Session two: law, sociology, and political science; Civil disobedience and the Democratic tradition
- Transcript
Look the problem that is before us and you know is civil disobedience and the rule of law in a democracy. This is in some respects right at the center of the kind of dilemma that we are confronting locally. The first speaker on this panel will be the main speaker indeed Professor Caleb Foote professor is a professor of law and criminology at our own university. He has been an expert in family law and criminal law and has been particularly interested in the initial and final stages of the criminal administrative process arrest and the sentencing and treatment of functions of the law. Mr. Ford's interest in criminal laws stems partly from his world war two experiences as a conscientious objector.
He served two sentences in federal prison for his conscientious objection so he combines the theoretical with the practical. All rather to speakers are professors Rogaine of the political science department and professors Professor Korn Hauser. Both of whom are I think older members of the campus community and Lee need less introduction to you. My pleasure now to present Professor Caleb Foote. Well I think there's probably considerable risk but we'll spend a lot of time here today in quibbles over what isn't is not civil disobedience and what the boundaries of the subject are already had some of that unless it seems essential to me to try to establish some common terms
of reference labels I after all have a peculiar power and tyranny of their own. How we label matter is evasion or is civil disobedience may make some difference in our disposition of a thorough whom we've already heard moved out of the sphere of more once rather than is. I know that if you read people like Sure I mean title lead education they will think they have heard something important but call it transcendentalism and they will think it is moonshine. Or have the lecture and put a song on the beginning of the prayer at the end of it and read it from home but then they will pronounce it good without thinking. My. Role is already. In. The. Terms of Reference which I operate under. Somewhat as follows above with some modifications from the philosopher Karl Cohen. I would simply say that civil disobedience is a protest which
by an illegal public nonviolent act seeks to effect to a change within the confines of an existing social and governmental order. First the illegal nature of the Act distinguishes civil disobedience from other forms of protest which operate within and seek protection from the existing structure of governmental process see. Second the open and public nature of the Act distinguishes it from evasion. That's one of those labels. And from the tolerated or institutionalized illegality which is so common a feature of our society. Third the nonviolent character of the act. Emphasizes that while a species of force is being substituted for the reasoned and orderly discussion of democratic lawmaking none the less the discipline nonviolence which distinguishes civil disobedience from rioting and sabotage attempts to conveying it to
contain the deviants from the normal democratic model within sharply defined boundaries. Fourth. The emphasis upon the fact awaiting change within the got it within a given social and governmental structure distinguishes civil disobedience from rebellion and revolution. I have two initial comments about this rather arbitrary definition which I advance not as truth but simply for the semantic reason of allowing us to communicate with one another. We use the same label civil disobedience very loosely to describe a number of different phenomena arising in a variety of disparate circumstances. There is the poster Wallach to protest segregation in the southern city a protest which is threatened and then broken up by the police perhaps abetted by mob action. That is not civil disobedience because no illegal act is committed except by the police. Like Al they is all on the side of the protesters who are exercising First Amendment rights
elucidated and more than a score of Supreme Court decisions. Then there is the act of public disobedience of a law which almost any lawyer would pronounce clearly valid under existing legal and constitutional interpretations. The protester may think the enactment which he violates is immoral beyond the proper boundaries of legitimate legitimate governmental action and unconstitutional in quotes in terms of his personal reading of the Constitution. But there is no present reasonable expectation that any court of law is going to agree with him between the clearly legal and the clearly illegal act of protest is the inevitable grey area of uncertainty. An example are the sit in protest which at the time they took place were illegal and under apparently valid state trespass laws but which were ultimately protected by the combined action of Congress and the Supreme Court. Most of the moral and practical
objections to civil disobedience do not extend to this kind of protest where the protester has at least a colorable claim for what gallantly and is essentially bringing a test case to establish his position as law at least for our purposes now. This does not seem to be civil disobedience. I would draw the line according to the probability of achieving success in court litigation within a reasonable time in the future where there is something better than a negligible chance of legal success. The ACT lacks that character of player illegality which is the crux of the moral and philosophical dilemma as posed by civil disobedience in a democratic society. A third phenomenon lumped under this label is illustrated by Gundy the leader of the rebellion against British power in India while he sought to accomplish his end by obtaining the abdication of power of the British.
