The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour

Intro

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. In the news tonight, in the TWA bombing, a known Arab woman terrorist who had occupied the seat where the explosion occurred is being sought. Israel says the bombing was the work of Palestinian groups Abu Moussa and Abu Nidal. NASA astronauts testified they did not know the seriousness of problems with space shuttle booster rockets before the Challenger disaster. Details of these stories in our news summary coming up. Judy Woodruff is in Washington tonight. Judy?

JUDY WOODRUFF: After the news summary, the TWA bombing is once again our major focus tonight. First, Israeli Prime Minister Peres says who he thinks is to blame. Then we hear from a reporter who just returned from Europe and the Mideast finding out how the terrorists operate, and from an airline safety expert. We next move on to a sampling of what some astronauts had to say at today's shuttle disaster hearing. Finally, a documentary report on what's being done to protect airliners from a killer called wind shear.News Summary

MacNEIL: The leading suspect in yesterday's TWA bombing is a known Arab woman terrorist who had occupied the seat where the explosion occurred only hours earlier. Italian officials investigating the bombing said the woman got on the 727 in Cairo, occupied the seat where the explosion later occurred, and got off in Athens. Two hours later she took a flight to Beirut. Cairo sources identified her as May Elias Mansur and said she carried a Lebanese passport. Italian authorities believe she may be the same person wanted for trying to plant a bomb hidden in a package of cigarettes in a suitcase on a Pan Am flight to New York in 1983. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres said today that the group which claimed responsibility for the bombing yesterday, the Arab Revolutionary Cells, was a cover for others.

SHIMON PERES, Prime Minister, Israel: I think it's an attempt to cover up for the real group. From what I know, the ones who did it is the Abu Moussa group, which is located in Syria, under Syrian auspices, together with Abu Nidal. Abu Nidal is connected with Libya, but I would be surprised if in that case the Libyans really played a role.

MacNEIL: In that interview with the NewsHour, Peres said he believed the TWA bombing was planned long before the U.S. naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra off Libya. State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb referred to the woman suspect as a Dr. Mansur, and said the U.S. was not ruling out anyone or any group yet.

BERNARD KALB, State Department: At this point, we are not ruling out any terrorist group, organization, movement or individual. I have read the press report about Dr. Mansour, and what I have on that, let us say, regarding that report, that we are obviously aware of these reports from Italian officials, and that the whole matter of how the explosives were placed aboard the plane is still under investigation. As I indicated before, we have no comment or confirmation of the report.

MacNEIL: In Santa Barbara, California, where he is vacationing, President Reagan condemned the bombing as "a barbaric act of wanton international terrorism." A senior administration official said the bombing did not look like the usual method of Libyan terrorism. "They shoot up airports; they don't put single bombs on airplanes," he said. Judy?

WOODRUFF: With the new information that the terrorists apparently boarded the TWA flight in Cairo and got off in Athens, two legs earlier than the return flight to Athens when the bomb went off, security officials at airports in the Mediterranean area and southern Europe were working overtime today. We have a report from Tom Brown of Worldwide Television News.

TOM BROWNE, Worldwide Television News [voice-over]: Information that a known extremist had flown on the TWA jet on its earlier leg to Athens led to immediate increased Egyptian security. Despite protests from some passengers, newly posted security police carried out a thorough scrutiny of everyone's documents and baggage. In Athens, the TWA pilot, Captain Richard Peterson, wondered what else could be done.

Capt. RICHARD PETERSON, TWA pilot: I don't see how they could -- I don't see how they can get it any -- search anymore. It's unfortunate, these cowards kill innocent people this way. I think it's outrageous. But that's the way some people are -- cowardly.

REPORTER: What are the chances that a bomb could have been placed on the way out?

Capt. PETERSON: It could have been, but it's so unlikely. But I don't know. It could have been secreted aboard the aircraft and been overlooked. I can't answer that.

REPORTER: Was the hand luggage in Rome searched meticulously?

Capt. PETERSON: Oh, absolutely.

REPORTER: Because there has been an official restatement to the effect that it was rather cursory.

Capt. PETERSON: No. There again, they're very tight on their security there. It could have gone through, but who knows about such things? There are -- these things happen.

WOODRUFF: As a result of the bombing, the head of the U.S. contingent of the Airline Pilots Association said that his group plans to call on pilots at an international conference next week to boycott countries that either harbor terrorists or foster terrorism. And an official of the International Airline Passengers Association said today that his group was warning Americans against any travel in the Mediterranean area unless it is absolutely necessary. Dan Smith charged that the U.S. government is apparently unable to protect the American public when they are traveling in that area.

MacNEIL: Leading NASA astronauts told the presidential Challenger commission today that they did not know the seriousness of the solid rocket booster problem suspected of causing the Challenger disaster. Chief astronaut John Young said, "I think if anybody in the gang had known about this business and understood it, we might have said something." Deputy chief astronaut Paul Weitz said their own system had broken down. And commission chairman William Rogers said it had to be corrected.

WILLIAM ROGERS, Commission Chairman: We realize you can't -- you're not going to be aware of every single problem, but certainly critical ones like this that got to the point where a redesign is under consideration, it's difficult for us to understand why you didn't know about it. And I can see why Mr. Young was -- and others were upset about it.

PAUL WEITZ, astronaut: We feel the system is in place but it broke down in some way. And I think part of the message that comes across here perhaps is that we do not have enough people in the Astronaut Office to be intimately involved in all of these details along the way.

