Focus 580; The Fall of Baghdad

As we talk with Jon Lee Anderson we invite you into the conversation your questions are welcome all you have to do is pick up the telephone and call us the number around Champaign-Urbana 3 3 3 9 4 5 5. We also have a toll free line anywhere you hear us. 800 2 2 2 9 4 5 5 any time during this hour please feel free to join us a bit more about our guest John Lee Anderson has been writing for The New Yorker since 1998 and has covered conflicts in Afghanistan and Angola. He's written profiles of Hugo Chavez Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein has examined the literary literary inference influence of Gabriel Garcia Marquez. He's the author of several books including Che Guevara a revolutionary life and guerillas and is the co-author of war zones voices from the world's killing grounds and inside the league. His work is also been published in The New York Times Magazine. The New York Times Harper's the nation life for the Guardian and Der Spiegel and many other journals and he's also been involved with television documentaries on Panama Bolivia Guatemala and Bosnia. And he joins us this morning by telephone.

Jon Lee Anderson good morning. Good morning. Thanks so much for being with us. My pleasure. I want to ask you to talk about when you first traveled to Iraq before the invasion actually quite some time ago I believe. Yes. I mean in terms of veterans of Iraq I'm I'm probably a late comer I first went there in 2000 but I went there precisely. Out of a feeling of fascination with a place that had long since lapsed into a kind of a mythology there were certain accepted wisdoms and folklore about Saddam Hussein and about his country about Iraq. Ever since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 that compelled me to go there and have a look for myself. I found that most of what we were hearing was based upon the testimony of defectors there was very little independent observation on the ground. And I wanted to go and see Iraq for myself also because I felt that ever since 1991 that there would be inevitably another war between the.

Did States in Iraq. You say you wanted to understand the phenomenon of Saddam Hussein two witnesses to hear tyranny and understand what made it work. That's right. I for some time I've been fascinated with the exercise of power and I have often written profiles of figures dictators of one sort or another Pinochet of today. Charles Taylor of Liberia and Saddam inhabited that realm as well. But so much of what I knew was so difficult to verify or substantiate I wanted to see it for myself. And so I tried to go with a clean slate as much as that's ever possible. And I spent time in Iraq and indeed found it to be one of the most controlled environments that ever worked and I concluded after my journey there where I had actually quite good access. It was a time when not many people were reporting on Iraq. And I got close to people I was able to

have access to people very close to Saddam Hussein. He himself lived this clandestine virtual life and didn't come out of hiding. But I spoke to people very close to him. I wanted to understand his psychology and out of the country in which he had almost reshaped in his own image. I came away convinced that it was probably the most terrifying dictatorship I had ever witnessed. And the reason for that was because no one spoke or even rarely even mentioned his name. The level of fear was so great that absolutely no one broke silence. And but it remained a fascinating conundrum to me for that very reason. How could it be that an entire nation could not speak. And so in a sense there began my ongoing exploration to try to to find out what was in people's hearts and minds. And I intend to fight that search as the war last year approached.

It's interesting you write that people gave you a clue. Sometimes that you know there are things that they didn't say that kind of made it obvious what they what they were you know what they were saying what they couldn't say out loud. And you know right. And for example you're driving by some of the palaces that he erected for himself and people couldn't even actually look at the palaces. And it's right. That's right. I had a minder assigned to me and I got quite close to but even he never truly broke silence. And what was the most amazing thing about Saddam's Iraq was that these huge vast immense palaces absolutely everywhere as well as his image was the only graven image in public in the country in fact you know massive statues and so on which I think a lot of Americans are now used to having seen the images of. But nonetheless when you were there it was quite extraordinary There was not a place you could be public in Baghdad without a corner of your eye somewhere there would be a portrait or a statue of Saddam looking at you. But these palaces were vast and we would be in the car chattering away and he'd be pointing out this and that to me and suddenly we come alongside the

