The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; The Falklands -- U.S. Position

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. The British said today they had completed the capture of the South Georgia Islands and the Argentine commander had surrendered, but Argentina said parts of their garrison were still holding out. Argentina complained to the United Nations Security Council and the Organization of American States, claiming British aggression.Argentina temporarily called off further negotiations with Britain being conducted by U.S. Secretary of State Haig. In London, Prime Minister Thatcher said the islands had been captured by Royal Marines meeting little resistance, with no British and only one serious Argentine casualty. She said about 180 Argentinians had been taken prisoner and would be returned to Argentina. Prime Minister Thatcher said the urgent need now was to speed up negotiations. President Reagan said in a Washington speech that the situation was increasingly difficult and time is surely running out. Tonight, with Britain demanding support from its closest NATO ally, and Argentina pleading for hemispheric solidarity, what options for the United States? Jim Lehrer is off; Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in Washington. Charlayne?

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Robin, at the request of the Argentines, the Organization of American States today began meeting to consider a call for assistance. This call comes under the aegis of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, widely known as the Rio Pact. Signed in 1947 by 22 nations including the United States and Argentina, the treaty would permit economic, diplomatic or even military sanctions against any country guilty of aggression against a member state. The treaty specifically states that an armed attack against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all American states.The regional defense zone ranges from Greenland to the Antarctic. The treaty also condemns war and threat or use of force inconsistent with the U.N. charter, and pledges efforts to settle all disputes between signatories peacefully, before they are referred to the United Nations. At the time of the signing, Argentina served notice to the conference challenging Britain's claim over the Falkland Islands, and asserting its claim over them. At this afternoon's special OAS session, Secretary of State Alexander Haig said implementation of the Rio Pact's provision would be inappropriate, and that the United States wanted to continue serving as a mediator.

ALEXANDER HAIG, Secretary of State: President Reagan believes that the United States has perhaps a unique ability to assist the parties. Under his direction I have made myself available to both, accepting their invitations to sound out their views and suggesting avenues to approach a framework of peace. Throughout this arduous period we have been aware that the stakes for the international community, the Americas and the two countries are very great. Continued military action will exact a heavy price. The enemies of the West could find fresh opportunities to seek that position of influence on the mainland of the Americas they have so long sought.It's quite clear that the crisis has reached a critical point. New military action has taken place. Unless a settlement can be found in the next few days, more intensive fighting is likely to occur.

The conflict over the islands affects us all. As we consider what we can do to help the situation, let us recall these points. First, there has been a use of force by an American state already, followed bya U.N. Security Council resolution which clearly sets forth the basis for a peaceful solution. While we should take advantage of the peaceful settlement procedures available to us in this forum, it would be neither appropriate nor effective to treat this dispute within the collective security framework implied by the Rio Treaty. Second, any resolution considered for adoption by the foreign ministers should be examined against a criteria of whether it contributes to the peace process, whether it impairs the peace efforts already endorsed by the Organization of American States, and whether it strengthens the ability of this organization to contribute in the future to easing crisis. Our participation in the Inter-American system pledges us to strengthen the peace and the security of this hemisphere. In the search for a solution that both parties can accept with honor and responsibility the United States remains at the disposition of the parties at this critical hour. We are redoubling our peace efforts. With your help we may succeed.

MacNEIL: For a view of how the outbreak of fighting is viewed in Washington, and an assessment of how it will affect the U.S. position in the crisis, we have Harry Ellis, who has been covering developments there for the Christian Science Monitor. Harry, you've just listened with us to that piece of Alexander Haig's speech late this afternoon. Do you read that as a diplomatic way of saying no to Argentina?

HARRY ELLIS: A very diplomatic way, but it also is saying no. The United States really does believe that invocation of the Rio Treaty is inappropriate.The treaty says that an attack upon an American state shall be considered an armed attack upon all of them. In this case Argentina did the attacking, was the aggressor, on a territory the sovereignty of which is clouded internationally. So I think it was a diplomatic way of saying no.