MacNEIL: Rogers disclosed that the commission will recommend that an independent safety panel oversee all future space shuttle flights, and that one astronaut should be on it.

WOODRUFF: The government of South Africa today denied that any restrictions against activist Winnie Mandela are being lifted. The lawyer for Mrs. Mandela, the wife of black leader Nelson Mandela, who is in prison, said yesterday that government officials had agreed to end restrictions that have barred her from legally participating in anti-apartheid politics for many years. Today the government said that no such deal had been made. In this country, meanwhile, 91 people were arrested after an anti-apartheid protest on the campus of the University of California at Berkeley. At least 29 people were injured when fighting broke out between police and demonstrators who had set up makeshift shanties to symbolize the homes of South African blacks. Police moved in and tore down the shanties, which had been built on the university campus. The shanties had been taken down in a similar scene on Tuesday, but were rebuilt last night. The demonstrators want the university to withdraw some $2.5 billion that it has invested in companies doing business in South Africa.

MacNEIL: That's our news summary. Coming up, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and others discuss the TWA bombing and making airlines safe; excerpts from today's testimony by NASA astronauts; and a documentary report on efforts to protect jetliners from deadly wind shear. TWA Bombing: Who Did It?

MacNEIL: We begin tonight's analysis of the TWA bombing with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who talked to me in New York before he flew back to Israel. Peres said the claim of responsibility by the so-called Arab Revolutionary Cells was an attempt to cover up for the real group.

SHIMON PERES: From what I know, the ones who did it is the Abu Musa group, which is located in Syria, under Syrian auspices, together with Abu Nidal. And I think they have attempted in purpose to camouflage.

MacNEIL: In other words, the group that made the calls in Beirut yesterday claiming it was the Arab Revolutionary Cells was an attempt to disguise --

Prime Min. PERES: Yes.

MacNEIL: -- the other identities. How do you know this?

Prime Min. PERES: Well, we pay some interests on that issue, as you may understand. And that's what we believe is the case.

MacNEIL: And what are those -- you say they're in Syria. What are their connections with Libya and Qaddafi?

Prime Min. PERES: Abu Nidal is connected with Libya, but I would be surprised if in that case the Libyans really played a role. It was done, as I have said, initially by the Fatah Habu Musa group, the one -- the dissidents of the PLO. You know, the PLO was divided into two parts, one under Syrian auspices and the other who left the Syrian control, and this is the group which remains under the Syrian control.

MacNEIL: Yeah. And Abu Nidal is the one the United States sought in connection with the hijacking of the Achille Lauro.

Prime Min. PERES: Yes.

MacNEIL: Yes. The claim in this phone call yesterday in Beirut was that it was done in retaliation for the Sidra incidents. What connection do you see between the two?

Prime Min. PERES: Nothing whatsoever.

MacNEIL: Why?

Prime Min. PERES: I think they have planned it even before it. This sort of an action is planned a long time beforehand. And again, this is a part of the -- of a whole disguise of the group who did it and the reasons for doing so.

MacNEIL: What are the reasons for doing so, in your view?

Prime Min. PERES: They believe that terror is a strategy, that it can overpower everybody, by killing, by shooting, by terrorizing. And, you know, they don't look for a solution; they look for the continuation of the conflict. Because if you look for a solution, you have some suggestions to make. But if you want to continue a conflict, the only thing that counts is the result of it -- more killing, more violence and so on.

MacNEIL: You praised the other day the U.S. action in the Gulf of Sidra. How has that helped things?

Prime Min. PERES: Undoubtedly, the most dangerous country concerning international terror is Libya, and the most violent person is Qaddafi. He is a killer and he's a liar. And let's call him by the real names. Now, until now, he could have spent all the money he has to act wherever he wanted to and feel that he doesn't face any problems back home. All of a sudden he was reminded that he has a home to defend and he cannot terrorize the rest of the world without facing the problem of being terrorized inside his own house. That's one point. Then his feelings that he can put the whole world in flames is a little bit exaggerated. The Russians, I believe, kept a low profile; they weren't quick to come and get themself involved. The technology he has is not the superb technology. So now I think he will begin to be a worried person, and the American action, at least at this stage, was strong enough to serve as a warning and controlled enough not to create another whole provocation. I mean, it was limited to a given purpose.

MacNEIL: Does yesterday's TWA bombing justify further U.S. action against Libya?

Prime Min. PERES: I wouldn't say so. I mean, Libya has enough of a record -- you don't need any more justifications. But what one can learn from the yesterday bomb is that the precautionary measures that should be taken at the airports and airplanes must be increased.

MacNEIL: Could this have happened to an El Al plane?

Prime Min. PERES: I hope not.

MacNEIL: Because you assume your security measures --

Prime Min. PERES: Yes. I think we have good enough security measures, both on the planes and at the airfields.

MacNEIL: Could the security measures, without going into the details, could the security measures that you apply in Israel to El Al planes be practicably applied to American airliners operating throughout Europe?

Prime Min. PERES: Yes.

MacNEIL: They could be.

Prime Min. PERES: Yes. It has a cost. You see, in order to reduce the danger of international terror, you have to act on three different stages. The first one is the preventive stage, namely to gather enough information ahead of time in order to prevent a terrorist or an act of terror to occur -- in the very early stages. The second is, while they are trying to do so in the different installations -- airfields, airplanes, ships, ports -- a better watchful eye. And the third stage is the stage of punishment, because if you won't punish -- as you have to punish criminals domestically, at your own home. Punishment is part of the prevention.

