the propaganda ministry or the foreign office in Egypt pushed that button. Otherwise, no other explanation for that sudden outburst of the worst feelings and the use of the worst words we know for centuries.

MacNEIL: In whose eyes is Egypt trying to discredit you?

BEGIN: I didn`t get your question, please?

MacNEIL: In the eyes of which nation or nations is Egypt trying to discredit you?

BEGIN: First of all, the Egyptian people themselves, and then probably anti-Semites who still dwell in certain countries. To them it`s music when they hear that the Prime Minister of Israel, the Jewish Prime Minister, is a Shylock; they like it. But first of all, they intended to incite the Egyptian people against the government of Israel and against Israel, and then they tried actually to frighten us -- you know, "If you don`t submit to the Egyptian demands, we shall call you names," and there was also a threat to make war on us. In one of the articles they said that I should remember there may be another October. What happened in October? We call it the Yom Kippur war. They took us by surprise, it`s true, and we had at first very difficult few days, with hundreds of (unintelligible) of our best men, youngsters, just after school, who went to defend literally with their bodies our people. But then we overcame, and I don`t want to exacerbate the situation, but the fact is that our army, after the fifth day of fighting, was very close to two capitals from which that war started. We don`t want to boast about it, but to try to frighten us with another October is childish, and we cannot be impressed by threats of war. Of course we hate war, we hate bloodshed; we want peace. But if attacked we shall defend ourselves.

MacNEIL: Can we examine the Egyptian motivation a little more? When you came back from the talks in Ismailia at Christmas time, you said that your relations with Mr. Sadat were warm and friendly and hospitable. Are they still?

BEGIN: I hope so. I said yesterday in Parliament -- really, as you said, at Ismaciliyah it was a wonderful relationship. We sat together for personal talks, we were together at our delegations, we discussed problems, in a most friendly atmosphere. And President Sadat stressed the fact, which I liked very much, that although we have differences of opinion, we should keep our friendship. And we shall discuss our problems, as it should be. And then I had to say that there were two interviews given by President Sadat to the weekly called October. The first was a good interview; I read it and I enjoyed it. Even he made some jokes about us, telling the Egyptian people that we have two chief rabbis, and they don`t speak to each other -- which is true. Well, and those jokes were perfectly all right with me; sometimes you have to joke at yourself, so what`s wrong with it? But it was all said in a friendly manner, no slurs at all, no insults.

But then came the second October interview. What a difference. And I asked yesterday, rhetorically, our Parliament, perhaps there are two Sadats? I don`t know. Because he was a completely different man. For instance, saying that our peace proposal means to say to the Egyptian people, "Sleep, and I will kill you." Well, that is, to use an understatement, an hyperbole which is absolutely incomprehensible. This is our peace plan? We suggested, look at this map; this is the Sinai Peninsula -- that Egypt will be in the Sinai Peninsula, to be demilitarized of course; it must be demilitarized so it is not there to get into a basis of aggression against us as it was in five wars. But we will leave the Sinai Peninsula; this was our suggestion.

And then to say that this peace plan means to lull them into sleep and then we shall come and kill the Egyptian people, it is not a rational statement, I say so with full respect. And therefore I wondered how come the man Anwar Sadat, who came to us to Jerusalem, we received him with the utmost hospitality, with warmth; and when I finished our nocturnal talk at 12:30 in the morning, he summed it up:" You are my friend." And I am. Of course, today I can say I have a sentiment for President Sadat; and when he called me "my friend" I reciprocated. We became friends; we struck a friendship. And from my point of view, it will go on. We want peace, and I want to make peace with him so that our nations can get rid of all the wars, the trials, the bloodshed and develop their economy, improve the social conditions.

MacNEIL: Is Sadat completely in charge of these negotiations, or is there some tension or difference of opinion between him and the Egyptian foreign office?

BEGIN: I`ll tell you something of my own experience. President Sadat is the ruler of Egypt. If he takes a decision, that`s that. For instance, I remember there was a discussion in the conference room at Ismailia when the representative of the Egyptian foreign office suggested that we should sign, conduct negotiations about peace agreements. I said, it should be written peace treaties, because a peace agreement is a very abstract concept. A peace treaty is concrete under international law; the first paragraph in all the peace treaties stipulates the state of war has been terminated, and then territorial issue, relations, diplomatic connections, et cetera, et cetera. And the man representing the foreign office of Egypt did not agree. He said, we cannot write peace treaties, only peace agreements. President Sadat listened to the discussion, and he turned to the man in the Egyptian foreign office and said, "Write peace treaties." And that was the decision. And in the document which we agreed upon was written "peace treaties." However, we learned that when it comes to formulations, judicial problems, President Sadat is being influenced by the people of the Egyptian foreign office, because, as he says so himself, he is not interested in the details. The details, may I say, are quite important. Napoleon Bonaparte used to say, "Care about the details; they are very important." But he, President Sadat, has got the general outlook and he pursues and decides about general policy. He doesn`t take interest in these details, and then he depends to a certain extent on his learned advisors. And we saw with our own eyes that they are the most intransigent and adamant because of the school of thought they lived in for, let me say, three decades.