skewed brooding massive palace with you know. Mosque like minarets it machine gun nests at the gates or Saddam on prancing stallions in bronze. And he would fall silent and sometimes I'm gone for you know hundreds of meters these places are vast and I guy eventually adopted the habit of goading him by saying what's that. He would get very irritated and would always say the same thing. It's a presidential guest house and then later I realized that you know he was simply terrified he couldn't speak. Once I was with him and we were I was looking at the pylons and the cranes of this great mosque that Saddam was hoping to build to be the greatest in the world after the Great Mosque of Mecca. And I took out a little camera I carry to take a picture and he begged me not to. He said no no no it's forbidden. He said I said and he said it's not only forbidden we can't even discuss

it. Not supposed to see it. And I said What do you mean we can. You and I can actually look at it and see it. But we have to pretend it's not there at any age. He nodded his head. Absolutely. And I could see from the tenseness on the states that he was deadly serious. Before the war you interviewed a number of people including some Iraqi exiles in Iran and others in a number of people you talk with said Iraqis would be very glad if America toppled Saddam but would quickly turn against America if there was an occupation. That's right. I found I went to Iran precisely did speak with Iraqis who could speak and there were hundreds of thousands that have been living in exile for years. People who fled Saddam's depredations most of them following the Gulf War who had been forced out in one of his his purges of ethnic Persian Iraqis. And I found amongst them it was fascinating and rather sobering because although these were arguably amongst the most.

Abused the victims of Saddam most have lost family members been tortured themselves spent years in prison. They were not jubilant about the prospect of the American invasion and the reason for that was because they knew there was a lot. There was no pronouncement about a subsequent gameplan in Iraq there was no no message coming out from the White House that this was simply a war of liberation and they would leave leaving most Iraqis to conclude that America planned to occupy the country and had hoped Syria or motives in its war so there was no sense that America was coming on a mercy mission. Bad most people said they recognized the world was inevitable. They said if you must do it quickly and leave don't make the mistake of staying in Iraq and getting bogged down in the shifting sands of Iraq. Iraqis are very nice people but they're very proud of their country they do not like to be occupied by foreign troops. They will fight you. You must

leave quickly. Don't attempt to follow through with these ambitions to remake the Middle East and the American image to create a great democracy. Do something pragmatic and go it will be bad for America to this day. And I've often and I have to say it resonated very much with my own growing perceptions and feeling of disquiet about again the lack of any. You know a future date of departure of American troops this notion that America is coming to occupy a nation about which it knew very little concern me very much and it caused me to look to the recent past. I say recently Iraq has a very long past most so many Iraqis brought up the 1920 Arab revolt against the British occupiers. To me that I began looking into that experience and I saw that only two generations ago the British who came as liberators again to dislodge the Ottoman Turks in world

run tried to stay on in the country and found themselves in the Gulf in bloodshed as both Sunni and Shia tribes rose up against the joint forces that made their lives miserable. It was a very catastrophic experience the British occupation. Iraq but it had been almost airbrushed out of history as our nations walked back into war in 2003. When you say that that in particular seem to be on the mind of every other Iraqi you spoke with awe. I doubt if one out of ten of Americans even knows about this. That's right. That's right not only that I was I I began asking after the war and the American military began spreading out in the country and as they began to meet resistance precisely the kind of attacks and resistance that so many Iraqis had for forewarned. I often sought out the officers to ask them if they had ever had any sort of briefing sessions history lessons you know

even that. Some of it some of the sort of military with a chalkboard and a battlefield of 19 20 in Iraq which I would have imagined they might have gone through as part of their prep before coming to Iraq. And I met with one colonel in particular a young guy West Point very bright. Pointed out to me as one of the best and the brightest. And I asked him he was in charge of the luge at the time which was the early flashpoint and remains the worst. And. He was talking to me about winning hearts and minds and teaching people democracy one a while and then how he regarded Saluja as a success story and all of this. This was in the summer of 2003 and finally I said to him by the way were you aware that flu too was an area right here where you are was where the Arab revolt of 1920 really took heart against the British and were you aware of that history when you came did you

