Focus 580; Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan

In this part of focus 580 we will be looking back to the closing days of World War 2 and at the complex relations involving the three major players the United States Japan and the Soviet Union and the basic question that we will explore is this. What are the factors that finally led the Japanese to surrender and to bring an end to the war. Now for many people the immediate answer would be the atomic bomb. The bombing of Russia and Nagasaki by the United States. However our guest for this hour of focus 580 historians so Yoshi house guy he has a different sort of analysis he says he thinks that it was the Soviet entry into the Pacific war that was the decisive factor and he says that he believes that this had a much greater effect than the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Also he says that he thinks that. In looking back at this period that both American and Japanese historians have almost completely ignored the role of the Soviet Union and

ending the Pacific war in this our focus 580 will be talking with. And so you're free to go he's professor of history also director of the Center for Cold War Studies at the University of California Santa Barbara and author of a recently published book that explores a subject the title of his book is racing the enemy Stalin Truman and the surrender of Japan. It is published by Belknap press of the Harvard University Press and has just come out fairly recently. If you're interested in the book you can certainly find it in bookstores. Questions comments are also welcome if people want to become involved in the conversation. That is certainly possible. All you need to do is pick up the telephone and call us here in Champaign Urbana 3 3 3 9 4 5 5. We do also have a toll free line good anywhere that you can hear us and that is 800 to 2 2 9 4 5 5 The only thing that we ask of people who call in is that they are brief and we just ask that so that we can get in as many as possible. Keep the program

moving but anyone is welcome to call again here in Champaign Urbana 3 3 3 9 4 5 5 toll free 800 to 2 2 9 4 5 5. Professor House gallery Hello. Good morning. Well thank you very much for talking with us. Well I'm glad to be here. Just a very basic question first and that is why do you think that it is as you note in the introduction that American historians Japanese historians have given so little weight to the role of the Soviet Union in ending the war in the Pacific. Basically two reasons. One linguistic because those people who were on this topic notably Russia signally post the sources were not really available until recently. Those are basic to visas.

I suppose we shouldn't really be that surprised if American and Japanese historians primarily focused on the American government and the Japanese government and that it would take a Soviet specialist to do the other thing that's right. That that's a Soviet specialist but I think that you know to study this subject you have to really take a look at to be major after the Russians and the Soviets and the United States and the Japanese and it is clear this is a rather difficult for when he still has to do all of those three six three factors I suppose I happen to be fortunate to. That's the suit you understand. The language is also somebody who is all the way. He sees the three countries. You explain that there are three subplots that's the language that you use in talking about the story that here you deal with.

So why don't we talk a little bit about each of those and in turn and the first has to do with the relationship between ultimately between the United States and the Soviet Union but specifically between the leaders. Initially that would be Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin. And then after Roosevelt died that would be Harry Truman and Joseph Stalin. And and it's there is a a significant difference in the attitude in the approach that Roosevelt took. When you compare that to the approach that Harry Truman took. So maybe you could talk a little bit about what was the thinking of Roosevelt and his advisors during the time that that he was still president about what they what they wanted from the Soviets and what sort of role they saw for the Soviets in East

Asia. Well I think that had. I mean the timing is very important at that time until about February and the conference the United States really thought it is essential to secure Soviet buy the space in the war to force defense to surrender. But by the time two men came to the table the signal to situation drastically changed and the U.S. military U.S. leadership came to the conclusion that the Soviets by the spacing was not necessary you know there was United States could not do it alone. So that's that's the basic difference another difference. Is that is the the vision of the post war how the Soviet Union.