MacNEIL: Well, for example, you told the Knesset last night, in example of differences of opinion, that President Sadat, when he was in Jerusalem, promised you that the Egyptian army would not advance beyond a certain line in the Sinai. But when it came to negotiations in the military committee, the Egyptian war ministry had quite a different line. How do you explain that?

BEGIN: It is the same, and it isn`t. The story illustrates the differences. But of course here we speak not about foreign office people and formulations, but about military affairs. I will only explain this: in Jerusalem President Sadat told me the Egyptian army will not cross the Giddi and Mitla passes, as you can see them to the west -- this is the line. And the distance between this line and the international border to which, in accordance with our peace plan, ultimately the Israeli army should withdraw, as we agreed in advance -- the distance is between 180 and 200 kilometers. That was the pledge with President Sadat. Then our Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman, goes to Egypt with the Chief of Staff; he presents a map in accordance with the pledge given to me by President Sadat, and General Gamasy, the War Minister of Egypt, presents his map, and what`s the difference? He says only forty kilometers from the international border there will be a demilitarized zone. In other words, the difference of 140 up to 160 kilometers, as you can see now between the two lines. To us it is a world; it means either that the Sinai Peninsula will be remilitarize or will be demilitarized.

MacNEIL: Do these differences emerge just from Mr. Sadat`s carelessness with detail or lack of interest in detail, or does it represent some change of heart on his part?

BEGIN:I wouldn`t go as far, but the fact is that he agreed with me on that line, the Giddi and Mitla passes, and then -- probably when the plan came for consideration between the generals of the Egyptian military staff -- they reached a different conclusion. And I cannot imagine that they would have brought their plan without President Sadat`s consent. So probably he had later on, may I say, an afterthought. But he never denied the pledge given to me in Jerusalem. I brought our peace plan to Isma`iliyah; I read out from my written document, "We base ourselves on the promise given by the President to the Prime Minister in Jerusalem to the effect that the Egyptian army will not cross the Giddi and Mitla passes." He didn`t say one word, let me assume -- did I say so to you? No. There was complete silence in the room. Neither he nor his advisors denied it. Yet the concrete plan was different, as I told you, with a difference of more than 150 kilometers. But we shall bring again our plan; I called yesterday from the rostrum of the Knesset on President Sadat to keep his pledge. It`s necessary for his credibility. I hope he will.

MacNEIL: How do you explain Mr. Sadat`s charge that you deceived him over the Israeli settlements in the Sinai?

BEGIN: He didn`t say so; no. The Egyptian press, some of the newspapers, said that I misled him. The difference between misleading and deception is maybe small, but we shall not forget it. Sadat never said that I even misled him. What he said in his speech was, That is true that the Prime Minister of Israel brought to me the plan, including the question of the settlements. But two days earlier I met Ezer Weizman, the Defense Minister of Israel, and I told him I will not accept those settlements. And the statement is true in both parts; namely, he met the Defense Minister of Israel, he told him he will not accept a settlement. Then two days later I came to Ismaciliyah, I presented him our peace plan with the settlements because this is a most vital issue for us for our security in future. He said we have a difference of opinion; he also repeated that we cannot accept it. But then everything was friendly, and we agreed that with this difference of opinion we shall continue our negotiations within the framework of the two committees, on which we agreed, in a personal talk, in two minutes. So it wasn`t the problem of an ultimatum. There was no expression, "If you stand on keeping those settlements, I don`t have anything to tell you," or, "there is superfluous discussion in the future," et cetera. Not at all. On the contrary, both parties, as it should be, agreed: we have a problem, we have a difference of opinion, now we have two committees and our friends in the two committees will discuss it until, as we hope, they will reach an agreement.

MacNEIL: Well, if that was the atmosphere, how do you explain to yourself the sudden withdrawal of the Egyptian delegation from Jerusalem a week ago?

BEGIN: I can`t explain it, because I was taken by surprise completely. So was the Secretary of State, and so was the Egyptian delegation. They just got an order to pack up and go back to Cairo. I can only surmise, I can make an assumption what happened: I suppose that the foreign office people in Egypt, after President Sadat gave his consent to have the political committee in Jerusalem, told him that that is no good, that the Egyptian delegation shouldn`t stay, let me say, for several days or perhaps several weeks in Jerusalem. Because there is the so called front of the rejectionists -- or you may call them the Tripolitanians, those who took part in the conference of Tripoli.

MacNEIL: The Arab states who oppose his negotiations.

BEGIN: That`s right, and they say, Well, that may mean recognition of Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel. And probably they said so to him that`s not so good. And then he also decided that perhaps it`s better to withdraw the Egyptian delegation. That is the only logical assumption, because there is no other rational explanation of this sudden step.

