The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; 6137; Interview with Edmund Muskie

[Tease]

ROBERT MacNEIL (voice-over): Tonight, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie talks about the hostages in Iran and other problems.

[Titles]

MacNEIL: Good evening. Iran`s Prime Minister Muhammed Ali Rajai today consulted the Ayatollah Khomeini on the latest stage in the hostage negotiations. But what precisely transpired is unclear. Afterwards Rajai spoke to Iranian television, and there are two versions of what he said. According to one, the Ayatollah said the government could accept guarantees by the Algerian intermediaries to solve the hostage problem. The other version uses the word "undertakings" instead of "guarantees". Before the Algerians returned to Iran last week with the latest American counterproposals, some Iranians said they would accept whatever guarantees satisfied the Algerians. Meanwhile the whereabouts of the hostages themselves are again in doubt. On Saturday the three hostages held all along at the Iranian Foreign Ministry were forced to move to an unknown destination. Today an unidentified administration official in Washington said some of them may be in jail. Tonight the administration view of the hostage situation and other matters. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie is with Jim Lehrer in Washington. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Mr. Secretary, welcome.

EDMUND MUSKIE: Thank you, Jim

LEHRER: First on the hostages themselves: Do we know now that some of them are in jail?

Secretary MUSKIE: No, we do not. I don`t know the source of the report to which Robin just referred. We don`t know where the three are. The government of Iran justified the move on the grounds that all the hostages are now under the government control, that they wanted to bring them all together wherever they are, and that it is an appropriate place. This is the only explanation we have.

LEHRER: Well, there had even been statements, oh ten days ago I think, from John Trattner about the possibility that some of the hostages were now in jail. There`s no new development on -- we have no new information about that, though. Is that correct?

Secretary MUSKIE: No, the latest information we about the other 49 is the news that we were given by the Algerian delegation, and that was all very positive. They saw all 52 hostages, spent some 7 1/2 hours with them talking to groups of them in their rooms or quarters, accepting letters from them to their people back here, and to the families back here in the States; and of course you had them taking pictures of all of those who were interested in having pictures taken -- I think there`s only one who did not -- so they had that much time to observe the hostages, and their impression was that they were in good physical health.

LEHRER: The explanation you said that the Iranians have given for taking the three out of the foreign ministry was that -- do you buy that explanation, that the government has now taken control of the hostages?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, in dealing with the Iranians. I`m always interested in as many facts as I can get, and one does not necessarily get a consistent version of what has happened or why. Our access to information is not perfect; the Swiss, of course, are our protective government in Teheran representing our interests, and they are in almost daily contact with the government of Iran, and they give us the best information they can: and we rely on them to give us information. And there are other governments that are useful channels of information. But at this point we don`t know where the three have been taken, but we are pursuing that question.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Mr. Secretary, is there anything important in these reported remarks of the Ayatollah to the Prime Minister today that I just quoted? Is there some significance that you can read into that?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, there is an additional report that you ought to have, Robin. Ambassador Gheraieb, one of the Algerian delegation, also at a press conference subsequent to the ones to which you referred, and made it clear that Algeria`s only role is as intermediary, so that whatever Khomeini said, it was not an accurate description of the Algerian role, certainly not a description that satisfied the Algerians.

MacNEIL: So that speculation that the Algerians might be performing something like the Camp David role of trying to come up with a package that brings those sides together -- they are not doing that?

Secretary MUSKIE: I think the most accurate to describe their role -- and I have used this description before -- is that of a positive intermediary. Now what do I mean by the word positive? When they come to the United States to get our response, they do more than accept the document, they also ask questions about the document, try undertaking to anticipate the questions that Iranians may put to them, so that they can deliver the docu- ment with a rather full understanding on their own part of the document`s significance and meaning. And they do that in reverse when they receive the Iranian response to our documents. So they have been very helpful and very impressive in that respect. But they are no more than intermediaries.