have any kind of history lesson and he paused and looked rather mortified and said no there wasn't time. We did. And then he said but I've picked up a couple of books and he picked up one he had in the corner and said I'm trying to read it in my spare time I don't have a lot of spare time. In other words I'm easy. They came without any real sense of the past that was is that the Gulf War of 1991 was the only starting point for the American history in Iraq and the Americans minds. We have a caller to talk within I hate to make them wait much longer I certainly have a lot of questions myself but I will defer to callers if you would like to join us. Let me mention again that we're talking during this hour focus 580 with Jon Lee Anderson staff writer for The New Yorker about his book The Fall of Baghdad just published by the Penguin Press. And if you'd like to join our conversation you can do so by calling us around Champaign-Urbana 3 3 3 9 4 5 5. Toll free elsewhere. 800 2 2 2 1 4 5 5. We have

a champagne listener. On line number one. Good morning. You said that you were fascinated by the exercise of power so I thought I'd ask you to elaborate more on how you did talk about Saddam Hussein to some extent. And I was just wondering if you know you can top out you know freestyle bit about about this history of the exercise of power in Iraq and how that may or may not have influenced Saddam Hussein's exercise of power or did he have outside influences or historical influences influenced by the Ottomans or the Germans or Stalin. And then also what about chalybeate Alawi and the CPA and Brenna and the neo cons. So a small question of OK I'll see how I how much I can address and just. But. It's interesting. Saddam very much was a student of Joseph Stalin when he was in prison in the early 60s after being essentially a thug who rose within the party having earned

notoriety and fame by having attempted to kill the prime minister of the country and then leave. He studied and read Isaac due to his biography of Stalin several times in a row I know this from someone who knew about this then who knew Saddam in those days and was extremely influenced by him to the extent that he built an apparatus a command economy where everything stemmed and came back to the state with a an all pervasive party and an intelligence apparatus. His his hallmark of bloodletting. Very similar to Stalin's purges of his own party. First of all to cement his personal power base and then followed up with purges the various groups assassins targeted assassinations as well

as butcheries which traumatized and made passive. Certain population groups that caused him problems. A lot of of his modus operandi appears to have been. Both. Both to have stemmed from his admiration of the way Stalin effectively exercise his iron grip over the Soviet Union. And also he took inspiration from great. That figure is the Mesopotamian the pre Iraqi past never had Nasir Salaam had seen the magnificent two who drove the crusaders from Jerusalem and of course the wars in those days were both epic and barbaric. Huge numbers of civilians were generally killed in the battles of those days and really when you look at Saddam at his own epic reign and the way he fought his wards he fought them

very much like on a busy year. A dictator of yesteryear he was almost a throwback to the days of Herod or never could Nasser and he very much saw himself as part of this great Mesopotamian epic. This ongoing epic sweep of history in which the cradle of civilization. Iraq proud Iraq would receive would be would be resurgent. That would be the ruler of the Arab world would defeat the Zionist entity as he referred to Israel. Add that and add the Persians as well. I think that the Saddam's brutality and and you know it to a certain extent has as created a pathology in Iraq which which almost any new ruler must address and tell the Iraqis have have have confronted their pathology. I suppose it's

analogous to that of a an abusive child who is grown up and spent many years with an abusive parent of being a victim doesn't make for nice people necessarily. The Iraqis have never had a chance to confront their rage and frustration their sense of humiliation over their victimization by Saddam and also by the fact that he made them the handmaidens to their own oppression. They were informing on each other. Certain communities stood by passively while he massacred others. He he played on the sectarian sentiments of the. Of the various communities. And so I think that's why we see you know Allawi the new American the handpicked leader of the country and attempt to appear to be assertive and even brutal. He makes jokes about it. There was a story when I was last in Iraq this summer about him executing personally six prisoners. He denied them but did so with a chuckle.