MacNEIL: If this had been an El Al plane bombed yesterday, given Israel's record in the past, would one assume there would be some retaliation?

Prime Min. PERES: We would surely look out after the responsible people. We wouldn't stop looking for them and after them, and we would do whatever we can, within the limits of legal measures, to have them punished.

MacNEIL: You were so certain of who they were a moment ago, knowing who they are. Are they so clearly identifiable that retaliation against them is possible? Without, you know, injuring a great many innocent people around them.

Prime Min. PERES: I don't have enough information to say that Syria is responsible for the act. But Syria is housing these people, and what I feel should be done right away is to tell the Syrians, "Look, you can't be a haven for snakes if you want to be part of the responsible world." The Syrians try to appear now as though they are against terror, but the headquarters of Abu Moussa and Abu Nidal are in Syria. And the Syrians must be told very clearly that if they want to help those gentlemen in their country, they must take the necessary measures for preventing them to kill the lives of innocent people.

MacNEIL: So you're saying the United States should first of all warn them verbally now, or should take some military action against Syria?

Prime Min. PERES: I suggest that, yes, that the Syrians should be told, I don't know if by the United States or by somebody else -- I don't want to give this sort of an advice -- but the Syrians I believe must be told.

MacNEIL: The fragmentation of Palestinian groups has made it increasingly difficult for Western experts to determine which was responsible for which act. The job is made even harder by the relatively easy movement of terrorists around such Mediterranean cities as Rome, Athens and Cairo. To explain who these groups are and how they operate, we have Rod Nordland, deput foreign editor of Newsweek magazine, former Beirut correspondent, and author of this week's cover story "Inside Terror, Inc."

First of all, Mr. Nordland, is Israeli intelligence good enough in this area that if Prime Minister Peres says it was Abu Moussa and Abu Nidal that we should have good reason for believing him?

ROD NORDLAND: I think their intelligence is as good as anyone's or better, even. But not necessarily. Very little is known about Abu Nidal and little more about Abu Moussa's group. But what he says is perfectly plausible; it could very well be those groups. Either of those groups are quite disposed to carry out an operation like this. And in fact, both of them in recent months, Abu Nidal most recently, have vowed to attack American airliners.

MacNEIL: Do you know anything about this woman being sought who is said to have boarded the plane and sat in that seat, this May Elias Mansur?

Mr. NORDLAND: I've never heard her name before, but I know that news reports now are linking her to Abu Nidal's group or some other Palestinian faction. And it's clear that she left Beirut and returned there, and either of those groups, as well as many other small radical Palestinian groups, operate pretty freely in West Beirut.

MacNEIL: How is it possible for people like this to be pretty much at liberty in cities like Athens and Cairo and Rome?

Mr. NORDLAND: Well, Athens and Rome both have large Arab communities. They also don't have visa restrictions for the citizens of some Arab countries, so that they can enter pretty freely. Cairo is a huge city and kind of chaotic, and I'm sure it's pretty much -- it's easy to do pretty much of anything in Cairo. I noticed earlier in your report there was a comment that I think the pilot said, that the search was done very thoroughly at the TWA counter. And that's true. Often I've gone through Cairo numerous times, but you also have tens of thousands of passengers going, and the terrorist only has to get lucky once. And I've been through that same check-in drill there at times when I haven't been searched very thoroughly, and I know could have, if I'd wanted to, get a weapon or a bomb aboard.

MacNEIL: And weapons or bombs can be pretty small and hard-to-detect things these days. The Italian investigator said tonight that there were two possible explosives they might have used, Temprite or T-4; less than two pounds of it would have done this, and that it is almost odorless and very difficult to detect with modern equipment. Does your reporting confirm that?

Mr. NORDLAND: Well, it's plastic explosives and it won't even set off a metal detector. So you have to visually identify it. There are also ways to wrap things so that they'll elude the metal detectors. All you need in the way of metal for some of these bombs is a detonator, and that's very small and could be easily confused with any number of personal items. There's also explosives that come in sheet form that could be used to line a suitcase, and again wouldn't give any kind of X-ray signature that would identify them as a bomb.

MacNEIL: What conclusion did you come to after the reporting you've done recently about this sort of thing, that it's just hopeless to pretend to be able to protect, for instance, American airplanes on these routes?

Mr. NORDLAND: No, I don't think it is. I think Prime Minister Peres makes a very good point that the Israelis have stopped hijackings of El Al. It's at a great cost, though. You have to take measures ranging from outlawing all hand baggage, even pocketbooks, to searching every single piece of --

MacNEIL: When you go through an El Al check-in, what do you go through?

Mr. NORDLAND: A lot of hassle, but it's very effective. Everything is searched thoroughly. You're body searched. You're asked a variety of questions that are both designed to see if you might be innocently carrying something and also to see what your personality profile is like and see if you're nervous and so on. It's highly sophisticated and very effective.

MacNEIL: Would it be, from your knowledge of airlines like TWA and Pan Am and so on, would it be practicable for them in places like Rome and Athens to adopt systems like El Al has?

Mr. NORDLAND: Sure, they could do it. It would mean passenger delays, it would mean greater expense, it would mean less profit, it would mean more employees to carry out the searches. It could be done, but then you could maybe eliminate airline hijackings and bombings, but you still have the terrorism problem and they'll find other targets. There are plenty of targets. They could strike banks next, or they could, as they've done, in fact, throw a grenade into a hotel swimming pool. You can't possibly protect all the targets that there are.

