Program 2 of 5; The U.S. and China

National Educational radio in cooperation with the Johnson Foundation of Racine Wisconsin presents highlights of the National Conference on the United States and China. In 1965 a nationwide conference on American Chinese relations was held in Washington D.C. sponsored by Georgetown University and the School of International Service of the American University in cooperation with the American Friends Service Committee. This conference brought together delegates from many nations for the first major national conference on American Chinese relations since the communists came to power in mainland China. The host for these recorded programs is William E. Moran Jr. Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and honorary cochairman for the conference. Dean Moran. Despite our differences with savvy at Russia we have worked hard and painfully over the past 20 years to improve relations with that country. We have had some success. We can at least hope for peaceful coexistence. We have not made

any effort to act toward communist China as we have towards our Viet Russia. We have refused recognition. We have a poetry admission into the United Nations. We have refused to trade with her and have severely restrict restricted opportunities for personal visits and exchanges. Has this served our purpose in seeking peace. Or are we on a collision course which might lead to war. If we had treated communist China as we had Soviet Russia or if we should start a similar approach now would it improve relations and the chance of peace in Asia and the world. Or would it react to the advantage of communist China and to the disadvantage of the United States and her allies in Asia and elsewhere. In this the second in a series of five programs dealing with the problem of United States relations with mainland China we will review the history of our relations with China over the past 20 years. We will compare the years with the evolution of our relations with Russia over the same period. In the light of this

historic review in comparison we will ask whether our relations with mainland China are such that we are on a collision course. Finally we will consider whether we should attempt to open up and improve our contacts with China through trade exchange of persons entrance into the United Nations and recognition or whether we should continue to follow our present policy. The first speaker on this program is Professor John King fair bank director of the East Asian Research Center Harvard University who will present the Historical Review to Chairman ladies and gentleman. Course of an optimist. And as an optimist I favor peace and victory. But. I'm afraid all of us have to be pessimists. I foresee that at the end of this year we will still be on a conventional ground war with mounting casualties.

Unable to use nuclear weapons because of the Russians unable to win on the ground because of the Chinese. Unable to get out. In other words this is a good time for discussion. And our effort at discussion has to. Try to get beyond the formulations. Or the half truths are perhaps I should say the incomplete statements. Which are made by all parties. For instance P. Kang would have us believe that this is just a. Locally based. War of liberation or rebellion. And we know that the North plays a part in it. And yet Washington would have us believe. Or would like to have a statement accepted that this is essentially a case of aggression from the north. And that might be called a half truth because while there is that element

we know perfectly well that it is based in the south. It has taken local route. In other words. All of these half truths trying to get at an approximation of the truth. Have got to be seen in perspective and in three dimensions. The Marxist Leninist effort in the world is based on some great half truths. The trouble is that they are half true. In other words partly true. As well as being half untrue. In a manner of speaking. The Americans as a sea based power are in danger of being sucked on to the land. The fact that we want to go away. After a victory doesn't necessarily mean that we will be able to go away. Because we may not get a victory. And now we're beginning this morning looking back at the United States and China since 1945.

Let me pursue this in five parts. Part one looking back at this 20 year period let us remind ourselves of the tremendous growth and change accelerating growth accelerating change in the world seen. This 20 years includes the beginning of the nuclear age. Missiles the space age the Cold War balance of terror that includes the economic revival of Western Europe. Economic revival of Japan and Germany who had the good fortune of being defeated by us. The growth of the American and the Soviet Russian economies. This 20 year period includes politically and 19th century colonialism in Asia and Africa tremendous change and a corresponding growth of the United Nations. And the growth of local warfare in many parts of the

world. And in this 20 years it has been an absolutely unprecedented American program of aid for the development of other countries and also an unprecedented build up of American arms. Used for containment and deterrence in an effort of stability. And finally we have got co-existence of a sort between the Americans and the Soviets and all this picture of the last 20 years. There's only one really unchanging thing and that is the American Chinese stalemate and hostility which leaves us today on a collision course. In other words I think if we look back over this 20 years and see this tremendous amount of change which baffles the imagination and then consider how little the Peking Washington relationship has changed. We may get the feeling that we're in for some changes in that relationship

apart to China and there's 20 years has gone through a great revolution. So great so vast. Affecting not only the largest number of people in human history but making such enormous changes structurally institutionally in people's lives in the state and the economy in the society. That you just have to call it a great revolution perhaps the greatest in human experience. And it's not easy to say it is either good or bad anymore than you say human history is good or bad. You just got to accept it. There is a great revolution. I would suggest that the main feature of this great revolution in China in these 20 years has been the mobilization of the populace that is bringing the vast mass of the Chinese people.

