Focus 580; American Heritage History of the Battle of Gettysburg

This morning in this part of focus 580 we will be talking about a probably the most significant battle of the Civil War the most costly in terms of casualties of any battle in that war and of course that war was the most costly in terms of casualties that the United States has ever taken part in. We'll be talking this morning with an historian who's provided a text to a new book that should certainly interest people who are interested in the civil war or in military history or perhaps in American history. The book is The American Heritage History of the Battle of Gettysburg that's just recently been published it's published by Harper Collins in addition to having the text by our guest Craig Simons who is a professor of history at the U.S. Naval Academy. The book has many many illustrations. It has maps. It has reproductions of paintings and drawings. It has photographs of what the battlefield looks like today and it has many photographs. From the time portraits of people who fought

there photographs of the battlefield shortly afterwards. And it's quite an interesting book so again the Civil War. Enthusiastic or if you're just interested in American history you might want to take a look at the book it is definitely out in bookstores now and as we talk this morning with Greg Simons and if you have questions you're invited to call here in Champaign-Urbana 3 3 3 9 4 5 5. We also have a toll free line that's good anywhere that you can hear us and that is 800 to 2 2 9 4 5 5 3 3 3 W while the toll free 800 to 2 to 7 while Professor Simon Celeste. Hi good morning thanks for talking with us. No problem my pleasure appreciate it. Just in we can talk. Maybe in some detail about about the battle not as much as there is in the book obviously but we can sketch out some of the particulars. But maybe just to ask a very basic question to start. What about the significance of the battle to the war to the to the Civil War.

I would guess that in fact there might be some people who would who would believe that in fact it was the last battle of the war which it was not but it seemed to be the battle that that was indeed the beginning of the end of the war or at least the end of the beginning I think the sentiment now is that somehow the Civil War changed turned. Sometimes you see references to Gettysburg as the turning point in the war and I think that becomes evident mostly in hindsight. As Americans and particularly Southerners look back on the Civil War it seemed perhaps in hindsight that that was the moment when Confederate fortunes began to decline. I think it was less evident at the time I think Southerners continued to hope and not completely unrealistically that they still had a chance at least to win this war and secure their independence. I think that chance was finally lost with the re-election of Abraham Lincoln in the fall of 1864. So the war had two more full years to run after Gettysburg and in fact in those two years more Americans died after Gettysburg than before Gettysburg. And yet somehow our impression

of the war is that on those first three days of July in 1863 the ward the war reached a turning point and I think as an historian looking back on that it's easy now to say so and in particular when you combine that with what was happening a thousand miles to the west on the banks of the Mississippi River at Vicksburg where on the 4th of July the day after Pickett's Charge John Pemberton surrendered the city and his army to Ulysses S. Grant so those twin blows of the last the defeat of Gettysburg and the loss of Vicksburg combined to depress Confederate fortunes. But it's only in hindsight that it becomes clear that that was in fact a decisive turning point in the war. This battle with the by decision. Bye bye Robert E. Lee. Yeah move north. And apparently the hope was if there could be if he could achieve a decisive victory in the north it would it would do a number of things including perhaps turn opinion in the north against the war toward negotiations that it might indeed persuade people in the north that in rather than a

military victory over the South a deal would have to be made. Yeah I think that was a critical part of his decision there are couple of reasons why Lee wanted to invade the north. He had tried this earlier in the fall of 1862 after his victory at second ACIS he took his army across the Potomac River into Maryland and fought in the end the battle of Antietam and September of 1862 for a variety of reasons that had not worked out in the way that he had hoped. But in the spring of 1863 his army was stronger larger better equipped its morale was very high it seemed to him this was the time to strike. And I think what he had in mind were two things one he wanted to take the war out of Virginia. He cited in the first place with the Confederacy because of his commitment to the state of Virginia he loved Virginia and it pained him I think almost physically to see the war being fought on Virginia soil. Armies even when they're being careful to spoil the ground on which they fight. So he would like to have seen a campaign season where the armies could move north across the Mason-Dixon line into Pennsylvania and let the Northern citizens

feel the cost of this war feel the pain of the war that that would play some role in convincing them that perhaps the south ought to be allowed to depart in peace. But as you suggest in addition to that I think he was looking for a victory a decisive victory. He had won victories before but none of them all of them being fought in Virginia so far except as we mentioned for Antietam which did not work out for him all. None of them came close to being the decisive kind of victory that would turn public opinion around and if he could sustain his army in enemy territory for a campaign season and win a decisive victory north of the Mason-Dixon line perhaps this would convince northerners that the cost they would have to pay to keep the Confederacy in the union was more than they were willing to pay and that they might consider opening negotiations. That was his great hope and he was coming off a victory at Chancellorsville. Yeah at Chancellorsville almost exactly two months before in the first few days of May he had one spectacular and I have to say improbable victory