And while the foresee implied was employed was nonviolent is goal was the revolutionary over it for all of a foreign and substantial expense extent despotic power. Although both Gandhi's philosophy of the relationship of the protester with his opponent as common members of the human family and the tactics he employed are at the heart of what we call civil disobedience. The revolutionary motive of his movement so distinguishes his case from most of ours here today that unless we sharply differentiate the two. Seems to me that we invite nothing but confusion in analysis. Revolutionary nonviolence owes no obligations to the existing political structure which has lost the protester's allegiance. This lack of allegiance frees the revolutionary protester from most of the moral and tactical dilemma's which plague the practitioner of civil disobedience who operates within and
seeks merely to modify existing legal and governmental processes. The revolutionary is not concerned with maintaining the rule of law. It has no motivation to limit the coercive aspect of its protest and to use civil disobedience only as a last resort Les's tactics weaken the cement which gives order to human affairs. For his objective is precisely to weaken that over. We can see this essential distinction very clearly in our own history in the years immediately preceding 1774 1776 as late as 1774 when George Mason It was later to be in the office of Virginia Declaration of Rights drafted the protest document against the British which was called the Fairfax resolves. He conditioned upon the stated premise that it is our greatest wish and inclination as well as interest to continue with our connections of with and dependence upon the British
government. As far as I am concerned and I suspect for most of us the discussion of civil disobedience today is bottomed on a comparable promise of allegiance to the validity of the rule of law and of the use of democratic process both as a device to give order and as a means of effect awaiting change to bring those dates forward to our present time. I think that here today we are in 1774 not in 1776. It is also important I think to distinguish the various context in which the issue of civil disobedience may arise for the individual because they vary so widely that the problems also vary with them. The first category are a first category seems to me to be the direct confrontation initiated by the state which leaves the individual with choices only of submission or resistance. A Japanese-American is ordered to report for evacuation from the Pacific coast under a program which he profoundly believes to be
but knows no fork will then hold an unconstitutional invasion of his rights as a citizen and in violation of equal justice. A conscientious objector is faced with a conscript of power of the state. I went to school for a McCarthy committee is ordered to name his associates in a college activity many years previously an activity which he believes to be innocent but which he suspects the committee will use for smear purposes against any person. The names a second situation might be described as direct confrontation by the chance operation of fate and circumstance. A farmer in southern Ohio in the late 1850s was awakened late at night but knocked on the door to find a group of runaway slaves seeking is help in their escape to Canada. The law requires him to turn them in to be returned to slavery. A doctor is consult of by the parents of a 15 year old girl of good family who has become pregnant as the result of a brutal rape. The law provides that abortion is a felony
less necessary to save the life of the mother a factor not present in this case although the doctor profoundly agrees with the girl's parents and the girl itself the performance of an abortion is both morally justified and by far the best resolution of the problem. The law not only forbids him to perform it but as emphasized by a recent case he may commit a felony even if he merely advises the patient of the location of abortions. A third category where the initiative is taken a third category of cases is where the initiative is taken by the protester who is activated by his sense of responsibility and urgency in making his weight felt effectuating change. A group of slum tenants despairing of persuading either their land that either their landlords to repair their substandard housing or the city housing inspectors to enforce its own housing code decides to conduct a sit in in
the mayor's office in violation of a local law and to refuse to leave until they obtain satisfaction. A group of doctors decide that the only way to effectuate needed change in the abortion laws during their lifetime is to break through the wall of silence and legislative fear surrounding that topic by a dramatic act and they are grey among themselves of the soon as any of them is consulted in a case which in their opinion Borsen is morally justified although legally prohibited they will. Then the doctor concerned will perform the abortion and then publicly inform the district attorney of what he has done and invite prosecution. As we move along this spectrum of cases from the direct confrontation by the state to those in which the initiative comes from the protester the factor of the protesters own sense of personal moral integrity seems to diminish in importance relatively and the factor of the