Into a kind of participation in political life bringing them by communist means persuasion terror ideology indoctrination. All that mixture of motivations that the communists have learned how to use. But bringing them into political life mobilization is perhaps a neutral term. I'm not saying this is a good thing and it's not a bad thing necessarily this was something that's happened. If you look back over this 20 year period and the Civil War or the rebellion of the Communist staged in the period 46 to 49. Part of their victory was due to the popular support they were able to mobilize for their so-called liberation army. And then if you look at the period since 49 you see the Chinese Communist regime effecting a takeover of the economy getting the inflation under control. Beginning industrialization. Partly by its capacity to

motivate and manipulate the public. The people common man. You see this particularly in the case of the peasantry as the regime takes over the peasantry through the program of land reform. How that program moves around just simple mutual aid which is a very sensible thing among peasants cooperatives on a voluntary basis and then into cooperatives which are involuntary. Which turn into real collectives where everybody really has to join in the in the cooperative or collective. Where in effect through land reform and good things the village is brought under control of the communist regime. Through a revolutionary change of sorting out of people. Motivation of them. All of this leading to. A mobilization. I may use that word again.

Then if you look at the takeover of the Chinese Communists among the intellectuals their program of thought reform in the early 1950s and since building on their earlier experience as they as they grew up before the war thought reform which continues through constant discussion in small groups constant self-criticism constant learning of the party line and so on. This leads to a control over the individual and manipulation of the individual and mobilization of the individual so that the intellectual. All the literate people in fact the whole country are brought under government leadership. They are subject to government stimulation. Well this is a kind of totalitarianism which again is so vast and so comprehensive as to be almost beyond good and evil as an adjective we can say this is a terrible thing. On the other hand it's used for some very good ends as well as some evils along the way. And

getting a balance on that I think is well you can try but it's not possible to sum it up in one word. The net result of this certainly has been in these 20 years of the Chinese great revolution to produce a strong government. For example they not only have their military organization which is under top control and not independent which is not unlike the traditional military structure of the old dynasties they also have their bureaucracy their civil government which is fairly under control. Like the government of older dynasties. And then they have a party which controls all this which now runs to 17 million or maybe 20 million members. Which is one of the enormous working bodies of organized people anywhere in history which takes the place of what there used to be in China. In the Person of the dynasty which had its

emperors and the successor to the Emperor came from the dynasty. Plus the censor at the institution of censors who went around looking for malfeasance and could room on straight and impeach Plus the institution in the palace of the eunuchs who were servants of the Emperor. In other words there is a modernization and a modern modernizing in general of all the supervisory organs. In addition to the military and the bureaucratic the supervisory organs of the party for control over the whole mechanism. And then something more has been added to this strong regime and gang and that is mass organizations. A new thing which brings everybody into. Contact with the government and its campaigns and these campaigns mounted one after another gets you into mass demonstrations. Study groups hating

certain evils taking off after certain targets remaking the society knocking out the landlords of the capitalists whatever it may be. And incidentally hating the Americans when necessary and this is a constant theme. In other words this government as part of the revolution has penetrated the population as never before. So the traditional structure of China has been revived and intensified. The classical orthodoxy of certain teachings that were true should be learned by everybody. The indoctrinated elite that is the leadership group who knew the classical orthodoxy and could follow the rules laid down. And finally the top autocrat the power holders with their continuity at the top in charge of the whole organization. Well this used to be a superficial thing under the old dynasties. The same elements now are still there strengthened and expanded. At the same time it's not just an old dynasty there are new features. The Marxist Leninist doctrines taking the place of Confucianism.

