The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour

Intro ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Leading the news this Friday, China's Communist Party chief resigned in the wake of prolonged demonstrations. Former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane reiterated that President Reagan gave prior approval for arms sales to Iran. Airport radar failed to detect a small plane that collided with another over Salt Lake, killing ten. We'll have details in our news summary in a moment. Jim? JIM LEHRER: After the news summary, we have an extended excerpt from Robert McFarlane's Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, a major look at the turmoil and the change in China, and update about acid rain in the western part of the United States, and finally the late Ray Bolger's big scarecrow scene from The Wizard of Oz.News Summary MacNEIL: The leader of China's communist party, Hu Yaobang, resigned today, apparently forced out over the widespread student pressure for more democratic reforms. The 71 year old Hu, who has led the communist movement in radical economic reforms, submitted his resignation after admitting mistakes. Observers said he'd been forced out by leader Deng Xiaoping, whom Hu had been widely expected to succeed. Deng was reportedly unhappy with Hu's handling of the recent student pro democracy demonstrations and the way he handled liberal intellectuals, who've been accused of inciting the students. Premier Zhao Ziyang was named as acting party secretary. The student demonstrations began early in December and were partly inspired by Deng Xiaoping's own promises of more open government and other political reforms. Jim? LEHRER: Former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane told his Iran arms story again today. His audience was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which is holding hearings on what went wrong with administration policy toward Iran. McFarlane said President Reagan's decision to deal with Iran was based mostly on information from Israel. He said Israeli sources made sure his Iranian contacts were legitimate and influential. ROBERT McFARLANE, former NSC Adviser: It was clear that before this was ever brought to our attention, the efforts of Israel to validate the legitimacy of these people was very thorough. And I say that in the context of these people having, indeed, made themselves very vulnerable and enabling -- putting themselves in extremely compromising positions which, if disclosed today, could put them in a very risky state. LEHRER: President Reagan today ordered his present National Security Council to stay out of covert operations and other special activities. The order was made in a memo written by National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci. The memo was made public today. MacNEIL: The President of Equador Leon Febres Cordero was kidnapped by rebel officers demanding the release of a jailed general. And late today, the vice president of that country said he would agree to the exchange. Febres Cordero, who is 55, was elected in 1984. He was seized on a visit to an air force base and taken hostage, along with his defense minister. The imprisoned General Vargas Pazzos was jailed following two attempted coups last March. Hours after his capture, the president broadcast a radio appeal for calm. The government declared a state of emergency. In Washington, the State Department demanded the president's release before the Equadorian announcement of the exchange.

CHARLES REDMAN, State Department: The United States government is totally opposed to this apparent attack on constitutional democracy. Leon Febres Cordero is the democratically elected president of Equador. We firmly support the rule of law and the maintenance of democracy in Equador. Support for constitutional democratic government is one of the pillars of our foreign policy. We deplore this reported insurrection. We call upon those holding the president and his aides to release them immediately and abide by the constitution and democratic process in Equador. MacNEIL: West Germany has agreed to extradite a suspect in the 1985 TWA hijacking if the U. S. guarantees he will not get the death penalty here. The suspect is Mohammed Ali Hamadei, a 22 year old Lebanese, the first arrest in the 17 day hijacking in which a U. S. Navy diver was killed. The Reagan administration said it was involved in sensitive talks with West Germany about the extradition. LEHRER: There were some hopeful words today from the chief U. S. arms negotiator in Geneva. Max Kampelman said the atmosphere of his first meeting with the new Soviet negotiator was constructive, and he said they had a rather serious exchange at that session yesterday. The new Soviet is First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov. He replaced a man of lower rank. Kampelman was promoted to State Department Counselor to keep things even. There was an unexplained show of Soviet arms in Kabul, Afghanistan, today. Soviet armored units were suddenly deployed throughout the city. Western diplomats told the Associated Press the action seemed most unusual and so far without explanation. MacNEIL: In Utah, investigators said a small plane flew into a restricted area when it collided with a commuter aircraft. The collision yesterday killed ten persons aboard the two planes and showered debris on a residential neighborhood near Salt Lake City. Air safety officials said air controllers did not see the light plane, a Mooney M 20C, on radar before it collided with the Skywest airliner which had eight persons aboard. At the time, the commuter plane was coming in for a landing at Salt Lake International Airport on a flight from Idaho. This was the first U. S. commercial disaster this year and the second midair collision in five months. LEHRER: Senator George Mitchell from Maine introduced national acid rain legislation today. His proposal came one day after an Environmental Protection Agency study showed thousands of western lakes in danger of becoming acidic. Until recently, acid rain was thought to be a problem for the industrial northeast only. Mitchell said his new bill covers the whole country.