predicted efficacy of the protest in achieving change is of increasing relevance in the direct confrontation cases the Japanese-American of the conscientious objector or the McCarthy witness as only the most limited range of choice either resubmit said violation of his own deeply held belief abdicating what he believes to be is own personal moral responsibility for his wife or he resists. If he is permitted the situation to drift to the final moment of confrontation at that point even the alternative of evasion is no longer a practical possibility. In such a situation the possible effectiveness of the protest in changing people's mind aren't drawing public attention to the wrong which the protester opposes may be of minimal significance to him. Indeed one moral litmus paper tests I suppose for a person considering such an action is to consider whether or not he would engage in it
regardless of its possible effect. So does this kind of civil disobedience. While it may be deliberately embraced as a technique for effectuating change can also arise and I suspect far more often in the past has arisen without such serious consideration of the effectiveness factor by someone who simply says this is my position I can't do anything else. In the middle range of cases an important alternative course of action becomes available between the extremes of turning the applicant for help the runaway slave or the rape victim turning them away or performing the illegal act and then publicly submitting yourself for prosecution. The doctor can go ahead and abort the pregnant right victim perhaps first consulting a psychiatrist or two in order to build a paper record about trauma for using this defense of his actions should later be challenged. The Ohio farmer of 1859 can shelter
and feed the runaway slaves and send them on their way to Canada. Both are willing to pay the price if they are caught. But both can decide that is they have a good prospect of avoiding detection. They will up publicize their actions and ask for prosecution. This alternative is not civil disobedience in the conventional sense or put into the definition which I have given. Because the act is not a public violation but it is a reason and principle if the illegal act it is based on the actor's moral convictions that he is much more right than the state. Not only is there no element of personal gain for the actor for Obviously I'm not talking about the profit motivated abortionist who will charge a roll of traffic conveyor but it subjects the actors to at least some risk of unpleasant consequences and prosecute as a protest can achieve a collective effectiveness which may be substantial. Certainly thousands of
runaway slaves made it to Canada before the Civil War and thousands of women have obtained an abortion to which they thought they were entitled according to some moral standards though not according to the law. Because of the. Underground Railway conductors or doctors who have acted according to this middle ground a middle ground which I suppose we would normally attach the label of evasion. Where the initiative comes from the protester. Of course there is not only a wider range of choice available but the actor is under no compulsion outside and self to do anything at all. Moreover the range of choice from which alternative actions can be selected is a wide one. In the case of our group of slum tenants who decided illegally to sit in the mayor's office thereby disrupting the conduct of city business and violating a law to focus attention on their legitimate grievances they could
instead have written letters protests to the newspaper or sent a delegation to talk to the landlords of the city building inspector or visited the city council and made a speech. If they preferred more direct action they could choose for a variety of public protests which would have kept them safely under the umbrella of constitutional protection. Passing out leaflets a poster welcoming even a parade through the city streets if they complied with certain reasonable conditions. They could even have organized a rent strike for all those some state conspiracy statutes would appear to make such a strike illegal. I think it's doubtful that it would be so held today under those circumstances apply for. I've been gauged in this lengthy prelude and cheer up this is one of those productions in which the over jury is longer than all the rest of the Opera put together because it seems to me.
An essential prerequisite to a discussion of the justifiability of civil disobedience under rule of law in a democratic society. We live together under that rule of law achieving a tolerable if far from perfect balance between the needs for order and for liberty. Certainly democratic society as a whole has to undergo that same perilous time ask is the role given to the teacher and one of Lauren Isley books. But he must ever walk wearily between the necessity of inducing those conformity which in every generation reaffirm our rebellious humanity that he must at the same time allow for the free play of the creative spirit on two propositions I would feel sure there is fairly general agreement and I will simply state them as additional premises for our discussion. The first is that constitutional
democracy appears to be the best method man has yet devised to achieve this balance between order and liberty. I say this despite an awareness of shocking deficiencies in our implementation of democratic principles are historical treatment of the poor discrimination against minorities and failure to provide a minimum economic floor in our society to name only three. But against this record of past failure we must say that the convincing evidence of the viability of the democratic process in this country of its capacity to change and to respond to needs. We have witnessed in the past half century you are now witnessing at least three revolutions in the legal position of the working man in the legal position of the Nigro and in the implementation of due process procedures which significantly buttress the position of the powerless individual against the omnipotent power of the state and its beliefs.