Brain and all the worship of science and material progress the idea of progress Western ideas they bring in the kind of a god like Terry and ASM you have under totalitarian control where everybody is equal more or less at least equally manipulated. And we shouldn't underestimate this they got to Terry in asm if you've been in the old China. Where the peasant was illiterate and now the peasant becomes literate and connected with official life. This is a this is a great change. You may call it a great improvement. Finally a new feature is the nationalism which has such ancient roots in China. Which is all the stronger because of the old Sino centric China as the center of the world. Concept of 2000 3000 years of history. When of course we can raise certain queries about this two decades of great revolution in China. One may well ask whether the economic growth. Might not have been much the same without the

communists. They claim economic growth is their greatest raison d'être but in fact if you look at the Czarist Russian example. Czarist Russia was developing industrial A and the right if it carried on would have been something like the communist success in Russia. Again if you look at the nationalism the present regime and became Sino centric nationalism a sense of superiority such as all great modern nations have tried to get. You may well ask why there even without the Chinese Communists this would not also have come with the Chinese revolution. Wouldn't any Chinese regime have asserted itself. In some very great and upset ing degree. In other words the Chinese revolution even without communist leadership would have posed a great problem for the modern world because of its degree of change. When I face the problem of how to get

this revolutionary China into the international order join allies as now I notice. Recent quote that the United Nations doesn't matter anymore. China is going to form its own order and it's perfectly plain I suppose that Indonesia would not be out of the United Nations if China had been in. At least China as more difficult more different from the rest of the world and on the other part it is more different from the west than Russian Communist regime and it has a different standards to a greater degree different values for instance concerning the role of the individual in the group than the state. At the same time China has more revolutionary ardor. It is more demanding. And so I come to this part three American Chinese relations since 1945. Well here let me try a few well-chosen words on the subject of our relations with China and others.

We can argue about this at great length but I think as a matter of fact that the main outlines of Narbonne pretty well shaken down and accepted. For example in nineteen forty five to forty eight during the war on the mainland between the Chinese Communists and the nationalists it now appears that the Nationalists were somewhat weaker than they thought they were. They had been weakened by eight years of Japanese aggression and the historical discussion now is whether their weakness came mainly from that or mainly from their lack of a genuinely revolutionary programme. In the hall they didn't show a great capacity for revolution in the village. This did the American mediation in that period the time of General Marshall aid program that followed were in a context where the Americans definitely did not want to get into a land war in mainland China. We had demobilized with unprecedented speed in 1945 and 46. There was

no demand that the Americans move into the Chinese scene and try to. Change the course of China's history from the inside. The net result in 1945 was that when the British recognised hoping to solve their problem that way Taiwan was isolated with a remnant of the nationalist regime. The American contemplation of recognition of the new communist power in Peking was thoroughly thwarted whatever ideas we may have had about recognizing this new situation were stalemated because we became very quickly the main enemy of the new regime. We remain in that position ever since it seems almost as though the regime has to have a main enemy and couldn't get along without it and we are the biggest thing on the horizon and they couldn't get along without us as a main enemy. At any rate in 1950 you recall the Korean War

brought us into actual fighting with the new peaking power. Stalin presumably was behind this Korean War. It was a very cunning move if it succeeded he would have had influence in Japan as well as Korea North China. Fail it only because the Americans and the Chinese fought the Chinese volunteers who came and stalemated our troops. They claimed victory at the same time. Taiwan again became our ally. As in 1954 we supported them militarily and have been ever Sansone and other words we are still underwriting the Chinese Civil War. Well this history of relations since 1945. One could go on expatiating and dealing with different aspects. It certainly adds up to a situation in which the Americans have been involved in a containment of the Chinese Communists

for 15 years. Now point for Taiwan since 1945. I think one thing to remember about the Taiwan prosperity of today is that it was preceded by 50 years of Japanese rule. 50 years of Japanese development. In the period 1945 to forty eight there was an early very corrupt exploitation by the mainland regime carpetbaggers and so on this led to a protest and considerable massacre 1947. The intensification of a problem of politics between the time when the Chinese and the mainland are Chinese which is still under the surface. However after 1949 the Taiwan regime developed a program of land reform. There was considerable economic growth. This was on the whole quite successful. The time Ani's Chinese today are participating not only in the army but in local government. They are getting education. They are part of the economy and its growth. The political

