The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Japanese Internment Camp Report

[Tease]

JOAN BERNSTEIN, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians: No amount of money can fully compensate the excluded people for their losses and sufferings. Two and a half years behind the barbed wire of a relocation camp, branded potentially disloyal because of one's ethnicity alone, these injustices cannot neatly be translated into dollars and cents.

[Titles]

JIM LEHRER: Good evening. A congressional commission today urged words and money be given to Japanese-Americans interned during World War II as an act of national apology for the grave injustice done to them 40 years ago. The words would be in a joint congressional resolution signed by the President which would formally apologize. The money would be in the form of one-time payments of $20,000 each to the victims. The commission said 60,000 of the 110,000 are still alive. The payments would be drawn from a $1.5-billion fund with the rest going for a foundation and other programs aimed at helping Japanese-Americans. The nine-member commission today repeated its basic findings, which were released in February, that the detention of American citizens and aliens of Japanese descent was the result of race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. John Jay McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, at the time has challenged those earlier findings and today's recommendations as well. Mr. McCloy is with us tonight, as are two of the commission members and a man who spent two and a half years in a detention camp.Robert MacNeil is off; Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in New York. Charlayne?

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Jim, the actions that today's commission condemned were justified by the American government back in February, 1942 as military necessity. The atmosphere was highly charged as a result of Japan's sneak attack on American ships on December 7, 1941, the day that President Roosevelt said would live in infamy.

[voice-over] Almost immediately following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, fears of subversion and resentment against Japanese-Americans emerged. The FBI started to round up suspected enemy aliens. In February, 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt signed executive order 9066 which led to the evacuation from the West Coast of more than 110,000 people of Japanese ancestry, citizens and aliens alike. Under armed military guard they were to be separated from the rest of the population for the duration. Most took only what they could carry. What could not be sold or stored was simply left behind. They were sent to 15 temporary detention centers scattered throughout Arizona, California, Washington and Oregon; finally, to 10 mass detention centers built by the government in isolated areas. The government eventually allowed the Japanese-American evacuees to seek temporary or permanent residence outside the camps, but only under certain conditions. Also, in January, 1943, the armed forces were opened to Japanese-Americans. Eventually, 33,000 Japanese-Americans served in the military. On August 11th, 1945, Japan surrendered and the war ended. By March of 1946 the last of the 10 internment camps was closed.

LEHRER: Today's recommendations came from the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. It was set up by Congress in 1980. Its chairman is Joan Bernstein, a Washington attorney who served as general counsel for two Cabinet departments in the Carter administration. Why should the Congress and the president of today formally apologize for what happened 40 years ago?

JOAN BERNSTEIN: I think it's because it's very basic part of our system that when we recognize, even belatedly, after 40 years, that a grave injustice has been done, that our constitutional principles have been abridged based on ethnicity alone, we must rectify that wrong.

LEHRER: And the apology would accomplish what?

Ms. BERNSTEIN: The apology would be a formal and official acknowledgment that it was a grave injustice and violated the Constitution on behalf of the American people to a group of its own.

LEHRER: And what is the purpose of the $20,000 payments?

Ms. BERNSTEIN: Largely it is a symbolic payment that would be made to those people who survived the internment. I say symbolic because it at best would measure property losses and income losses. It could not in any way be a measure of pain and suffering or for deprivation of liberty, which are very often a part of a damage award. Rather, this is sufficiently high to avoid its being considered trivial and yet does not in any way fully compensate those victims. It's a conservative estimate and, as I said, a symbol of what those people suffered.

LEHRER: How was that figure arrived at -- $20,000?

Ms. BERNSTEIN: We had, among other things, much testimony on the kinds of losses that occurred. Secondly, perhaps equally important, we commissioned a consultant to do an economic analysis of loss, and in large part that figure was based on those losses.

LEHRER: And the $1.5-billion total that you want allocated for this overall purpose, how would the rest of that money be spent? What's its purpose?