at that time he had detached a third of his army under James Longstreet off to an expedition to Suffolk and Virginia and therefore only had to between 55 and 60 thousand men and was attacked by a union army that numbered close to one hundred thirty thousand men so he faced odds of of two to one. And yet during the Vicksburg can excuse me during the Gettysburg campaign his odds would be a lot better so he seemed to have reason for confidence is there. Was there some particular reason that the battle took place where it did that is at. Gettysburg something about it or was it in the sense of in some sense a matter of chance and that's where it happened. Well mostly chance. Neither army commander still looked at the map and said Ah Gettysburg that's the place I want to take Gettysburg was a relatively sleepy little town a population of twenty four hundred it was the county seat of Adams County still is in fact the county seat of Adams County in Pennsylvania and had no particular strategic significance except one and that was that if you look at a road map not so much now but

certainly then of south central Pennsylvania the road network kind of gravitates toward Gettysburg. The roads that radiate out from the town square Gettysburg head for a north south east and west there are actually ten of them altogether almost like the spokes of the wheel radiate outward from Gettysburg so that a general who said I need to bring the disparate elements of my forces together in a convenient location looking at a map would see naturally that Gettysburg would be the magnet that would draw them there and in fact it turned out to draw both armies there. Our guest in this part of focus 580 Craig Simons He's professor of history at the United States Naval Academy and he is the author of Half a dozen books on the civil war and he's provided the text for the new American Heritage History of the Battle of Gettysburg. It's published by HarperCollins It's out now and has a wealth of photographs and illustrations and reproductions of paintings and drawings from the time. You're interested in the civil war. You might want to look at it and your questions are welcome I have one

person here holding and ready to go others are invited 3 3 3 9 4 5 5 we also have toll free line that's good anywhere that you can hear us 800 to 2 2 9 4 5 5 and the caller is in Chicago and line number four right here. Hello. Good morning gentlemen. Yes good morning. I was wondering is it true if the Battle of Gettysburg might not have taken place if Jeb Stuart had been where he was supposed to be instead of out on a raid. He is supposed to be the iris of little economy and he was not there and so we sort of blundered into this battle and now wants to it did show up on the stand that generally gave him a rather stern talking to a natural right. Yes it's mostly true I'm not sure whether the battle wouldn't have been fought but it's might certainly have come out fought differently or in a different sequence. It is true the cavalry in the 19th century was the intelligence gathering arm of the army the cavalry. Principal job was not to draw saber and conduct these dramatic mounted charges at one another they did some of that certainly but their primary function was to gather information about where the enemy army was

where it was going how numerous it was and to screen the enemy's cavalry from obtaining precisely that same kind of information about your own Army's movement so they operated on the fringes in the parameters of the armies to both gather intelligence and prevent the enemy from doing the same. Well you know I will write a book called warriors of Jeb Stuart a black farmer that he has always defended Stewart's actions. The source of the Alleghenies fagots concern but there is there is there are people of that claim. Well I think by and large he deserves a defense I think what happened after the battle was over and the Confederacy began to recognize it for the dramatic turning point it it became. Subsequently they tried to find an explanation for their disappointment and they found three possible culprits one was Jeb Stuart I'll talk more about that in just a minute here another was Richard starter youl who had replaced Stonewall Jackson in command of the Second Corps who hesitated at the end of the first day where many critics claim Stonewall Jackson would not have hesitated.

We have the army on the run to me he didn't he'd have a Indian army on there on that after that first day and the third culprit often identified as James Longstreet who critics claim behaved more conservatively more slowly than he ought to have done given the circumstances. But as for Jeb Stuart let me talk about him first Jeb Stuart I think did actually a remarkable job as a cavalry commander during the Confederate Army's maneuver northward through the Shenandoah and then the Cumberland valleys. He Stef equably screened his confederate army from the prying eyes of the enemy. And if it's true that to a certain extent Lee blundered into the battle of Gettysburg it is also true that so did the Union Army. What makes this battle so interesting is these two armies are gravitating toward each other almost like two men in a darkened room with their hands outstretched and finally they make contact at their fingertips not really sure what's behind that. And almost as if they were wearing blindfolds begin slugging at one another. This was not a battle planned by either side it was a battle that each side had to react to as it unfolded in front of them and the cavalry on both sides I suppose share some responsibility for that.

