The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Falklands Pressures

- Transcript
[Tease]
JIM LEHRER [voice-over]: Argentine soldiers readied their defenses against the British as the big battle for the Falklands seems imminent.
[Titles]
LEHRER: Good evening. The decisive battle for the Falkland Islands is apparently only days, maybe just hours, away. Unofficial press reports from London claim British troops today seized high ground overlooking the capital city of Stanley. It is there the main Argentine force of some 7,000 troops is dug in, prepared to fight a reinforced British attack force of equal size. There are few military experts and neutral observers anywhere predicting anything other than victory for the British. This belief has spurred fresh diplomatic and political stories about pressure: pressure on the British to go easy, to stop short of humiliating the Argentines, to be magnanimous in victory; pressure on the Argentines to surrender before more Argentine and British blood is spilled; and pressure on both to agree at least to an 11th-hour pause, a ceasefire of some kind, so serious talks can be held before the all-out war over Stanley begins. Tonight we look at both the military and the diplomatic battles over Stanley. Robert MacNeil is off; Charlayne Hunter-Gault is in New York. Charlayne?
CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Jim, the major focal point in the Falklands fighting today was the strategic high ground you referred to a few moments ago -- Mount Kent, a 1,600-foot mountain some 12 miles from Stanley. The British movement from there suggests that they will advance on Stanley with a three-pronged attack. One group moved out of the San Carlos bridgehead and then took the settlements of Douglas and Teal Inlet. Another force, part of the unit that captured the Goose Green airfield and town of Darwin on Friday, has moved towards Stanley from the southwest. Aiding the land forces have been ships of the task force, and Harrier fighter-bomber attacks, which have bombarded Argentine positions as part of the softening up process for the final assault. It has been reported that some 3,500 ground troop reinforcements have already been put ashore near Stanley to reinforce the 4,000-man troop force already on the ground. The British said today that one of their Harrier jets from the carrier Invincible shot down an Argentine transport plane off of the Falklands. Argentina has acknowledged that some 120 Argentines were wounded, and claimed some 1,400 of their men were taken prisoner. The Argentine ministry said British casualties included 17 dead and 31 wounded. The British would only confirm the loss of the commanding officer who led the attack on Goose Green. Jim?
LEHRER: An assessment of the military situation now from Vice Admiral Thor Hanson, who retired in February after 31 years in the U.S. Navy. He was staff director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he retired.He served most of his line duty in the Navy aboard cruisers and destroyers. Admiral, what does it look like to you, a probable or a certain victory for the British?
Adm. THOR HANSON: Jim, I don't think you can say anything but a certain victory. The only question to me is how long it's going to take, and that has to do, I think, with whether the British decide to try for some kind of a negotiated settlement, or whether they decide to move on in to certain bloodshed on both sides.
LEHRER: Is the likelihood of a British victory such that it would behoove the British to announce when they're ready, all right, to give the Argentines an opportunity to surrender before they honestly attack, and do you think that would work? I mean, is it so obvious to everybody the British would win?
Adm. HANSON: I personally think, and would hope that they will give that kind of an option to the Argentines. I can't answer the second part of your question of about whether the Argentines would take them up on it. I would hope that they would because it seems to me that their position ashore militarily now is really quite desperate.
LEHRER: There was one of these unconfirmed reports from London just a short while ago saying that Prime Minister Thatcher had in fact told the fleet commander in the Falklands to do that when he was ready. In other words, before he did anything to give the Argentines a chance to surrender. We'll see what happens on that. Admiral, from a military point of view, as Charlayne just laid out, the ground forces seem fairly equal in terms of what the Argentines have around Stanley and what the British are prepared to use in this assault force. Why then do the British have such an advantage?