He very much liked the fact that the story was out there and indeed around Baghdad the response by most Iraqis I questioned on it was well if he did good we need someone who's strong. There is a sense that only strength and brute strength will will stop them from the chaos which has overtaken Iraq since the arrival of the American public. Some of the callers question we have another nother caller waiting and we're already almost a half point you're in there's so much that I'd like to try to cover but anyway we'll go next to another caller in Champion county line number two. Good morning. Hi good morning. Talking about amnesia. I think one of the things that should be pointed out in this context the influences on Saddam is that the U.S. was pivotal in his rise to power. This is why Iraqis are kind of suspicious of American intentions it seems to me we were collaborating we were providing. The U.S. was providing

intelligence that aerial photographs probably around the time when the whole object happened and the receipts. Dr. Germ still apparently has the receipts for some of her biological purchases. You mentioned the New York New Yorker as a great source the host in the introduction I don't know if the guest actually heard that but I when I had take issue with that because I think there was some amnesia in the early reporting. Jeffrey Weinberg article on a lob I managed to ignore the U.S. role in the whole thing at the time and and it seems to me that this is this is this is also what the U.S. population doesn't know about and when we when people are wondering why there is such a treat and such reaction. This is the source part of the story end after even after the Gulf War when. The US didn't encourage an uprising and then didn't aid one that's when a lot of the mass graves were actually. Well you're right.

I mean just jump in because. Yeah I mean absolutely true there is that there is a story that that most Americans are probably unaware of. I don't see why they are but apparently they aren't aware of which is that you know. Yes Saddam did have weapons of mass destruction and he used them to great consequence in the 1980s both in poison gas attacks against its Kurdish population and against the Iranians in the long Iran-Iraq war and it was precisely during that time that Western companies were supplying him with the means to obtain those chemical weapons. This is not a political tirade it is. Isn't that factually substantiated. Our present defense secretary visited a set on the same twice in Baghdad during that period. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians were killed in the battlefields and whenever the Iranians made headway on the battlefield we

began providing him with a wax aerial intelligence showing the troop concentrations of the Iranian forces whereupon he launched devastating artillery and rocket attacks on them and including a poison gas attack so precisely the time that Saddam was using weapons of mass destruction. We were covertly and not so covertly allied with him in all but. But. But name in all but. There was not no there was never a public expression of support. But it was in the side guys and it was very much happening on the ground. It was and then again after the 1991 uprising which followed the Gulf War and the decision by President Bush not to unseat Saddam from power. Our troops were still on the ground in Iraq while in essence we allowed him to counterattack to carry out the vast butchery throughout the south of Iraq

where the people had risen up against him and many of the mass graves we've seen the images of being uncovered in the past year and a half are filled with the bodies of people that were murdered precisely in those weeks. So indeed that that is one of the reasons why there was not a great sense of jubilation and quite a bit of anxiety among the exiles and the refugees I spoke with in the weeks and months before the 2003 war because they had this history. They were aware of America's history in the past. And there was never there was never a public relations effort to say the least. By the United States to overcome those feelings of dread those feelings of bitterness those feelings of cynicism about American intentions. Which is one of the great problems. A curious thing that isn't common and much from the Kerry Bush debate that struck me very hard was his comment that we should clearly say we have no intentions to stay in even question the idea of these bases that are going

up 14 bases some of them already constructed and some of them still under construction. One of them dumb on the Syrian border and clearly. Well it's very important that America I mean this is one of the problems we've had and why that it's one of the things that has fueled the insurgency is this is this of mixed messages that come out of the White House about our intentions there. And I mean it's almost inconceivable that the colossal nature of the blunder is assuming that that was the plan to take over Iraq or to democratize it afterwards invade Iran and Syria. The blunders that were made tactically speaking have been just. Through ordinary because not only do they not send enough troops they didn't never protected the borders and if Iran and Syria felt threatened then they certainly do. They have either looked the other way or Absolutely who operated with the

inflow of people willing to wishing to to do battle with the Americans ever since to this date that the borders are not secured. So we are as you say building what appear to be permanent military bases in the country and Iraqis like most people are proud of their nation and feel humiliated and emasculated by the presence of foreign troops. Whether it was President Bush or a future President Kerry were able to say we intend to leave your country we have no long term designs on your country we would like to make good on the fact that we are there we would like to rebuild we would like to do this and this and by this date we will leave your country. We will there will be no foreign troops left in your country as of that date. That is very important. That's a very important message to send. But during this entire administration during the last 16 months no such statement has come out of this White House and I think it's it's one of the greatest causes for the