We had we have hopefully I think we are on the threshold of a fourth revolution dealing with the legal economic rights of the poor. We have seen moreover that in the labor relations legal recognition was followed by substantial restructuring of Labor's economic position and it is at least reasonable to hope that for presently economically deprived nonwhite and poverty segments of the population the same sort of by restructuring may follow where the equalization of the legal position sets in motion forces which allow greatly accelerated reform in the economic sphere. It's capacity to accommodate to such radical changes to provide for the orderly transition of power and to allow substantial scope for individual liberty. Our constitutional democracy presents a picture which compares very favorably with any alternative presented to us by history.
A second premise seems to me to follow is that in this capable corollary of the first the function of all democracy must operate by consent by a willingness to abide by the rules established by the democratic process. There are elements here of the spirit of the good loser. At least until the last presidential election of a willingness to compromise competing policy elements and the patients that abide by established channels of affection waiting to change prohibition the Prohibition amendment is only the best known example of what has been demonstrated again and again that you cannot enforce a policy by force over the strong objections of a substantial segment of the community within a democratic group and that where substantial consent is withheld. The democratic process has falter. At least as a general proposition therefore constitutional democracy
depends upon a willingness to abide by the rule of law to accept and support majority decisions which you dislike or think wrong while exercising your option to seek change through established channels. This position however does not seem to me at all necessarily inconsistent with any of the kinds of civil disobedience which I've discussed in the material distributed with the call for this meeting the late President Kennedy is quoted as saying Americans are free to disagree with the law but not to disobey disobey and following the government of laws and not of man. No man is entitled to defy a court of law in Title I suppose implies some sort of a criterion for determining justifiability. President Kennedy continued with the reasons for the
necessity of what he stated apparently is an absolute principle. If this country he said should ever reach the point where any man or group of men by force or threat of force could long deny the commands of the courts and Constitution then no law would stand free from doubt. No judge would be sure of his writ and no citizen would be safe from his neighbors. If that statement is to be read and there's certainly some ambiguity in the phrase good long delay. I was merely saying that wholesale long continued defiance of law could undermine the whole social order achieved by the rule of law. But I think it's an exception. If however a seems to be the case it is read as saying that any act of civil disobedience threatens the whole structure of society. And the reason for the absolute imperative not to add to it but the absolute imperative to a by the law is because disobedience would have such calamitous results.
Then I simply think he is wrong he is wrong historically certainly. I cite you only the case of the runaway slaves. There was no disruption of society caused by that kind of a protest against a society so monstrously off course. He is wrong I think. But this is a matter of taste and personal judgement I guess. He is wrong morally for the importance attributed to the individual by the Democratic philosophy must include it seems to me a respect for an element of individual detachment and all limit final responsibility for your own life and actions. A reserved power of the individual which is not and cannot be delegated away by the individual to the Democratic majority. But most of the ball it seems to me is just plain wrong factually
and with the known facts of how a democratic system actually operates in process. I see no evidence that the kind of civil disobedience we have experienced in our society and which I have described poses any substantial threat to the whole structure of water. I see substantial evidence that moral disobedience of this kind is often performed a positive function in allowing democracy better to realize self I see substantial evidence that over the past few years the existence of civil disobedience as a channel for the expression of outrage against injustice has contributed substantially to the preservation of the rule of law and that without that channel we might have had welts many times multiplied. Let me take one example of the practical working in this way of the of the democratic process from my own field of specialisation the administration of the criminal law. We know
that to achieve the general social goals derives from law enforcement is enough if one convicts only some proportion of detective law by leaders a proportion which is very substantially less than 100 percent of all known violators have been wrong which is virtually never in the past such as the criminal sanction against fornication are very contrary am very rarely or compassionately in Paris time to time and manner of my. Own I sometimes find that the effectiveness of map. And encouraging compliance with which the statute passed. Very sharply can tire her tire and indeed right happen there is that non of a non crash meant encourages an institutionalized as a Bayesian but provided you have a policy of consistent prosecution of some offenders over a period of time.