Adm. HANSON: Well, Jim, I'd say for about three reasons. First, they have much more seasoned, and I would say, probably much better trained troops that have seen action -- at least, large numbers of them probably have. That one point. A second is that they have the advantage of mobility. I would say they must have many more helicopters to be able to move elements of their troops about more rapidly than the Argentines. And then, third, they have the advantage of being able to pick the time, the place, the initiative there; where they're going to commit those 3,500 troops from the QE2, which are probably ashore. We don't know that, confirmed from the Defense Ministry. But how they're going to use those, where they're going to make their moves and when. Those things keep the Argentines very much off balance, I would think. I would say those are their main advantages, and that's what swings it in their favor, for me.
LEHRER: Do the Argentines have any viable military options now?
Adm. HANSON: To win, I would say no, Jim, they don't. It seems to me their options are to keep flying, as best they can, raids from Argentina to go after the British ships at sea, try to get a big supply ship, try to get a carrier. That isn't going to change the outcome of the battle on the ground, in my opinion. And also perhaps to fly in -- of course to fly in and try to go after those British troops on the ground. But for the past two days the weather has been really quite clear, not much cloud cover, and they have not been mounting that much from an air attack point of view, and it's now clouding over. So I don't see that that's going to be a real factor.
LEHRER: In general military terms, Admiral, are troops on the ground, as the British troops are now, are they good targets?Are they vulnerable to air attack?
Adm. HANSON: It depends on how they're concentrated. You know, men in green suits in green terrain are pretty hard to find. But when you set up major supply bases and that kind of thing, that becomes vulnerable. I don't think the British are in that position yet. Then, of course they again have the further advantage -- one other point I didn't make before, they really do locally control that air, and they have those ships close by that can just keep pounding Port Stanley where those Argentine 7,000 troops are. And they have their Harriers they can fly in from both sides now, because I'm sure they're operating some from Goose Green and from other spots up to the north in the East Falklands. The Argentines just don't have any of that.
LEHRER: Admiral, a tough question, but I must ask it. Assuming that there is no surrender, and assuming there is an all-out assault by the British, and assuming that the Argentines resist with all that they have available, knowing what you do from a military standpoint, is it likely to be a very bloody battle? I mean, are there going to be heavy casualties on both sides, or is there such a thing that the British could win it quickly and neatly without a lot of loss of life on either side?
Adm. HANSON: Well, of course a lot of that depends on what the Argentines do and how hard. You're setting up the fact that they're going to fight hard.They apparently have a hard core of some well-trained, tough marines around Stanley. Their track record to date around Goose Green-Port Darwin has not been good, as we've seen. They did surrender 1,400 troops fairly quickly to a much smaller force, as best we can tell. I think, though, if they decided to fight in a very determined way, and have a nucleus of trained, tough marines -- and they must have a lot of ammunition there because they haven't been using it up to now, other than some anti-airfire against incoming Harriers and that sort of thing -- they've got the wherewithal to make it a bloody battle, and I would never discount that that could happen should that kind of eventuality that you have set up -- should that occur.
LEHRER: Admiral, is there a military explanation for why the Argentines have not put up a stronger resistance along the lines you just mentioned -- the Goose Green, the Darwin, all of those situations that didn't seem to last very long?
Adm. HANSON: Well, I don't think they prepared very well in the month they had as the British came down, obviously. I think the real explanation is the British have been very, very clever. They have taken some big risks. When they made that landing, they decided to put their frigates and destroyers out there, and essentially expend them to protect that landing to make sure that lodgment got ashore to be able to reinforce it to bring the supplies in. They made a calculated risk, and they came out of that very well. Losing four ships is not a small loss, but as far as the battle goes, it was not a significant factor in the balance, in my opinion, to lose those ships to establish that beachhead. Once the British got ashore in force and were able to sustain that -- and they picked a place very cleverly to do it; it was separated from the Stanley area by a mountain range that kept the Argentines from being able to dislodge them -- and once the Argentines had allowed that to happen, I think their days were numbered at that point. But the British have fought a classic campaign in my mind. They went in at the right place, they got themselves established; they then protected their flank at Darwin by coming across and isolating that section. Now, any other Argentine troops that are in the southern part of the East Falklands, or any of those in the West Falklands, are just absolutely useless to them.And they've just been very methodically bringing this -- escalating it and getting themselves in a position so that they can dominate in numbers.