Ms. BERNSTEIN: The purpose of the remaining money would be for educational purposes and humanitarian purposes. And the educational purposes I think we all, to a person, think are as important as anything else we have done in our action throughout. The educational aspects are --

LEHRER: who are you talking about, educating the people who were in the internment camps or the rest of society?

Ms. BERNSTEIN: No, we're talking about educating the rest of society, the rest of the world, really, but primarily to keep alive as a living lesson that this is an event that should always be avoided. We don't want it to slip into history. We want people, the younger generations, to have access to materials that we've produced or that others might produce. We want it to be a continuing education to let people know about it.

LEHRER: Why?

Ms. BERNSTEIN: Because we think that the only sure way of avoiding this kind of event in the future is a) the Constitution, and b) a continuing reminder of it, knowledge of it.

LEHRER: And the rest -- I also read in the report that some of this would be spent for specific programs involving Japanese-Americans, the elderly and that sort of thing as well?

Ms. BERNSTEIN: Yes, those were what we would identify as humanitarian purposes. We took a good deal of testimony that led us to believe that the older generation, the first generation of Japanese-Americans, suffered perhaps more than others while they were in the camps. We would like to have money available to assist those now elderly and in many cases poverty-stricken individuals.

LEHRER: are there a lot of them?

Ms. BERNSTEIN: There are a significant number, or so our testimony showed, and they are in communities all over the country. Some are in Los Angeles. We received, I recall, much testimony in Chicago that there was an elderly group of victims who really had suffered more than others. And it makes sense. Older people find it more difficult to come back, pick up the pieces, start over again than younger people do.

LEHRER: Thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: As Jim said earlier, some 55% of the persons interned are alive today. Among those is Tom Kometani, who was seven years old when he and his family were evacuated from their home in Washington state. They were interned in three different detention centers over the next two and a half years. Mr. Kometani is now president of the New York chapter of the Japanese-American Citizens League. Mr. Kometani, how do you feel about the commission's recommendations?

TOM KOMETANI: I feel that for Japanese-Americans in this country this day represents a milestone as well as -- I think it represents a milestone for America. Where else in this world can a government redress actions of this type 42-odd years later? It's -- the findings and the recommendations of the commission I think do represent things that Japanese-Americans have known all along, that we were loyal, that we were not a threat to our government's security. And therefore I feel that this recommendation today -- there are five portions of it that were reviewed earlier. I think all five parts are pretty much in line with the kinds of things that we're after.

HUNTER-GAULT: Specifically, how would you describe the losses suffered by you and your family during the internment?

Mr. KOMETANI: Well, my family I think suffered quite a bit of financial loss. My dad used to run a gas station and automobile repair shop between Seattle and Tacoma on a main highway, and it was a fairly lucrative business at that time.And he had to give that up in a very short period, and he left it with a friend of his. Later on in the camp he did decide to sell it -- at quite a loss -- to that friend, and took quite a beating on that. Now the reason he sold it was that we didn't know what was going to happen to us, that the future was very indefinite. And so we thought we'd recoup the money on that as much as we can.

HUNTER-GAULT: Did you find -- you heard Ms. Bernstein just say that for older Japanese it was very hard to pick up the pieces. Did you find that -- do you find that to be true?

Mr. KOMETANI: Yes. My parents took their family and settled in a small town in Illinois right after the encampment, and had to start from scratch. We lived in a rural community. I went to a one-room schoolhouse for three years, which was quite a bit different.But coming out of three years of camp with bad schools or insufficient schools and another three years in one-room schoolhouses trying to eke out a living out in the country there.I think we suffered educationally. As a child think I didn't realize it, but I think I suffered quite a bit. There was a humiliation. The stigma of being labeled as an enemy of my own country. I was totally convinced when I was seven years old that I was an American.

HUNTER-GAULT: You were not an American?

Mr. KOMETANI: That I was an American. But then to be labeled as the enemy of our country was really quite a blow. And this is something that has taken a long time to get over.

