The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Veterans Day Army Morale

Funding for this program has been provided by this station and other public television stations and by grants from Exxon Corporation, Allied Chemical Corporation and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Good evening. On Saturday, the nation celebrated Veterans Day, once Armistice Day, marking the end of the First World War 60 years ago. Led by President Carter at the tomb of the unknown soldier, there were parades and speeches throughout the country to the glory of those who served in four wars. But for the serving soldiers of today, these are times when the glory of a military

career may seem in short supply. Still racked by the experience of Vietnam still digesting the change to an all-volunteer service, the U.S. Army is coming under fresh fire. Critics have attacked its present standards down to the fundamentals that make an army effective for recruitment, training, office equality, morale, and our demanding substantial reforms. Tonight, the U.S. Army and its critics, Jim. Rob and last month Army Secretary Clifford Alexander said he about had it with the critics of the present day Army with the undercurrent of pessimism they've created with the open season on our soldiers they've declared. He said he personally found the critics' remarks offensive, misdirected, unfair, and uninformed. Alexander named no names, but critics of the Army are not hard to find these days. Two of the most devastating criticisms were leveled and written documents. One, a report done for a member of Congress. The other, a book about the Army Officer Corps. The Congressional document is called the Beard Report, done at the behest of Congressman

Robin Beard, Republican of Tennessee, a member of the House Armed Services Committee. A staff member spent five months on the project, which included interviewing more than 500 soldiers of all ranks at 30 separate installations here in a broad. The conclusions were simply these, that the Army is not as strong, well-trained, and effective as it was five years ago, that it suffers serious morale and discipline problems, that many reforms are needed because, and I quote, the Army is fighting for its future, one of the most difficult battles in its history. The other critical document was a book entitled Crisis in Command, and its co-author is with Robin in New York. Robin? Crisis in Command is a withering indictment of the modern officer corps of the U.S. Army. It was written by two former Army officers who both teach politics now at Sundancem's College in New Hampshire, Paul Savage and Richard Gabriel. With us is Richard Gabriel, a major in the Army Reserve, a former staff officer with NATO, and an intelligence analyst attached to the Pentagon.

So Gabriel, you say the U.S. Army came to grief in Vietnam because its officers had been trained to be managers, not leaders. Why did that matter? Well, fundamentally, if one looks anthropologically at the development of successful armies, you find that what makes men hold together in combat is a feeling of strong primary groups that are supported by officers and men who interact, share the same kinds of risk, same kinds of combat, same kinds of experiences. When we began to look at the problem of the officer corps in Vietnam, we found that this was not the case. The officers had been trained to be managers, not for the battlefield. For example, the troops spent 12 months in the bush. The officers spent only six months. We could look at a whole range of practices, but fundamentally what happened was that the officers corps training made it fit as managers. They were told to manage their resources, not lead their men. They did not lead their men, and the result was disaster. Not only an army that bought it on this cohesion or disintegration, but one that actually was fought to a draw by a far minor enemy.

And I add that the quality of the officer corps was perceived by the troops. One notes that over 1,000 officers were assassinated by their own men, and that may be only the tip of the iceberg. Those who were caught, attempted assassinations made run as much as twice as that. If that's true, about 20% of officer casualties were taken at the hands of our own troops because the troops perceived that the officers were not prepared to share the same risks or the same burden of sacrifice. They perceived that the officers saw the troops as tools of the end of their own career rather than as moral charges. This change in the ethic of the officer corps from the traditional one is, as you put it, has that at all been changed since Vietnam, or is the situation the same in the U.S. Army today? I think catastrophically it's the same. The basis of that kind of entrepreneurialism was, of course, Robert McNamara in 1960 with the cost-effectiveness and the application of other economic model techniques to the running of an army. This false league... Making the army like a large business corporation. This false league equates business corporations with what I call cooperative structures.