LEHRER: I read somewhere that this has almost been a military textbook operation from the British point of view. Would you agree?
Adm. HANSON: I certainly would. It certainly would.
LEHRER: Thank you. Charlayne?
HUNTER-GAULT: Now for an assessment of Argentina and its military government. It comes from Robert Potash, a professor of history at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He has been studying the politics of the Argentine military for the past 20 years. His most recent work is a two-volume study, The Army and Politics in Argentina, published in 1980. Professor, does the situation look as bad for Argentina as was just suggested?
Prof. ROBERT POTASH: Well, from everything that we hear up here, the military situation is very discouraging from an Argentine viewpoint. Nevertheless, I don't think the Argentines are prepared to concede. I think that they will stand and fight, unless a ceasefire of some sort can be arranged that would allow them to extricate themselves honorably.
HUNTER-GAULT: You don't think that a heavy and quick assault on Port Stanley, with lots of casualties, would force a surrender?
Prof. POTASH: Well, if the assault succeeded, the assault would succeed. I don't believe that the Argentine government is prepared to surrender before such a battle.
HUNTER-GAULT: Argentina said today that its troops would offer determined resistance in any assault on Stanley. How long do you think they can hold out?
Prof. POTASH: Well, I would imagine for several days.I suspect that they may use their remaining air force and their naval capacity -- they still have two submarines that have not been employed -- to inflict damage on the British. I think ultimately from their viewpoint, even if they lose the island, if they have stood up to the British, if they have -- as they have already done -- inflicted serious damage to the British fleet, then they will have the view that they conducted themselves honorably. After all, from their viewpoint, they see themselves as a medium-sized country opposing the military might not only of Great Britain, but of Great Britain supplied by the United States. So to be defeated under such circumstances is not a disgrace.
HUNTER-GAULT: So they would accept a defeat, in your view, if they could somehow say they accepted it honorably?
Prof. POTASH: Yes.And if they conducted themselves in a military manner.
HUNTER-GAULT: But up to now, as was just discussed briefly, the Argentines have not been as aggressive as many people who have studied the Argentine military predicted or expected they would be. Why do you think that was?
Prof. POTASH: Well, I don't know for a fact, but what I suspect is that the better troops -- mention was made by the Admiral of their marine component -- but their better troops have been deployed around Port Stanley, and that the units that were deployed in the Port Darwin and at the nearby air base were relatively untrained conscripts who were deployed there not with the idea that they would actually have to stand and fight.
HUNTER-GAULT: So everything you're saying suggests that you expect to see a very different kind of fighting now in the final defense of Stanley?
Prof. POTASH: This is what I would anticipate. Of course I could be wrong.
HUNTER-GAULT: One of the members of the junta today -- Air Force General Lami Dozo, I believe -- suggested that Argentina may have to declare a national emergency and form a new government. Does that, in your view, signal acceptance of a defeat?
Prof. POTASH: Well, I think it implies a realization that the islands might be lost, and that in order for Argentina to continue the struggle -- because they are viewing this now as one battle in a war. They're not by any means conceding, even if they lose control of the islands, that they will no longer claim them or no longer make an effort to recover them. So what I -- I hadn't heard that reference to Lami Dozo's proposal. This sounds as if they will try to bring civilians into a broader government, which would be committed to continuing the struggle with other means.
HUNTER-GAULT: Just very briefly, would that suggest or do you have any sense that at this point they could accept a negotiated settlement?
Prof. POTASH: I think they could. I think they could, provided it would give them certain minimum objectives. You remember there was a good deal of discussion about an Argentine flag.There would have to be some kind of Argentine representation, an Argentine official or person, who could remain on the island with the Argentine flag as evidence that the situation before all this has not been restored. In other words, the status quo ante would not be restored.
HUNTER-GAULT: Right. All right, we'll come back. Thank you. Jim?
Prof. POTASH: All right.