Sen. GEORGE MITCHELL (D) Maine: Acid rain is associated with more, not less, damage to our health, aquatic life, forests and buildings than we previously believed. As time has passed, the case for tough, national acid rain controls is more, not less, convincing. There is a threat. And I think it would be unwise to develop a national policy based upon the premise that we would only act after damage has been done. LEHRER: The Justice Department wants an independent counsel to look into possible misconduct of former Presidential aide Lyn Nofziger. A spokesman said today there is enough evidence to warrant an independent counsel investigation. Nofziger allegedly lobbied administration officials on behalf of his private clients within one year of leaving the White House. Such lobbying would violate conflict of interest laws. Nofziger was chief political adviser to President Reagan during the first year of the Reagan Presidency. MacNEIL: That's the news summary. Coming up, new McFarlane testimony, the rocky path to reform in China, the latest on acid rain, and remembering Ray Bolger. On the Stand LEHRER: Robert McFarlane is first tonight. The former National Security Adviser testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today. The committee is holding hearings on administration policy toward Iran. McFarlane again linked Israeli officials with the Iran arms sale diplomacy, but he said it would have been a cop out not to have made contact with Iran. He was asked about U. S. reliance on information gathered by Israel.

Sen. MITCH McCONNELL (R) Kentucky: Do you think it's a rather dangerous position for us to take to rely almost exclusively on any other country's intelligence assessments as a basis for initiating a policy which, by your own admission, was fraught with danger? Mr. McFARLANE: It seems to me that if there was to ever be anything except copping out and doing nothing, which is safe but irresponsible, that you should start something with the best information you can get -- and we did. Let it run until you see whether they are delivering results and these people are people of influence -- and we did. And when you are shown that they can not, even if they are well meaning, deliver, stop it. You should do that, and I tried. Sen. BROCK ADAMS (D) Washington: I am concerned about the testimony of Secretary Shultz before the House committee that -- he says, ''I learned not as a result of being involved in the development of the plan'' -- and we're talking about this authorization -- ''but, so to speak, as a plan that was about to be implemented. I learned in various ways of the two proposed transfers during 1985, but I was never informed and had the impression they were not consummated. '' Are you saying to me now that he knew that it was the President's decision that he verbally communicated, but at the end of this, some type of instruction was clear within the National Security Council statutory people that this was going to be done? Mr. McFARLANE: Absolutely yes, Senator Adams. Now, the knowledge of the specifics, the detail, the scope, the intent of the President's decision was understood by the Secretary of State and Defense, and they expressed, again, their opposition to it. Now, as to whether or not after the decision the continuing awareness by them of what was going on did occur, I would say that, first, in that same transcript, the Secretary of State acknowledged that in 1985 -- Sen. ADAMS: Yes, he knew that this was being discussed, but he indicates he thought that the policy -- and that's what we're trying to talk about here -- that the policy either had not been implemented, or he didn't know anything further about it being processed during your watch. Mr. McFARLANE: No, during my watch -- Sen. ADAMS: -- what happened to you afterwards. Mr. McFARLANE: I believe, if that transcript is complete, it also says that while there for him, the Secretary of State, was lesser awareness in 1986 than in 1985, he testified there was considerable discussion and to and fro about it. And specifically, I took occasion to just go back and try to recall the numbers of times and settings and occasions in which I, with him and others on the NSC -- the statutory cabinet level people -- was in touch or met with them. And in only three months' time, from July, August, September, it came to more than 200 contacts with those five or six people. Sen. ADAMS: Was there a written Presidential option memo distributed to them? Mr. McFARLANE: No. But there was no ambiguity or uncertainty by them of the nature of the decision. Sen. ADAMS: All right. Now, I want to, because my time is running out, ask you -- now, you're out of office. You're on the receiving end of instructions. And people are saying that this is the Presidential policy in 1986 on which you operated. Did you receive that with a written Presidential option memo, a verbal contact? How did you know what the policy was? Mr. McFARLANE: In May of 1986, when I was asked by the President to go, ostensibly to open a political exchange, I was given written instructions -- terms of reference, they were called; four pages of them. And it was on that basis that I proceeded. Sen. ADAMS: And who did you receive those from? Mr. McFARLANE: From the National Security Adviser. Sen. ADAMS: Mr. Poindexter? Mr. McFARLANE: That's correct. Sen. ADAMS: In other words, your successor. Mr. McFARLANE: That's correct. Sen. ADAMS: So you had written instructions of what you were to carry out. Is that correct? Mr. McFARLANE: That's correct. Sen. ADAMS: Did you notify, at that point, the Secretary of State, the CIA, any of the other operating agencies of your instructions and mission? Mr. McFARLANE: I asked whether or not they were involved and who had approved these instructions and was told that the Secretary of State was involved, indeed, and that the President had approved the instructions. Sen. ADAMS: You were told that, but you didn't see a Presidential option memo or anything, because you were out of government at that point. Is that correct? Mr. McFARLANE: That is correct. And I was called in for this meeting the day before I was -- had already -- or they had already arranged for me to leave. Sen. ADAMS: Was the President or the Vice President or any of the other officials, other than Mr. Poindexter, there present and issuing to you instructions verbal or written? Mr. McFARLANE: They were not. On my return, the President acknowledged that the instructions were, indeed, his instructions. Tumult and Change MacNEIL: Next, we turn to the events in China, the ouster of that country's Communist Party leader, and whether that signals the end of the economic and political reforms put into place by Deng Xiaoping. We'll be talking about that with a China expert, a former Peking correspondent and a Chinese author. Then we'll look at how the Chinese experiment with reform is spilling over to its neighbor, the Soviet Union. First China, where today's announcement of Hu Yaobang's resignation capped six weeks of political struggle and protest.