MacNEIL: But as the Argentine foreign minister, who spoke before Mr. Haig, said to the OAS, Britain attacked South Georgia while negotiations were still ostensibly going on. Has that fact changed the diplomatic position for the United States at all?

Mr. ELLIS: It has changed it in the sense that it makes it harder for mediation to take up again. I think that what the United States now hopes is that the fighting will stop with the recapture of South Georgia, and that on the other hand, within the OAS the foreign ministers will not vote sanctions against Britain, but perhaps simply some kind of resolution expressing hemispheric solidarity with Argentina. If that were to occur -- those two things -- then it might open the way for further mediation.

MacNEIL: Is there any likelihood in the U.S. view that the OAS will vote for sanctions against Britain -- that a majority will?

Mr. ELLIS: Very little likelihood. Almost certainly, Argentina can get a resolution expressing some form of hemispheric solidarity. Very likely, also, Argentina could not get a resolution which would have to be passed by a two-thirds majority invoking sanctions.

MacNEIL: Now, Secretary Haig, we've seen widely reported, was not very surprised about the British determination to use force, and perhaps even expected it in South Georgia. Do U.S. officials now expect the British to follow that up with an attack on the Falkland Islands themselves? Is that the feeling in Washington?

Mr. ELLIS: The feeling in Washington is, or I should say, perhaps, the hope in Washington is that having run the British flag up over South Georgia, having recaptured the island, that this may assuage British pride to the extent that there can be a breathing space while the British fleet maneuvers around the Falklands while the OAS does not invoke sanctions against Britain, and that this would be the opportunity for the mediation effort by the U.S. to take up again.

MacNEIL: Washington is coming under increasing pressure from some politicians, but also from the British, to take sides in this. Does the Reagan administration feel -- and Mr. Haig feel the time is approaching when he will have to take sides?

Mr. ELLIS: Reluctantly, if the fighting were to spread, or if the OAS were to invoke sanctions, then the United States would have to take sides. That side would be with Britain. So what the United States hopes is that it will be able to resolve the situation peacefully.It would side with Britain, but it would hesitate to do that, or it would be very reluctant to do that if it injured American interests in Latin America. And those also are important.

MacNEIL: Is there any expectation now among the people around Haig that this is going -- that there is some useful role he can play, and that a peaceful solution can yet be found?

Mr. ELLIS: I think there is some expectation because, if one listens carefully to what Prime Minister Thatcher has said since the recapture of South Georgia, and to what the Argentines themselves are saying, then it would appear that both are still looking to Mr. Haig to find some fresh way to reach a compromise that will allow them to retire with grace on both sides. After all, the British are not really opposed to giving up sovereignty over the islands. They want first of all to make sure that the self-determination of the -- the rights of those 1,800 islanders are preserved, and that that is publicly shown, and then that there be proper negotiations for a transfer of sovereignty, but not under the gun, so to speak, of an Argentine military presence on the Falklands.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: For a view from Capitol Hill, now, we go to the Senate and Richard Lugar, a Republican from Indiana, and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its Western Hemisphere subcommittee. Senator Lugar, Senator Lugar, Senator Moynihan says that diplomacy is dead in this situation.Is that the prevailing view in the Senate?

Sen. RICHARD LUGAR: No, I don't believe so. Clearly, the prevailing view in the Senate would be as Harry Ellis has just said, sympathy with Great Britain and the feeling, if push comes to shove, that's where we would be. But it seems to me that there is considerable sympathy with the work of Secretary Haig and others who are advising him; there is sophistication in the Senate that we have interests in Latin America; that these have been growing, that this administration has tried very hard to engender a sense of greater fairness in North-South issues; and to recognize that we have great stakes in our relationships with others as we call upon them to help us. And we have done so, in the case of El Salvador recently, and Nicaragua, and various other situations. Well, we're asking, really, people actively to take part in helping us in the hemisphere.

HUNTER-GAULT: So that in the view of the Senate, and perhaps in the Congress as well, this mission should be continued by Secretary Haig?