One obvious thing about Pickett's Charge right. There's always been a controversy about Pickett's Charge. Yeah. How was that a wise decision are in retrospect all of that rather well. Well the great thing about being an historian is that in retrospect we know all sorts of things are less clear at the time. Clearly in retrospect the attack that has gone down in history as Pickett's Charge you know Pickett was one of only three divisions that took place in this attack but he had the Virginia lobby behind him and therefore got better press that probably shouldn't be called the picket Pettigrew Trumbull charger Longstreet's charge but. But we'll stick with Pickett's Charge for now and clearly because it failed it's obvious that it was not a good idea. Well you know let's truck let me finish here if you're on the Senate. A case for Lee's decision to send that attack you can put together a pretty good case that it had a reasonable chance. As it turned out we know that it didn't. But the decision was not quite so desperate. Perhaps some people consider it considered it afterward. Well you know that Sergeant always got a lot of publicity but it's not a fact that if you want to know well a lot of

I'd say 18 months later at that Franklin That charge was actually more traumatic was a natural that literally I am also the biographer of Patrick Claiborne. And my biography of him stonewall the West deals quite a bit with the charge of Franklin. This is a charge by almost exactly twice as many men over a field almost exactly twice as long against troops that were not only well positioned but entrenched so far more desperate a decision on the part of John Bell hood of a tragedy about that was they had a chance to destroy that northern army in Tennessee. And good Lou and I think that's probably an accurate assessment. They had a chance to destroy that army after and Chickamauga and well of course Brad was in charge then but I'm saying that later on I would have a chance to destroy that army people sometimes. Yeah I think that's probably I mean we could have a whole discussion about that one too. But OK I'm not going to write I know you have a lot of calls. Thank you very much. Welcome to the call and of course other questions are certainly welcome 3 3 3 W while toll free 800 2 2 2.

W-why Hello again our guest is Craig Simons He's professor of history at the U.S. Naval Academy and has written several books about the Civil War and has provided the text for this book I mentioned here the new American Heritage History of the Battle of Gettysburg. Looking at this book I think in my mind reinforces something that. One has to appreciate about the way the conditions under which war at this time were fought. One being that it was extremely difficult maybe next to impossible for the commanders to have a complete picture of the battlefield and what was going on. That would be one thing and the other thing would would be the the the level of autonomy that battlefield commanders had and the fact that sometimes either if one was hesitant about doing what you were ordered to do or if one actually took the initiative and did something other than you were ordered that could be the turning point one way or the other. Certainly true I mean we mentioned intelligence gathering off obviously battlefield communications were very different in the 1900 then they are today. Often what would happen is a commanding general would turn to a

staff aide and say Please present my compliments to General Ewell and ask him if he believes he has a good chance to take that hill that he should do so if practicable and that they would salute smartly gallop off across the field spend perhaps 10 minutes getting to the place finding the person repeating the orders and of course you never played that game where you sit around a campfire and whisper something in one another's ear until it makes all the way around the circle how dramatically. Messages can change in the transmission. The other way was to jot down eye orders on a piece of paper and hand them to a courier who would gallop off and these these create imperfect battlefield conditions for decision makers and it also creates circumstances where as you mentioned junior officers subordinate officers without orders or with orders that are unclear often had to make decisions on their own. The consequences of which could change the outcome of the battle one of the fascinating things about the civil war in general and about Gettysburg in particular is that there are numerous cases where relatively junior officers down to the level of regimental commanders who were no more than

young men in their middle 20s had to make decisions about how to behave under certain circumstances without the benefit of oversized oversight from the high command. And so in the end it's a wide variety of individuals who have tried to talk about in this book other than just the Army commanders who made decisions that determine the outcome of the Battle of Gettysburg. I wonder if there are ways in which. Well I guess what I'm thinking about the fact that say let's say between the end of the Civil War and World War One. Warfare changed tremendously. You know World War 1 was it was something that people who had fought in previous wars it was something entirely different. But I guess I also wonder in in what say what sense say the Civil War differs from you know how Say for example if I don't know if this is a fair comparison to say compare Gettysburg to Waterloo that's not a very long period of time is only about 50 years I don't but it's a wonderful comparison.