HUNTER-GAULT: How far do you think the commission's recommendations will go in making up for those losses that you've just described?

Mr. KOMETANI: I don't think the losses will ever be made up totally, but I think the intention of the Commission in its recommendation is to somehow rectify those wrongs by admitting that the government was in error and taking steps -- legislative steps -- to avoid something like this from happening again. I think that's -- this is an American issue, even though it involved Japanese-Americans. It's a constitutional issue, a basic human rights issue that must be addressed at this time because things like this can happen again. The mechanism is still there.

HUNTER-GAULT: Very briefly, what's your reaction to the financial compensation aspect?

Mr. KOMETANI: Well, that's a question that's always going to be asked. I think it's very difficult because the first question is usually. "Is it adequate?" Well, I don't think anything is going to be adequate, but it is a substantial sum that people can recognize as a large amount of money. And this in itself, I think, will bring attention to this issue from the point of view of the American public, but as far as the Japanese-Americans are concerned, I think it's the government telling us that we're putting our money where our mouth is. "We feel there was a wrong done. Here is our compensation to show how we feel." And that part of it I think is very important to me.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: There were nine members of the commission, and their recommendations today were not fully endorsed by all nine. A dissenter was the one commissioner who is also a member of Congress. He is Representative Daniel Lungren, Republican of California. Congressman, it's the payment of the money specifically that you oppose, correct?

Rep. DANIEL LUNGREN: That's correct.

LEHRER: Why?

Rep. LUNGREN: Well, I firmly believe in this society that sometimes we see an effort to suggest that nothing can be genuine unless it's looked at through the coin of the realm. That is, unless you attach a monetary side to it, it can't be a real genuine sincere expression of concern or an action. And I got on this commission; I supported the legislation. I worked for it; I co-sponsored it to establish this commission, because as a Californian I had grown up not realizing this had happened. I was born shortly after the war, and I knew Japanese-Americans in my hometown and in my area, and it took a long time for me to realize what had happened to their parents. And to realize that they had been branded as less than loyal Americans is something that I think we have an obligation to try and change. At the same time, going into it I thought the burden of proof was rather high, as far as I was concerned,for individual monetary redress because once you go there, I think you have to say how do you delineate this from monetary redress to blacks, for instance, the heirs of those who suffered for slavery for so many years, or the American Indians, or other ethnic groups?

So, not meaning to demean the experience or the magnitude of the indignity that was suffered by the individuals who were subjected to the camps, I fought very strongly for a public apology and also for an historical record to be established. To me those two things are most important, because I want to make sure that all Americans understand it. Here I grew up in California and I didn't know about it until basically I was out of high school and into college. Most Americans my age don't know about it. That's important, number one.And, number two, it's important for us to try and draw some lessons out of it. And I think we ought to be able to utilize this to heighten the understanding and appreciation for how we can make mistakes. The other thing I'd say is this: I think we make a mistake if we say simply this was a product of racism, because I think it was more than just that, and I think we've identified in the report that it was at least three things -- war hysteria, racism and lack of political will or political judgment. And we don't learn any lesson that will help us for the future if we merely say it's racism. We have to realize how all of these things came together, and to minimize the wartime experience or hysteria I think is to miss the point here and doesn't help us try and avoid it in the future.

LEHRER: Some have suggested that putting a dollar figure on this, any dollar figure, demeans the experience. Is that -- do you agree with that?

Rep. LUNGREN: I wouldn't go so far as to say that. That has been said to me by some Japanese-Americans. One of the things I think we ought to make very clear is there is a tremendous split in the Japanese-American community about this whole thing, some thinking it is demeaning to even be offered money; others thinking that this money is insufficient and there ought to be more money and people of all gradations in between. Some people feel that very, very strongly. I was not one of those who experienced that so I don't think I could presume to say that it would be demeaning to me or should be demeaning to someone else.

LEHRER: Thank you. Charlayne?