[voice over] Hu is a 71 year old veteran of Mao Tse tung's famous long march of the 1930s. In recent years, the reform minded economist has led his country on another trek to a more Western style economy with free market incentives, foreign investments and less government control. The last was probably his downfall, producing the student demonstrations that have wracked China in recent weeks -- demonstrations that hard liners blame on the permissiveness favored by Hu and his adherents. And while China was liberal enough to allow the student unrest to be shown on national television, the crackdown was also widely circulated on the same medium. Hoodlums and troublemakers were shown being arraigned in court. Today, the man considered an heir apparent to Mao and a supporter of Western style intellectuals was arraigned before a tribunal of his peers and stripped of his power. LEHRER: We talk first now to Michel Oksenberg and John Burns. Mr. Oksenberg was President Carter's China expert on the National Security Council staff. He now teaches at the University of Michigan. Mr. Burns was the New York Times bureau chief in China from 1984 until last July, when he was expelled. He served in Moscow before that. He new runs the Times bureau in Toronto, where he joins us from the studios of the Canadian Broadcasting Company. Michel Oksenberg, why was it necessary for Hu to go today? MICHEL OKSENBERG, University of Michigan: It's still not clear why. Clearly, Deng Xiaoping, though, has become disenchanted with a person that he had been associated with for a very long period of time. And whether he has panicked, whether he's acting out of pressure or personal pique against Hu Yaobang is simply not clear. It's a very significant development, however, because it means that many of the things that Deng Xiaoping has been trying to do for the past eight years, in terms of an orderly succession, in terms of his own -- Deng's -- withdrawal from the political process, in terms of separating the party and the government, a number of those reforms are now endangered. LEHRER: Now, why? Mr. OKSENBERG: Well, a lot of what Deng Xiaoping has been trying to do is to convince the Chinese people that an era of instability has come to an end, that the leaders can settle their disputes in an orderly fashion, that Deng Xiaoping is positive. He's posed as a person that is going to be supporting the intellectuals. In 1978, I remember his saying that he was going to be the head of the logistics department in support of the intellectuals. And now he's helping get rid of a person who has been central in promoting the cause of liberalization toward the intellectual. LEHRER: Is the suggestion then that Hu was out doing things on his own or that he was not following Deng Xiaoping's orders or what? Mr. OKSENBERG: Well, again, there are a lot of mysteries to Chinese politics. Some of these developments have taken me by surprise. I think, though, that the blame is going to be tried -- that Deng is going to try and shift some of the blame to Hu Yaobang. I met with Hu Yaobang in July of last year with Dr. Brzezinski. We were in China together. We met with him for about five hours. And during that time, Hu Yaobang told us that Deng Xiaoping had asked him to help prepare a document on political reform that would be presented to a party congress that is planned for this fall. I would suspect that Hu Yaobang has disappointed Deng Xiaoping in the way he has handled that particular tough assignment. LEHRER: What about the handling of the student protest? Apparently, at least from reading the wires today, that was given as a stated reason for Hu's leaving -- that that was somehow mishandled. What's your reading of that? Mr. OKSENBERG: I think that's probably more the straw that broke the camel's back. There have been rumors for some time that Hu Yaobang's own position was not totally solid. There were, indeed, intense rumors about a year ago that he might be promoted out of his active position, you might say, and given a more honorific title. But what's crucial to focus on here is the suddenness of this decision, lack of preparation for the general public that Hu Yaobang was slipping, and also the way the decision was made -- in a hurried gathering at the higher levels, somewhat in secret. That gives signs that there is an intense dispute at the higher levels, and I don't believe that simply student protests could bring that on. LEHRER: Is there a simple way to describe what that dispute is about -- I mean, what the factions are that are at combat? Mr. OKSENBERG: Sure. I think so. At issue in part is how far the reform should go. I do believe that, at present, Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping and then Hu Yaobang's acting replacement as general secretary, Zhao Ziyang, all support the economic reforms. They all support the opening to the outside world. What they differ on is how rapidly economic reform should be pursued and whether political reforms -- meaning elections, curbing of the role of the Communist Party in Chinese society and its role in society, granting greater freedom of the press, greater freedom of assembly -- whether those reforms should also go forward. So there are differences over the rate of progress. But there's also a very important point to be made. There have been a lot of people in China who are skeptical of the reforms. And I think that now they're going to come out of the woodwork, exert a great deal of pressure to try and roll back some of the reforms. And I think the coming six to eight months are going to be very significant ones in China, as we find out whether the people in favor of reform have established a wide political base as attacks are launched against the reforms, against the opening to the outside world. LEHRER: John Burns, you were in China during this period when most of the reforms were launched. How does it look to you, as far as whether these reforms are now in serious jeopardy as a result of this action today? JOHN BURNS, New York Times: I'm a little bit more skeptical than Mike Oksenberg is. We've discussed this, he and I, over dinner in Peking more than once. As he said, there is very little known about the internal processes of Chinese politics, so I think it's important to say at the outset that much of what those of us who