You've raised a very interesting point and that is that this one of the things that makes civil war fascinating is that it sits exactly on an historical pivot point that marked a dramatic transition in the nature of warfare a lot of people overlook the fact that only five years before the Civil War began a Frenchman had invented something called a Minie ball which allowed into soldiers in the ranks to fire a bullet out of a rifled musket. Now prior to this I'd always use smooth bore muskets which are accurate up to about 80 yards perhaps 100 yards if you were really good shot and had no wind. But with a mini ball fired from a rifle musket you could now fire a thousand yards so 10 times the distance. What that meant was that the casualties are going to be hobble and the Civil War marks the transition between the polling on a core affair of the first. Big War to use mass armies armies numbering in six figures and larger. And the end of the industrial revolution. Remember the civil war is the first war not only with the rifle musket in the mini ball but it's the first war with armored warships

railroads telegraphs even aerial balloons it's the first war in which a submarine sank an enemy warship. The Civil War sits right on that pivot point of the transition from the pulling out of warfare to World War One. And in fact if you look at the Civil War in 1861 it looks like Napoleonic warfare. If you look at the Civil War in 1865 it looks like World War 1 and Gettysburg sits right in the middle of that pivot point. The troops were an entrenched facing each other across an open field using all the modern weapons of warfare and slaughtering each other in unprecedented numbers and I think because the Civil War occupied that historical transition moment that it was not only the greatest national trauma in our nation's history but also a turning point in the history of warfare generally. The casualties at Gettysburg something like 50000. The number that most historians have settled on the records are imperfect in those days but the casualty figures you will hear ranged between fifty three thousand and fifty eight thousand. The reason we can't be certain as I mention is because of the record keeping but I also want to mention that this does not

mean killed. Fifty say fifty five thousand will choose a middle number there includes the total number killed mortally wounded wounded captured and missing. And of course there is a large number missing which may be missing presumed dead or missing presumed runaway or some combination of the two. But yes it's the single bloodiest military engagement in our national history including an eclipsing things like Evo Jima Okinawa D-Day battle of the bulge in terms of a three day period if you measure the battle the bulge over its entire six weeks era you might get a different number. Let's talk with some other people here Terre Haute. Next line for Hello. Well I've been a little bit late so you may already have answered this question If so I apologize. Would you give us an analysis of what you thought of that. Now I'm getting panicked. You know I'd be happy to. The film Gettysburg is based on a on a wonderful novel by a man named Michael Shara the late Michael Shara. H A R A with a curious title of The Killer

Angels. In fact when Ted Turner first bought the rights to the book and planned to make a film out of it he had planned to call it The Killer Angels but he did. He ran the name against a test audience and they assumed it would be a biker movie. So he changed the name to Gettysburg. But what makes The Killer Angels such a wonderful book is that all of the events that take place are historically accurate. What makes it a work of fiction. And it won the Pulitzer Prize for fiction in the 1700s. What makes it a work of fiction is that Shara speculates about what the individuals on the battlefield may have been thinking. And of course although his speculations are reasonable we can't know as historians whether they're accurate or not so it ends up being a work of fiction. Ted Turner and Ron Maxwell the director did a wonderful job of bringing that to the film and the film itself is is quite faithful to the development of the book and I think while I think the book is better I think the film is very good they took great care to make sure that they had the little things right and I think it's an excellent portrayal and it focuses on particular individuals. It makes some

interpretations that I personally don't agree with. They're perfectly reasonable interpretations it makes Robert E. Lee a man who already sees death in his future I'm not sure that was true. It makes James Longstreet a bit more precious about the future than I think he was in reality. And of course it focuses a great deal on Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain the commander of the twentieth main regiment which is one of those examples that I mentioned earlier of a relatively junior officers having to make responsible decisions in moments of crisis with the broadest consequences I think it's nice that you focused on Chamberlain. I tell my students obviously this demonstrates that college professors are wonderful military leaders could have chosen any one of at least a dozen other regimental commanders who occupy positions equally important and had to make decisions with equal consequences but the short answer to questions is I think it's a wonderful film. It's one of things that you note in the book there's a little section where you write about Long Street. And that he divided his army into three these three

corps and had these three top commanders were generals Longstreet will and Hill. And also you talked about the fact that after the battle when people in the south started asking this question well whose fault was it that we lost a number of different people and that up being targets of blame Longstreet one another I suppose there are some people who even wanted to to blame would go as far as blaming Robert E. Lee. Well that's you know his his image was so so highly polished that that doing that was you know likely to get you into trouble all the Longstreet himself apparently in his talking about the battle afterward said that he thought basically that it was really that the loss was Lee's responsibility. That was mostly his undoing of course in the years after the Civil War when the South was looking at swoons and trying to explain to itself what had gone wrong they constructed a sort of an alternate past. Call the lost cause. And in the lost cause all my all the women were beautiful all the men were handsome and brave. It's sort of the kind of image you get out of Gone With The Wind and it