See here is the role that the Soviet should play in the post-war world I think that I think the two men have a slightly different approach to that problem. To what extent did concerns about Soviet expansionism shape that the decision of the Truman administration to essentially go it alone and believe that with that the Soviet assistance wasn't really necessary. So I think that was a very crucial factor. Time Truman came to power then the Soviet Union United States questo Poland and Eastern Europe and in fact that the Polish problem was the first problem that confronted Truman administration and so Truman was really concerned about the impact of the consequences of

Soviet expansion in Asia. And same thing might happen. So that's pretty much the concern that Truman had two mothers in dilemma however on the one hand that he wanted to avoid some of it by the spacious but on the other hand the music has a telling him that so that by the space age if even if he this in on this is that it would shorten the war and therefore to that extent it is beneficial to the United States so that he had to resolve that to dilemma. He was confronted with this problem. What were the Soviet war aims in the Far East Soviet war and Far East was not ideological but basically geopolitical you know that too. You know it pained us security. The Soviets needed that that territory and I think that he

had that secret protocol agreement that it was very crucial that Roosevelt and Stalin conclude they yelled at the moment that is granted certain consolation to Stalin that is a way important to you and certain portions of the house from Japan the territory of Japan and so I start starving and it is very crucial to have pain. Those those territories. I think this is this became really important safety for status. When that when as you say this was something the promise that was made to Stalin Truman as a way of gaining Soviet rule. Them apart me yes yes yes yes indeed. A promise made to Stalin by Roosevelt by Franklin Roosevelt in as a way of getting Soviet. So that cooperation and the hope that that eventually the Soviets would

become involved in the Pacific Pacific war and that it did. How did Truman think about the promises made at Yalta. And did he have some idea that somehow there would be some way around that or did he feel that he that the promises that had been made to the Soviet Union about about the territory that they could have would have to be kept. Well I think that that has to him of course and to him and of course is to follow the leader and you know. It was a part of it although that he I don't think that he was he was really happy with it the way they read the provisions. But still I think that he had here that to that provision is OK that we conclude it. And this is the base is always a step that he had to construct that

post-war world and therefore that to that extent I think he was committed to the observance Sylvio that perhaps I should introduce again very quickly our guest with this hour of focus 580 We're speaking with so Yoshi Hoshyar He's professor of history and also director of the Center for Cold War Studies at the University of California Santa Barbara and he has authored a book that looks at the closing days of World War 2 and at the question What was it that persuaded ultimately persuaded the government of Japan to surrender. And as I said the beginning of the program that probably a lot of people would say Well that was the dropping of the atomic bomb by the United States. He makes the argument that is our guest makes the argument that the decision by the Soviet Union to enter the Pacific war was a greater influencing factor on the Japanese than the dropping of the atomic bombs and that that really was decisive and he makes the argument that this is something that other historians particularly American Japanese historians have have downplayed that is they haven't

given it to the weight and significance that it has. And he lays all of this out in a recent book titled racing the enemy Stalin Truman and the surrender of Japan. This book is published by the Belknap press the Harvard University Press is available in the bookstore and certainly if you want to read it you can go out and look for the book. Also here on the program questions are welcome 3 3 3 9 4 5 5. Toll free 800 to 2 2 9 4 5 5. As I mentioned you explained. And as laying out the way that you think about the major themes here that there basically are three there are three. One we've just talked a little bit about and that is the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union particularly between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Another one of these important story lines has to do with the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union. That's right. And earlier in the war the Soviets and the Japanese

concluded a neutrality a pact of nonaggression pact that if that is essentially they agreed not to make war on each other now whether the parties that concluded that agreement. You know how long they thought that would last that's maybe open to question but at least formally they were pieces of paper that were signed by both sides are saying that each would not attack the other. Well no it's it's not known that just simply a thing you try to get that is set the books of the state in utero. So that's you know that's that was completed in April 1941. And and even if the United States that that way even if the Soviets then that's yet back to Germany at the Soviet Union of course that depends he said. Here to state the facts and so that was that was the way throughout the war now the US and you joined the pact was in effect