have lived in China or worked on or about China for years say is very speculative. That said, I would say that there has been almost throughout the period of reform in China, going back to 1978, a most profound dispute about the future of the country. And what we see here is a small turn in the cycle of Chinese politics which many optimists in the West have persuaded themselves had ended. I think there are plenty of people in the West, many of them quite well informed, who have taken the view that China had emerged from a period of unreason and chaos into calmer waters and would now continue to steer a course that was recognizably sane and productive and progressive to us in the West. In fact, I think that there has been this contest between what one might boldly describe as the conservative and reformist elements in the Chinese Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping, of course, leading the reformers. And although he has had periods with the wind at his back when he has been able to make great progress, there have always been people behind him or below decks profoundly at odds with the course that he's taken. And these people, in my view, have used the student demonstrations -- possibly even incited or provoked or helped stage manage them -- to create a certain degree of political instability in China. And on the basis of that, I would guess, have moved forward to remove Deng's chief lieutenant. I can't see how that can be anything but the most grave political development for Deng Xiaoping himself. LEHRER: He might be in jeopardy? Mr. BURNS: I would have thought that a man so closely identified with Deng Xiaoping and his policies -- a sudden removal in this manner would be seen and interpreted within China -- and actually is -- a fundamental blow at Deng and at his policies. And that the -- although the occasion is the student disturbances, that in fact the conservatives, who are well represented in the politburo and are strong even within the standing committee of the politburo -- the key body in China -- that the conservatives have used this as an occasion to move one great leap forward in their attack on those policies. LEHRER: What would you say would be the most vulnerable of these reform policies now? If there is to be a roll back -- if they have Deng Xiaoping on the run, in other words -- where's he going to run first? Mr. BURNS: Well, Deng is a master tactician. In 20 years as a journalist, I have never observed or chronicled a man more adept at shifting his position in small ways left and right in order pursue the main course. And that may well be what he's doing here. I wouldn't like to suggest that Deng Xiaoping is facing overthrow himself. My own guess would be that he is secure as long as he lives. He is, of course, 82 years old, in relatively sound health, though a chronic smoker, as you know. So he says that he expects to make it up to 85, in his words. We may see Deng remaining, therefore, for some years yet. But it would be quite consistent with what we've seen of Deng in the past for him to trim his sails very considerably now to maintain the option of returning to the main course in the later on. The problem, of course, is that when he goes, there is nobody of his stature to take over. There is inevitably going to be a struggle. That struggle will inevitably be fought over the main issue. The issue will be, as Mike has said, the economic reforms at home, the resort to market principles in the Chinese economy and, in my view, also, much more important, possibly, to the West, over the accommodation that China is making with the outside world. I was far from sure during my two most recent years in China that the Communist Party at its higher levels or the Chinese people in the large are completely at one with Deng on this issue of the historic accommodation with the West. LEHRER: All right. Thank you. Robin? MacNEIL: Now we go to a man who's experienced firsthand some of China's recent political upheavals. His name is Liang Heng, and he wrote about his experiences as a red guard in a book, Son of the Revolution. He left China in 1980, now lives in New York, where he's the editor of a Chinese magazine called The Chinese Intellectual. Mr. Liang was the coauthor last year of two books about intellectual life in China since the cultural revolution, one of which was titled, After the Nightmare. Mr. Liang, do you think this means that the reform movement is in serious trouble? LIANG HENG, author: Yes, it is trouble. But now the situation seems very complicated. And for me, it's a tricky game. Because to hard liners, they're not happy to see people asking freedom or participating in political activities for long term. But for the time being, they're very happy to see the student movement that gave them an excuse to attack Deng Xiaoping and his supporters. So for Deng Xiaoping, I think he's not very happy to see the student movement that damages his reform strategy and also makes him uncomfortable, because in order to counterbalance the hard liners, he has to remove his supporters, like Hu Yaobang and other supporters, from power. So he has to act against his own interests in the shorter run. So I think -- MacNEIL: So the reason he'd be angry at Hu was for permitting the conservatives, the hard liners, to have the excuse of the student demonstrations. Mr. LIANG: Yeah. I think, of course, the student movement is one of the reasons why Hu Yaobang has been removed. But as Professor Oksenberg says, Hu had trouble last year. And why? Because he was not welcome by the high ranking officials in the army. At that time, Deng Xiaoping supported him strongly. So I think now the hard liners found an excuse to take him away from power. MacNEIL: Do you -- for the hard liners, the conservatives, what part of reform is the problem, or is it all the problem? Is it political liberalization, is it economic liberalization, is it the opening to the West, is it all of it? Mr. LIANG: You see, the reform in China means many things, you see. And of course, economic reform is very welcome by the Chinese people, also welcomed by the people in the West. But about the political reform, I think it's a very different subject. When I was in China last September and October, I heard definite worries about political reform. To intellectuals, political