dominated American story for a long time and in this vision of the past Robert E. Lee was the noble warrior. No one would be critical of Robert E. Lee and yet Longstreet was and by doing so in his own memoirs by writing in his memoirs that Lee was trying to remember the exact phrase that he used that he kept pushing his men at the enemy until enough blood was shed to satisfy his blood Luster's words to that effect. A shocking words to the south and convince them that Longstreet was an apostate and that he was. In fact he ended up being nearly as hated in the post-Civil War South as William T Sherman for example among his other sins of course was the long straight sided with the Republican Party during Reconstruction he became in the parlance of the day a scallywag. So that pretty much undercut Longstreet's reputation and his view is storable view was quite low until it was largely resuscitated by Michael Shara and The Killer Angels and by Ted Turner in the movie Gettysburg where he becomes a person carrying a very difficult psychological burden.

He's ordered to execute an attack he does not believe in and this puts him in a very difficult psychological position and it creates great dramatic circumstances for both the book and the movie. But yes Longstreet was one of the three of the individuals the Southerners tried to blame rather than Robert E. Lee for an explanation as to why the South lost the battle of Gettysburg one we've already talked about and that Stuart whether he did or did not provide Lee with the kind of intelligence about the enemy's movements and strength that Lee needed to make decisions another was Longstreet who perhaps was slower than he ought to have been in the third one was Richard's daughter you will who has attended perhaps just the wrong moment. Well can you can you defend I think earlier you said that you could be misremembering this but can you defend Lee's decision ultimately to hurl his troops against the Northern troops that were. Heavily dug in and they were just they were just slaughtered they just went

into it just a hail of lead and that was that. Well Pickett's Charge has gone down in history as kind of the quintessential example of throwing your forces at troops in a good defensive position as one of the earlier callers pointed out it's not the only example of this in the Civil War by a long shot but it's the one that we've kind of accepted as a mythic touchstone for this sort of tactics and clearly in hindsight it's obvious that this was a desperate and wrongheaded decision by Robert E. Lee but I'll try to construct an argument for it before it's taken place and that is that Lee had won the battle the first day when the army's first got came together collided head on north and west of Gettysburg on the 1st of July. The Confederates won that attack they had the momentum they had numbers they had position. They threw the Federals not only out of their defensive positions drove them all the way through town and back on the cemetery hill. The next day when Lee ordered Longstreet to attack the Union left flank Longstreet delayed before executing that attack but when it took place it too was successful that drove the

the Federals out of devil's den in the wheat field in the peach orchard inflicted terrible casualties more casualties on the Federals than the Confederates received themselves nearly broke through and Lee could see that night as he thought about it I merely won the battle the first day I nearly won the battle the second day. If only I could coordinate these attacks in an a place directly under my own vision. There directly across the field a shade of that little clump of trees where only 5000 Federals you mention that they were dug in. But recall that this is an open field meaning there are no entrenchments on this battlefield except on cult Hill. But there in the center those troops are simply standing on a gentle fold of Pennsylvania countryside. They were not entrenched there were no nothing to protect. Check them accept a low stone wall about 18 inches high which if you were going to worry about being shot in the ankle I guess would be useful but otherwise not. And he had numbers Leica put 15000 man against 5000 advantage of three to one he could cover their advance with the massed artillery barrage and the smoke from that artillery barrage as well as the shells that

would keep the enemy pinned down would cover the troops as they crossed the field this is the way he envisioned it and if they broke through with that weak spot in the federal line the two flanks of the Federal army could not stand alone the army would have to give up its position and fall back and be cut up as it moved. This might yet give him the victory that he sought. Now we know that that vision was false that it did not happen that in fact the Confederate artillery barrage did not silence the federal guns which opened up as soon as the infantry came into the open field and what emerged was very nearly a slaughter. But I think you could see before hand how the vision did not seem quite so desperate as it does now in hindsight. There is a great quotation by the way from Faulkner out of I believe it's intruder in the dust where he says for every Southern boy at some moment in his life. It's not yet three o'clock in the afternoon on that early July day and the flags ham hang limply at the staffs and it hasn't happened yet