spill. And to continue fighting in Iraq. On the contrary that the time certain leaving was was attacked as being you know antithetical to quote unquote victory. I wanted to make an analogy to Vietnam and the one that I'd like to make is that there were some sort of after action report on Vietnam and it showed that 30 percent of the puppet government in Saigon was was actually supportive of the ouster of the US. And it just seems to me that particular with some evidence from the Canadian military writer I forget his name at this point but he was captured in Tal Afar and which is Turkoman region and it just staggers me that there's such a complexity of cultures where Turkomans who you would expect to be Sunni are actually Shia. But but he was captured very easily by some sort of insurgent group there because

the people that were in the U.S. provided military uniforms who were nominally the Free Iraqi Force actually just escorted them to them. This this couple it's clear to me that they know that they're kind of mixed loyalties. Then there's a great deal of mixed loyalty going on. I mean even the coalition partners many of the mainstream political parties within the United States has brokered a kind of tactical alliance and are not fighting or urging their people to fight the Americans wish the Americans to leave. They are very much tactical partners. And as for the wholesale recruitment of people in this is the need to have to rebuild the security presence having disbanded the former army ill advisedly and that sweeping way in May 2003.

A lot of people that want to carry out espionage. Sabotage operations within the security forces are of course volunteering as well. We've seen a number of cases where arrests have been made of senior commanders. The Iraqi defense forces because they're collaborating with the people fighting them and fighting back. So it's the Americans are operating in a serious intelligence vacuum. I mean the bombings this morning occurred right outside the Green Zone wall. And they continue. And it's a daily event. Now what Americans should be aware of is that when they when they hear of these things is that now hang on aren't we occupying the capital of Baghdad don't we control it where our troops well they're behind those walls. They're sitting in armored vehicles and the streets immediately around the Green Zone are are being operated in with impunity by the insurgents huge swatches of the capital are now no go

areas. And that's 16 months into a an American the military occupation. They do not know what's going on and they're incapable of preventing attacks. That's why they take place every day. We're talking this morning with Jon Lee Anderson staff writer for The New Yorker discussing his his new book The Fall of Baghdad. And we have several callers waiting and I wanted to just you know ask a couple of questions about the experience you witnessed. I mean there's so many great stories in the book I don't even know where to begin actually but the the issue that I want to ask you to talk about is when the Americans did arrive in Baghdad how they conducted themselves how they interacted with the Iraqi people in Baghdad and then the beginning of the looting and what was the response at that point by the American forces. Well the Americans arrived with very few men and I mean I watched them arrive in northern Baghdad where looting had begun

and these young men who'd been traveling all night in these armored personnel carriers suddenly emerged from their vehicles. I was watching. And the bleary eyed They didn't know where they were and they asked me where they were I told them and within minutes they were. Their first duties were to control the flow of traffic. The only traffic on the road were hundreds and soon it was thousands of looters emerging from the buildings that they were plundering on the Avenue in front of us. But and within within a few hours those buildings were on fire. There were gun fights taking place. By the next day the looting had spread to right down to downtown Baghdad. The soldiers appeared to be incapable of stopping the looting and clearly had no orders to. In the beginning in the first few hours it was there was this air of sort of happiness you know happy looters. The people were saying Bush good Saddam bad and and these young

soldiers and Marines didn't know any better and assumed that this was just they were just attacking the institutions and Saddam's power. But there was clearly different things going on I watched as an American a special American unit came and protected the oil ministry set up an ambush just as the first looters were beginning to loot that building and carry out the sofas from the foyer. But they did not protect the buildings on either side which included the trade in the Commerce Ministry the warehouse of the Olympic Committee the Education Ministry all of which were absolutely plundered and then burned. And increasingly as the days went on It was clear that the that the plundering was with a large scale that was almost industrial looting going on and some of it was sabotage and appeared to be by members of the old regime who groups of them were still fighting in different parts of the city. On the second day after the fall of Baghdad I realized that the hospitals were being looted as well and the Americans had not offered any protection to these.