MacNEIL: Okay, we'll move on. Judy?

WOODRUFF: The TWA explosion has also raised serious questions about airport security, as we noted, and the methods terrorists use to disrupt air travel. To talk about those issues we have Richard Lally, the top security expert with the Air Transport Association, which represents major U.S. airliners, including TWA. He is a former director of security for the Federal Aviation Administration.

Mr. Lally, based on everything you have heard and read, how do you think a terrorist or terrorists got through the security systems to do this?

RICHARD LALLY: Oh, I couldn't speculate on that, and I think any scenarios that are advanced are speculation. The investigation is an intensive one, an active one, and I think it's premature to speculate on just what happened.

WOODRUFF: Well, in general, how is it possible with all the security measures -- we heard the pilot say he didn't know how people could be searched any more than they already are -- how is it possible to get something through a security system?

Mr. LALLY: I'd say it's very difficult, and I say it's undertaken at great risk. I think the airlines, particularly United States airlines, have adopted some rather extraordinary measures to protect their passengers and their crew and their property from criminal acts, including terrorist acts. I think you have to recognize also that when it comes to a terrorist act, as this incident is labeled, that the act is against -- a political actagainst governments, primarily. And the airline and the passengers on that airline are victims in that international terrorist game. So that I think the airlines, while doing everything they can conceivably do to protect their passengers, that I think as was mentioned earlier in your show, that we need a mechanism among international -- in the community of nations to punish persons who do this.

WOODRUFF: What do you mean? I mean, what should the United States government do, just for starters?

Mr. LALLY: Well, I think the United States government's already on record in calling for the International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen international security standards and recommended practices. That's the role of ICAO. I think we really should go a couple of steps further: one, to give ICAO the authority and the resources to not only promulgate the standards, but to evaluate their application and their effectiveness; and then third, which is most important, to give them the authority and the resources to identify persons who are not effectively applying the standards and impose some sanctions upon those nations that do so, and also sanctions upon nations who would encourage these kinds of terrorist acts or provide safe haven for the criminals.

WOODRUFF: All right, let's go back to what happened. The Cairo airport, the Rome airport, the airport in Athens -- what is it about those airports that makes it easier to breach security?

Mr. LALLY: I don't know. I think it's just a matter of the geography involved and the turmoil and the political unrest in that area. I think that airports and airlines become symbols, and unfortunately acts against airlines and airports get, you know, extraordinary publicity.

WOODRUFF: Do you think that what's been happening there could happen at any airport? Or do you think that there is less security at these airports based on what you --

Mr. LALLY: I think the security at those airports is probably adequate. But I'm not in the business of assessing security at foreign airports. You know, there are people who do that. So I can't comment. I think that the security measures practiced by United States airlines, both at United States airports and at airports abroad, is good, tight security. Now, the host governments have a significant role to play in supporting the airline security measures and in providing a secure ground environment into which they operate. And that's all part of the scheme.

WOODRUFF: If I hear you correctly, you're saying there's only so much these airports and airlines can do? Is that -- the airlines can do. Is that correct?

Mr. LALLY: Well, certainly there's only so much. I think that there is a responsibility of governments, and I don't mean just one government, I mean governments united to make the act of international terrorism, particularly against airlines, a futile act, one that will not pay dividends.

WOODRUFF: But when you've got somebody carrying these highly sophisticated explosives as we just heard described by Mr. Nordland -- plastic explosives and whatever these other devices are -- is it possible to protect against that?

Mr. LALLY: Well, no system is fail-safe, but I would say that the passenger screening and the baggage screening and the other measures in place today are capable of detecting that kind of material.

WOODRUFF: Even the plastic?

Mr. LALLY: Even the plastic, because the plastic by itself, you know, is not dangerous at all. There needs to be other components, and by itself plastic is not going to do any damage. So that -- but we do need, and the United States government has recognized it and the Federal Aviation Administration is leading the effort -- we do need techniques to efficiently and effectively detect explosives in the aviation environment. Fortunately --

WOODRUFF: You mean beyond what already exists.

Mr. LALLY: That's right. I mean a technique using latest technology that will detect explosives in the airport-aircraft environment.

WOODRUFF: Wait a minute. I --

Mr. LALLY: And there are some promising techniques.

WOODRUFF: So you're saying there's not adequate security to protect against that sort of thing now.

Mr. LALLY: No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying that the measures we have now are effective, given the tools that are available, and I think they are effective. What I'm saying, it will make the job much easier and better, better conducted, more efficently and more effective, if we can bring these techniques out of the laboratory and into practice in day-in, day-out life.

WOODRUFF: Mr. Nordland, let me bring you back into this. If the sort of things that Mr. Lally is describing were brought into effect, how much would that protect additionally against terrorist acts?

Mr. NORDLAND: Well, as I understand it, the kind of technology he's talking about is extremely expensive, and I'm not sure that it's nearly at the point now where it would be very practical to have it. I think so far the best thing has been really thorough hand searches, and so far airports with heavy passenger volumes just don't seem to be willing to go to that extreme. And even then, the best hand search is only as good as the hand searcher, and you only have to get sloppy once for somebody to get through.

WOODRUFF: They're not willing to go to that extreme, you mean, because of the inconvenience it creates for passengers, or what?