and it could all be called back. But it's going to happen we know it's going to happen so that our ability to look back and know the results know the outcome of that leads us to suggest how desperate this attack was but before hand it's not completely unreasonable. Did I convince you I have to think about it somewhat. Let's talk with some other callers who will go to Paxton is next in line number one. Hello hello good morning. I have two questions for you. Number one is activities for all the reading I've done Gordon me get short shrift. Thought I'd like you to speak to his important thrown an important OK in that battle. And the second question is I'm trans an economist and I always use Vicksburg as fundamentally more important and getting more even though Berg has the psychological swing because Vicksburg really

affects the logistics of the war more. Right. Could you let me take those in turns. George Gordon Mead first mead is a largely overlooked Civil War figure he doesn't somehow fit into the pantheon of our top drawer heroes he's not grant or Sherman or Lee or Jackson. And yet meit happens by chance mostly to find himself at the epicenter of the war here at Gettysburg. It came about in a curious sort of way the Army was still under the command of Joseph Hooker. My campaign began when Lee's army started north Hooker was still in command of the Army of the Potomac and was relieved from that position after quarreling with Lincoln over a relatively minor issue. Only three days before the battle began. So Meade finds himself in command of this army fighting the battle of its life. Only three days after assuming command and his command position as a major general is virtually the same as that of his corps commanders and his division commanders all of whom are major generals and having been in command for so short a period and an army that already

experienced a kind of rotating door of command responsibility led him to have almost to require him to solicit the views of his subordinates before making decisions. And at Gettysburg the decisions he had to make were relatively minor shall we stay or shall we run. He decided in each case to stay and fight it out. They turned out to be the right answers. Lincoln after the battle was a little disappointed that Meade did not pursue as effectively as he might have. Lee's defeated army as it retreated south of Lincoln was hoping that having suffered such a terrible reverse that this might be an opportunity to crush his army now perhaps to shorten the war by as much as a year. But. Even if it shorten the world by only a month. Lincoln felt it was worth taking risks. And yet me did not take those risks. Lee was allowed allowed managed to escape back across the Potomac River into Virginia. Now Meade remained in command of the Army of the Potomac. But Grant was brought to the eastern theater after his success at Vicksburg to become overall commander and traveled

with Meads army. So for the rest of that war most people referred to that army as Grant's army even though Meade technically remained in command. So Meade is you're right often the overlooked soldier of the Civil War. He made few mistakes but on the other hand neither did he achieve any dramatic successes. Now as to your second question about Vicksburg I think you're absolutely right. If you look at it in strategic terms if you're studying these campaigns in a war college you would say the capture of Vicksburg in the opening of the Mississippi River which has tremendous economic and logistical implications is clearly a more important strategic success for the North than defeating Lee's army at Gettysburg. And yet having taken place in Gettysburg where the the Northern press in the eastern theater paid more attention to what was happening to the two main armies in the eastern theater and because it did mark subsequently the sort of high point of Confederate hopes Gettysburg had a greater psychological impact on the voting electorate and on international public opinion.

Then did the campaign at Gettysburg so that I think yes Vicksburg is the greater strategic victory but Gettysburg is the more important psychological victory for the North. And in terms of its implications for foreign recognition and so forth was excruciating really important to the Lincoln administration. One more certainly with General Meade. Obviously behave conservatively. But he was the first commander to win a battle over. Now what is the not overread to keep the Potomac army together and then offer to deal with Grant. Yeah I think the second of those I mean it's hard to say after the fact that he ought to have done this or ought to have done that. A lot of enthusiasts about the civil war like to engage in counterfactual hypothesizing and begin the sentence well if this then what and we can never know the answer to those but I think you're absolutely right in his ability to cooperate with Grant Grant

came East fully intending to replace a need in command of the army the Potomac he was going to put one of his favorite subordinates that he got along with in command of that army and he went out to meet meet and talk to him and over several days to Grant's credit came to decide to meet as exactly the man he wanted he was conscientious. He was responsible he would take orders. He knew what he was about he was a professional and he remained exactly that through the war. And though he and Grant occasionally quarrelled not very often mead made it possible to translate Grant's overall strategic vision into the movements of the army the Potomac and presided over the movements of the Army all the way to APA matic so grant certain issues we need certainly shares with Grant some of the responsibility and the credit for the final outcome of that campaign and I think you're right. Thank you. Let's go to line two This is Charleston. Oh yes I had a question concerning the Wilderness Campaign and all the Georgia Campaign as I understand from a book called The Civil War Day by day Edited by John F..