MacNEIL: I see. Last week, before they went back, one of the spokesmen in Iran, the man who`s in charge of negotiations, Mr. Nabavi, said that they were prepared to hear a U.S. counteroffer. Are you hopeful that what you have now sent back with the Algerians will produce a positive response in Iran? Do you have some hope of that?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, I`ve long ago dismissed hope as a useful emotion in these frustrating talks. I don`t even describe them as negotiations. But one never knows, given the political power struggle that is going on in Iran today -- and it seems to have developed into one of those more abrasive kinds of struggles, more public than it has been for some time-- one never knows when someone in Iran is in a position to make a decision, and to make a decision favorable to our proposals and to the hostages. And the second point I would make is that, notwithstanding the positive role that the Algerians have played in conveying not only our documents but an explanation of them, it has been very difficult to convey to the Iranians precisely what the limitations are on our authority, on the president`s authority, in a way that`s credible to them. They`re suspicious of us anyway, and so we think that by patiently and persistently making our points, our limitations, reformulating our proposals in accordance with the questions that they raise, that we might at some point strike a formulation that gets a favorable response. Time is obviously running out, and we`re aware of that, and we hope they are.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Have you asked the Algerians to emphasize that point to the Iranians, that time is running out?

Secretary MUSKIE: Oh, indeed, and it wasn`t necessary for us to emphasize it. They`re quite aware of it. too.

LEHRER: They can look at the calendar as well. Is there any indication at this point as to when this next Iranian response to our counterproposals are going to be received here in the United States?

Secretary MUSKIE: No, there isn`t. I think that Rajai is scheduled to hold another press conference tomorrow -- you know, he had one today and gave us no --

LEHRER: It must be terribly frustrating to you to have to get information from a press conference every day or so. Is that --

Secretary MUSKIE: Well now, that doesn`t seem to me that you take your profession seriously enough. Aren`t press conferences supposed to be informative?

LEHRER: All right. [Laughter] Yes, sir.

Secretary MUSKIE: But you`re absolutely right, and like so many politicians in this country as well as in Iran they often say things in public that are not necessarily a clue to what their thinking is or what they may be planning to do.

LEHRER: I see. Have the statements by President-elect Reagan, particularly those characterizing the Iranians as barbarians, have they been helpful or hurtful to the negotiations or the discussions, whatever you want to call them?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, that`s hard to measure. It has certainly struck a chord over in Iran and some very violent -- or vigorous reactions. But he has of course made it clear to them that they can`t expect a better deal in a Reagan administration than they can get from the Carter administration, and to that extent perhaps it`s useful.

LEHRER: What do you make of all this talk in the last several days -- and it`s just talk as I understand it -- but the suggestion that some people are going to make to President-elect Reagan that what he ought to do is ask the Congress to declare war on Iran? Does that sound like a good idea to you?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, when we do that, we risk turning away from one of our two objectives. Our two objectives from the beginning of this administration has been the hostages` safety and speedy return. The word "speedy" has to be dropped now. And secondly to do so consistent with national honor. Once we go to these other alternatives there is a risk. Now there are risks even in our present strategy. So it may be that another look at those options would be in order. But the fact that one looks at options doesn`t necessarily mean that one is looking seriously at one option or another. And I think that a new administration would, as I think Vice-President-elect Bush put it, examine the problem from ground zero. And when you do that, you look at a lot of options that you won`t necessarily consider seriously, and I don`t think it would be useful for me to prejudge options that may not be considered seriously.

LEHRER: Robin?

MacNEIL: Why is it in the Iranian interest. Mr. Secretary, to solve this before the Carter administration leaves?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, it seems logical to me. It seems logical to me. even in terms of their own interest, that they should have solved it long ago. But our logic doesn`t seem run parallel with Iranian logic.

MacNEIL: You mentioned national honor a moment ago. We`ve rejected the S24 billion deposit demand. We have offered, as I understand, something like $6 billion. Why is our offer of $6 billion consistent with national honor and their demand for $24 billion not acceptable as consistent with national honor?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, the principles upon which we have been negotiating -- two important principles. One, that if they will undo what they did -- that is. seize the hostages -- we would do everything we can within the limits of the President`s authority to [undo] what we did in retaliation. Now the $6 billion figure, which doesn`t come from the Slate Department [but from] a very official source, and I`m not going to use any numbers, but the number that has been used is that the assets frozen at the time the hostages were seized amounted to about $8 billion. Now any sum in excess of that is to do more than restore our financial relationship to the status quo ante. That`s the first principle. The second principle is that if and when this exchange of actions is taken, they must be taken simultaneously - - that is, so that we are sure of getting the hostages back for taking our action, and that they are sure of getting their assets back. Now the complicating factor in all of this is that subsequent to the freezing of the assets a great number of suits arising out of business arrangements, banking arrangements that the Iranians had entered into before the seizure of the hostages, changed. Banks [had] offset loans against assets; people with claims against Iran filed suit and made attachments. And that`s the complicating factor. One cannot just arbitrarily wipe out the rights of those people to a judicial settlement of their claims. And that`s the complicating factor, and it`s the amount of those claims which is very hard to measure that complicates the net numbers to which you referred. Now there`s nothing like $24 billion in Iranian assets involved in all of this.