LEHRER: We get a feel for the pressure on the British now from David Owen, foreign secretary in the Labour government which preceded the current Conservative Party government of Margaret Thatcher. Dr. Owen has since split from the Labour Party to help form the new Social Democratic Party. He came to the United States for a press conference on disarmament today, but yesterday he went to the United Nations to see if a pre-all-out-war settlement could be reached on the Falklands. And Dr. Owen, what did you find out at the U.N.?
Dr. DAVID OWEN: Well, the Secretary General is doing his best, but I think he is fairly pessimistic, and he will have to go to the Security Council and tell them results of his discussions, possibly this evening. Certainly he's got to report back by tomorrow. So there's likely to be a Security Council meeting, I should have thought, either late tonight or tomorrow.
LEHRER: Dr. Owen, do you personally believe that it's possible for a ceasefire, for a pause or anything like that before this expected assault on Stanley?
Dr. OWEN: Well, I think that the British have always been very clear -- and I support this -- in linking a ceasefire and immediate withdrawal. So I don't think any British government would accept just a ceasefire by itself, an unconditional ceasefire. If there was any sign that the Argentinians were prepared to withdraw, I do believe the British would let them withdraw with some degree of dignity. I mean, let them send their own ships in, to go out in their own ships. But I don't think, myself, that Britain will talk in terms of just a ceasefire. We feel bound by Resolution 502, which is after all a mandatory resolution which talks of three things: a ceasefire, withdrawal of Argentinian forces, and a negotiation for the future. I think we're ready to see all three elements introduced. But as yet, you see, there has been absolutely no sign that the Argentinians are ready to withdraw their forces. I wish they would. I mean, I have absolutely no wish whatever for a bloody battle for Port Stanley. I don't want to see any more people lose their lives. It seems to me quite wrong. And if we could possibly avoid it, Britain wants to. There is no sense of vindictiveness in Britain. There is no feeling that despite the losses and the ships having gone down that we have got to kick them off the island physically. I don't believe that's a dominant mood in Britain at the moment.
LEHRER: Not even among the general public?
Dr. OWEN: No. I really don't. There has been a lot of strange reporting out of Britain. I don't think the mood is what we call jingoistic or bellicose. It just is that we see a naked piece of aggression. The Argentinians went into that island; they have completely disrupted the peaceful existence of the Falkland Islanders; and the British are people who are pretty slow to rouse. We have put up with an awful lot around the world over the last few years, and I think the general feeling was, you know, enough is enough. And this really is a question, if we allow this to happen, well, I mean, where does it stop? And I think there's a very gut, honest feeling; I don't think people even hold out for British sovereignty. What we're holding out for is the best interests of the Falkland Islanders. And I think most people feel that whereas before this happened the Falkland Islanders might well have accepted some accommodation with the Argentinians, it's very unlikely that they would accept Argentine sovereignty. But we could go a U.N. trusteeship.Britain is in no sense a colonial power. We've been giving up our colonies now for 20 years.
LEHRER: Dr. Owen, what kind of pressure is building on the Thatcher government to, the phrase is, to not humiliate the Argentinians in defeat, or in victory, from the British point of view?
Dr. OWEN: Well, I think there is a growing recognition that the danger is that even if we take Port Stanley -- which I think personally we can easily do. I think we'll lose some loss of life, but I actually do think that our forces are really very much superior to them on the ground. But even if we do that, the Argentinians are likely to continue the battle. I think they will try and take out our ships, and I think they will interfere with British shipping, not just for months, maybe for years. And I think they will interfere with aircraft, and I think the danger is that we will have a sort of fortress Falklands where we will have to keep a fairly substantial force down there, but there'll be a status of semi-war, which is hardly the best atmosphere for the Falkland Islanders to enjoy peaceful sheep farming.
LEHRER: How can this be prevented, Dr. Owen?
LEHRER: Well, how can that be prevented, Dr. Owen?