That is to say military structures. The things that make men fight are categorically different from the things that make men work for say IBM or DuPont. So when you confuse the two, you end up trying to motivate troops by higher salaries, for example, by greater league policies, a whole range of incentives. More importantly, you force the officer corps since it responds to its own imperatives of promotion to behave more and more like managers. If one looks at the American army today, especially with the rise of voter and attempt to recruit literally by dollars, I would say that the condition, in fact, is not changed. The evidence suggests it's gotten worse. What does that done to arm the state of Army morale today? Well, I think, as one factor in the entire effect of this equation, Army morale is at rock bottom. I don't think one has to go very far to see that. What's the evidence for that? Well, certainly the beard report, letters I get from troops in the field. But there are some more evidence, for example. You look at an army that's about 31% is thrown out.

At the end, 38% is thrown out at the end of the first year for mental moral or physical reasons. It does not complete its full tour. An army that, depending on who you read, 28, 28.5% are addicted to hot, drug abuse. The number of honorable discharges is down to 87%, the lowest time in recent history. I think the evidence that the quality of the officer corps in the American army today in terms of combat effect, and this is rather clear. Well, thank you, Jim. All right. Here to respond to Mr. Gabriel's comments is Lieutenant General Robert Yerks, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel General Yerks is a West Point graduate who has served in the Army for more than 27 years. He commanded an infantry battalion in Vietnam and was commandant of the U.S. Army War College before taking his current position. General rather sweeping indictment of the current day, our good evening, sir, is he right? Absolutely not. I would like to respond somewhat to Richard's use of statistics which are grossly inaccurate, and I think it's a disservice to the American people if I leave those statistics hanging

in the air, yet I have not the intent to get into a statistical battle because an advocate can use his statistics as he sees fit to drugs as a gross misrepresentation of the American soldier today to state that and the implications of the officer corps not carrying the burden of battle and leading their troops in Vietnam is a very misleading statement. And I only ask that in the assessment of our soldier today, and we're talking about today's soldier, in the assessment of it, that I would hope that we would not get into a situation where we are using statistics that themselves are just misleading to the American public because they and the end need to make the proper judgments and gain the proper perspective as to whether or not the volunteer concept is working or should not be scrapped.

All right, General, let's take some of the specifics. One of the statistics that he just mentioned was that one-third of all army and listies are failing to complete their initial three-year enlistment. First of all, is that correct, second of all, if it is correct, then what is the reason? Yes, sir. I think Richard used the term, made the statement that some 38 percent did not finish their first year in the service. Now, that is incorrect. The more accurate figure is that, and I think he relates to a 1974 figure, that in the first term, that is the first three years, three to four years of that enlistment of those that entered in 1974, did a trip. Now, this is an excessive percentage, and that's why I don't wish to get too far into statistics. We had disturbed about that in the army as well.

You can see there's a problem. Most certainly. What's the cause of the problem, General? Well, so there's several reasons, one of which, and it makes comparisons rather invalid. Because we have instituted what we call expeditious discharge programs, and trainee discharge programs, which a leader, a commander, can summarily discharge a trainee or a soldier. If he finds that that soldier is not living up to his responsibilities, or perhaps he does not have the capabilities, and rather than to waste the time of commanders and create a situation where this young man or young woman might get himself into difficulties, which would possibly result in court, marshal, and so forth. We discharge him. That counts as well. Let me ask you the probably the more serious charge that Mr. Gabriel just leveled, which is that army officers in the United States Army now are being trained to be managers rather

than leaders. Leadership, you must differentiate between managership and leadership. To say that manager-ship is not needed in the service today is to support a position that says good practices and business practices and logistics and good practices and economizing resources and so forth, is not desirable, and it is managers, good managers, and good management business practices in those areas of support for our armed forces, it is just good cost effectiveness, and they can apply to the service, should apply to the service. Leadership is something else. So you are with the American soldier in that combat role in training now. You need that intangible, that leadership, and we are teaching it in our schools on an

expanded basis. I think that, and this is not to say that we put as much emphasis on leadership as we should have. You see, we found ourselves in the increasing technological era here of concentrating our thoughts and our efforts on the technical side of our profession, the sophisticated weapons systems and so forth. And in our school systems, we did forget de-emphasize this leadership character and this leadership trait that is so necessary to lead in combat. And I think that Richard would find and be very pleased with the efforts of General Starry or Training and Doctrine Command Commander now where we have a great emphasis on a leadership in our school system. All right.