MacNEIL: So is it wrong to think of this as a negotiation like a labor negotiation where they start with a high demand, and then there`s a lower offer, and gradually the two sides come together monetarily?

Secretary MUSKIE: No. I don`t see it in that fashion at all. Recall that I said the principle is to restore each other`s position to what it was. and given the fact that a year irrevocably changes those positions to some extent, you can`t give the hostages back that wasted year, and in the case of the assets these attachment have complicated the Iranians` claim to their assets. So you can`t put them back, but all you can do is -- and so you`re dealing with fixed items. You can`t negotiate down the claims. What we`ve offered to do there is to create an international claims settlement procedure which would substitute for the judicial process; a claim settlement procedure to make judgments as to the validity of claims and to arrange for their settlement. In order to wipe the slate clean at some point, Iran has said that it is willing to pay its just debts, but beyond that it is not willing to concede against its own assets. So the numbers are not really that flexible.

MacNEIL: It sounds as though there`s not much more room for maneuver.

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, to answer that question adequately would require that I go into the matter more extensively than I think would be helpful.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: On a scale of one to ten. Mr. Secretary, what do you think the chances are of the hostage situation being resolved by the deadline January 16?

Secretary MUSKIE: You know, that method of measuring is useful in the United States but not in Iran.

LEHRER: You won`t play my game, in other words?

Secretary MUSKIE: No, I won`t.

LEHRER: Okay. Moving on to another major problem of Iran, which is its war with Iraq, yesterday Iran announced that it had launched a major counteroffensive against Iraq. Is that real, the best you can tell?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well. I know what Iranian reports say about it. What they claim to have been involved is Iraqi casualties in the hundreds. Now, in terms of World War II that`s not a major offensive, but in terms of this war that is a sizable loss. So they claim this victory. Reports out of Iraq, at least as of this morning -- I`ve been caught up in other things all day -- made no reference to such an offensive. So, all we have is the Iranian report and Bani-Sadr who`s in charge of the military operation made that report to Khomeini and received a note of congratulations. So that`s the evidence that there was such an offensive. The war has bogged down -- - it`s a rainy season there now -- it`s bogged down into a sort of a war of attrition at a very low pace. And at this point neither country seems to be in position to achieve a quick victory over the other. It looks like a long, dragged-out process which is taking its toll from both countries economically. They`ve lost a sizable portion of their oil revenues. In the case of Iran the sanctions which were imposed as the result of the hostage issue is denying it access to markets that otherwise would enable it to improve its ability to sustain the war effort, so that -- but Iraq also is suffering economic damage. So it looks now as though the war has settled down for the long term. Whether or not at some point both parties will be receptive to the termination of hostilities, a cease-fire, withdrawal from territories, negotiations. I think is the objective toward which we ought to address our efforts with other countries in the Security Council.

LEHRER: Well, it doesn`t look like that`s on the immediate horizon. Right?

Secretary MUSKIE: No, it does not.

LEHRER: Let me move on to another part of the world -- Poland. Is the immediate threat of Soviet intervention there pretty well subsided for now?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, let me describe it as accurately as I can on the basis of the information that we have. There has been some reduction in Soviet military activity, but their stale of readiness is still at the high level that it achieved in December. So they`re in a position militarily to move on fairly short notice. Internally, the tension level seems to have been reduced somewhat, but there are some difficult points ahead of us. There`s a question of work-free Saturdays, for example; there`s a question of a union for the farmers; and down the road further there`s a scheduled congress of the party in Poland. And there`s the very difficult economic situation which could trigger political reactions and counter-reactions from the government, and maybe conceivably from the Soviet Union. So it`s going to be a very delicate, sensitive and potentially volatile situation for some time.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Sorry to rush you around the world so fast, Mr. Secretary, but in El Salvador, as of last week six Americans have recently been killed there, Americans who were working there privately or under government auspices. Is there anything that requires changing in American policy or that can be done to stop this loss of American life there?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, first of all one must understand the basic situation, We have two forces contending for control in El Salvador -- the right, made up of those who occupied a privileged position in the economy of the country traditionally, and the disadvantaged and dispossessed who seek to achieve a government that`s more sensitive to their needs and their aspirations. And so there are those in both groups inclined to violence and they`ve both succeeded, to the extent that last year there were 9.000 lives lost altogether. The government is made up of a junta with military representation, a President who is a civilian, and the government- -- the civilian is a member of the Christian Democratic Party which is seeking to establish a moderate government and has pledged itself to reforms -- land reform, which is perhaps the most important and significant and key reform proposal, and which led to the deaths of the two Americans who were just killed and a very significant. EI Salvadoran political figure. Mr. Viera, who is sensitive to the needs of the poor and the disadvantaged.

