The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Shultz Shuttle: Israel Accepts

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ROBERT MacNEIL [voice-over]: Israel accepts plan for withdrawal from Lebanon. But will Syria block it?

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MacNEIL: Good evening. The Israeli Cabinet today accepted a plan negotiated by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz for withdrawal of troops from Lebanon. But the Syrian state radio said the plan would mean Arab surrender and warned Lebanon not to accept it. Lebanese President Amin Gemayel welcomed Israel's acceptance and said he would make his own decisions without outside tutelage. Syria's reaction will be crucial because Israel says it will not withdraw its 25,000 troops unless Syria pulls out its estimated 40,000. Secretary Shultz is going to Syria to seek approval tomorrow. Today he briefed Jordan's King Hussein. In Washington, the White House said the Israeli action was a positive development and a good foundation for wider Middle East peace talks. Tonight, the price of the agreement and will it work. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, the Israeli Cabinet reportedly accepted the agreement reluctantly, one Cabinet member saying afterward, "It was not a good arrangement -- we should have had a better one." He said Israel went along anyhow in hopes it would lead to some stability and peace along the border between Israel and Lebanon. Former Defense Minister Sharon was one of the two Cabinet members who voted against acceptance, on grounds it did not guarantee against the return of Palestinian guerillas to southern Lebanon. There were strong indications that Secretary Shultz and the Reagan administration also sweetened the pot for Israel. Secretary Shultz was asked at a news conference if the U.S. would now reconsider its decision not to send Israel 75 new F-16 fighter planes. "I don't want to scoop the President, but I don't see any reason --" Shultz stopped his answer there in mid-sentence, giving rise to believe the answer was in fact yes, Israel will now get those fighter planes, the delivery of which was suspended following Israel's invasion of Lebsnon 11 months ago. The deal from Israel's perspective and why it did finally agree is what we get first now from Mordecai Abir, formerly a consultant to the Knesset defense and foreign relations committee. He's a professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, now here as a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars. Mr. Abir, do you think the F-16s had anything at all to do with why Israel went along?

MORDECAL ABIR: I think that you know the answer, it's obvious that it did not have anything to do with this. That was to sweeten the pot, yes, at the most, but Israel had held the whole matter as closed and as promise that has to be fulfilled anyway. In the past we've had the same kind of things, that we had to pay for the same thing twice or three times -- I don't think that Israel would have paid anything for just delivery of the F-16s in 1985 -- and we are speaking about 1985 of course.

LEHRER: Sure. Well, from your perspective, why do you think Israel, the Israeli Cabinet, finally today agreed on this?

Mr. ABIR: I think it is a combination of constraints, internal constraints and foreign policy constraints. Internal constraints: there was a consensus in the country, that Israel should abandon the central part of Lebanon and retreat to the Awali line -- that is, Awali River line. Mr. Begin came under increasing pressure from public opinion to follow the wish of the people, and we have seen in the past the public opinion in Israel can be very, very strong indeed when it forces government to take decisions. So, that was one thing. And then, of course, the matter of the future plans of defense: it was felt within the government as well once Mr. Sharon was no longer the deense minister, and Mr. Arens had taken over -- and I know Mr. Arens personally very well -- his lines of thought are very different than those of Mr. Sharon. The third point was of course a consideration of the relationship with the United States and what was at stake if the agreement would not go through.

LEHRER: Is it -- you heard what I said a moment ago quoting a Cabinet member -- it was actually the energy minister, I believe, who said that this was not a good deal, essentially, for Israel. How does it look to you, based on what we know about it?

Mr. ABIR: I would repeat what Nadayir[?] said: it's not a good deal. Because it actually opens the possibility of additional violence. I don't think that there are many people in the military in this country who truly believe that the Lebanese army is able to police the area and to take care of the security of the area. It will be a long time before they will be able to do that. Now, if the Israeli plan was to be put to work, there would be stronger units in the area, and they would be working out of centers within the area, within the Lebanese border area.

LEHRER: What you're referring to there was what Israel originally wanted, was the right to patrol, I think it was in -- what, 25 miles inside the border, right, to protect their own border?

Mr. ABIR: Yes, about 40 kilometers. And that is, of course -- gradually, this was eroded, the Israeli position, step by step -- which was to be expected. But the rumors about what the deal was, that is that just eight Israeli soldiers will go with each patrol, and the commander would be the Lebanese and the whold operation would be a Lebanese-conducted operation, and then Israel would not have the guarantee of a trusted person in the area, such as Major Haddad. All of that tends -- leads me to --

LEHRER: Mr. Haddad being the Christian leader --

Mr. ABIR: The commander of the militias -- not just Christians.This is a repeated mistake. The majority of his soldiers are Shiites and not Christians, by the way. All that leads me to believe that this was a far greater concession on the part of the Cabinet, and had it not been for the conviction of Mr. Begin himself, I don't think that any other minister could carry it through.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: For a Lebanese perspective, we turn to Halim Barakat, a professor at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University in Washington. Mr. Barakat was born in Syria, raised in Lebanon; he's the author of the book Lebanon in Strife. Would you regard this as something of a victory for the Lebanese, Mr. Barakat?