Sen. LUGAR: Yes, I think without any doubt emotions flow rapidly in these situations.There is a common sense viewpoint, I think, in the Senate that aggression was committed by Argentina, as the U.N. has suggested, and as persons observing, common sense [unintelligible]. But at the same time, there is also a sense that the expense to Great Britain and to Argentina, and ultimately the United States, could be very great if conflict occurs. Tonight's peacemakers are not very popular and the mail comes in and people say, "Well, it's somebody else's lives and fortunes, why not go at it and sort of settle this thing?" There's a great deal of romance surrounding Her Majesty's fleet going down there: pronouncements such as we heard last night, that all of it was settled in 15 words or less. But the facts are that it's a complex issue that could extract a great deal out of the hides of our friends and ourselves, and there is a great deal to be said for the negotiation process.

HUNTER-GAULT: Well, given that delicate line that the United States has to walk, what else do you think the U.S. could do and should be doing at this time in seeking a negotiated settlement?

Sen. LUGAR: Well, I think we are going at this at the maximum. In other words, I think essentially Secretary Haig's travels have been extensive, exhaustive. He's prepared to come and go as are other diplomats. That is what we ought to be doing. Our statements have been well prepared and reasonable, in my judgment. We were entertaining, as a government, in the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate, Mr. Pym the other day, hearing likewise from the Argentinian people about their situation. There are other forums in which we can be understanding, in which we can shed some light on this historically, but I think essentially the ball is in the Secretary's court, and this is why pronouncements by senators, members of the House, are not terribly useful while the negotiations proceed.

HUNTER-GAULT: I see. If the British go ahead and attack the Falklands, what does that do to diplomacy, and where does that put the United States?

Sen. LUGAR: Well, I think diplomacy probably still continues. I see this, and it may not be an exact analogy, but cases in court which have a jury trial, and the lawyers attempt to settle it out of court beforehand; sometimes they do, sometimes they don't. Sometimes the trial starts, you have a few witnesses and a little sparring around. Sometimes you get well into the trial before it's perfectly clear whose hand is which. And that may be the case. We're still going to have a need for diplomacy to unravel this, even if we go through several stages of hostilities.

HUNTER-GAULT: And there's no sentiment in favor of the position that we are bound by the Rio Treaty to support Argentina?

Sen. LUGAR: No.I think diplomatically Secretary Haig indicated that would be inappropriate, that clearly the Rio Treaty doesn't cover aggression, and aggression has been committed by an American state in this respect.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right, think you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Now another opinion of what the United States should do. Larry Birns is director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, which monitors U.S.-Latin American relations.Mr. Birns, where does the latest situation leave the United States, in your view?

LARRY BIRNS: Well, I think that the position that the United States has now caught itself in is essentially the bitter harvest of an extremely misguided Latin American policy on the part of the Reagan administration. I think the capstone of this policy was the statement by the President when the Falkland invasion took place that we're friends of both sides and that we should really try to solve this problem. Now, no one, of course, disagrees with the good offices of the United States, but to generate equality between a country like Great Britain -- the Westminster style parliamentary democracy -- and a dreary, right-wing military dictatorship that has liquidated 15,000 of its own people since it seized power in 1976, I think is distorting the whole notion of equality and equilibrium. I think that it's observed by many that Argentina would not have made the move, would not have invaded the Falklands if it didn't feel that the Reagan administration would give a benevolent tilt to the operation. This has been openly speculated, and even before the Falkland invasion, by Argentine newspapers which said that the United States would "understand what we have to do." Now, the fact that the Reagan administration has sent scores of high-ranking State Department officials to a country with whom its closest foreign relationship is the Soviet Union in an effort to aggressively court Buenos Aires indicates to me a policy without moral content, and a policy that didn't even pay off on a pragmatic basis.

MacNEIL: Well, then, taking the situation from where it is now, what do you think the Reagan administration should do?

Mr. BIRNS: Well, like the Senator and Mr. Ellis, I certainly don't want to see any kind of military encounter take place, but what I would imagine would be a useful thing to do right now is to mount pressure on the Argentine military regime, a regime which has many different tendencies in it, which is answerable, really, to no one except itself -- I would engage in a graduated increase of pressure on the military regime by slowly beginning to shift positions to Great Britain. I think that Haig's statement that he made before the OAS today is step one of that course. I'd like to see step two and step three that is instrumented to the nature of the Argentine response. If Argentina continues to insist that it's Britain who has violated international law, not itself, then obviously the military in Argentina is not facing reality, and we have to just continue to build pressure on them.