I visited I happened to visit one where I had a friend working. It was the only hospital remaining in Baghdad with the foyer it was full of dead and wounded people. And my friend the doctor emerged from the emergency room where he'd been working 36 hours straight all bloody and begged me to bring Marines to guard the hospital. I did so I managed to find the commander of the Marines. He was unaware that the hospitals were being looted. I could I could see this from. It's expression he was surprised we got a map out of the city and he did not know where the hospital district was. And eventually I led a group of Marines to this hospital which was being surrounded by looters. They were armed there was gun fights going on and they did protect that hospital. And later on I spoke with the military men about that period because I think it was key to the loss of the aura of invincibility this American military power that have been established during the bombing of Baghdad.

The Iraqi people were prepared to do what the Americans wanted. They went from applauding the troops to cursing them within hours of their arrival because they they allowed the city to be pillaged and as well as many of their Howlett institutions like the National Museum the National Library with sacred old texts and so on. And they knew that the people who wanted to fight the Americans were plundering Parsifal's right under their noses. So the Americans not only lost the respect of the many Iraqis who were prepared to go along passively with their occupation but also the people who were being displaced by the Americans lost their fear of them because they realized that they were being. That the Americans were operating without any intelligence. If they could rob an armory and get away with it the Americans didn't know about it but the Americans really didn't know what they were doing. And that's exactly what happened. So it was it was a very it was.

I hadn't no real expectation of anything other than to kind of come to the collapse of the regime once it was clear that there was not going to be a prolonged siege of Baghdad which was the first thing that we all believed was going to happen because the Saddam's plan. You thought it was going to be very bloody and best that it was very strange how everything melted away. And in retrospect it seems clear that there was some kind of plan not to stand and fight but to melt away back at the Americans. The seaman seemingly walked into this as much as you know in the old cowboy movies. A group of cavalry guys go into a canyon and get ambushed by Indians. It was it was very a very nice thing to do. And they they mishandled things immediately. If they had established a curfew very quickly and secured the city I think things could have been different. And there was a series of other judgments made along the way that that fueled this.

But this is not a war that was inevitable. There would have been problems. Yes it was. It's at times as a result of bad political decisions and serious errors of judgment made along the way. It did not have to happen this way with some of the calls and talk with lets talk with them another Indiana listener next line number four. Good morning. I do appreciate your comments on what a terrible dictator that Saddam is a lot of time in our current media and press we kind of get the impression that he really wasn't that bad a guy and I appreciate you talking about how he is one of the worst dictators that has ever been alive. And I also am very upset with your characterization of our military as being a bunch of idiots walking into Baghdad and talking about how you yourself thought there'd be a big bloody fight and then you come out and say well they were stupid they were idiots. They and I will stand with this. OK OK OK.

I didn't I never called anybody an idiot. I was going to call him stupid I said that and nor have I nor have I in any way. I don't I don't think I've made any statements of disrespect for the soldiers on the ground these are mostly young men they had fought long and hard. They had every expectation of being greeted as liberators in Iraq and it was the result of political judgments and political decisions made well above them that they were forced to implement or not to implement as the case may be that that brought about this situation. I have every respect for the actual soldiers on the ground. My criticism is is directed at people above and beyond the soldiers. So please get that straight. Ok hope it gets to the caller's point there will go next to a champagne list or on line number one. Good morning Ylem. Yes yes getting back to the Iran Iraq. In view of the American occupation.