Mr. NORDLAND: Inconvenience, delays, necessity for extra staff, higher costs.

WOODRUFF: Is it your experience -- go ahead.

Mr. LALLY: No, I would disagree with that. The airline industry, and I think the aviation industry in general, security is considered synonymous with safety, and there aren't any corners cut. So if the cost is X dollars to perform something that needs to be done, that's paid. And the inconvenience to passengers is regretted, and in aviation security that's the challenge: to maintain a balance between operational requirements, passenger -- you know, personal liberties, facilitation and security. And that's a changing condition and one that needs to be followed day by day and location by location.

WOODRUFF: Mr. Lally, do you have reason to believe that the bombing -- that the type bombing that we saw in this TWA flight is what we're going to be seeing more of in the future, rather than the hijackings, the more general acts against persons traveling?

Mr. NORDLAND: Yeah, I think we're going to see more of it. There really isn't any way to totally protect against it. But I'd like, to just back up a bit, you know, what Mr. Lally said. I think, you know, why have the Israelis at Tel Aviv been so successful at stopping terrorists, and Rome and Cairo and Athens again and again in the last year have failed to do so? And I think there's a lesson there. But nonetheless, there is no absolute way to really protect against these incidents, and they're bound to happen again.

Mr. LALLY: I would agree there's no fail-safe system, but I think to compare Israel with the United States and to compare El Al as an airline with a U.S. airline is apples and oranges. Israel is one airline, one airport, a small fleet of aircraft with limited service. The United States is talking about 100 airlines, 400 airports in the United States alone, a million passengers a day. So the scope and the magnitude is vastly different.

WOODRUFF: So you're saying it's just not feasible for American-based airlines, U.S.-based airlines to do what the Israelis do?

Mr. LALLY: Well, I'm saying, number one, I don't see the need that the Israelis have. And I think our societies are sufficiently different, too. So that's obvious. But I'm saying that to do what the Israelis do to United States air transportation system would have a very drastic effect on the service provided. It wouldn't be the same.

WOODRUFF: And do you think the airlines would be willing to do that?

Mr. LALLY: The airlines would be willing to do whatever is necessary to maintain safety and security. But what I'm saying beyond that is that we're talking about are political acts aimed at governments. These are political statements. And I think there needs to be some united governmental action that is at least the equivalent of the measures that the airlines take to protect themselves. And this ought to end up in an international mechanism to identify and sanction nations that do not do what they should do.

WOODRUFF: Well, Mr. Lally and Mr. Nordland, we thank you both for being with us. Robin?

MacNEIL: Next we return to our interview with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, in which he discusses wider questions about the Middle East. He told me he intends to honor the agreement he has to hand over the premier's office this fall to his right-wing coalition partner, Deputy Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. I asked Peres whether he thus considers himself a lame-duck prime minister.

Prime Min. PERES: No, I don't think so, because you see, here, well, many people are wrong. We don't have a normal cabinet. One may say that Shamir is under me, but that's not the case. We are two parties; we have two heads of the parties. Shamir is not an official working for me, and I'm not going to be an official working for him. He's a leader of a party, I'm a leader of a party, and we can't keep the government together unless and until we shall respect the guiding lines of the government. So I mean, it's not a normal setup.

MacNEIL: If Shamir is rejected by the Herut Party as their leader -- and there have been in recent meetings a lot of dissension over his leadership -- is the deal off? If he's no longer the Herut leader, is the deal off on rotation?

Prime Min. PERES: I would be careful not to answer to any ifs so I won't get myself mixed in in the affairs of another party. The only thing I can say is that the agreement has names, not just positions.

MacNEIL: Does the imminence of your stepping down under this rotation agreement put additional pressure on you to get something going again in the peace process with Jordan and with the Palestinians?

Prime Min. PERES: No. I would do it even if I would have more time. The fact that we would have more time does not permit us to waste it. I'm not going to remain passive, I mean, whatever my new post may be. But then let's remember that the maintenance of the peace momentum is part and parcel of our agreement. I mean, what is the sense to be a member of a government if the government doesn't have the right policy, or doesn't have a policy? Just to remain in the government doesn't make any sense.

MacNEIL: Is there any point trying to get anything started now with the United States declaring itself in a reflective mood about the Middle East, with Jordan having given up on the PLO, with your appointee as the mayor of Nablus having recently been murdered and discouraging other Palestinians from accepting mayoral posts there -- is there any point right now in trying anything new?

Prime Min. PERES: Yes. I think reflection is a nice expression, but I'm afraid it's not reflection but skepticism. And I think skepticism is detrimental to the peace effort. In order to have peace you must have a climate oreinted on peace. And for that reason I think we have to try some new openings and maybe there are more than it meets our eyes here and there. And just to be a little more specific, I believe (a) we have to conclude our negotiations with Egypt successfully. It's very important for the overall peace sentiment in the Middle East. I think we can do some new -- take some new measures on the West Bank to improve the quality of life, and again to keep the door of peace open.

MacNEIL: Can I interrupt you there? It's reported that the U.S. has agreed to fund a $600 million effort to improve the quality of life on the West Bank. Is that correct?

Prime Min. PERES: I don't think so. Six hundred million dollars sounds to me as an inflated number.

MacNEIL: Have they approved some other number?

Prime Min. PERES: I think small amounts of money, which we welcome. I mean, we say to the West Bankers and to any international or national countries or institutions that want to act in order to improve the economic situation in the West Bank, that they are welcome.