MacNEIL: But it has been reported that a great many Latin American -- at least a number of Latin American nations sympathize with Argentina for one reason or another of their own -- hemispheric or Latin solidarity, or because they themselves have territorial claims on neighbors, and would they not interpret this switch by the United States negatively, and would our whole posture in Latin America not suffer if we did this?

Mr. BIRNS: Well, our posture in Latin America today is pretty poor, and I think that Latin America in general is pretty much of a mess today. In terms of Argentina you have the bizarre condition of countries like Nicaragua, Cuba and Grenada supporting Argentina -- countries which the Argentine government is busily trying to overthrow -- their governments; and you have democracies like Venezuela supporting Argentina. In the case of Venezuela, of course, it's very interested in legitimating the principle that you can use force to change boundaries, because it has a border dispute against nearby Guyana. And Peru, another democracy that's supporting Argentina, has a boundary claim against Chile. A number of very important countries in the region don't like what the Argentines have done. Argentina, by the nature of the kind of regime it is, and the nature of its enormously high levels of human rights violations, doesn't have a high alliance potential with countries in the region or overseas.

MacNEIL: Finally, can I ask you briefly, how many of the countries in the OAS will support Argentina's contention that this is British aggression, not Argentinian?

Mr. BIRNS: Well, Argentina will need a two-thirds vote -- 14 votes out of the signatories to the Rio 1947 Pact. It is possible, as it was suggested before, that a generalized statement could acquire the two-thirds vote, but certainly not a strong statement condemning the British action. It would be absurd to label Britain the aggressor in that situation.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: Finally, now, a Latin American perspective. It comes from L. Francis Bouchey, the executive vice president of the Council for Inter-American Security, an independent educational research institute concerned with Latin America and the Southern Hemisphere. Mr. Bouchey served in the Nixon administration from 1970 to 1973, and was responsible for the recruitment of Peace Corps directors in Latin America. Mr. Bouchey, what's your view of how the U.S. has handled this diplomatic mission?

L. FRANCIS BOUCHEY: Well, I think that our involvement has certainly been positive to this point; however, I think that it is terribly important for the United States not to allow Great Britain to ask us to choose between it and the 21-country alliance of Rio, all for the sake of some 1,800 shepherds and a remnant of colonialism.

HUNTER-GAULT: But what do you think should happen?

Mr. BOUCHEY: Well, I think that a negotiated settlement is indeed possible on terms that will meet the minimum requirements of both the Argentines and the British. I am fearful that there has been insufficient pressure to date on the British to be serious about negotiations, and I think it was unfortunate that Mrs. Thatcher came out so strongly in terms of British sovereignty immediately, so that she has put herself in a position that makes our efforts on their behalf rather more difficult.

HUNTER-GAULT: What kind of signals -- in what Secretary Haig has been doing and the position of the United States has been, what kind of signals is that sending to Latin America?

Mr. BOUCHEY: Well, I think that there has been a generally reserved, reservedly positive reaction to the U.S. involvement, but there is a great deal of suspicion that when push comes to shove the United States will more than likely come down on the side of the British. The fear that I have is that the British will move to regain the Falklands. If they move militarily, they have little or no choice than to attack the Argentine mainland to take out the air force, which is a substantial edge for the Argentine. At that point I think it is difficult for us to argue that the Treaty of Rio is not applicable, because American territory will have been struck militarily. So that so long as they could remain restricted to the Falklands per se, I think we could still credibly maintain that position.

HUNTER-GAULT: Oh, you mean up to this point, we -- do you agree with the position that the Senator and others have taken that the Rio Treaty does not apply and we are not bound to assist Argentina?

Mr. BOUCHEY: Not at this point.

HUNTER-GAULT: That Argentina has been the aggressor?