HUNTER-GAULT: A final reaction now from one of the key government officials who oversaw the Japanese relocation plan. He is John J. McCloy, former Assistant Secretary of War. Mr. McCloy is now a practicing attorney in New York. Mr. McCloy, specifically what do you object to in the report?

JOHN J. McCLOY: I want to make a little preliminary statement why I'm here. I just got this information that these recommendations were coming out a very short time ago. I take a very strong position, perhaps, from your point of view. I don't want to be on the defensive on this. I didn't have anything to do with the movement of the Japanese from that coast. I was not in the chain of command. The President of the United States was in the chain of command. He was the only man that was commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the United States, and he saw after that day -- I was down in the War Department that morning, and I happened to be the highest civilian official in the department that day because I had -- I had an idea something was going to occur. Well, it did occur. I didn't think it was going to occur at Pearl Harbor. I thought it was going to be further off. But it did occur, and I think it's utterly unfair and unconscionable at this stage, 40 years after the event, for any commission to try to equate the damage which has been done -- the damage which has been done as the result of an act of aggression, which is unequalled almost in history -- that is the day of infamy to which the President referred. President Roosevelt was a man of great humanitarian record; so was Stimson. Noble men, really; men of great integrity. And I resent the fact that they are suggesting that having acted wrong under the provocation and the extreme provocation that they had, which was this sneak attack, as you point out --

HUNTER-GAULT: So you don't buy the argument that a grave injustice was done to the intern --

Mr. McCLOY: No I do not buy it at all. I think grave injustices are done in every war, and you never can equate them. You can't equate -- you can't come back now 40 years after the event and say this man or that woman unduly -- was not unduly -- was not duly compensated. One man or one woman or man is killed, or boy is killed. Another man gets a slight wound, or and even his health may be increased. And for us at this stage to try to compare, for example, the lives and the suffering that people endured as a result of this sneak attack, and to charged the American taxpayer, who was no more responsible than you were for the attack at this stage in history is to me incongruous, absolutely unconscionable and utterly unfair.

HUNTER-GAULT: What about the idea of an apology?

Mr. McCLOY: Oh, I think it's shocking, the idea that we should -- if anybody should apologize for this thing, I think it's the Japanese government should apologize. I did my best to try to convince the Japanese government not to encourage or really step and make a statement in regard to this because our relations with Japan were very good indeed. The old "yellow peril" business had been gone long since. Here, on the morning of this attack -- I happened to be there when that word came in. I couldn't believe that they were attacking Pearl Harbor. But they attacked Peral Harbor and in 15 minutes they destroyed our entire -- well, not entire, but practically our entire, certainly greatly impaired our only -- first defense on the Pacific, that is, the Pacific Fleet. The next line of defense was the coastal area, where our airplane factories were.

HUNTER-GAULT: So you're saying, in effect, that the internment was justified?

Mr. McCLOY: I don't call it internment. It wasn't internment. It was relocation, what -- the word internment was never used. These are perjoric words that are introduced by some of this lobby that's been operating under this thing for a long time.

HUNTER-GAULT: But you accept the notion of the relocation?

Mr. McCLOY: I accept the notion of the relocation. I said it was -- I say it's a just result and a just and natural consequence of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, and that in itself justifies fully, without goint into whether or not the Japanese were thought to be loyal or whether they were thought not to be loyal. There was a great deal of evidence which was never brought out here which would indicate that large segments of the population were disloyal. We didn't know who they were.

HUNTER-GAULT: So you're supporting the idea of the military necessity?

Mr. McCLOY: Yes, definitely.

HUNTER-GAULT: Do you believe that anybody owes the Japanese who were relocated anything?