HALIM BARAKAT: We don't know yet what are actually the terms of the agreement. The Lebanese have been seeking a peaceful solution and they want Israeli withdrawal. I think also the Syrians are interested in seeing an Israeli withdrawal because they will be -- they are so close to Damascus. Now, the Lebanese have three main concerns, and I'm not sure to what extent this agreement meets these concerns. One major concern is the concerns of any self-respecting sovereign country. To have Israelis doing patrol in Lebanon, within Lebanese boundaries, is an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty and that's how it's going to be seen by the different Lebanese factions.

MacNEIL: Even if it's just a token number of Israelis such as we just heard.

Mr. BARAKAT: I think sovereignty is a symbolic thing and this token thing is seen symbolically as an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty, and I doubt that any self-respecting sovereign country would tend to accept that. This is one basic concern. Another concern is that Lebanon more than ever needs to heal the wounds and thus reconcile the different factions, contending factions within Lebanon.

MacNEIL: Who are fighting each other again today.

Mr. BARAKAT: Who are fighting each other. So we have to see -- the Lebanese government would have to be worried about whether this agreement is likely to undermine its attempt at reconciliating the different Lebanese factions and provide unity.

MacNEIL: From what you know of the agreement in broad outline, do you think it is likely to exacerbate those differences or heal them?

Mr. BARAKAT: I doubt that the more there is Israeli visibility in the south patrol, the less it's likely to heal or to facilitate the government's attempts to reconciliate the different contending factions.

MacNEIL: Let me ask you this. You heard what I quoted the Syrian state radio as saying, warning Lebanon not to accept -- "it would mean Arab surrender." If that turns out to be the position of the Damascus government when Mr. Shultz goes there tomorrow, can Mr. Gemayel say no and just make his own decision as he boasted today?

Mr. BARAKAT: I think the Lebanese government has to take Arab reactions, and especially Syrian reactions, into consideration, and this I think is a third major concern. That is, the agreement has also to take into consideration how other Arabs would perceive this agreement and whether it is interpreted as a threat to the Syrian security. I think the more Israel has influence within Lebanon, the more this is going to be interpreted within Syria as a threat to the security of Syria, and Syria is likely to interfere and undermine this agreement.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: The next move is up to Syria, because if they don't play, the deal is off. For a perspective on what the Syrians are likely to do, we have Talcott Seelye, the U.S. ambassador to Syria from '78 to '81. He's now a consultant on Middle East affairs. Mr. Ambassador, how do you interpret Syria's strong negative reaction to this deal?

TALCOTT SEELYE: Well, I think you first have to distinguish between the rhetorical reaction, which is the reaction to the press, and what may be a basic policy decision by President Hafez al-Assad. I don't think there is any place in the Arab world where the difference between rhetoric and reality or policy is greater than in Syria, so I'm not surprised by this negative rhetorical reaction. This is something that is predictable. But I think if you look at the past history of recent years in Syria, you will find that on a regular basis, their rhetoric has been strident and negative and very destructive. And yet quietly Syria has in a number of instances agreed to very constructive and moderate policies, so I don't think that we should conclude that this initial negative reaction is going to be the final policy decision of Hafez al-Assad.

LEHRER: What do you think is going to be the final reaction?

Amb. SEELYE: Well, I think that depends, really, on what the terms of the agreement are, I think Syria would find it very difficult to accept any Israeli presence in Lebanon -- certainly any military presence, and I would guess they would probably have difficulty in accepting even this small observation group that's talked about in the press. And that being the case, I think we will have problems in getting Syria to agree. If on the other hand, through the diplomatic efforts of Secretary Shultz and perhaps through the good offices of the Lebanese, it's possible -- it's conceivable, in my view, that the Syrian government might conceivably agree to this very small, non-combat Israeli observation presence. This is possible, but it's something still that I -- it's a moot question.

LEHRER: From Syria's point of view in the big picture, and you can define the bigness and the smallness of that any way you wish, which way does Syria have more to gain right now -- going along with the deal or finding a way to reject it?

Amb. SEELYE: I think Syria has made the decision that while all things being equal, that is, if the Israelis were not present in Lebanon, they would prefer for the indefinite future to remain in the Bekaa Valley at least -- that is the valley that separates Lebanon from Syria -- because the Bekaa Valley in the Syrian strategic view is one of the most natural invasion routes for an Israeli army should a full-scale war break out. So at least for a strategic reason, the Syrians would, in all things being equal, want to remain there. But, I think that the Syrians' overriding concern is that the Israelis leave Lebanon and that therefore if the Israelis leave Lebanon, then the Syrians will do so likewise.