Mr. BOUCHEY: But it could very easily disintegrate, and I think that at that point the United States is in the posture of probably coming out the sum loser because we will be perceived as an irresponsible ally to the other countries that are signatories to the Rio Pact.

HUNTER-GAULT: Is that all that would happen if we sided with the British?

Mr. BOUCHEY: Well, that's a rather -- that's rather substantial because you're talking about one of the two most important treaty arrangements that the United States has, and it's particularly important in terms of the nature of the global competition we're engaged in with the Soviets in the Southern Hemisphere.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right. Robin?

MacNEIL: Senator Lugar, what's your view of that, that if we edge towards the British as this grows more serious militarily, we alienate more of Latin America?

Sen. LUGAR: Well, that's entirely possible that we will. I'm not certain that we have easy choices in this respect. I would guess that we're trying very hard to negotiate now and sort of keep it all going, and I would agree that attacks on the mainland of Argentina, various other escalations to make it even more difficult, ultimately, though I suspect that the politics of the situation are that we will side with Great Britain, that Argentina must know this in one respect or another, and if not now, fairly soon, and that this may assist us and be more effective in negotiating.

MacNEIL: Mr. Bouchey, what do you think of Mr. Birns' contention that the Reagan administration in a sense invited this Argentine action in the first place?

Mr. BOUCHEY: I would not concur in that judgment; however, I would cite the fact that both the United States, our State Department and the British Foreign Office were somewhat remiss in not having picked up on the Argentine intention very early on.

MacNEIL: Yeah. Mr. Birns?

Mr. BIRNS: A couple of things here. One thing is that I think that we've all learned that you can't easily do business with dictatorships. Now, the Reagan administration has effectively learned that you can't do business with extremist leftist regimes, but it has never learned, in fact, it directly repudiates the notion, that it's equally difficult to do business with extremist right-wing regimes. The Argentines have continuously said that their relationship with the Soviet Union is non-negotiable. That no matter how much the United States attempts to woo the Argentine government, the military government, that this is not going to be bought at the sacrifice of its relationship with the Soviet Union. So for the United States to come forth with the position that it's dealing with an ally or a government which has high credibility I think belies the fact that essentially the Falkland thrust by the Argentine government was done for Argentine reasons. It wasn't done for reasons of patriotism.It was done for reasons to prop up a highly unpopular military regime that had lost credibility even with the middle class due to the disastrous economic situation in Argentina, and also a government that had alienated the civilian population by highly repressive actions. And so essentially this was not a coherent government. It was a government that had run amuck, and that needed a Falkland operation to restore credibility to itself.

MacNEIL: Excuse me. Harry Ellis, there has been a lot of reporting to the effect that Mr. Haig found a great deal of disunity and competition and, in effect, political chaos within the Argentine leadership. Have you picked that up within the circles around the Secretary?

Mr. ELLIS: Oh, I think that, probably, Robin, is quite factual because the enormous domestic problems which Argentina has, and which had been possibly on the lip of nationwide strikes and severe difficulties, are perhaps one reason why the present junta went into this action. So I think indeed that there are generals and colonels on the sidelines watching very closely to see if their turn comes next.

MacNEIL: Senator Lugar, are you confident that the United States can getout of this without either driving Argentina into the arms of the Communists, or alienating Britain and the Europeans?

Sen. LUGAR: Yes, I think we have a good possibility of coming out of it fairly well. First of all, I think that we will not alienate Great Britain. I don't think that's in the cards. And, secondly, it appears to me that the blackmail that somehow Argentina might go to the Soviet Union is just simply not credible. I would guess that there are already ties with the Soviet Union; these have been expressed in this program. Maybe some more. But we've had to live with that for a long time, and it seems to me that we will not suffer further. I would hasten to add, however, that our chances of maintaining good relationships with the rest of Latin America are almost the paramount point that I would make, leaving aside Argentina.

MacNEIL: With that observation I'm afraid we have to leave it. Gentlemen, thank you all for joining us tonight. Good night, Charlayne.

HUNTER-GAULT: Good night, Robin.

MacNEIL: That's all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.