Robin? Are you encouraged by that, Mr. Gabriel? Well, Bob, I'm afraid I'm not in a couple of instances. For example, clearly, there's a need to utilize management techniques, but it's one thing to manage ammunition supplies. There's quite another thing, for example, to expect management techniques to move troops. Fundamentally, what we know from a cross comparison of armies, historically, trans-culturally is that there have got to be tight bonds between the troops. I agree with the general that there has been a re-emphasist of leadership doctrines in the army. The problem is that the system itself, the army system itself still rewards essentially the ethos of the staff officer, the staff officer in motion. Accordingly, if the system rewards that, we will continue to produce more staff officers who are more of the managerial bent than of the gladiatorial or combat. What do you mean that it rewards the ethos of the staff officer in motion? What does that mean in words of oneself? Well, part of the problem, of course, is the 20-year-up route system. Young Officer has 20 years to punch all his tickets, to hit all his staff assignments,

hit all the correct assignments in order to have a shot at making, of course, the star. This means, if you begin to calculate it out, he's lucky to spend 18 months in any given unit or any given assignment. So he's continually moving from one place to another. He's never certainly with troops or with a command long enough to establish strong primary groups. Once he leaves troops, the whole inflated OER system, Officer Efficiency Report System, makes any given assignment a good place to be from. As a result, he's not more likely to manage the difficulties or solve the difficulties of his command as he is to let them go, perhaps, in some extent, cover them up and let them fall to the next man. Let's give the general a chance to respond to that general. Yes, again, Richard, I think you're being very unfair and your implications that the officer corps lacks integrity. I could certainly not be further from the truth. I have found that the one, if there is a major change in the officer corps, if there is a major change in the Army, a post-Vietnam, it's in this area of ethical awareness.

As I travel and talk to troops, as I travel and talk to officers, I find that post-The Milai Post Watergate, a very refreshing change where our soldiers and our officers are looking into ethical dimensions of decisions. The zero defect days are over. Our selection process for officer promotions and general ships in particular plays great emphasis on integrity. Are you saying, excuse me, John, are you saying that some of what Mr. Gabriel claims was perhaps true a few years ago but isn't any longer? So what I'm saying is a practice such as Richard alludes to practices that he not alludes to that were prevalent in Vietnam where management to use his time, success in some cases

was based on such things as body count and success and practices such as the Milai incident arose. I would find that very difficult to believe that such an incident would occur today if we were to go to war. I find within, again, the officer corps and increased awareness, again, I feel like I'm throwing out something to promote a positive response from Richard but I do know on his book one of his recommendations was that there need be an ethical awareness program, a re-establishment of faith and trust and one of the reactions which I'm sure that he would be pleased with is a rather extensive study and a rather extensive action program which George

Chief of Staff has just promulgated to restore the trust and confidence of the officer corps itself and to restore that trust and confidence on a part of the soldier towards his officer. Scott and Mr. Gabriel's reaction to that, well, Bob, again, I find myself agreeing with you to some extent and I have some problems with the extent to which the army has in fact faced up to the problem of what we call the Code of Ethics or Code of Honor. For example, if the beard report is to be believed, the letters I get from the troops is to be believed, they're still a considerable amount of managing of disciplinary rates which is functionally, as you know, not reporting serious problems. They're still a problem of readiness goals in which readiness reports are not accurate and these, of course, as you know, are signed by officers. But let's look precisely at the problem that we mentioned that is the need for Code of Honor. At West Point, I was in contact with General Goodpaster after the article appeared in the times that he had promulgated a Code of an ethics course.