reform means freedom of expression and political participation and, you know, human rights also. But for Deng, for the party leaders, political reform means to separate the party from the government, to reach efficiency in the government and criticize the corruption in part of the government. So a little different, right? So I don't think Deng Xiaoping and his supporters, also including hard liners, of course, have to see China, you know, use the Western democracy system. But to Deng Xiaoping, I remember what he said in 1980 in highly secret documents. He said China needs political reform. He called socialist democracy. You know, that's very slogan. But what means that is a question. MacNEIL: So is Deng in trouble? Mr. LIANG: I think that Deng feel uncomfortable, and -- but don't forget, Deng lost his own power twice. Then he came back to the power. So today, even though Hu Yaobang lost his power doesn't mean it is the end of his political life. Maybe he will come back. You never know. This is Chinese politics. It's always like a mystery, you see? Because don't forget, the leadership at a central committee level or at [unintelligible] level, many people now in a powerful position followed Hu Yaobang. They came from the Communist Youth League Organization. So of course, Hu Yaobang lost his power. That will shake the structure of the party. But I think Deng Xiaoping, even though now he controls the situation very well, but he has left some potential political crisis. MacNEIL: Do you agree that -- don't count Hu Yaobang out of this -- that he still has support at the top of the party, and he may just have been tactically moved to one side for the moment? Mr. OKSENBERG: I think he has suffered a very serious blow, and I would suspect that it's unlikely he personally can recover from it. I'd like to focus, though -- MacNEIL: You just disagree with that. The way Chinese politics go, you think he could come back, because Deng himself has come back. Mr. LIANG: I think in Chinese politics there are some cycles, you know. Today the situation is warm, and tomorrow it is cold, you see? And it depends how far that Deng Xiaoping can control this situation, how long. MacNEIL: It's an important question, isn't it, Michel Oksenberg and John Burns? It's an important question if Hu was the obvious successor to Deng and there is no other obvious successor. Mr. OKSENBERG: Well, I think that one has to focus on the gentleman who has taken Hu Yaobang's place, Zhao Ziyang. He was premier. He may still retain that post. There are some aspects of the change that are still unclear. Zhao Ziyang, as well as Hu Yaobang, is very much identified with the reforms. The question is whether Zhao Ziyang himself -- MacNEIL: So Deng has had the confidence to put in Hu's place a man who is a reformer as well. He's not -- Mr. OKSENBERG: That's a very important point. Now what everyone -- the Peking watchers -- are speculating is, who will take Zhao Ziyang's place as premier? Could that person be a more conservative individual? And indeed, have these changes so fundamentally altered the careful arrangements that Deng Xiaoping has made that many people will be willing to launch attacks? I agree with John Burns and much of what he has said. A lot of people have been waiting for a moment like this to begin to attack the reforms across a very wide front. But we still have some more personnel appointments to be made to see whether Deng has some residual strength to put people committed to the reform in those positions. MacNEIL: Do you agree with that, John Burns? The picture has yet to play itself out as we see more -- Mr. BURNS: I do. I think Mike is absolutely correct. I think one can also say that if a blow as serious as this can be struck whilst Deng is alive, what could the conservatives or hard liners, if you will, achieve when he's gone? I think one can also look at the man who, I think, is most probable, as far as one can read the tea leaves, to succeed to the leadership of the government -- the position vacated by Zhao Ziyang -- Li Peng, a man, I think, of some interest to Americans. He's 57 years old. He was educated in the Soviet Union. He was the foster son of Jiao Linyi. He has, therefore, impeccable political credentials. But I watched Li Peng at close quarters for some time, and I suspect Mike has done too, both in Peking and on his tour of the United States last year. And my impression is that Li Peng has positioned himself very carefully, so that he has a foot in both caps. He gives off signals, including during his trip in the United States, that he's not altogether impressed with some aspects of the open door policy, in particular. He took a kind of show me attitude when he was in the United States. More than once on his tour of American institutions, his questions ran to, ''So how is this relevant to us?'' I took that as a kind of symbol of his positioning himself for a possible shift in the political wisdom in China. And if he should become the premier now, and therefore a strong candidate for ultimate power -- after all, he's somewhat younger than Zhao Ziyang -- that could also be anindication that there is going to be a change in course. MacNEIL: Do you agree that Li Peng is someone to watch in this case? Mr. LIANG: I think people say that Li Peng is a favorite of Soviets because he has education in Moscow. But I think today all the reformers, including Li Peng and the Premier Zhao Ziyang, including Hu Yaobang himself, are very happy to see the economic reform in China. Just because they have different opinions about political reform -- what kind of political reform they should have in China -- so they have difference -- arguments, right? So yes, if now Premier Zhao Ziyang instead of Hu Yaobang as the general secretary, that situation is very strange, because Zhao Ziyang, Premier Zhao, is actually for the economy in the government; not in the party. So I would state this situation as a temporary situation. It's a transition period. And I think, because this October at Communist Party we hold the national conference -- I think it's October -- at that time they will show all the structure of the party: who will play in the party and who play role in the government. MacNEIL: Well, if you were advising the U. S. government now, as you used to do before, would you say