Conviction of what is probably a very small percentage is sufficient to establish between the law and the general public the general communication of accountability for the particular conduct involved. Moreover it seems highly probable that after this minimum level is reached increased efficiency leading to the conviction of a higher percentage of violators is subject to a principle of rapidly diminishing returns pulling out of the air figures which have no empirical validation of all it so. It seems probable that if you increase the conviction rate for some crime from 1 percent to 20 percent you achieve a base of support marked increase in educational and a deterrent effect on the population but the effect of a further increase from 20 percent to 40 percent convictions would accomplish very much less in the curve of anticipated increasing educational of the active does probably continues to flatten out markedly thereafter.
It is this principle which makes practicable risk theory of our Bill of Rights and the policy of deliberate inefficiency of law enforcement which is overstated in the aphorism that it is better that 10 guilty persons go free than one innocent person big convicted. The escape of the ten guilty is commonly accounted to be a cost of a democratic system of law enforcement. The fact is however that in terms of maintaining social order it is not much of a cost of all as a real issue of guilt or innocence or a search and seizure kit a defense arises only in a relatively small fraction of cases. The conviction rate developed from the large majority of uncontested cases is sufficient for educational deterrent purposes. And society has no pressing need for the conviction it forgoes on principle where guilt is and doubt. Needless to say this leaves out of account of the goals of the criminal law of therapy or foreign teams which raise other questions but are relevant to this discussion.
I think a similar principle clearly apprised of the broader field of social order. It isn't enough for the maintenance of such order. If most people buy most of the law willingly most of the time there is simply a lot of play in the joints. There is a lot of room for a society of ours to tolerate deviants without any serious risk to order and to demand democratic principles. If you look at the nature of the examples of civil disobedience which I cited earlier what is the nature of the possible threat to order which is public for the conscientious objector or the witness at the congressional hearing. Who is faced with the limiting factor of a very substantial cost if he indulges his protest. I think it's perfectly clear that at least always historically it has been
negligible calls because of the small numbers involved. If it becomes numerically significant as in labor relations protests in the last century society should and does take some account of it usually legitimizing it directly in part and tolerating the illegality indirectly by some of a fairy device. You take the case of the doctor in the abortion law. You reach much closer to the heart of the reality of the functioning of the democratic process. Most doctors as we know from him burial data take my middle position. They abort the girl and keep quiet about it but it might be far preferable for society in dealing with this kind of problem. If the doctor did did what the English doctor bull horn the prototype of my example did namely perform the abortion and then challenge the prosecution prosecute him for this would at least expose and perhaps remedy one of the great unsolved problems of our democratic
process. The rigidity of our law in certain areas which we seem to be unable to change and which are accommodated by a form of legitimize evasion. You may have some of you I'm sure remember Ruth Benedict's discussion and patterns of culture of the current I tried in Australia who raised an impossible marriage standards by which. If any yet two young people wanting to get married would have to perform an illegal act and they institutionalize this by providing that if you ran away to a certain place of refuge and if you made it to the other villages if you weren't smart got you in good. But if you made it to the place of refuge and waited until a child was born you would come back and be accepted by all your fellows in the community all of them of course have been married in the same way. Now there is there is a tremendous amount of that sort of