LEHRER: If you were in a position to advise Secretary Shultz, what would you tell him, what should be his pitch when he sits down with the president of Syria tomorrow?

Amb. SEELYE: First let me note that I think it's extraordinarily significant and important that Secretary Shultz is going to Damascus tomorrow. I think we have made a mistake in the last few years in not according enough high-level attention to the Syrian government because one cannot talk of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement without including Syria at some point. Therefore his visit is extraordinarily important first in terms of the U.S. government recognition, the highest level, that Syria must be involved in any kind of resolution of problems in the Middle East. I think what I would do in my talks to Hafez al-Assad, who incidentally makes an extraordinarily good impression in terms of a meeting, private meeting -- he is a very intelligent, very moderate, calm individual -- I would propose that Shultz tell him "Look, we have in mind a comprehensive settlement, but we're going at it step-by-step. The next step is obviously hopefully negotiations between King Hussein and the Israeli government.The step after that has got to be a Syrian participation, and we do not envisage in any way, shape or manner excluding Syria from a peace settlement, and this means involving the Golan Heights and Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights as well as from the West Bank in Gaza." And I think if he tells that to Hafez al-Assad, that will help a great deal, even though that isn't your main -- to the present problem.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Does today's agreement build a foundation for wider peace efforts? With us now is Judith Kipper, a Middle East specialist with the American Enterprise Institute where she's a resident fellow. Ms. Kipper recently returned from a five-week trip to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Ms. Kipper, do you think the Shultz effort made the big difference, or it was very largely internal political pressures in Israel?

JUDITH KIPPER: I think the Shultz visit clearly made the difference, and I think at the outset when Ambassador Habib went out to do the groundwork and to prepare the detailed agreement and so on that it was always understood that closing the deal, so to speak, would be done by the secretary of state, and we know here in Washington that he had reserved this week on his calendar as a time when they thought an agreement would be likely and he was prepared to go if it would be possible to close the deal. I do think that the bombing or the embassy in Beirut made it an imperative to go.

MacNEIL: What are thoughts on whether Mr. Shultz can get the Syrians to go along? You heard what the former ambassador just said.

Ms. KIPPER: I would certainly agree with the ambassador about paying more attention to Syria. Syria is a very big power in the Middle East, and it should be regarded as such and I think we need to consider its political culture -- of Syria as well as other Arab countries. But I think that whether Syria will agree to this or not will depend on what the United States can offer Syria.We already know that the secretary of state and probably the President is reconsidering the F-16s for Israel. It was announced in the Israeli press, I believe the radio, that Prime Minister Begin would indeed be visiting Washington sometime soon, and there are carrots and sticks. And I think that Syria needs to be brought into the larger formulation of American policy in the Middle East -- at least to have a consistent, high-level, important, substantive level of consultation which we have not had so far; and we do need to also consider Syria's security concerns because they do have security concerns on their border with Lebanon.

MacNEIL: The Israelis have as good as said, and the foreign minister repeated on television tonight, that if the Syrians didn't go along, the Israelis would reserve the right to act unilaterally, and most people interpret that to mean they would pull all their troops back to that 25-mile line north of the -- inside Lebanon that was talked about earlier. Wouldn't the Syrians rather avoid that, having, as it were, a permanent large encampment of Israeli army, and have instead eight observers per patrol?

Ms. KIPPER: I think that they would like to avoid that, but I'm not always sure that Syria can gauge its own political acts in synch with what the Israelis are about to do, and I think that the Israelis probably are considering that very seriously and might even do it as a gesture of goodwill towards the United States, a partial pullback to the 25-mile/40-kilometer zone and just sit there and wait.

MacNEIL: Do you think that moderate Arab states, the Saudis and perhaps King Hussein, are going to think that the U.S. has, so to speak, delivered Israel enough to convince them to help the U.S. move forward with a wider peace effort now?

Ms. KIPPER: I don't think that they'll consider that the U.S. delivered Israel, but we do have to remember that this is the sixth Arab-Israeli agreement that has been negotiated by the United States. No one else has succeeded in negotiating any kind of agreement between the Arabs and Israel. And we have a very unique role, the United States, in being in fact the only party to whom they all turn, Arabs and Israelis, in seeking peace. And though most of the parties, Arabs and Israelis, don't much like our policies, think we ought to do this or that on one side or the other, they have no place else to go. The American role is fundamental, and I think Secretary of State Shultz' presence in the area, after the very painful event of having this massive attack on our embassy, was a signal of that no matter how tough it is, that unique role gives us a certain responsibility to keep going.