MacNEIL: Are you suggesting, then, that the break off of the negotiations was a tactical step by Mr. Sadat to remove the political committee from Jerusalem -- because that implied some recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital?

BEGIN: Of course it was a tactical step; that`s only my assumption. I cannot say for sure that it is as I put it to you. It was a tactical step suddenly to break up the negotiations within the framework of the political committee. And then he tried, in his speech, to put Israel, let me say, in a certain position of having had an ultimatum: You will have to change your proposals or give up your proposals, in order to make the renewal of the negotiations within the framework of the political committee possible. It`s a kind of pressure on Israel: "If you want the political committee, you can`t have your position. Change it." We are not going to submit to it. But it was probably that reason.

MacNEIL: You had an exchange on the day that the talks broke off here, with some Egyptian newspaper editors, and you said later that after that you began to understand something, and you implied that it was that in Mr. Sadat`s mind he had made a major concession by agreeing to recognize Israel`s right to exist. Is that the big hang up in the situation?

BEGIN: No, no, no. What I learned from the Egyptian journalists was that they see a great change, a far-reaching change in the fact, as one of them put it to me, that President Sadat and Egypt now recognize -- I now quote - - "your right to survive, or your right to exist." Then it dawned on me that that was the assumption by President Sadat. He came to Jerusalem, he will recognize our right to exist or to survive, and then in exchange we have to give anything he asks for. And then I explained to the Egyptian journalists, for two decades you probably are so accustomed to hostility to Israel that you perceived it as the most far-reaching change in the fact that there is now recognition of Israel`s right to survive. That`s not the case. Then I told them, We have never asked you to give us such recognition. What do you mean, the right to survive or the right to exist? We have such a right, as any other nation, far or near, great or small, strong or weak. I never heard about anybody speaking about recognition of the right to exist of Belgium, or of Luxembourg, or of Liechtenstein. Now I again will repeat, the visit by President Sadat to Jerusalem was an act of civil courage; and we recognize it. But for that recognition of our right to live, to ask us to jeopardize our security, to mutilate our country, to put the lives of our civilian population in jeopardy, in direct danger, as the case would be if we should accept the demands by President Sadat, that is a complete different story. And therefore, it now dawned upon me about that illusion, or the misunderstanding, they had in Egypt. They may have been sincere: Look what we did for the Israelis; we hated them, we fought against them, we conducted five wars against them, we wanted to destroy them, as they did. Now, what a change. A revolutionary change. We recognize the right to survive. And therefore, whatever we ask you, you have to submit to. That was the mistake.

MacNEIL: But wouldn`t that state of mind explain why the peace proposal that you responded with seemed to them -- because it was the beginning of a bargaining position, I assume -- seemed to them like an inadequate gesture in response to what they considered this very considerable gesture?

BEGIN: So they say, even more so. Sadat said in that second October interview I already mentioned to you, "I gave Begin everything, he gave me nothing." Look at this map; this is nothing. And therefore, whenever we say that we have problems, they say, "What do you mean, problems? We recognized your right to survive." But that is absolutely unwarranted. It is inconceivable. This is probably the misunderstanding between us. Now it will be cleared up. After that crisis we had during the last week, President Sadat and all the Egyptian leaders will know, thank you very much if you recognized our right to exist; this recognition doesn`t mean anything to us. It is the natural thing to do between all the nations. All nations have a right to exist. What we ask you, and what we are going to negotiate with you, are the conditions for peace treaties in which there will be mutual recognition -- of independence, sovereignty, and peace.

MacNEIL: Are you not concerned that world opinion might see Mr. Sadat`s gesture in very simple terms, whereas yours -- your position is much more complicated, requiring on the precise wording of Resolution 242 of the United Nations; and Mr. Sadat`s gesture might therefore carry the day just in public relations terms?

BEGIN: It doesn`t. It doesn`t carry the day, although some of his advisors would like to carry the night. It doesn`t at all. My friend, I think we already succeeded in convincing the leaders of your great nation that all these problems are not problems of formula and words and letters, they are problems of our life. Look at this map, please. When President Sadat asked us to go back to this green line, to the west, to the sea, and the mountains should be the Palestinian state, then we are in mortal danger because then all our citizen towns will be in the range of the conventional artillery. If there should be a so-called Palestinian state, in no time it will be taken over by the PLO, which is bent on the destruction of Israel - - they will get all the Soviet artillery, tanks and guns, et cetera -- and every woman and child is in direct physical danger. It`s not a matter of formulations, it`s a matter of our lives.

LEHRER: Interestingly enough, while that interview was in progress this morning, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was issuing a statement here in Washington during a moratorium on public statements from the major Middle East parties. He asked for what he called "a period of quiet." Whether Begin`s remarks were quiet enough, well, time will tell -- the time it will take for President Sadat to react.

Assuming travel plans go as expected, Robert MacNeil will be back in New York tomorrow night, and we`ll see you then. I`m Jim Lehrer. Thank you and good night.