even if the 45 would certainly the Russia and Japan had fought before. Sure and they had competing territorial ambitions and so one would imagine that for both sides this was this was a strategic matter. It was in a sense saying they were saying to themselves Well we're we're we're engaged elsewhere at the moment. Let's just say let's just say we're not going to fight this fight now. Someday we might write a letter saying right now or let's put that aside for the moment. The Russians were busy with the Germans the Japanese were busy with the the United States and so this was a way of covering their backs and saying OK we're not going to worry about that just yet. That's to precisely I think is a marriage of convenience to the Soviets. Try to avoid that too from more on defense and wanted to avoid to flaunt the law and the new safety pact I think what's convenient for both but is as

long as it's as long as it serves its purpose. LN the beginning the Soviet needed needed new trade to fast more than Japan and Japan was although the Japan was concluded the fact that the secret of the reste preparing for all for the attack of the for the fear of it moment to come. For instance the Germans. Just about to defeat the Soviet Union Japan is going to test but the situation changed to 42 43. The situation the military situation changed drastically. I guess Japan then I think Japan needed serve it needs to be more than the Soviets. It is it is Japan. So that's the situation.

So I see this balance concern. And he had the sterling concluded he yelled at me. Right. So it was Stalin was looking for the chance to attack Japan so that he made sure to making sure that he would gain the promises that made. Well but the but the problem is the new threat they passed what the Soviet government going to do with the fact that the April that's about just sort of before Roosevelt had the Soviet government notified the Japanese government to the Soviets the Soviet government this does not intend to be news that you trace it back. But the provision the Internet the fact that even if you know you have to you have to not file one year before that fact

ceases to exist. But they still get notification that does not mean that the ME had it ceased to exist it's best if it's supposed to continue until 1946 and saw that the Starland justis fact try to slap the stylus on what loud Japanese to sleep you know us to pretend and I think it's a depressing effect until next year. And then I see clearly he was preparing for the war transporting of troops and equipment to the Far East. It seems that from the beginning there commit. To this neutrality pact West not terribly solid but as you know note Stalin may well have been thinking about this all along and actually even the man who had gone to Moscow to negotiate this and signed this

on behalf of the Japanese government it wasn't very long after that he was actually talking about you know Russia. That's why both sides are trying to be to a at that point to Mormon. It is it is. Neither side was really deeply committed to it. I think this is only to continue to adhere to it as long as the best of it that you can use a service like. But but the problem for Stalin is that OK that you have these disputation that you trade the past to continue until the airport in 1946. Right but the problem is. Well he was just about to violate you trace it back. That's Japan. How to justify the violation you tried to pass but peculiarly when

everybody knows the Soviet citizens and have been you know that and that's hegemony violating the netlist impact but you don't want that comparison and so that that's a dilemma to how to how to attack to pain in violation you trace back. So that's why I think Stalin needed the American invitation to join the war. In fact that's when. Harry Hopkins went to Moscow and serious conversation with him and it is Harry Hopkins who promised to Stalin that the the issue of joint all tomato against Japan would be discussed at the forthcoming foursome conference.

And so so that was that I was doing political style and because now that they're so they're going to be invited by the United States and Britain joined the war that were more important than significant justifications to wage war against Japan that that's all the rage that that that and that was very important therefore that Stalin came to post and conflicts with the PPA the text for trying to commit them. I think this is a very important moment to put in the past but I'm confident in this our focus 580 We're talking with the story and so Yoshi and his book is titled racing the enemy looks at the closing days of World War 2 and the role that the Soviet Union played in persuading the Japanese to surrender and end the war we have a couple of callers here people who have questions so we will bring them

into the conversation and anyone else who is listening if you'd like to talk with our guest you may certainly do that. 3 3 3 9 4 5 5 a city. Champaign-Urbana number we do also have a toll free line good anywhere that you can hear us and that is 800 to 2 2 9 4 5 5 0 go to that line first or caller in Eureka line number four. Hello good morning. May I ask you a question Sharon. A very interesting conversation. One I can remember reading a book about Truman and Potsdam and your guest was just alluding to it but it seems to me from my memory that one of Truman's top goals at Potsdam was to secure the USSR entry into the war against Japan. Could your guest elaborate on that please. OK yes I think this is it was. He said that in a barrier that the purpose is to secure