life of Taiwan is still in a Chinese style. Under a sort of modified party dictatorship. Since the Korean war the Americans have given aid and military aid as well as economic. There has been a large military burden in the Taiwan scene. I think the main feature of time on today is the patriotic pride of the regime. John Kai-Shek still clings to back to the mainland as is a goal he will not give up. His. Past year. He is a man of pride like the people in. The American interest in my view is in an independent Taiwan. Whatever the local government may be I think it cannot easily be in our interest to join the mainland Chinese patriots of all caps seem to be rather opposed to an independent Taiwan

in principle. However the Taiwanese Chinese have an independent Taiwan and there it is not part 5. The future of American Chinese relations. My own view of this is that the Americans need a more balanced program. We thank of the military activity that we're pursuing. We have an economic program. These are the material things that we understand best. I think there's a third element in the power situation in East Asia and all over the world in fact that is you might call social political organization or the reorganization the mobilization theme that I mention of the common people in their villages and this is a an element a factor that we don't have much direct contact with. And fourth I think you might say there is an ideological factor having a view of the

future for these people. A strategy of change or revolution a revolutionary ideology. Well the fourth thing is the military the economic social political organization and the ideological element of strategy and aim. These four things all contribute in my view to a balanced program. In the modern revolutionary world. The Chinese communists I think make their efforts on all these four levels. In Vietnam today the American effort is strongest in the military and economic con that we are fighting have a technique village revolution which is descended from the Chinese Communist technique that they learned in their revolutionary rise in China. It's been further developed. It is based on the social political organization of the village. Taking the people in the village and getting them into a new structure of relations. Getting them mobilized and under control

getting them motivated. The motivation is not merely by terror. You use terror to assassinate the representatives of the government. You use indoctrination you use ideology. You give them a vision of the future. You give them the half truth of Marxism Leninism the story of why the foreigners are there at the same time you organized them and this social political organization is a technique. With great potentialities. This is the important part of guerrilla warfare. The fighting part is a minor part of the effort that goes into social and political organization of the villages far greater. Than the effort that goes into the mere fighting of a guerrilla war. You can have a successful guerrilla movement on the basis of the social political reorganization of the village. You can't have it without. So I would say that the United States has got to pay attention to this question of

social political organization of knowledge in Southeast Asia and other countries Asia and Africa for example in northeast Thailand. We know perfectly well the effort is going on there as it went on years before in South Vietnam. At the same time the United States has an obvious program of appealing to nationalism self-determination which is a worldwide phenomenon. I would suggest that avoiding negotiations with the Vietcong may become impossible in the end. But in any case we have to compete. With them. And the element of delay is revolution. You can't do that directly. That is American troops going in with Candy for the kids cannot provide the competition that the Vietcong represent in the village. The Chinese communists are not in there themselves they have merely taught the method. They have spread the doctrine that

technology is the thing that is spreading and the American problem is how to work with nations of that area and elsewhere who want on a noncommunist basis to carry through their own type of revolution as a basis for political. Control well and if necessary military defense. Well this is what I would suggest as a balanced more balanced effort to take our minds off the bombing program. As well that we're going to be a solution that at best I think is just a holding operation and we can argue perhaps whether it is effective and doesn't play into the hands of the Chinese more than we realize giving us a bad image and so on stirring up the opposition hardening the people that are bombed against us. This can be argued whether it is really effective. One effect of the bombing of course is to buck up the South Vietnamese army. You can argue back and forth I will leave this to the president but

I think we all have to leave quite a lot to him in fact. Second point however. Quite aside from this matter of balance and putting our effort into the understanding of the village and what's going to happen to it in the future other words how the people live in an organized kind of science and that I think a second effort in our future American Chinese relations has to be. The problem of war with China. To try to avoid this war with China. At least on a big scale. Probably our choice is a big war or a smaller war and peace is perhaps beyond us. At any rate you can have worse wars and you can have less bad wars. Whatever we come out with our effort is to try to mitigate the kind of disaster that we can get into with China. Because let's not void the issue here. The world power balance could be considerably shaken and

changed if we got into the wrong times of warfare with China.