For the first time in the history of West Point, we got a Code of Ethics and I couldn't have been happier. I wrote for the syllabus. It turns out to be a history of ethics taught by the English Department. The problem I have is I'm not sure a managerial structure, as Maxwell Taylor hinted at when he said the army is not a business, it's like a church. I'm not sure a managerial structure is capable of coming to grips with its own ethical shortcomings, even if it meant it had them because, by definition, the men who were in a position to change those ethics have to repudiate their own history. By their own admission, their own careers have been premised on the old ethics. And I have a problem with this at West Point. And again, the evidence in the field in terms of management of disciplinary rates and management of readiness goals leads me to believe that I wish you were right and I think you're partially right. But I don't think it's going deep enough. You have a brief comment on that general for a move on. I think the only proof of my position and I think reassurance for Richard in these areas can come from history and I am extraordinarily confident that our efforts in this area

will produce a better army, an army that is looking at itself in the mirror, an army that is candid and whose reports are accurate. In no way are inaccurate reports and readiness and management of disciplinary statistics or mismanagement of them condone in the army today, I am ultra confident in this area. Thank you, General Jim. All right, now the special perspective of James Webb being heralded widely as a best-selling novelist author of Fields of Fire, the story of Marines in Vietnam. Webb was a marine platoon commander in Vietnam himself, one of the most decorated of all Marines in that war. He's currently a counsel to the House Veterans Affairs Committee and as such makes it his business to stay abreast of what's happening in the lives of present-day Marines and soldiers as well as veterans.

Different set of questions for you in a way, Mr. Webb, based on your experience in combat, what are the basic motivations that cause people to hang in there and fight in the first place? Well, I think Professor Gabriel was correct in his premises. I would disagree with his application of them to the Vietnam environment. It is that you have basically a social group, a peer group, in Vietnam, I would say the basic social group was a platoon, a rifle platoon. That needs to be what I would do. Well, the rifle platoon being anywhere from 25 to 45 men, depending on the casualties you're taking. The company being the basic operational unit, which is anywhere from 100 to 170 people. But I would wonder, I would want to ask, Professor Gabriel, whether he's serving combat in Vietnam. You know, how he is able to judge the ambience of these units. I can give some examples, speaking, first of all, to the fact of officers putting the next on our line with the men, I reported to a company that had five officers with it. We took seven Purple Hearts and a KIA. I went over with 67 infantry lieutenants and 22 of them were killed.

And this is perhaps a little bit higher than what Army casualties may have been. I don't want to make any judgments on that. But the environments were the same, the infantry experience is essentially the same. In my opinion, the people in Vietnam were, for the most part, well-led. One difference being, and something I would agree with, Professor Gabriel, on, is that Vietnam was an extremely humanistic war. I mean, the humanistic aspects of leadership were the most important aspects, because it wasn't... Give me an example of what you mean by that. Well, for instance, well, for instance, in World War II, perhaps the most important part of leadership was the technical aspects, you know, the ability to direct a tank on a target. It was a distant type of war fought with heavy artillery and the sort of flame. Whereas in Vietnam, it was very up close and personal. Some of the decisions that you were making with regard to civilians in the way. And with regard to sweeping through a village, a so-called friendly village, which wasn't a friendly village, these required humanistic personal type decisions that we were asking

more out of our leaders than we would have been in other wars. You are the discussion between the General and Mr. Gabriel, the question of ethics. How does ethics affect you in combat and your relationship with your man? Does ethics mean anything on a combat situation? I think absolutely it does. I think one of the first things that I did when I took over my platoon in combat was to get all of them, as many of them together as I could, given where we were, and to give them a speech, talking about the relationship between an officer and a man, and also saying that I will believe anything you tell me, this becomes important because when you send small units out to do certain things, you have to know exactly where they are, you have to know they're obeying you. I will believe anything you tell me. But how did you know you were they were going to obey you? Well, this is just the way you lay it out. You say I will believe anything you tell me if I ever find out you're wrong, you're dead. And enough said, I never had any trouble with my man. They were basically given the situation well motivated, I think what we lacked in Vietnam