MacNEIL: Has the role been enhanced -- the U.S. role been so enhanced by getting this agreement out that some of these states are now going to think "Okay, let's now cooperate in the next steps," which is presumably what Mr. Shultz would like to urge on King Hussein?

Ms. KIPPER: Well, I personally don't think that this is a great triumph, but if we had a 40-watt bulb burning before, now maybe we've got a 75-watt bulb. But it's not bright enough yet.

MacNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Mr. Abir, do you see this as a great triumph for United States diplomacy and Secretary Shultz?

Mr. ABIR: I think it is in proportion to what the United States has attempted to achieve all the time. It would not be something new if I told you that it was widely rumored in Israel on the best authorities that the U.S. has been stiffening the back of Lebanese resistance to the Israeli demands for a very long time. And moreover, the role of Saudi Arabia was definitely a primary role in what happened. It was very clear that nothing is being done without coordination with Riyadh. And it seems that --

LEHRER: Let me ask Ms. Kipper about that. Does that jibe with what you've been told -- that the Saudis played a strong role in this?

Ms. KIPPER: I think that we tend, the Israelis and Americans, tend to overestimate the role that Saudi Arabia plays. I believe that Saudi Arabia means it when they say that whatever the other Arabs will accept, they will accept. They did say that no infringement on Lebanese sovereignty, but that's also an American position because we are trying to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon at this moment.

LEHRER: From the Lebanese point of view, the United States, do you agree that only the United States could have gotten this deal together?

Mr. BARAKAT: Well, the United States has, I think, the greatest leverage because of its influence over Israel to do that in the immediate future. Yes --

LEHRER: Mr. Abir was suggesting that its real clout was with the Lebanese, more so than with the Israelis.

Mr. BARAKAT: I think the Lebanese and the U.S. differences in point of view are minimal as I read it, and Lebanese have agreed to begin with on the terms -- on certain terms that would preserve the Lebanese sovereignty, and as much as it does not open the new difficulties for Lebanon locally and in Arab countries.

LEHRER: Let's go to the Syrian question, to you, Mr. Abir. You heard what everybody else has said, about what the United States do, what Shultz should do, etc., etc. What's your feeling about that?

Mr. ABIR: Well in the first place, Syria has played a destructive role in all the negotiations in the past because of a basic attitude of a rejection of Israel and leading on the rejectionist front, and I doubt it very much if Syria would --

LEHRER: Rejection of Israel meaning rejection of Israel's right to exist?

Mr. ABIR: Yes. And it is my impression that the U.S. has tried in the past. We had the Kissinger attempt and being slapped in the face in a sense. I don't think that that has changed very much. But at the same time, as to what Ms. Kipper has just said here, I would just want to interject here and remind Ms. Kipper that Hafez al-Assad ended up in Riyadh as well to coordinate. It was not Fahd who came to Hafez al-Assad but vice versa, and there is a clout -- there is a certain clout to the United States here, and the clout is Arab consensus number one. There is a general Arab consensus now, and this is exactly what the Americans are supporting as well.

LEHRER: Consensus for the withdrawal of Syrian troops?

Mr. ABIR: No, to get the Israelis out.

LEHRER: Get the Israelis out, right.

Mr. ABIR: If the Syrians are the ones who are the obstacle, they are immediately the target of propaganda by that and by [unintelligible] will be -- that is no question in my mind. And the second question is a question of a subsidy, a very substantial subsidy from the oil countries.

LEHRER: Do you agree, Mr. Ambassador, that it would take -- I mean, Arab pressure could bring the Syrians around, could they not? -- no matter what Shultz says over there.

Amb. SEELYE: I think that Arab pressure has an impact, but I think we overexaggerate the extent of Arab pressure. What Hafez al-Assad will decide is pretty much a matter of what he thinks is Syria's best interest. The Saudis do have a small role to play --

LEHRER: But what everybody else is suggesting is that the Saudis and the other moderate states might make it in his best interest to get the Israelis out, if that's what essentially is going on here.

Amb. SEELYE: I understand that, but he knows what his best interests are, and I don't think that their influence would be that great. Let me just make one correction of what Mr. Abir said. I think it's incorrect to characterize Hafez al-Assad's policies as rejectionist.Now there are Arab rejectionists. Mr. Qaddafi is a rejectionist. The country of Southern Yemen is rejectionist toward Israel. But Hafez al-Assad is on the record, and he has restated this a number of times, including during my tenure, of supporting the basic U.N. resolutions 242 and 338, which are in effect recognition of Israel in the context of withdrawal from occupied territories. So I want to make that -- put that on the record.

LEHRER: All right. It's done, and we've got to go. Robin?

MacNEIL: Yes. Ms. Kipper, Mr. Abir, Mr. Barakat, Ambassador Seelye, thank you for joining us. Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night, Robin.