Bowman who has just as many casualties probably more killed in each of those separate campaigns. Then this occurred in Gettysburg. I wondered if you could respond to that in an OT or kind of a nod to this even though I've been to Gettysburg read several books but I hope I have my journals right in the Wilderness Campaign. Wasn't that grand resolutely and Lee was deeply entrenched and the number of the soldiers were left on the field to die and Grant would not ask for it. Could you respond to that. Yeah I will I first of all in terms of the casualties of the Wilderness Campaign as it's usually known I began on the 1st of May 1864 and lasted through pretty much the end of July lasted all spring and well into the summer. Because what historians do is they they lump together several battles the battle the wilderness the battle Spotsylvania battle of Cold Harbor the and so forth into it which is actually a series of battles that took place over a 40 day period.

From the rapid down river all the way down to the gates to Richmond any one of those battles the battle of the wilderness for example or the Battle of Spottsylvania does not come up to the casualty levels at Gettysburg but if you count them all as one continuous campaign over a five or six week period and you add all those casualties together then yes they surpass the number of casualties in the Gettysburg campaign. As for the Atlantic campaign which began at exactly the same time may 1864 through July of 1864 when Sherman worked his way southward toward Atlanta finally capturing the city in September. Even if you add all of those casualties together they still don't come up to the number of casualties suffered in the one battle three days at Gettysburg. But casualties were horrendous in the civil war there's no getting around it. More Americans were killed and I'm not talking casualties now I'm talking killed in the American Civil War then in all other American wars combined. I think we finally passed the number sometime in the last a

couple of months of the Vietnam War but that includes World War 1 and World War 2 twice as many Americans in the civil war as in World War 2 for example in spite of the horrible casualties of that conflict. So yes I'll grant you the point that the casualties were horrible throughout this war but there was never a concentration of death in a single battle such as. As it took place at Gettysburg in July of 1863 and yes the Wilderness Campaign did pick Grant although technically as we just mentioned it was Meade's army would grant an attendance grant against Lee. The story about Grant's unwillingness to give a truce was not in the wilderness battle it was the battle of Cold Harbor. Excuse me Cold Harbor and it was Lee who was unwilling to grant that truce until Grant admitted that he had lost. This was kind of a 900 century thing you know you admit that you lost that you're asking for a truce and then all granted but until you say you know yeah you won then I won't grant a truce and so and because of that because of that peculiar nineteenth century attitude soldiers probably bled to death on the battlefield.

I have a follow up question. Sure. Walt Whitman the poet and journalist at the time. And now we're talking about a journalist who died in our ongoing war in Iraq on what was the dilemma or the situation of the journalists during that period of time. Well we were still trying to work it out because the Civil War was such a transitional period in American history and in the nature of warfare generally. Some of the rules of war were not very clear for a long time journalists just came down whenever they felt like it and talk to whoever they wanted and that was that the first general to say no I'm going to put some rules on this and we're going to get it get a hold of the situation with Sherman. William P. Sherman hated the press hated reporters. He would have shot him if he could've gotten away with it and he banned them from his army and banned him from his camp. That was in 1864.

That's after Gettysburg at the time of Gettysburg there were still reporters traveling with the armies and sketch artists who traveled with the armies Alford wad several of whose drawings appear in the book that I've written was an eye witness to many of the scenes that he drew. Cameraman photographers did not show up until 15 days after the battle. Camera photography in those days was a very dicey undertaking more of an art than a science and required movement of all sorts of equipment in a wagon and of course you could only take still shots because the film had to be exposed for a certain number of seconds. So the only photographs we have of Gettysburg are that of the battlefield two weeks afterward. But we do have the sketch artists from Alford Why do we have eyewitness accounts from a number of reporters and of course the soldiers themselves wrote eyewitness accounts for their hometown papers and sent them back and some of those 19th century volunteer soldiers were surprisingly literate and wrote quite moving accounts of the battle and again some of which I've included in the book. Thank you very much.