Mr. McCLOY: Well, I don't think they do, and I don't think anybody today owes some money to an American soldier or somebody that was on the Bataan death march because he wasn't adequately compensated. The men that are now entombed on the bottom of the Pearl Harbor in the New Mexico and in the Arizona and the Pennsylvania, they're still there. Were they adequately compensated? And the idea of now trying, 40 years after the event, to equate the sufferings of people that suffered as a result of the war, particularly of an active aggression such as this, when the Japanese fleet got away absolutely unscathed after having impaired so grossly -- that was a natural consequence to take and taken by men of real character, great statesmanship, men of integrity, with no more racism in President Roosevelt's little finger or Mr. Stimson's much more than some of the people that are now pressing and urging racism as a result of this. There wasn't a slight of it. I knew Mr. Stimson very well, and I knew Mr. Roosevelt very well. They were two great humanitarians.

HUNTER-GAULT: And Mr. Stimson was --

Mr. McCLOY: He was the Secretary of the War when I was the Assistant Secretary of War.

HUNTER-GAULT: All right, thank you, Mr. McCloy. Jim?

LEHRER: Ms. Berstein, unconscionable, utterly unfair and shocking is what Mr. McCloy says you are recommending.

Ms. BERNSTEIN: I think I find Mr. McCloy's statements equally shocking. There isn't a person on the commission nor anyone I have talked to who would disagree with Mr. McCloy that World War II was just as he characterizes it. We were aggressively attacked. It was a great, tragic event in our history. We also agree, and I certainly personally do, that the President and Mr. Stimson were great Americans throughout. That really has, in my judgment, nothing to do with the fact that American citizens were removed from their homes, relocated for over two and a half years, without even a suggestion of the most rudimentary of the most essential types of process that this country has ever -- has always followed. I consider it shocking that anyone would defend American citizens, people born in this country, being treated in such a fashion.

LEHRER. Mr. McCloy?

Mr. McCLOY: I think it's no -- American citizens certainly were subjected to this relocation, but so were non-American citizens, and our concern was just as much for them as it was for the American citizen. The constitutionality of this act, which was decreed by the President of the United States, which was approved by the attorney general, who helped draft the order, went to the Supreme Court with it, and in all essential factors it was approved. The suggestion has been made we must do this in case it never occurs again. I don't know what's going to occur in the next war. It may very well be that some of these people that were dislocated and dumped on our shores in Florida would have to be moved if there was another attack on the United States. I don't believe it is -- it is conceive -- it is fantastic to think that after the event, this long after the event -- the steps which were taken as the natural and prudent consequence of the defeat of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the defeat -- and the destruction of our fleet should in any way be questioned, and certainly that the American taxpayer at this stage, who is beleaguered now with all he taxes that he can endure, should be asked -- I don't think even the Japanese taxpayer should be asked to do it.

LEHRER: Mr. Kometani, how do you react to what Mr. McCloy has said?

Mr. KOMETANI: I find his remarks also shocking. I think he tends to equate Japanese-Americans with Japanese enemy, and he did that back then, and most people did in those days, and I think he still feels that way. I feel that it's a -- it's entirely proper to look into this now. A wrong is a wrong until it's --

LEHRER: What about his point about injustice -- that there is injustice to many in war, and what about all the other folks who also suffered, other American citizens who suffered? Why should the Japanese-Americans be singled out for this special apology this many years later?

Mr. KOMETANI: Because the Japanese-Americans were singled out back in 1942 strictly on the basis of race.

Mr. McCLOY: Oh, it's not so.That's just not so.

Mr. KOMETANI: And I think that it's --

Mr. McCLOY: It's just not so.

Mr. KOMETANI: It's outrageous that anybody can make a statement like that today.

LEHRER: You insist it was not race. Mr. McCloy?

Mr. McCLOY: I make that statement very clearly, that it was -- that was a fact that took place at that time, and that in accordance with the responsibilities of those who had for the security of the country at that time, steps were naturally and logically taken, which is an element of the old suffering that war does produce.

LEHRER: I hate to interrupt. We are out of time. Mr. McCloy, Mr. Kometani in New York. thank you; Congressman, Ms. Bernstein here, thank you. And good night, Charlayne.

HUNTER-GAULT: Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: And we'll see you tomorrow night. I'm Jim Lehrer, thank you and good night.