Very little is being said today about the really quite open praise of Empire by the neo cons. Prior to the war and immediately afterward not thinking about believe his name was Friedman article in The Atlantic which was very open. Exposition in favor of elites. Well the second century Roman Empire and the 18th century British. You know empire. And then there were various writings and pronouncements by Richard Perle who to a lesser extent Wolfowitz. How can they have any expectation that we're going to leave. Well yes of course this is part of the problem and not only did I mean we that's what I was saying I think it's anything but an act of cool air to announce the sort of ambitions if if indeed you were hoping to carry them out. Because I remember having in several

conversations in Iran a month before the war in which. People very close to the ruling. Clergy there so said to me and I had I looked through the notes again and again because they were so prescient this said look you your leaders seem to be what he say seems to be their minds seem to be taken over by Armageddon. They are going to make this war in Iraq. It is not in our interest as a nation. But since its going to happen it is in our interest to make sure that you become bogged down there. We did not want you coming here. This may well be you know the worst decision the Americans could possibly make. And they said you know we hope that Iraq we do not like Saddam would like to see him but we did not want to see him next door because they had said they wanted them here. So you know we will do our best to see that you brought down

this. Now what that has translated into I don't know but you know they I felt as though I was sitting with a very savvy poker players and standing in for the man who had already showed them his hand. It was they were almost licking their chops at the prospect of the Americans blundering in a up do. But indeed I think we will have a reckoning. This is the day to day kids be open. The loss of the variables that seem to think or to some people's prime in policymaking circles the following September 11. Try to get it back in Iraq even for those Iraqis who are not maybe inclined to you know sort of a political reading and in that sense you know what's on the minds of Paul Wolfowitz for example the American

pretext for invading Iraq was to disarm Saddam of weapons of mass destruction but of course none have been found I guess I'm wondering how do how do ordinary Iraqis feel about that does that play into their analysis of the you know the situation. The fact I mean you know politicians usually drag that out as as the first stone in their quiver you know. Given about the perfidy of the Americans but but in fact for the average Iraqis it's a moot point. They let you know that they're dealing with a fait accompli. I mean the average Iraqi would be happy that the Americans that sort things out and leave the service possible. You know they had every expectation of a new life they were many many Iraqis were even vastest were fed up with Saddam and hoping that that that you know Iraq would become like Dallas or something. They say there was a hard core

Of course that were going to be displaced and were going to fight but that hard core became much larger with some of the judgments made afterwards to sweepingly than all benefits from public life. To disband the entire army you know one in every four Iraqis had a family member in the armed forces depended on that salary most of them were fairly a political as well as many baths. They were civil servants they ran the country. So the for the average Iraqis the question whether or not there was weapons of mass destruction isn't really a moot point. They're quite cynical about you know most Iraqis believe that America is there for their oil and you can sit down and have quite reasonable conversations and they'll say look it's fine Americans here because they're all OK. You take 70 percent but leave us with 30. Saddam didn't leave us with any. But if America will take 70 percent of our oil but just let

30 percent or 10 percent stay here in Iraq that will be good enough for us. People say things like that in sort of good humor and cynical good humor. They don't understand the way it all works they don't understand that America wants to buy oil. They think they think we are there simply stealing it. But even that they're prepared to live with as long as there's peace and they can their families can be safe and their children can be educated and they can have a piece of the action. It's it's we done a very bad public relations job in terms of explaining to Iraq to the various levels what our true intentions are and the and the original sin the lies precisely in the end that the Imperial discourse which began emanating out of Washington the war you're right. We have another call to talk with let's do that. Listener in Rantoul number one. Good more. Good morning. I think there's two things I mean first off the battle plans for Gulf War

1 and then battle plans for Gulf War 2 which are Operation Blue Devil. I mean that you know that started back in the mid 90s. The other thing that I think we're forgetting and what has a direct impact is the horrendous casualty count as a result of the sanctions Gulf War one where we destroyed all the chemical biological agents and then it continued operations to this day. And just my own conversation with the Iraqis and the leaders. That's one of the major things that has an impact on looking at what the U.S. intentions are and I was just going with the guest thoughts are on that. Are you speaking about the depleted uranium that kind of thing. Well we've got the depleted uranium but then we destroyed all the chemical biological missions in the sanctions so you know I mean the World Health Organization would look at that. Yes I don't have words of a quarter of a you know over a million and a half to two million as a result of the sanctions in the hospitals to this day. When you look at Ali Ali's reports out of Basra Yes just a disaster. Oh yeah I mean it's it really is I traveled between Gaza and the Kuwait border late 2010 to where the doctors had told me that