Soviet entry into the war. But at the same time that he as I said before that he was bothered by the dilemma that is that he wanted to avoid Soviet expansion of Soviet entry into the wall. And yet that the his military adviser is saying that Soviet entry I think is necessary to shorten the war. And so he couldn't resolve that and of course that he he had the first meeting with Stalin promised that. So the union would enter the war sometime in the last of the old. And this time that he wrote down that's OK that's what we believe is the promise from Stalin. The reason why we came to came to post them at the same time. I

think he was. He was looking for the solution to the dilemma. He wanted to avoid some of it by this and participation in the war but he wanted to short of the war and just the same there that he received the news that the United States succeeded and passed in the New Mexico that's only found I think here is the very important moment that the dummy bomb became a really really important factor in calculation at Potsdam Truman in a kind of nuanced way he did to Stalin that they had a super weapon is that not right. That's right that's right. Well I think that that I think the story and I think sometimes it interprets that Truman diaries that okay here it is that that is not the Tomic bombs coming along was

not coming Soviet Fastow's Poland fought them but Stalin just I mean Truman went to Boston to secure the Soviets by the space and the war but it is not I think that the in my opinion the Soviets by the space in the war was the security policy. But what if that does that damage bomb didn't work. Then I think that we would have Soviet space and it was no longer like a psychological advantage would you say that would be true. Well in the mind I mean what are the psychological. I mean it was more to put fear in the minds of the Japanese at that time and something that that that Truman really wanted to happen. That's what I meant. Right right. But now that he acquired that then the bomb and they say he had the solution though and the limo was sold by that the MC bomb and it was that that for the first time he realized that OK the United States is supposed to be the force ship and surrender before so it didn't know. And there's a very very interesting moment in Stinson

says things that I wanted to explore the possibility of revising the blessing that the unconditional surrender you caused to Truman and to Mrs. burns and burns as well. We worked out the timetable. And the timetable I think is a very important time table is that I think the whole fact this that that the Soviets by the space in the world to prevent so that the spirit would go up to bow before Soviet the Soviet state that it will force a defendant to do so and I think this is this is the way that the fear that the two women thought about this and how it might my second question has to do with I believe by history by George Kennan about Russia and he stated that in thirty eight thirty nine there were some very large battles that the Russian army had fought against the Japanese army somewhere in my MENTIRA Mongolia. That area of

Asia that were really quite. On a grand scale but never where much have been recorded or paid attention by storage would you have any comment on that or know anything about that. Well Japan Association for war twice border wall one score of Les cousins is a Korean bullet and 1938 was a decisive victory for for the Soviet Union and then 1939 It's called the Bible no more hundred that's a full fledged war that lasted for three months. Oh I think and then again from from May to August and this is again a decisive victory for the Soviet Union and the Japanese military at the end under estimated the Soviet capability because I think they had this information the Soviets you know Soviet high command Soviet hopes the school was severely

purchased and therefore weakened but they turned out the Soviet Red Army is very strong and that really had a sobering effect on the media and then. And therefore I think that's a very important fact. For Japan to keep you throw even after the soul of the German invasion Soviet Union this debate within within the Japanese government whether or not they should really abandon the new 10:20 to join Germany. You know war against Soviet Union only to pressure the state to the previous plan to go south which really meant that war with the United States. But but the military was was in favor of sticking to the to the original plan and

they decided not to attack Soviet Union in in the summer of 1940 41 and this is part of the reason is that the Japanese do respect proper respect for the Soviet capability. Thank you. Thanks for the call. Well their questions are certainly welcome. 3 3 3 9 4 5 5 toll free 800 to 2 2 9 4 5 5. Our guests are Yoshi Osco is Professor of History at the University of California Santa Barbara where he is also director of the Center for Cold War Studies. And again if you'd read want to read more about this period in history. His book is titled racing the enemy Stalin Truman and the surrender of Japan. It's out now fairly recently published by the Belknap press of Harvard University Press. Just again to I don't know. We're going over this ground too closely but I just I think it's interesting when you consider that just how much changed in a relatively short period of