To another caller here this is champagne line 3. Hello. Hi thank you for writing about this I think it is an important war for Americans because we do do our geographic isolation of never been in major wars. We're very fortunate for that. What I I think Gettysburg is crucial because I personally have always questioned why. I mean our nation obviously had some issues you know besides slavery. I mean there were some major major issues between the north and south but why did the war drag on. You know this question has always bothered me because the Americans shooting up Americans with you know we're a pacifist nation by history. And you know it's just an amazing thing. And. I think it comes down to Gettysburg and I'm not sure I'm right on this but how far is Gettysburg from Washington. Well Gettysburg is about a to almost exactly a two hour drive it's about 80 miles it's fairly close. So Ford was close enough to hear the sound of the gunfire but not quite so for days march in other

words probably you know if you're Stonewall Jackson it's a four day march for the regular army moving maybe 10 to 15 miles a day might be a five day and six day march or a few Rangers of course you can go a whole lot further. But it was can perceive that the time accurately I think is a genuine threat I think Washington was less the target of Lee's initial campaign than Baltimore and Philadelphia both of those cities were and went into a near-panic would record barricades in the streets called out the local militia. I mean they've they really expect they started digging trenches outside Philadelphia fully expecting Lee's army to show up at any minute. I might take issue by the way with your assumption that America is a pacifist nation. I do agree that we've been fortunate as a nation to have friendly neighbors Canada and Mexico we did fight a war with Mexico in the 1840s but it was at our initiation and we've never really been seriously threatened in our security by either of those nations and I hope that remains true and so when in our foreign wars we were able in both of the two big World Wars of course to stay out of it for at least a

while before getting in. And those are all blessings to the society. But you ask why the war went on so long. I mentioned earlier that getting. Is a turning point particularly in our ability to look back on it and understand what was to come. But I think the reason the war went on after the July of 1863 and the disappointments of Vicksburg and Gettysburg is the South still expected to when they granted their morale was not as high as it had been. And I don't think their expectation was necessarily misplaced. They were outnumbered they had less resources all that's true. But on the other hand what they had to do to achieve was convince the northern voters that it would not be worth paying the price of continuing this war and it would be better cheaper to let the South go. Well and I think they believe that was possible right up until Lincoln was re-elected after that I think they're fighting mostly for each other. And from momentum and from inertia and from an inability to perceive a realistic alternative.

Well because I think Gettysburg I mean and I don't know that this is true but there was a common impression was from friends I've had studied the war that the south were actually have better soldiers and a better army but I think of that whether that's true or not I don't know but I think it's because they did come so close. Taking out. Well I know at least you know a major battle that could have brought you know certainly a ceasefire if not an outright truce. I've always wondered where this momentum comes from I think the the union was very scared because the you know Confederate States you know are about to break the Keystone State which sounded frightening. You know and the South came away with the impression that wow we can win this war. If you're looking for a reason as to why there isn't an earlier settlement I mean a settlement based

on what terms this is remember after the announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation. And as you correctly noted there were differences between the North and South other than slavery but slavery was the one. Unsolvable problem. There is no compromise on slavery you can't be sort of a slave you can't have some slaves compromise. There's just no middle ground on that issue it's why the two sides eventually went to war and having announced the amount of patient proclamation and been being very clear that he would not back away from that position. The South said We either have to win this war or we are going to be subjected to a society where our property is emancipated. And that was a prospect they simply could not abide. The North was in the same situation having committed themselves to the notion of emancipation. There was no backing down from the statement so after January 1st 1863 when the Emancipation Proclamation went into effect a compromise settlement between the two sides if it was ever possible about which I'm kind of skeptical anyway became impossible. And I think that's another reason why the two sides fought.

Let me. Make a quick comment if I can about the Southern prowess on the battlefield. If you want to use a football analogy I guess you'd say the South beat the spread. You know they did better than the numbers suggest they ought to have been able to do in terms of white males of military age they suffered a 4 to 1 disadvantage in population and they were had an even greater disadvantage in terms of this being the first industrial war. The capability to produce the kinds of things that would maintain an industrially based war. So given those disadvantages the fact that they fought so well for so long suggests that they did extremely well on the battlefield but on the other hand it's a very difficult thing for the North to march into the south and occupy and take that land away from the South's job was an easier one. They had to defend what they already had. I think the soldiers on both sides were absolutely remarkable in their willingness to sacrifice and their willingness to stay and fight even when their enlistment expired they would renew those inlets months kind of losses

such as we saw at Gettysburg where a third of those who were there became a casualty. We talk about an army being decimated that means 10 percent at Gettysburg 33 percent were were taken away from the army killed wounded or missing and I think to call upon soldiers to make that kind of sacrifice month after month for a four year period. I give kudos to the soldiers of both sides. We're going to have to stop it. There's certainly much much more we could talk about we simply use the time. Professor Simmons we want to say to you thanks very much for my pleasure thank you. Our guest Craig Simons He's professor of history at the U.S. Naval Academy and has his home in Annapolis Maryland and if you're interested in reading this book that we have talked about it is the new American Heritage History of the Battle of Gettysburg. It's published by Harper Collins.