Dr. OWEN: Well, that is why I personally -- and I think this is a view of quite a lot of us -- would like to see, even at this last moment, the Argentinians being forced, if you like, by the pressure of other Latin American countries, and to some extent the United States, to realize that the game is out, that they're going to be thrown off these islands, and they had better come to a negotiated settlement; and therefore there could be an immediate withdrawal followed by some withdrawal of some of the British forces. We'd probably keep some of the ones that have been sent down to reconstruct the island, because there is going to be a lot of clearing up to do. And then negotiations over the long-term future, maybe even revive some of the sort of Peruvian ideas, having maybe United States military presence, a small one, perhaps with some other Latin American countries. You see, where Britain is going to find a very great difficulty is taking our troops off there, having lost lives to get there, unless we feel that there is a guarantee the Argentinians aren't going to reinvade. And I think that in that sense the knowledge that there were U.S. troops -- you know, there don't need to be very many -- would be a safeguard.We would feel if there were any U.S. troops, say, 25, 50, even, and possibly a Latin American peace-keeping or U.N. peace-keeping initiative, then I think we'd feel pretty sure the Argentinians wouldn't come back.
LEHRER: But as you sit here tonight, Dr. Owen, you're not terribly optimistic that something is going to happen in the next few hours or the next couple of days to prevent a bloody battle over Port Stanley?
Dr. OWEN: No, I'm not optimistic, but in a strange way there's a whole sort of secret to diplomacy as it is only at the brink that you get the breakthrough. It is only when the Argentinians feel themselves totally encircled, when they know that those 3,000 additional British troops have landed, that they see them in position, that they are strafed by Harriers, that they're bombarded from the sea, and even the most brave commander suddenly realizes, "Look, this is suicide. We're just going to be taken completely and we're going to have very heavy casualties." And at that stage, if we could get Latin American countries to say to Argentina, "Look, this is ridiculous, you've got to give up. Withdraw your forces with some degree of honor and go into some form of negotiations." Now, at the moment, you see, the Argentinians have shown no sign of wanting to do this; all through the last seven weeks of negotiations, at no stage have they really been able to take up a negotiated offer. They've been given some quite sensible, tempting offers, as the last British government's position, which was having a U.N. administrator for the interim period. It was, I really think, a very flexible, reasonable position.
LEHRER: Thank you. Charlayne?
HUNTER-GAULT: Professor Potash, those pressures building up or that could build up inside Argentina, do you think that the problems that the junta [has], and what Lami Dozo said today, have anything to do with the division of opinion among the junta about what should be happening now, what Argentina should be doing?
Prof. POTASH: Well, let me, before I get into that, take issue with Mr. Owen. I don't think the Argentines have been totally intransigent. I think through the negotiations they were prepared to accept an interim administration. They wanted an Argentine presence on the island in some form. Now, even what Mr. Owen says right now, that the Argentines, under Latin American pressure, should withdraw their troops -- I don't think it's the troops that's the issue. It would be the recognition on the part of Great Britain that Argentina has some right there. This obviously hasn't been conceded, and I only regret that some years ago Great Britain, when it did propose what we call the Hong Kong solution, might have pushed ahead with that despite the objections of the islanders.
HUNTER-GAULT: Mr. Owen, would you like to comment on that?
Dr. OWEN: Well, I think that's true. I mean, I think that in 1980 there was a possibility, but the snag is that what you have to do is to look at the Argentinian government. The Falkland Islanders, when it was put to them, rejected it. And they looked at Argentina across the mainland, they saw a dictatorship, they sawa government which had an appalling record on human rights, they saw the disappearance of individuals. What people would, when asked by this, to hand over sovereignty, effectively, to that type of Argentinian government? And I think this has been the problem. We've been negotiating with an Argentinian government all the time growing rather more extreme. And it has been impossibly difficult for us to convince the Falkland Islanders. Now, if you believe in the principle of self-determination, you've got to take at least account of the Falkland Islanders. And I've noticed throughout this conversation there has been very little discussion about the basic fundamental. The fundamental is that the Argentines invaded that island -- took it by force. And, I mean, it's very difficult therefore for Britain to accept that they should gain anything.But when you say an Argentinian presence, the three-flag situation of a U.S. flag, an Argentinian flag, and a British flag was proposed at one stage. I think Britain would have agreed with that if the Argentinians had accepted it, and we would have accepted some form of U.N. trusteeship in which the Argentine could have been part of the trusteeship council. I mean, quite honestly, I think you are being more generous to them than is fair. I don't see any sign that they have really been prepared to accept that sovereignty is not prejudged. They wanted to be able to settle on the islands. They want to be able to buy land. They wanted to create fact and effectively take over the Falkland Islands by the back door, in their most recent response to the British proposals.