MacNEIL: And what is the third point that you --

Prime Min. PERES: The third point is now I believe there must be an international effort to help the Mediterranean countries economically. I believe that out of the three major issues facing today the Middle East, which are: the ongoing conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis, (a); the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq; and the dramatic change in the income from oil. It is the economic aspect of the Middle East which is becoming the overriding problem.

MacNEIL: You have proposed what's being called this Marshall plan for the Middle East. Is that falling on receptive ears in Washington?

Prime Min. PERES: Yes, sir. I don't suggest this time that the United States will finance it. You know, I know that you're in a Gramm-Rudman mood, and I should be very careful to suggest to spend more money. But I do believe that the Europeans and the Japanese will make this year $70 billion because of the drop in the price of oil. Now, they will need the oil of the Middle East in the future. You know, in 400 square miles in the Middle East you have half of the known resources of oil. And if the Middle East will go in flames, so will the oil, and there is no sense to invest so much money in physical installations, in refineries and pipelines and so little attention in the political stability. From what I have learned is that Jordan has a foreign currency reserve of $400 million, Syria $50 million, Egypt $900 million.

MacNEIL: Nothing, in other words.

Prime Min. PERES: Yes. And you can't escape the problem. Neither can you postpone the effect of it upon the normal and stable positions of many governments in the Middle East.

MacNEIL: Prime Minister, thank you.

Still to come on the NewsHour, top NASA astronauts testify before the Challenger tragedy commission, and finally a documentary report on efforts to make airliners safe from a killer called wind shear. Astronauts Speak Out

WOODRUFF: It was the astronauts' turn at the presidential commission hearings on the shuttle disaster today. For the most part they defended the program. But they raised questions as well, particularly about why they did not know more about the highly publicized seals on the booster rockets. Elizabeth Brackett was at today's hearing.

ELIZABETH BRACKETT [voice-over]: Astronaut Paul Weitz, number two man at the Astronaut Office at NASA, told the commission that the astronauts had not known about the problems with the seals on the booster rockets.

PAUL WEITZ, astronaut: We were not made aware of it while we were there, or we did not realize the significance of the item.

WILLIAM ROGERS, commission chairman: Well, I gather, from so far in our investigation that it wasn't presented to you from an organizational standpoint. None of these groups knew about it. At least you didn't know about it -- that's correct, isn't it? None of you knew about the problems that you'd been having with this joint.

Mr. WEITZ: Yes, sir, that's correct.

Chairman ROGERS: And I guess one of the things we have been trying to find out, how that happened, how did it happen that the astronauts, who are so vitally concerned with safety aspects, didn't know about this problem?

Mr. WEITZ: Well, that's part of what we're trying to reconstruct also.

Chmn. ROGERS: In this case, and beginning in August of '85, concern had been expressed to a lot of people about this joint and about this seal and about the O ring and about putty and so forth. And at that point there were tests being made to possibly redesign that joint. Now, what I have trouble understanding is why none of you gentlemen knew about that.

Mr. WEITZ: We feel the system is in place but it broke down in some way. And I think part of the message that comes across here perhaps is that we do not have enough people in the Astronaut Office to be intimately involved in all of these details along the way.

ROBERT HOTZ, commission member: Do you think that the joint problem is the kind of problem that should have surfaced in flight readiness reviews or configuration control boards or wherever? Should it come to your attention?

Mr. WEITZ: I don't see how we can say otherwise, Mr. Hotz. I have to say I believe that, since it turned out to be apparently a fatal flaw.

Comm. HOTZ: Well, we're interested in your opinion. That's why we're asking these questions.

Mr. WEITZ: Yes, sir, the answer's yes.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: Though astronaut Robert Crippen, who has flown more space shuttle flights than anyone else, said he had been told of some erosion, or blowby, from the seals after an earlier shuttle flight.

ROBERT CRIPPEN, astronaut: It was presented that we had had a blowby and that there was sooting. And in truth, from my perception it wasn't considered that much of a big deal.

Chmn. ROGERS: Did you at that time realize that the criticality-one list had indicated there was no redundancy?

Mr. CRIPPEN: I did not. And I was not aware of the waiver that had changed the joint from a 1R to a 1. And I was not aware of the rotation problem. If I had been aware of that in association with the sooting, I would have taken the problem much more seriously.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: The astronauts and the commission struggled with the question of whether it was the system or the people in the system that were at fault in the disaster.

HENRY HARTSFIELD, astronaut: And we've got a good system, but it's only as good as the data that gets into it.

Chmn. ROGERS: Well, we have some reservation about the last comment of whether the system is good. I think the system is probably good as described here this morning, but the system, according to the people at Marshall, they complied with the system. They say, "We had no obligation under the system to do anything that we didn't do. It was a level-three question. We -- " as they say, "We worked it, and therefore we didn't have any responsibility under the system to do anything else." If that is the system, that's wrong. That's not a good system.

Mr. HARTSFIELD: I couldn't agree with you more.

Chmn. ROGERS: So to that extent it's -- if that is the system, it's not a good system. And one of the --

Mr. HARTSFIELD: Well, let me clarify. When I said the system, the system as we work it in our side is good. But this part of the channel apparently is broken.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: For chief astronaut John Young, author of several bitingly critical memos on NASA's safety, communication remained the biggest safety problem.