just wait and see for a few months? Mr. OKSENBERG: I think we have no choice but to do that. Let the dust settle. I do think that, in terms of Chinese foreign policy, however, so much of that policy is dictated by the objective national security concerns that confront any leadership group -- the military forces that the Soviet Union has deployed against China, the need of the Chinese for external financial technology -- financial assistance, technology for development, the objective situation in Asia -- that the continuities in foreign policy for the next few months are likely to be overwhelming. MacNEIL: We'll come back. Jim? LEHRER: Yes. We bring a Soviet expert into the discussion now, because what is happening in China is of great interest to those in the world's other great communist power. Marshall Goldman is associate director of Harvard University's Russian Research Center and a professor of economics at Wellesley College. He is also the author of a forthcoming book, Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology. He joins us tonight from public station WGBH in Boston. Marshall Goldman, why is what's happening in China so, so important to the Soviets? MARSHALL GOLDMAN, Harvard University: Well, the Soviets are very much worried that if they're not careful, the same thing might happen to them. They're also a group who have been working very hard to bring China back into the communist camp, so to speak. And this might cause -- if there's turmoil, this could cause them problems. But I think primarily the Soviets are worried because they're undergoing a process of reform. After a good deal of resistance and a good deal of negative response to what the Chinese are doing, they began to turn around and introduce some of the same kinds of activities -- some private enterprise, a return to joint ventures, policy of openness, glasnost, as I'm sure everybody has heard. And now to see some of these things begin to unravel, students beginning to take democracy seriously, demonstrations, the Soviets are nervous, particularly because they've had some of the same problems in the Soviet Union. There were riots with deaths, burning and looting in Kazakhstan. Now, that may have been for nationality reasons, the replacement of a Kazakh with a Russian by Gorbachev. But still, it's a nervous thing to watch. Similarly, there was something that's not been widely publicized in the United States. There was what the Soviets called a workers' demonstration at their largest truck plant. The workers were involved here. In China, it wasn't the workers; it was the students. And the Soviets are much more nervous about workers -- the proletariat, if you will -- than they are students. But in Kazakhstan there was a merger of both the students and the workers, and it went on for two or three days. So they can see, you know, ''There, but for Deng Xiaoping, go I. '' And that's obviously making Gorbachev nervous. LEHRER: So when you say the Soviets, you mean Gorbachev, right? Mr. GOLDMAN: That's right. Absolutely. And I should also point out that the criticism of Gorbachev has continually been much more blatant, much more outspoken, than it has been towards Deng Xiaoping in China. LEHRER: You mean criticism within the Soviet Union? Mr. GOLDMAN: Within the Soviet Union. Gorbachev never makes a speech in which he doesn't refer to the opposition -- the resistance to what he is doing. You know, there was a speech that he gave in June to the writers group, a portion of which was published, a portion of which was not. The unpublished portion, Gorbachev says to the writers, ''I need your support, because the operat -- the bureaucrats -- broke Khrushchev's neck, and they're trying to break mine. And they'll go so far as to use terror. '' And then on top of everything else, there's a bizarre element here that hasn't been talked about, and I'm almost embarrassed to do it. But there is, in addition to the resistance from the bureaucrats, the resistance by the workers, the resistance even by the military, a superstitious element there. You know, Gorbachev has a head like I have, and he's got this big birthmark. In the Russian religious tradition, they view that as the mark of Cain and that he's cursed. And therefore, when you talk to a Russian, they'll say, ''This has been a disastrous year for us: Chernobyl, the sinking of the ship in the Black Sea, the sinking of the submarine in the Atlantic, the cold winter. Who has brought this on to us?'' LEHRER: Oh my. Mr. GOLDMAN: You know, so -- LEHRER: Wow. Mr. GOLDMAN: So now he looks, and the Soviets have been following very carefully what's been happening in China. LEHRER: How do they follow that? Where do they -- is this thing being reported fully in the Soviet Union? Mr. GOLDMAN: Well, I wouldn't say fully, but it's being reported more extensively than they would have in the past. Within two days' time, it appeared in Pravda and Isvestia and on the radio and on television. And they refer particularly to the calls for democracy and also to the fact that the Chinese have opened up the open door policy much more than the Soviets have so far. And that -- they quoted kind of a fascinating thing which said there was a conference in Cincinnati, of all places, where there was a group discussion about how the open door can serve as a lever to convert -- to divert the Chinese back to capitalism again. LEHRER: So the people who -- the people in the Soviet Union who would be cheering now are the hard liners who are opposing what Gorbachev is attempting to do or allegedly attempting to do. Mr. GOLDMAN: Absolutely. Because, you know, there's also something interesting. The head of the Kazakh Party, the man who provoked this -- whose overthrow provoked this uprising, Kunayev, was thrown out of the head of the Kazakh Party, but he's still in the Politburo. Now, that's, you know, already almost a month that that took place, and he's still not been removed. Gorbachev has said that he was going to hold a meeting of the Central Committee to kind of consolidate and make some more political changes. That's not taken place. LEHRER: While we're in the tea leaf business here tonight, what do you think the immediate thing will be in the Soviet Union, if anything, in terms of reaction to what happened today in China? Mr. GOLDMAN: Well, I think that, as