time between Yalta and Potsdam. Now certainly we had a change of administration so we had we had a change of the American president and also perhaps the looming presence of the atomic bomb. And yet it seems that that things certainly changed fundamentally here in a period of months from Yalta was in February and Potsdam was in the summer in July I think yes. That seems. That have a very very significant sorts of changes in the dynamics here. That's a really very short period of time. Oh yes yes I think things are moving very quickly. Two I think post some confidence that the previous caller talked about I think he's really a great turning point and I think that there I think that that's due to race by my table race based basing any race

between the Soviet style and to them and really began well some conflicts. As I said standing face a dilemma is that the we should well hold we should allow the Sunnis participate. But on one hand we want just that. Truman wanted to avoid the war and the war before so it kind of faded. And yet you know it hasten the end of the war that we needed to have it by the station and he had it. The economic bump played a very important role and it is you know it to move convinced that the United States was chair stand that will be forceful and that it will be just a very important one. Well let's just have some callers here and I promised these folks we'll get to them but let's just again sort of underline that point. I think perhaps probably if we went out and we asked

people the question why do you think that Harry Truman decided to drop the atomic bombs. The answer would come back well because he thought that that would end the war they would force the Japanese to surrender and that certainly had to be our primary aim. One of the things that were up there was uppermost in Truman's mind however at the same time you're adding in this other element that is that while the one hand the Truman wanted the the the looming threat. Of the Soviet entry into the war as a way of putting pressure on the Japanese He was also concerned with Soviet expansion and didn't really want them to enter the act to in fact enter the war. So part of what would have been in his mind was the idea is we drop the bombs we get the Japanese to surrender quickly now before the Soviets can can become involved so that would say then and then would argue that a second and sense a secondary aim and I don't know how you rank these two things but a secondary aim would indeed be ultimately to block Soviet expansionism.

That's I think that's very true I mean that's I think my pad the title of my book Raising the enemy I think is very important because it becomes very important as Stalin and to him and racist racing they have to have that Truman was trying to force Japan the famine there before Soviet and to do that and to stab me with bits of it that the joint that will be good for Japan defense aren't you know it again because that yelped a provision provision that stated that if the concessions that he promised trophies that you were promised that Yelton contingent upon so getting and entering into Will I thought that that that was a crucial race. I think this is very important. When we ask one one further important question and that is for the the government of Japan. How they viewed these these two things one being the the real fact of the bombing and its

immense destructive power and the and the yet uncertain but but looming possibility that the Soviets would it would enter the war militarily I think your argument is that we here we would we would tend to think that the bombing bombings of the cities the dropping of the bomb should have been enough and would have been enough to persuade the Japanese to surrender you're argument is that in that it was not enough that the thing that really turned was the decisive factor was then even after the first bomb had been dropped the the Soviet threat the real Soviet threat to enter the war. Yeah that's right. Because as you know. And how would you react to it. Two on the atomic bomb and Soviet entry into the war you have to understand the psychology or the hierarchy of values that cold

seamy held at the time. Re my I think that's OK the damage to being inflicted without them a bomb on japanese japanese people lives will be enough for all the posts you make to say that that's that was enough. Resigned but that's not the way that you haven't foreseen made me because I thought there was hired by you to devalue that they have held high yet and that the sacrifice was Jeff and advice that he's the preservation of Empress. And that was lost of course by by the time that the battle of working was over with the defeat of Japan that they were convinced that Japan is not going to win the war and that they started thinking about ending the war but on what terms and the terms they use the one thing they did they held a very high stake it was the preservation of Emperor and Empress

system and therefore the Japanese government cannot accept unconditional surrender. That it was demanded by the United States and conditional surrender and who was in that state not in a show of hands. The destruction of being imperial city Empress system and so that's why they. They decided to terminate the war through the Soviet mediation. It's a sort of wishful thinking just sort of yes I mean that way that the Soviet Union of course was the only major major major nation that stayed neutral and was not fighting against Japan sort of through the Soviet mediation that they could have been attempts to terminate the war namely the police invasion emphasis. It seems it seems difficult to believe though that the government of