JOHN YOUNG, chief, Astronaut Office: I have this feeling that the very biggest problem that must be solved before the space shuttle flies again is that of communications. And that's communications with respect to the early identification and proper appreciation of programwide safety issues. And I wonder, though, sometimes why if the space shuttle is inherently risky, why we should accept additional avoidable risks in order to meet launch schedules -- and we do that sometime -- or to reduce operating costs -- and that's been proposed -- or to fly unsafe payloads, and I think sometimes that happens. The problem is that we've got right now, and I think everybody in the Astronaut Office appreciates it, we just can't afford to have another accident.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: When asked what else could be done to improve safety, several astronauts said they wanted an escape hatch for the shuttle. There was no way to escape on the Challenger.

Mr. HARTSFIELD: Well, I personally would like to see some sort of a low-altitude escape system. This all fits together in a package, you know -- some ability to bail out the vehicle. Whether we can develop such a thing reasonably or not I'm not sure.

Chmn. ROGERS: One of the things we'd like to see from you are your recommendations about whether money should be appropriated for that purpose or not.

Mr. YOUNG: It would be a tough proposition.

Chmn. ROGERS: But let's assume --

Mr. YOUNG: I guess if you put the right people on it with the right money and the right effort, you ought to be able to do it pretty darn quickly. But I'm not sure we have that kind of capability at NASA.

Mr. CRIPPEN: It's more than money. It is a tough problem to solve technically with the vehicle that we have. Again, I've said this before publicly and I'll say it again, I don't think I know of an escape system that would have saved the crew from the particular incident that we just went through.

BRACKETT [voice-over]: But there are more problems with the shuttle program than the lack of an escape hatch. Commissioner Robert Hotz.

Comm. HOTZ: This commission has been accumulating a lot of evidence over the past two months on trends in the shuttle program, which are basically a greatly increased flight schedule in 1986, plus several exotic payloads such as Centaur, balanced against a series of trends including an increasing number of launch scrubs, an increasing shortage of parts and cannibalization, and a crew training load that was only able to keep up with the schedule because of the launch scrubs, and a very demanding mission software program that was difficult to maintain. And I just wonder if in any of the meetings that you sat in during the last year or so, that anybody in NASA management was plotting these trends and putting them all together and wondering about where they were leading the shuttle program.

BRACKETT: It is a question the presidential commission will try and answer in its upcoming report. Chairman Rogers hinted today at some of the recommendations the panel will make. One will be an independent safety panel for the shuttle program. Also today, the White House once again denied that it urged NASA to launch the Challenger the day it exploded. Spokesman Larry Speakes said a review of White House phone logs before the launch gave no indication that the administration pressured NASA. Speakes said that while there might have been phone calls made to NASA officials in the weeks before the launch, they were not on the subject of the Challenger. The issue was raised by Democratic Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, who had requested a review of those phone records. Deadly Wind

MacNEIL: Finally tonight, another aspect of the perils of flying, but one experts are working to correct. It's been almost nine months since 135 people died when a Delta airliner crashed at Dallas-Fort Worth airport. The crash was caused by wind shear, a sudden change in wind velocity. Tonight we have a report on new developments to keep planes away from wind shear or to teach pilots how to get out of it safely. The reporter is Lee Hochberg of public station KCTS-Seattle.

LEE HOCHBURG, KCTS [voice-over]: United Airlines pilots at this flight simulator at Denver's Stapleton Airport are learning by trial and error how to fly through one of the deadliest dangers in the sky: wind shear.

Capt. JOHN PERKINS, United pilot trainer: I've got you set up on the runway. I'd like for you to work as a crew in coping with this inadvertent encounter with wind shear.

HOCHBERG [voice-over]: Captain John Perkins is the manager of United's 727 pilot training program. He's teaching United's 6,000 pilots a newly developed maneuver to help them fly through wind shears and survive.

Capt. PERKINS: All right, very good, gentlemen. We've penetrated that wind shear.

HOCHBERG [voice-over]: Perkins knows the danger of wind shear. Two years ago here at Stapleton, an airport prone to the sudden wind shifts that make a wind shear, he was flight engineer aboard a flight that hit one on takeoff. Flight 663 came within inches of disaster.

Capt. PERKINS: About halfway down the runway, we noticed an aberration in our air-speed indication. The air speed stopped accelerating. We did lift off right out here prior to leaving the end of the runway. But we only achieved a liftoff altitude of about five feet. Actually the aircraft tires went between two antennas, and had we been a foot or two lower, we would have -- the landing gear would have hit the concrete mounting for the antenna. And that would have been disastrous, I think, to our flight.

HOCHBERG [voice-over]: In fact, one of the antennas punctured the fuselage of the plane and embedded in it. Flight 663 and its 68 passengers were able to return to Stapleton and land safely, thanks to Perkins' prior training. But at least 30 planes have crashed in wind shears since 1964. Four years ago a Pan Am 727 went down in New Orleans -- 153 people died. Last year a Delta L-1011 crashed in Dallas -- 136 people died. More plane crash fatalities have been attributed to wind shear than to any other cause. Today John Perkins is training United pilots to deal with the most deadly kind of wind shear, the microburst, the kind that slammed the New Orleans and Dallas planes to the ground. A microburst is an intense downdraft that spreads out in all directions when it hits the ground. So a plane moving through it at low altitude suddenly hits a headwind, then a strong downdraft, then a tailwind. The plane's air speed drops, and experienced pilots instinctively lower the nose to pick up speed. But that's the worst thing to do in a downdraft, especially on takeoff or landing, when the plane's already close to the ground. Perkins and United are working with engineers at the Boeing Company, the aircraft manufacturer, to help pilots overcome their instincts.