process in our own democratic culture and the abortion law is a very good example of how we not only don't have such a horror of disobedience of law as the statement of President Kennedy would imply but we legitimize it. We institutionalize it. Although of course with heavy costs with the case of the current I in Australia the cost for this evasion every process had to be paid for the occasional awkward unlucky couple who were caught and killed in our society. The poor play here is everywhere else. Any rich woman can get an abortion. It is the public health clinics which do not countenance institutionalized evasion of the Long Now. In this area all I can say for this type of case is that civil disobedience is not only not an exceptional threat but it is probably a far healthier phenomenon for society
in terms of Honestly bringing out to the surface what is a thoroughly hypocritical situation and exposing it to a possible corrective of legislative action. As to the bird class the protest or initiated demonstrations I guess I've already indicated what I think about that from my remarks were it not for this sort of outlet. We would have Watts many times multiplied over. The danger that protest oriented morally based responsibles disobedience poses a present threat to the legal waters seems to me to be one of the less serious of our dangers but it mildly we would be far better off were we to accept these protests with thanks for the vitality of a democracy which it demonstrates and move with far greater speed to rectify the grievances upon which civil disobedience throws the
spotlight of the. But I like you. Without any further delay. But Professor Rogan of the political science department who will pose some queries and make some remarks on the basis that Haitian professor wrote will move them. As I understand my function here is to comment fairly
briefly on Mr. Ford's remarks. I find myself however. Unable to be uninfluenced by the remarks of the participants in the discussion in the previous panel. So my remarks as we have generally will be my reaction to what I've learned this afternoon thereby perhaps committing the first act of civil disobedience. See here now the distance Mr Foot makes a distinction that a lot of the other speakers have also made and that is between civil disobedience and action which rejects the legitimacy of the established order and civil disobedience that accepts the legitimacy of the stablished order which means as far as we're concerned we're going to see our democratic processes in a democratic society in which we live.
I only want to suggest that very serious problems arise if the nature of the democratic society that we live in has serious flaws in the way of the participation of people in making policy and in the way of the so to speak unbiased formation of public opinion. And if it is in fact true that in any kind of mass industrial society those interferences with democracy are inevitable that only makes the problem all the more serious that is to say let me approach from a somewhat different angle and say that it's a pretty easy thing to be for civil disobedience under Saddam was relatively easy least easy for me let's say snobs in Israel. Lot of people where the mass of people in a society have an abstract commitment to what you are for like civil rights for example. When the
injustice is AAT very clear when it violates norms we all accept and so on. But suppose public opinion is not permitted to be formed on an issue such as for example the war in Viet Nam for a lot of reasons it is extremely difficult to form a public opinion which then makes one's civil disobedience have a response in the society. Call attention to where it may indeed antagonize people because of all the you know the nature of the political process the nature of the mass media the capture of the political leadership its commitment to American interests in the cold war which may not be the actual interests of ordinary people in the society and so on then it becomes actually if you then have a situation where. The immediate consequences of civil disobedience are indeed to antagonize people. There is no reservoir of moral agreement to call upon.
Then you are indeed in a very serious situation and that sort of situation that it seems to me we face over the be in them or that up until now at least we have not faced over civil rights and then the question is what is the legitimacy of civil disobedience in that situation. And I would only suggest that Mr. Ruston praising the draft card burner but attacking the demonstration to end the war in the end then is making a distinction that I am totally unable to follow because it seems to me that the draft card burners do exactly the same thing as the marchers. He is expressing his indignation that say his only distinction has to do with a possible unconstitutionality draft card war because in terms of antagonizing people. I have a tremendous symbolic commitment to meaningless symbols in a society like this in terms of antagonizing mobilizing opposition and all the rest of it.