Mike Oksenberg said, the Soviets -- for the United States, the Soviets will probably cool it for a while. But I think they're going to -- LEHRER: Cool their reforms? Mr. GOLDMAN: No. Well -- LEHRER: Not say anything. Mr. GOLDMAN: Yeah. Not say anything. Just wait and see. But at the same time, in some sense, maybe even pull back on the reform. Some of them have not been fully implemented. I think, you know, they're not all that radical, as far as that goes. LEHRER: Sure. Mr. GOLDMAN: But go slowly and I think continue to stress to the Chinese that ''Don't have so much to do with the United States and the West and the Japanese. They give you these crazy ideas. They give the students the crazy ideas. Look to us. We're a solid base of support, and you know you can count on us, and we'll be there when you need us. '' LEHRER: All right. Marshall Goldman, thank you. Robin? MacNEIL: John Burns, do you go along with that -- it's liable to produce some slowdown of whatever reform is underway in the Soviet Union? Mr. BURNS: I would have thought so. When I was in the Soviet Union, and that takes me back to '83, '84, before Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko, they were already watching very carefully what was happening in China, and at that time with a good deal of skepticism. At that time, the Soviet press was rather critical. And indeed, Soviet officials in the Soviet embassy in Peking continued privately to be extremely skeptical even after the public stance of the Soviet Union changed. Many of them began travelling to some of the showcases in China of reform, such as the Chengcheng special economic zone, which is what is colloquially known as Hong Kong gone north. This is a territory inside the People's Republic of China where various economic reforms have been adopted to attract Hong Kong and foreign investment, including American. The Soviets went there and were very skeptical. But most of all -- most of all, intelligent Soviets that I talked to were skeptical about the very thing that I think most Westerners are skeptical about when they look at reform in the Soviet Union or China. And the question is this: can you liberalize your economy, can you introduce market principles into the economy, without introducing parallel political reforms? And if you do that, how far do they go? We've already seen in China how the introduction of market principles has swept right across the country at a speed and with a scope that I think nobody, including Deng Xiaoping, could have foreseen. I saw it for myself in my last journey across China that resulted in my expulsion this summer. I was absolutely astonished to travel over 1,000 miles across the heartland of the country down an unbroken chain of private enterprise. Furthermore, it was apparent to me during that journey that the vast majority of the people of China don't care about politics anymore. That was the true significance of Deng Xiaoping, as I saw it, was that Deng had allowed people to return to the traditional patterns of their lives -- I'm talking about rural people for the most part -- who, in my experience, in smoky provincial inns, on the road, in trucks and elsewhere where I've talked to them, couldn't have cared less about politics. They did not know who the local party secretary was in many cases, nor did they care, nor did they much care or know about who was running the country. Now, in that there lies a lesson. Is the Communist Party of China, or indeed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, prepared ultimately for the consequences of introducing the same market principles into politics? I think the answer is likely to be a resounding no. MacNEIL: Let me move that on the Michel Oksenberg. Mr. OKSENBERG: I think what John has just said is very important. It raises the question as to whether, particularly in the countryside, the reforms -- decollectivization of agriculture, the spread of the marketplace -- whether those reforms have spread so far that it would be very difficult to really retract those. I am inclined to believe that those reforms are now very deeply a part of the Chinese system, and it would take a great deal to reverse those. But now the question is whether the reforms that have yet to take place in the urban areas, similar to those that have taken place in the countryside -- greater role of the marketplace and so on -- will go forward in the urban areas. What's happened today, I think, makes it less likely. And I think Marshall Goldman is absolutely correct. The lesson that we see before us is how difficult it is for people with a Soviet style economy to reform it when the bureaucracies in those societies have a vested interest in maintaining the current system. MacNEIL: In China's case, Mr. Liang, does this mean much less freedom for intellectuals now? Mr. LIANG: I don't think so. I think who are really the victim are the Chinese intellectuals, because both liberal and conservative party leaders can not punish the students' movement. Because both of them don't want to cause more problems and produce more crises. So they are criticizing the intellectuals. Of course, they only now, so far, criticize Liu Binyan, the famous writer; and Wang Ruowang, the famous writer; and Fang Lizhi, the famous professor. So in China, according to Chinese saying, that party toward intellectuals is killing chicken to scare the monkey. So that's -- MacNEIL: Kill the chicken to scare the monkey. Mr. LIANG: Yes. And that really scared intellectuals, because Chinese intellectuals still remember the cultural revolution. During the cultural revolution, they were suffering. They still remember, you know, 1980, the democratic movement. They still remember 1985, anti spiritual pollution movement. So internal, if one or two or three writers or scholars are criticized by the party, that means is quick in Chinese intellectual life. MacNEIL: Okay. Well, Marshall Goldman in Boston and John Burns in Toronto, Michel Oksenberg and Mr. Liang in New York, thank you all. Acid Rain: Heading West? LEHRER: Next, acid rain. The Environmental Protection Agency has just completed a study of the lakes in the western states. The work began a year and a half ago. Lee Hochberg of public station KCTS, Seattle, covered that beginning, as well as the conclusion this week. Here is his report.