Japan after the first bomb had been dropped the hope was that they could still achieve achieve an end to fighting end it and with the preservation of the world household that was the thing they were concerned about and that they could and that it seems so difficult to believe that they thought that somehow the Soviets could still help. That is that they they in the interim. This interim period between the dropping of the two bombs before the Soviets declared war on Japan the Japanese were still thinking that somehow the the Soviets could could they could somehow use the Soviets in the negotiation process to have a the outcome that they the Japanese were looking for it's that seems far too trusting on the Dimmy at least it seems far too trusting on the part of the Japanese way in me to say it. Yeah that's what I think is the failure of definite definite on Japanese diplomacy you know but but the but the Japanese government thought that the Soviets

would terminate the world through Soviet mediation and why that's why the post and the coalition welcome nation was the issue. Both simple combination of said that and conditional Saturday in the first place and do not say anything about the status of them for a system they didn't love we just put them for the mission right away. Some people said to him and say yes but then they suspended judgment. They decided that the globe you know the reason we still continue in mediation and in fact the Japanese kind of man asked Soviet to mediate and to give this guy a Japanese government. We're going to send him for a special mission to Moscow and they're trying very hard to gain to obtain the answer from the Soviet government wasn't full commission will be issued and they said OK we have to still vote where some good coalition will be issue very if the first thing they know there is that

that the son was assigned to post them because still that the mosque over it is open. So that's the way that the Japanese government and its whole the Soviet mediation and then and then the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the security situation changed. No well of course that became urgent of course that they did more urgent to terminate the rule but by what means do a Soviet mediation. And so that I make bone did not really substantially change that change the thought that the Japanese government in fact that the Japanese government's policy to seek mediation m c a combination of war through Moscow's mediation the fact that they became I mean his government of the more urgent in fact that it is seeking that Soviet mediation can bear infected for me Staff told will send an urgent dispatch I mean

sent the telegram to bust. Given the bus in Moscow just try to get that appointment with Amal tough to see how the Soviet government would respond to a request that's one day after the heroes human bones and so they did quite clear that the Hiroshima bomb was not was not really decisive and Japan's defense. Yeah I missed two days later the same day that the second bomb. Him was dropped when the Soviets said officially declared war on Japan. But that timing I think it's timing is very crucial here that there you'll see a bomb was dropped in the August 6th in Japan time and the Soviet Union attacked the given a source in Manchuria and on the whole the US tonight that the general hours of August oh that's nice. And then Hiroshima and then I think a bomb was dropped and the that it had

to be live on the clock in the morning and all that night so that you know that the Soviet entry into war with sandwiched between the two atomic bombs well and saw that as I said that the Soviets had been Japanese go and pin its hope on the phobia to mediation. That's why the Soviet entry into the war was really a great shock given is because that they were hopeless so dashed that Hope was the States became impossible. This is the first thing that the Japanese government confronted the CEO post of the coalition how to time in a civil so. So that's my argument that in the US you have all my life here so my bone was not decisive I think. Soviet entry into the war was as well as more on decisive Japanese decision.

Let's see if we can take one or two calls and that the time that remain. We'll talk next with someone listening in Chicago. This is lie number four. Hello. Yes I recall reading I think in the 50s an article in Harper's Magazine and which states also stated that the Japanese had they had had been in contact with the with the Soviets asking them to to contact the Americans for discussions on how to end the war. And apparently the Russians never passed the word on through duplicity. What do you have on that and what effect what was the effect of that. Such should have given the Japanese some indication of the role that the Russians were playing. Well the Americans had intercepted the