HUNTER-GAULT: Mr. Owen, let me just ask Professor Potash, do you sense, as I said before, that the comments by Lami Dozo today about a new government indicate that there are some elements within the junta who would be willing to take a different posture?
Prof. POTASH: Well, they may adopt a different tactic, but I think the objective, namely, the Argentine recovery of the islands, or an Argentine presence on the islands is common to all groups. This is an issue, interestingly enough, which has unified Argentine opinion in a way that I certainly haven't observed, and I've been going back and forth to that country since the 1950s. It's rather remarkable the degree of unity of view and intensity of feeling that transcends all traditional cleavages within the country.
HUNTER-GAULT: Let me ask you both, or all three of you, for that matter, do you think that if this fighting continues in Stanley, for example, and is protracted, and there are heavy casualties, that this will have an impact on public opinion in Britain, which is now solidly in support of the action, and in Argentina, which is, as you just described, solidly in support of determined resistance? Will casualties of a severe nature affect those attitudes in any way and bring this to a closer end, do you think, starting with you, Admiral?
Adm. HANSON: Well, I can't speak for attitudes in Britain, certainly, as well as Dr. Owen, but I can't believe that a bloody encounter of the kind that would probably happen couldn't have deep effects in both countries.
HUNTER-GAULT: All right, I'm sorry, we have to leave it there.
LEHRER: We'd love to have heard what you had to say, Dr. Owen and Professor Potash, but we're out of time on that. Thank you very much, Professor Potash in Boston; Dr. Owen, Admiral Hanson, thank you here. And good night, Charlayne.
HUNTER-GAULT: Good night, Jim.
LEHRER: And we'll see you tomorrow night. I'm Jim Lehrer. Thank you and good night.
- Series
- The MacNeil/Lehrer Report
- Episode
- Falklands Pressures
- Producing Organization
- NewsHour Productions
- Contributing Organization
- National Records and Archives Administration (Washington, District of Columbia)
- AAPB ID
- cpb-aacip/507-0k26970h2z
If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/507-0k26970h2z).
- Description
- Episode Description
- This episode's headline: Falklands Pressures. The guests include Adm. THOR HANSON, United States Navy, Retired; DAVID OWEN, Former British Foreign Secretary; In Boston (Facilities: WGBH): ROBERT POTASH, University of Massachusetts. Byline: In New York: CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT, Correspondent; In Washington: JIM LEHRER, Associate Editor; DAN WERNER, Producer; JUNE CROSS, PATRICIA ELLIS, Reporters
- Created Date
- 1982-06-01
- Rights
- Copyright NewsHour Productions, LLC. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode)
- Media type
- Moving Image
- Duration
- 00:31:24
- Credits
-
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Producing Organization: NewsHour Productions
- AAPB Contributor Holdings
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National Records and Archives Administration
Identifier: NHNARA31 (AAPB Inventory ID)
Format: 1 inch videotape
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- Citations
- Chicago: “The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Falklands Pressures,” 1982-06-01, National Records and Archives Administration, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed July 8, 2025, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-507-0k26970h2z.
- MLA: “The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Falklands Pressures.” 1982-06-01. National Records and Archives Administration, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. July 8, 2025. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-507-0k26970h2z>.
- APA: The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Falklands Pressures. Boston, MA: National Records and Archives Administration, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-507-0k26970h2z