The draft card burning is perhaps even more objectionable to people in the Mormon Church and where there are none so that the question I want to ask In other words is where is the fun for the civil disobedience in a hostile environment in a fundamentally hostile environment where in a certain sense it becomes even more necessary perhaps for those of moral commitment and I will only then want to say that it seems to me essentially the function then becomes one of political education. Of course this will go into the reasons why I think that but any case the. And it seems to me that if there is in the first place has to do with a matter of public order. Because while we are all in favor of public order many people decide to not. As for as I'm a find it many people in the society do not live under public order as we understand it and that the middle class a failure to understand the public water is a precarious thing does not simply mean we don't understand how fragile it
is for us it's also we don't understand it doesn't exist for working class people in a society large measure for Negroes in the society in large measure for poor people who do not have the freedom to be creative who are oppressed by a capricious and arbitrary law enforcement and so on. It is that indeed it does exist for dissenters radical dissenters with starkly The Saudis have not confronted the response of public water to their actions no matter how legal and where I learned that civil disobedience is simply the parallel between the disorder that's created in the society by people who sit down in front of the shared palace and sorter in the lives of ordinary negroes in the society who go through an analogous process day after day where as a middle class person may not. And that's one kind of educational function it seems to me is performed. And secondly also for the very people who participate in cells they learn quite a bit about the nature of public order in the society in terms of the treatment they get in the courts. The remarks of the judges
of the unparalleled example of Washington and after Nazis and handed out to Viet Nam the industries they learned so the real education function here. And secondly it's a matter on our of again I mean I learn from Mr. Ruston about the. People go south in 1941 with no hope of changing anything. It's a matter of keeping a tradition a long line. It's a matter of making people I leave aside the immediate media tactical questions here. I leave aside also the matter of whether one has any alternative for example of one is drafted and if one is the possibility of going to Viet Nam arise whether one has any moral turnitin sense to refuse to go or leave aside that kind of question it leaves out the question of the immediate tap of the significance and I simply say that in terms of keeping alive a tradition a tradition in which people in the society so how many were many few they ever few they may be
can understand what is happening in that society and can be reminded of it and can remind themselves through their experience and can at least remind those few people around them in the Saudi who are able to listen and able to understand and remark can make them see the reality as it is in reality the reality or the reality of. Their own treatment and so on it keeps alive a certain tradition which becomes extremely important sees me particularly in a time when a society is getting involved in a war when such traditions of the sand alternatives are very difficult to meet. And then if you know why that tradition. It provides people who will perhaps be active in a more hopeful and favorable time and will not have been swallowed up and made impotent by the developments in the society of Amstel will thank you for all of them.
Well I like to call my friend Mr. courthouse or to make the final comment. This afternoon's session this morning. Just arrest him. The only problem in this crowd you know what these things are. Why we're here. Yes there are a lot of analysts. I only have a few for remarks
rather than trying to respond directly to Mr Ford's excellent presentation. The reason why following civil disobedience such a fascinating subject is because it is extremely ambiguous. There are two kinds of ambiguity. The first is the substantive ambiguity what is civil disobedience and what is not. The second is the moral ambiguity. One is civil disobedience justified and when not. Let me make a few remarks on each of these matters concerning what is civil disobedience and what is not. I begin with a terribly elementary notion because I have heard some of my Collings last year likened the tactics of the FS to those of the Ku Klux Klan. Let me know. The only three differences. First the Klan seizes any means at hand
it is unrestrained. Second the plan acts in a clandestine manner. It is unaccountable furder the clan seats no universal principle. It is on principle. Civil disobedience is action that anything that is restrained accountable and principles the principles may be wrong in any given case but at least they are appeals to reason and to all manner of reason. Accountability mean means committed to being judged by the community. But let me hasten to add that in my judgment accountability does not necessarily mean being punished by the community. People can be in terms of for their actions and still seeking vindication of those actions in a court of long.
Restraint means great concern for the consequences of one's acts especially the real act. Here again let me enter the controversy over matter by stating that I do not believe that restraint requires an absolute commitment to nonviolence. Or there may be circumstances in which se fails at least is justified. Let me turn to the second question what is civil disobedience justified and when down. If civil disobedience is principled accounted for and restrain then it is consistent with the rule of law. But this still leaves open the question of whether civil disobedience is justified in any given situation. In order to make this kind of judgement we must probe more deeply into the concrete circumstances mobile use and methods of civil disobedience.