Japanese diplomatic corps school and then did and he caught it. And so this you know what the Japanese are trying to do I think was what was known to be who the hell are going to need us as close to the magic of MAGIC intercepts as saw that the Japanese government approached the Soviet government. For the request for mediation. And there it was. It was intercepted by the United States in. And Truman you fool fool Well that's what the Japanese come to trying to do with the fact that the Japanese government sent the dispatch to the Emperor who is interested in terminating the war and for that reason that we have pending the special envoy to the mosque all in could you please receive the damn ball. The only problem for

terminations the war was the and who was the it was the Allied unconditional signed demand and the Japanese government could not accept on condition would not be able to accept unconditional Sundays to demand that conditional sign then that we have no choice but to fight to the day. So that was no loss that was the message and this message to stand by the US by the United States and therefore the Truman knew that if that the United States demanded that conditional sentence the Japanese would would reject it. And there but went pull some proclamation was issued this unconditional sign that was included the fact that there Stimson strongly suggested that we should we should really have a law we still include the past so the fact that we should allow that that is a variation of some kind of Monash health system under the kind of vanity

and their Truman eliminated the passage. And so the question becomes why did Truman insist on that condition aside and fully aware that the defense would reject in my in my conclusion of this road nobody has nobody has said that before and this is pro the radical. They read going to pick patients that is both post and proclamation was issued. In my opinion to be rejected by the Japanese so that it would justify the use of atomic bombs. Yes. That's a very very interesting radical interpretation of course and I ask another question. Yeah. If you can be quick because I got some others you know it seems that the United States was following a policy of accepting the guidance of our military

leaders ahead of everything else and basically the military leaders were operating on a short term basis such as that. The US needs a yeah yeah ok so is that in Europe. Marshall recommended that they use the Russian to recommend that the Russians be allowed to proceed further into Europe then it seems proper I suppose. And this would be a case also as far as. In the current sorry the same sort of right but then the US military is concerned I think that the past is to force Japan to surrender. I think they would you know they would be planning to have this operation Olympics that their jets and defense homeland the invasion

of close to it that they would have. Dave there would have been very very very happy if the defense ended before that and for two for that reason a Marshall always mice in my shell or who was in favor of Soviet but its base in the world to simply because it was to speed up the process of justice. Well I want to try to get least one more caller and we will go on to someone in Crete Illinois here lie number one. Hello. This opens a lot of questions are you saying in the sense that if we didn't have those bombs dropped to Japan would surrender just proves to be uniquely at war in August 1945 when you seen the dropping of the bomb as a demonstration weapon in Tokyo. Many wouldn't have convinced some of the Japanese surrender was in the tealeaves and how many bombs was necessary to drop before the Japanese with the idea that they should surrender but that's a very interesting question.

It's a kind of fashion I'll have had the two bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki been enough for Japan to sign that to my question. My program would not I think and would have probably still trying to seek some mediation from the Soviet Union and therefore the Soviets by that space and it would have been very important. Well without some of it by the space and how many bombs was necessary for Japan to send. Well I don't know I don't know. Would the United States prepared to drop the third bomb Thunderball is supposed to be ready by the middle. And the United States was supposed to have nine bombs by November the first would be would it with Truman be prepared to go up although I don't know.

The trouble of those funds. I don't know it is a bit of a disk up to say and yet they would have not surrendered just because of the Soviet declaration of war if we didn't have bombs and the Soviets declared war on Japan. You say he would have surrendered anyway but I would doubt it without the bomb. You know I think that is that that was a distinct possibility. To the extent that the Japan we had pinned its hope on the Soviet Union and saw that. Yeah I think that that's a distinct possibility. Thank you very much for and thank you well of that I think we're going to have to stop with more to be discussed. Certainly we haven't really talked very much about what was going on in the minds of the people who were involved in the Japanese government but you can certainly read more about this. So this entire story by looking for the book that we have mentioned it's again titled racing the enemy. Stalin Truman and the surrender of Japan published by Belknap press of Harvard University Press by our guest so Yoshi

Hasegawa He's professor of history director of the Center for Cold War Studies at University of California Santa Barbara Professor thank you very much. Thank you very much.