the leukemia rates were huge amongst the farmers and people living there and they were still living there producing the food because they had nowhere else to grow grow it at it was being sold in the markets. I visited the leukemia wards of the hospital which is you know the numbers of child infant looking at quintupled or something like that since the before and of course this became a very politically inflammatory and volatile issue and everybody loads their figures one way or another but it seems to be that there was good ground for this argument that depleted uranium had affected you know that is our art our armor piercing shells used inaugurated I guess in the Gulf War and used extensively in that war and left around the country had indeed caused cancer rates to rise and this was an issue that was not being addressed or being stymied. But the World Health Organization the U.N. and others talked about it with great concern and gave great creat

great credence to this possibility but it was being ignored by our political class. And then of course the sanctions. I mean I think it's quite beyond the effect on malnutrition or whatever I mean in fact Iraq was a country where there was a lot of food. Yes there were many poor people in fact people living miserably. But a lot of you know a lot of that was as a result of Saddam's rule rather than sanctions you. You noticed it when you went to the south Basra was miserable because Saddam never put any resources into the place but the markets had food. People did not starve. The money of the country had gone into war material rather than medicines and and and and schools. But the sanctions didn't help. Doctors complained to me about the inability to get for instance X-Treme. Because it was classified as nuclear medicine and because Saddam had wanted to build a nuclear bomb he wasn't allowed any radiology equipment so they were forced to smuggle

it in or not at all and people like me were brought to see the dying children in the hopes that it would help them win the propaganda war. So it's all very cynical. I think that for me the most dismaying thing about visiting said Saddam's Iraq and Iraq under sanctions was the was the stark realisation that 13 years after the Gulf War there was a new generation of Iraqis who had seen nothing. Probably the nine from our country. Nothing. We exercised no positive influence in Iraq whatsoever. The only thing we did was over fly the country and occasionally bomb radar installations and then occasionally civilians would die. And we gave the country back to Saddam to stir the pot against everything we were doing and really did not engage in the in the battle to win Iraqi's hearts and minds and then in March 2003 decided we would go to war with a country again and expect to be greeted as heroes and

liberators in a way of course that didn't happen. We have one caller I'll squeeze in real fast we only have a minute or two left. Listener champagne. Good morning. In reference to your Iraqi friend who said leave us 30 percent of the oil there may have been a bit of irony there he probably was aware of the overthrow of the message back in Iran. The British and Americans took 80 percent an unknown of 20 percent of the oil for the Iranians. Just a brief comment right. Well that's right there there. They base a great deal of their world view there. On the assumption that you know they are a prize a piece of booty to be raped and plundered. I mean their own pirates did it to them and they knew that the British had you know was Anglo person Oil Corporation long

after their occupation began that oil was one of their interests. And of course they're very aware that oil is money. I don't really know how the oil that it would you know the oil economy works but they noticed that the oil ministry was started well the rest of the ministries of Baghdad were allowed to be plundered and they are aware as most Americans are that if there's one part of the Iraqi economy that is working out be it with sabotage because of the oil is the oil the oil that's been being has been getting pumped regularly since the very early days. It was one of the worst parts of the Rockies. Iraq's infrastructure to be back on stream so you can understand why there's a certain amount of your points well taken. Well I'm sorry to say that we're at a time and we're going to have to leave it there we have barely scratched the surface of the stories in the book The Fall of Baghdad is the title The author has been our

guest Jon Lee Anderson a staff writer for The New Yorker so if you'd like to learn more in excellent way to go. And you can pick up that book in bookstores I'm sure it is published by the Penguin Press. Also I mention real briefly that since the Chicago is in our listening area Jon Lee Anderson will be in Chicago at the borders on Michigan Avenue on the 14th of October that's a week from this Thursday so you have a chance to meet him there as well. And to you John Lee Anderson thank you so much for talking with us. Thank you it's my pleasure.