Civil disobedience is morally ambiguous in part because it is highly vulnerable perverse. This vulnerability stems from the fact that civil disobedience occurs outside of regular chariots of action and therefore places an extraordinary burden of responsibility on the individual a responsibility characteristically carried to great extent by institutions. I shall mention only two former abilities of civil disobedience. Let me hasten to add that I've talked about our abilities not about actuality. About certain Danes. First Civil disobedience is dramatic and personal. And therefore has a special appeal. Quite apart from its declared aims I respect this concerts main and we listen to a personal response.
At the same time but as a resonance the danger of a romantic view of civil disobedience such a new one springs from your interest. Contempt for ordinary power takes and your political ideals. The danger here is the danger of any little mantises namely self-indulgence rather than genuine intellectual moral and political concern or civil disobedience then ceases to be an authentic act. Second and far in civil disobedience generally elicits considerable attention indeed notoriety. Greatly facilitated by the insatiable appetite of television and other mass media for exciting materials as well as the right of way or in some of the American
public. On. The very power. Civil disobedience to communicate by use of the propaganda of the deed makes it vulnerable to being used as a tactic merely for the sake of cover this city. A point of view. Civil disobedience then ceases to be a serious act Frogmore of concern and political purpose and simply becomes one more device for gaining attention. This is especially to be regretted in a world where it is already terribly difficult to distinguish between the significant and the trivial. So let us do our utmost to avoid these twin dangers of romanticism and opportunity. Professor to give us the words on this
afternoon session. I find. Your comment except if I understood Mr. Rhoden correctly this is the first time I've ever heard Mississippi described as a non aggressive societal situation. He says that about the need to first be looking at civil disobedience in the context of extreme social hostility against it of course most of the examples we've talked about have been extreme social hostility against it. There was extreme social was still to be against the Japanese in California in the spring of 1940 to this extreme so she was still there yesterday today and tomorrow in Mississippi. I think that the whole thing we're talking about is a movement which operates against extreme hostility in many situations and which the power of the press to publicize it seems to be a very uneven power I
suspect. Mr. Ross and one for many years the minimum out policy for the kind of civil disobedience which is occurred on the and there are many instances of civil disobedience is not got published but certainly it is a it is a technique which is likely most often arise in situations still.
- Producing Organization
- KPFA (Radio station : Berkeley, Calif.)
- Contributing Organization
- Pacifica Radio Archives (North Hollywood, California)
- AAPB ID
- cpb-aacip/28-vm42r3ph5q
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- Description
- Description
- In this second session of the conference on civil disobedience and the democratic tradition, Caleb Foote, Visiting Professor of Law and Criminology at the University of California (and a conscientious objector who served two terms in prison during World War Two) gives a talk, followed by comments from Michael Rogin, Professor of Political Science, and William Kornhauser, Professor of Sociology at the University of California. Carl Schorske introduces the speakers.
- Broadcast Date
- 1965-12-30
- Created Date
- 1965-11-00
- Genres
- Talk Show
- Subjects
- Civil Disobedience
- Media type
- Sound
- Duration
- 00:54:03
- Credits
-
-
Producing Organization: KPFA (Radio station : Berkeley, Calif.)
- AAPB Contributor Holdings
-
Pacifica Radio Archives
Identifier: 2634_D01 (Pacifica Radio Archives)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
-
Pacifica Radio Archives
Identifier: PRA_AAPP_BB1352_02_Law_sociology_and_political_science (Filename)
Format: audio/vnd.wave
Generation: Master
Duration: 0:53:58
If you have a copy of this asset and would like us to add it to our catalog, please contact us.
- Citations
- Chicago: “Session two: law, sociology, and political science; Civil disobedience and the Democratic tradition,” 1965-12-30, Pacifica Radio Archives, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed November 13, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-28-vm42r3ph5q.
- MLA: “Session two: law, sociology, and political science; Civil disobedience and the Democratic tradition.” 1965-12-30. Pacifica Radio Archives, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. November 13, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-28-vm42r3ph5q>.
- APA: Session two: law, sociology, and political science; Civil disobedience and the Democratic tradition. Boston, MA: Pacifica Radio Archives, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-28-vm42r3ph5q