CHARLIE HIGGINS, Boeing: What the pilot has to do is use enough pitch to keep the airplane away from the ground and keep it flying, but not so much pitch that it would stall the airplane. It's a counter-intuitive thing in order to properly control the airplane. It's something that the pilot wouldn't normally do.

HOCHBERG [voice-over]: Charlie Higgins of Boeing says the maneuver could allow pilots to escape about three or every four wind shears they encounter. Meanwhile, Higgins and his staff have developed a device to give pilots further help in penetrating a shear. A device to alert pilots that they're in a wind shear is going into some new Boeing planes. It's similar to a device Piedmont Airlines has already installed in some of its planes. Higgins says Boeing's device will give pilots crucial guidance on how to escape a wind shear.

Mr. HIGGINS: What our device will do is it will tell them that, hey, this encounter that you're in right now is to the point where it's time to stop what you are doing and do something different.

HOCHBERG [voice-over]: The video device generates an image of the plane and an image the shape of the letter T. As long as the pilot's maneuvers keep the airplane image inside the letter T, he has a good chance of penetrating the wind shear. Where the computer puts the letter T depends upon the characteristics of the particular shear.

Mr. HIGGINS: It is sort of a video game. The stakes are pretty high in some situations, but that's basically what it is.

HOCHBERG [voice-over]: Yet as flight controllers in the tower at Denver's airport have learned, there are limitations to what pilot training and cockpit devices can do. They help the pilot only after he's already flown into a shear, and for some shears that's too late. The only system that gives pilots any help in avoiding wind shears in the first place is called LLWSAS, or the low-level wind shear alert system. It's in place at 80 airports, including Stapleton. LLWSAS measures wind conditions at several sites across airport grounds and warns flight controllers if drastic wind changes are occurring. As this storm charged across Stapleton Airport, winds at one sensor were 16 knots from the east. But winds at another sensor were 22 knots from the northwest -- treacherous wind shear conditions. And the flashing lights alerted the flight controller. But LLWSAS misses many shears, as it did this day. Even at Denver, where the system has been enhanced with extra wind gauges, it can't cover every square foot. Ten minutes after the shear we just watched cleared the airport, the LLWSAS system completely missed another one, as this United plane was cleared for landing. The wind suddenly kicked up, and only 10 feet from the runway the pilot was forced to abort his landing and go around for another try.

Capt. CHARLES FELLOWS, United pilot: They were saying there's no shear reported. We heard another crew asked him if there was any shear reported, and they say, "No, no shear reported." So they had no idea of what was actually occurring out there either.

Dr. JOHN McCARTHY, wind shear expert: The situation passed as far as the controller knew it, and he had no technology available to tell him that there was something going on above the ground.

HOCHBERG [voice-over]: Dr. John McCarthy is director of wind shear studies at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colorado. His staff is working on an improved detection device that might have prevented the Denver confusion. It not only reports wind readings at the airport gauges, but uses those readings to draw a picture of probable wind currents airport-wide.

Dr. McCARTHY: And the two green lines of the bar here represents a wind shift that's going to move across the airport, and here, where the blue and the white shows up, is where the computer has identified automatically that there is a frontal wind shift. So when you see all of these colors going on, that's where the action is. And it's a much -- we think a much more convenient way to show the information to controllers. Essentially, a picture is worth a thousand numbers.

HOCHBERG [voice-over]: McCarthy expects the colorful screens to replace digital readouts in the towers of 110 major airports by 1988. One year later, a Doppler wind shear radar system may be in use, and that could take most of the guesswork out of wind shear detection. It's been tested for a year at Stapleton and is going through final evaluation by researchers in Boulder. The Doppler system measures actual wind currents miles away, so it can detect wind shears long before they move across an airport or a flight approach.

Dr. McCARTHY: So right now we're already at a shear strong enough for -- to cause Pan Am 759 to crash at New Orleans. And it's a 50-knot shear, the classical microburst development, and that's where you wouldn't want to be flying.

HOCHBERG [voice-over]: Airport administrators in 15 cities hope to install the Doppler system by 1989.

Dr. McCARTHY: We don't think that training or Doppler radar, improved LLWSAS, will eliminate wind shear accidents. But instead of having one every one or two years, where lots of people get killed in those accidents, we'll have one every 20 to 30 years. It's true, we're giving a pilot a skill that will help him out in wind shear, but not all wind shear. And that's what they have to understand.

WOODRUFF: Tonight cartoonist Ranon Lurie looks at the subject of terrorism.

[Ranon Lurie cartoon -- terrorists shooting at U.S. target, but their shots eventually cover the entire globe]

MacNEIL: Once again, the main stories of the day. In the TWA bombing, authorities are seeking a known Arab woman terrorist who'd occupied the seat where the explosion occurred. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres told the NewsHour that the bombing was the work of two Palestinian groups, Abu Moussa and Abu Nidal. NASA astronauts testified they did not know the seriousness of problems with space shuttle booster rockets before the Challenger disaster.

Good night, Judy.

WOODRUFF: Good night, Robin. That's our NewsHour for tonight. We'll be back tomorrow night. I'm Judy Woodruff. Thank you and good night.