LEE HOCHBERG [voice over]: The study was begun in autumn of '85. EPA researchers in helicopters skimmed treetops throughout the West, dropped down to mountain lakes to collect water samples, then whisked them away to mobile laboratories for analysis. In wilderness areas, where helicopters aren't allowed, Forest Service crews hiked miles on foot to get their samples -- a $4. 5 million effort to bring back 700 gallons of water. The EPA sought to do two things: first, assess the current acidity of Western lakes; and second, test their ability to deal with any acid rain that does fall on them -- their sensitivity to acid rain. Lakes that are graded sensitive today could degenerate and become acidic in the future. Now, the results: a 500 page, four inch thick document with chemical analyses of some 700 Western lakes. DIXON LANDERS, EPA acid rain study: The bottom line is, we didn't find any acid lakes. I think that the study demonstrates that we have not seen widespread or any effects of this composition yet. HOCHBERG: Anywhere in the West. Mr. LANDERS: Anywhere in the West. HOCHBERG [voice over]: In the Pacific Northwest, the EPA found one quarter of the lakes are highly sensitive to acid rain, but none yet is acidic. In the northern Rockies, again, about a quarter of the lakes are sensitive; none acidic. Lakes in the central Rockies are less sensitive than most in the West, and again, they are not acidic. Even in the more urbanized southern Rockies and the state of California, the EPA found no major problems. The findings fly in the face of several independent reports that say some Western lakes have an acid problem. The architects of those studies, like John Harte of the University of California, say the EPA research was conducted in such a way that it missed most of the acid in the lakes. JOHN HARTE, environmental scientist: This is evidence that no lakes are acidic in September and October, when they did the study. But if you looked at those same lakes at snow melt time, you would see acidification in progress. HOCHBERG [voice over]: Harte says the EPA should have gone looking for acid in the springtime, when a whole winter's worth of acid snow melts off the top of Western mountains. Conditions in regional lakes are altogether different then. Mr. HARTE: We have found that in early June, when snow melt is at its peak, when the snow melt is very intense and the runoff waters come down in torrents down the mountain slopes, that the steep slopes and the thin soils lead to an enormous input of acidic water suddenly into the lakes. If they had sampled waters from lakes during snow melt, they would have found negative acid neutralizing capacities and PHs down as low as the high fours and the mid fives. HOCHBERG: Acidic lakes. Mr. HARTE: Acidic lakes. They would have only found this for a short period of time -- for a week or two. HOCHBERG [voice over]: Harte says those two weeks at snow melt are a most vital time biologically for aquatic creatures -- the time they lay eggs, they feed, they mate, the time they're most susceptible to the acid input he's measured and he says the EPA missed. Mr. HARTE: Autumn would be the last time in the year. It would be the time of year with these effects will show up last. Mr. LANDERS: One of the problems with conducting a survey like this in the spring is, it can't be done. One reason is that these lakes in the high altitude West are frozen in the spring. In some cases, they don't thaw even in the summertime in some years. But it's also very difficult even to get there with helicopters or ground troops, because of the snow pack that hasn't melted. HOCHBERG: If you had conducted this study in the spring, would you not have discovered increased acidification -- more acid lakes? Mr. LANDERS: You really can't say without having, I think, more data from the West. I would not expect the results to be largely different. HOCHBERG [voice over]: The EPA says this 1985 study is but the start of its Western lakes acid rain research. It will continue monitoring rainfall and lake acidity in the West. And though there are no plans for a springtime study that might record the snow melt phenomenon, the agency says it now better understands how acid rain is affecting the West. Mr. LANDERS: We now have a database in the West that we can use as a point in time to measure all other future changes against. In the Northeast, if we had a database like this one from 20 years ago or 40 years ago, we would be in a lot better position in assessing how much damage has occurred. Mr. HARTE: For now, it's just useful data to store and come back to in many years to see if there's been a change. If, however, the study is used to try to argue that we can forget about the acid rain problem in the West, then it will be a real disservice to science and to the public. Road to Immortality MacNEIL: As you probably heard, Ray Bolger, the dancer and actor, died of cancer yesterday at the age of 83. Bolger played many roles in his career, but he is most beloved for his portrayal of the scarecrow in The Wizard of Oz. He was the last living star of the 1939 movie that also featured Judy Garland, Burt Lahr and Jack Haley, Sr. Bolger said of that movie, ''It's a great American classic, and long after I'm gone, I will be remembered as the scarecrow. And how many people can say that they're remembered for anything?'' We close tonight by remembering Ray Bolger as he was best known.

[clip from The Wizard of Oz] RAY BOLGER: My, it's good to be free. JUDY GARLAND: Oh! Oh! Mr. BOLGER: Did I scare you? Ms. GARLAND: No, no, no. I just thought you hurt yourself. Mr. BOLGER: But I didn't scare you? Ms. GARLAND: No, of course not. Mr. BOLGER: I didn't think so. [to crow] Boo. Scat. Boo. [to Dorothy] You see? I can't even scare a crow. They come from miles around just to eat in my field and laugh in my face. Oh, I'm a failure, because I haven't got a brain. Ms. GARLAND: Well, what would you do with a brain if you had one? Mr. BOLGER: Do? Why, if I had a brain, I could -- [singing] I could while away the hours conferring with the flowers, consulting with the rain. And my head I'd be scratching while my thoughts were busy hatching, if I only had a brain. I'd unravel every riddle for any individdle in trouble or in pain. Ms. GARLAND [singing]: With the thoughts you'd be thinking, you could be another Lincoln, if you only had a brain. Mr. BOLGER [singing]: Oh, I could tell you why the ocean's near the shore. I could think of things I never thought before. And then I'd sit and think some more. I would not be just a nothing, my head all full of stuffing, my heart all full of pain. I would dance and be merry. Life would be a thing of daring, if I only had a brain. LEHRER: Again, the major stories of this Friday. The head of the Communist Party in China resigned as a result of student protests and other unrest. And the president of the South American nation of Equador was kidnapped by a group of military officers. There are reports tonight he will be freed in a swap for an imprisoned general. Good night, Robin. MacNEIL: Good night, Jim. That's the News Hour tonight. We'll be back on Monday night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.