The land reform program is the object of the displeasure of both the left and the right. Privileged people who have owned the land and in effect dominated the economy see land reform as a threat to their privileged position. The left sees land reform as a reform which frustrates the kind of change which they would like to initiate through violence and overthrow. So that land reform and reforms of this kind that are sponsored by the government are attacked and resisted from both ends of the spectrum.

Now Mr. Hammer, who was one of the Americans killed regrettably in this recently, was in charge of the land reform program, and so he had his enemies on both sides. The question is, from which side of the political spectrum did the attack come? President Duarte and the Defense Minister responded quickly to the protests of our charge and they`re pressing for an investigation. And we need to determine that. But the problem is how to get the moderate center established, credible, and how to build support for them, given these pressures from the left and the right. People get caught in the middle, when they`re Americans or anyone else treading on dangerous ground.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you.

LEHRER: Finally, Mr. Secretary, to your favorite subject, Zbigniew Brzezinski. As you know, in the past week, both U.N. Ambassador Donald McHenry and former State Department spokesman Hodding Carter have gone after him. McHenry said, for instance, that Brzezinski spoke out publicly when he shouldn`t have, and has been sending mixed signals around the world on U.S. foreign policy. Is that true?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, let me put it this way. This subject has been discussed now on just about every -- well, I won`t say "every" -- many interview programs which I`ve been on, and my --

LEHRER: We`re looking for something fresh, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary MUSKIE: I have nothing fresh to say. I`ve tackled the subject from the institutional point of view -- the respective roles at the National Security Council and the State Department -- and I`ve made those views known and clear and I don`t think it`s useful, nor am I inclined to get involved in a personality contest with Zbig -- Zbig and I are good friends; we get along fine, I find him congenial, and I see no reason at this point to --

LEHRER: But McHenry wasn`t a personality thing. McHenry was talking about - - he`s the U.N. ambassador of the United States -- he was talking about sending mixed signals on foreign policy. He didn`t attack him personally. Hodding Carter`s statement was a little different.

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, let me put it in institutional terms. What Don McHenry had to say could have been said when Henry Kissinger was National Security Advisor. It could have been said in previous administrations when the National Security Advisor was given a public voice. That`s a problem. Now it`s the President`s choice as to whether or not that that`s what he wants.

LEHRER: And President Carter said that he made that choice.

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, he clearly did, and he saw advantages in it for him. Zbig says that an activist president -- that is, a foreign policy activist president -- will give his National Security Advisor automatically more visibility, which is a legitimate point of view.

LEHRER: Dave Broder in a column in the Washington Post recently said that you offered your successor designate Alexander Haig four rules that --

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, don`t call them rules; I didn`t.

LEHRER: All right. No press secretary for the security advisor. No press briefings or TV appearances. No contacts with foreign governments. And for him to do his job. and not the State Department. Is that an accurate reflection of what you think the rules ought to be?

Secretary MUSKIE: Well, it wasn`t put in the diplomatic way that I`ve learned to say things, or tried to, in the last six months --

LEHRER: But structurally you think that would help.

Secretary MUSKIE: Well. I think that those four points highlight the point that I made a moment ago. The President under the Constitution makes foreign policy; he`s got greater power there than he does in domestic policy. Secondly, he ought to have a Secretary of State in whom he has confidence as his delegated voice. Now that`s the arrangement. And that should be the arrangement. Now. to the extent that someone else -- whether its the national security advisor, or the Secretary of Defense -- articulates foreign policy, then to that extent you send mixed signals, or at least risk it.

LEHRER: We have to go. Mr. Secretary, thank you.

MacNEIL: Yes, thank you for joining us, Mr. Secretary. Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night. Robin.

MacNEIL: That`s all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night, when our guest will be Zbigniew Brzezinski. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.