and where this thing came apart is that society, and the one thing in Professor Gabriel's theory that I have read his book, and the one thing that he fails to focus in on, in my opinion, in a democracy is the absolute importance of the relationship between the military and society. The military and a democracy is a mirror of society, and when society rejected Vietnam War, these other things began to fall apart. The racial problems were not poured all the military at all. That's right. Well, I think that leadership is an intangible, there were leadership failings in Vietnam. In many cases, because of the nature of the draft, that certain people who normally would have been present in any war found exclusions because of the college deferments and this sort of thing, so that the army was forced to draw, in many cases, on a lower caliber of person to be officer, Callie being a classic example. But what happened really was, there were a number of problems that were imported from the United States.

The racial problem, the drug problem, that the institutions had lost their ability to come to grips with, and that when the things started unraveling, society rejected the war and officers lost a lot of discretion because of the force of these events from the states and couldn't deal with the problems. And one thing real quickly with regard to the fragging incidents and this is where the assassination is, whatever it is, I think, I was raised on stories from people from World War II in Korea that we're saying if we had a bad officer he lasted three seconds out of the boat. I mean, this is something that occurs in any war, it's not an intention to kill someone. If someone has life and death power over you, you want to get them out of the way if he's incompetent. And that did happen. Sure, it happened at an officer level, it happened at an NCO level, and it happened at every war. Okay. Robin? Ah, there are great many points. We can't refight the Vietnam War in the time we have. I'd just like to ask all three of you in conclusion, your assessment of the state of the problem in the US Army now and to what extent it affects its readiness or its effectiveness

in carrying out its mission. Where would you say it is now? In my own view. In its ability to carry out its mission. I think right now the American Army, especially the Army in Europe, is in terrible shape. I think that we have all kinds of problems, many of which have been brought on by Volar. We talk about low military Army, the difficulty in training troops, 40% of our troops are working at tasks for which they're not trained. We're short for. We talk about continued drug use in Europe. In my view, I don't think the officer corps has, in fact, improved that much. Taken all together, it strikes me even if we were to control for the enormous advantages the Soviets have and equipment and material and men. There's still a question of quality. Jim Webb mentioned the point about what makes men hang together in combat or humanistic war. All wars are small wars. There are all the wars of small unit combat. Quality of leadership is crucially important historically, as John Keegan has pointed out and as Jim has pointed out in his own book.

Very quickly, one of the reasons why the pathologies in the Marine Corps did not surface Jim, as Paul Savage's new study on the Marine Corps shows, is precisely because the practices we use in the U.S. Army were not applied to the Marine Corps, and I'm talking about short tours and short drops. Can we keep it on to General York's, on to the readiness of the U.S. Army to perform its mission at the moment, given the various problems that are acknowledged some of them by you this evening? The Army today, and let me say categorically, the Army today, has problems. It has some strengths too, and it distresses me, Richard, to have, again, have you used statistics that are so grossly inaccurate and leaving an impression upon listeners that is adverse. Let me say this, as far as readiness is concerned, and we have nothing better to judge than readiness reports that admittedly can be inaccurate at times or somewhat dependent upon human

judgments, which are imperfect at times, but are certainly more accurate today than ever. Reports from the field, from our leaders, state that with shortfalls, with equipment and shortfalls, with some personnel shortfalls, the Army and Europe today is a magnificent fighting force. We, American people, can be proud of it. I'm sorry to leave it there, General, but we run out of time. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Webb. Goodnight, Jim. And thank you, Mr. Gabriel. Let's offer tonight. We'll be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert McNeil. Goodnight. For a transcript, send one dollar to the McNeil Air Report, box 3.5, the York New York 1-0-0-1-9. The McNeil Air Report was produced by W&E-T and W-E-T-A. They are solely responsible for its content. Funding for this program has been provided by this station and other public television

stations, and by grants from Exxon Corporation, Allied Chemical Corporation, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Thank you.